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Belief in the power of sorcery, and in the real existence of sorcerers who are 
capable of causing illness, injury, death or other personal misfortune, are common 
amongst people from all walks of life in Papua New Guinea today. In response to 
such harm as is honestly believed to have been brought about by the malevolent 
actions of sorcerers, or apprehending that such harm is likely to occur, it is not 
unusual for those who regard themselves or their kindred as actual or intended 
victims of sorcery to respond, or to react pre-emptively, in the traditional manner, 
that is to say by killing the suspected sorcerer. Although the practice of harmful 
sorcery is a statutory offence in Papua New Guinea, accused sorcerers are rarely 
prosecuted, and no such prosecutions would appear to have been heard or decided 
by a superior court. At the same time, however, many persons who have 
dispatched a suspected sorcerer have been charged with, tried for, and convicted 
of conventional homicide offences. 
The legal system in Papua New Guinea is based on English common law, and 
the processes of judicial ratiocination in the superior courts tend to rely on the 
precedents and the reasoning articulated in the judgements of English and 
Australian courts. Thus, when confronted with a matter in which sorcery-related 
beliefs are determinatively involved, the courts in Papua New Guinea must 
address, in a very real and practical context, a range of issues centrally implicated 
in two ongoing and otherwise unrelated debates: viz., the socio-philosophical 
debate about the contours and content of 'rational', as opposed to 'irrational' 
beliefs, and the nature of the relationship between custom and law in societies, 
like Papua New Guinea, in which indigenous values, attitudes and beliefs, and the 
behaviours they engender, are assumed to be inconsistent with many of the 
fundamental premises upon which the rules and principles of the adopted common 
law are based. 
Using the idioms of sorcery and law-the existence of both of which 
constitute undeniable social facts of life in Papua New Guinea today-this thesis 
critically examines the intellectual and ideological foundations of the 
dichotomisation of law and custom and the contraposition of rational and 
irrational beliefs. The analysis of these issues leads to some tentative conclusions 
suggesting that (a) for the purposes of both a practical and theoretical 
jurisprudence, the legal traditions instantiated in Melanesian custom and the 
X 
common law are not nearly so inconsistent as most anthropologists and socio-
legal scholars would have us assume; (b) in reality, the effective operations of the 
common law system are not nearly so dependent upon conventional Western 
understandings of 'rational' thought and action as many social theorists and legal 
philosophers would have us believe; (c) in iterations natural to the cultures and 
societies in which they occur, a range of beliefs arguably no less 'irrational' than 
Melanesian sorcery beliefs can, and quite properly do, enter into the sound and 
sensible decision-making of Western common law courts; and (d) to the extent 
that the law is properly concerned with the behavioural and ideational parameters 
of a real world of social experience, there is no good reason, in law or in logic, 
why the social reality of sorcery-related beliefs should not be regarded by the 
courts of Papua New Guinea in much the same way they readily regard any other 
socially real and relevant facts. 
No ultimate recommendation is proffered as to the particular determinations to 
which such a modified conception of law and sorcery should necessarily lead, as 




LAW AND SORCERY IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
A Conceptual and Phenomenological Anamnesis 
Given Western society's emancipation from it, Western travellers, missionaries, 
administrators and even anthropologists have often selected this, the most 
bizarre and exotic aspect of native life, for a disproportionate share of 
attention. People's witch-beliefs are as often recorded for their sheer 
entertainment value as for their scientific interest. They seem to reward the 
romantic search by both writers and readers for fantasies that come true. 1 
The National Court at Waigani yesterday sentenced eight men to I 0 years 
jail each for the murder of a supposed sorcerer. The men pleaded guilty 
to killing Sauri lni on June 21, last year. The defendants. said they 
killed Ini because he was believed to have killed many people by sorcery in 
various villages including their own. Their claim was supported by two 
witnesses called by the defence. Judge Los found that both witnesses believed 
in sorcery and many people, like them, feared Ini. 2 
1. PROLOGUE 
Reporting on the 'administration of justice in connection with the natives' of 
British New Guinea in 1898, the first Chief Judicial Officer in the colony, the 
Honourable (later Sir) Francis Pratt Winter, was remarkably sanguine in his 
reflections on the development of inter-communal relations during the preceding 
decade. 3 In that time, Winter observed, there had been surprisingly few hostile 
confrontations involving indigenous Melanesians, on the one hand, and members 
1 M. Marwick, 'Introduction,' in Witchcraft and Sorcery: Selected Readings 2d ed 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1982), p. 15. 
z 'Killers of "Sorcerer" Jailed for I 0 Years. 'Post-Courier (3 April 1991 ), p. 16. 
3 Annual Report on British New Guinea 1897-1898, p. 69. 
2 
of the small community of colonial officials and other expatriates resident in the 
Possession, on the other. Many more instances of what he described as 'quarrels 
due to racial antagonist qualities' might well have been expected. The natives, 
after all, 'possess[ ed] ideas of their own on the subject of justice, which . 
differ[ ed] widely' from those of the Europeans with whom they had come into 
contact. 4 And in so far as these conceptual disparities were generally regarded as 
reflecting the kind of inter-cultural cleavages which, from a European perspective, 
were directly attributable to the plain and inherent differences separating savage 
and civilised society simpliciter, they were naturally assumed to preordain a 
continuing course of inter-racial conflict. In the event, the fact that they did not do 
so was, perhaps, quite remarkable indeed. 5 
Far more troublesome for those engaged in the processes of introducing and 
extending colonial rule in British New Guinea were conflicts involving the native 
inhabitants of the Possession inter se, in which conflicts the Administration 
considered itself bound, by right and by duty, to intervene. Here too, 'native 
notions of justice' were at sharp variance with those embraced by administrative 
authorities.6 But whereas natives 'might acknowledge that the Government was 
4 Ibid. 
5 Winter attributed the low level of inter-racial conflict to 'the slight influx of Europeans into 
the Possession for several years after its founding ... .' This circumstance, he suggested, 'enabled 
the Government to ... instil into the minds of the natives the belief that the white man had not 
come to their country for the purpose of ill-treating them.' Ibid. But as the number of Europeans 
residing more-or-less permanently in British New Guinea in 1898 was so small (certainly less than 
I ,000), it is arguable that there simply were not very many opportunities for such conflicts to arise 
more frequently than they did. See E. Utrecht, Papua New Guinea: An Australian Neo-Colony. 
Research Monograph No 6. (Sydney: Transnational Research Project, 1977), p. 4. 
For some discussion of the nature and incidence of such inter~racial violence as did occur in 
British New Guinea during this period, see H. Nelson, 'The Swinging Index: Capital Punishment 
and British and Australian Administrations in Papua and New Guinea, 1888-1945' (1978) 13 
Journal of Pacific History 130, at 130-!35; E.P. Wolfers, Race Relations and Colonial Rule in 
Papua New Guinea (Sydney: Australia and New Zealand Book Company, 1975), pp. 13-27. 
6 Annual Report on British New Guinea 1897-1898, p. 70. 
3 
entitled to punish a native for harming a European or other stranger,' they were not 
so readily inclined to accept its authority 'to punish one native for harming another 
native. '7 In consequence, whenever hostilities amongst the natives 
themselves were seen to threaten the preservation or advancement of colonial 
interests to such an extent as to warrant the interposition of administrative force, 
the ramifications of that kind of intervention were likely to be more problematic, 
and potentially more violent, for all concerned. s 
It was, therefore, to disputes involving the natives exclusively, and to which 
colonial authorities assumed some sort of militant response was incumbent upon 
them, that Winter drew especial attention in his decennial report. As it happened, 
conflicts deriving from native beliefs in sorcery were singularly outstanding 
amongst these distinctively intra-communal disputes; and in this particular 
respect, the Chief Judicial Officer's comments were tempered with a marked 
sobriety: 
Sorcery, or to speak more accurately, the belief in sorcery, is a 
prolific source of murder. At times it leads to the sorcerer, or 
reputed sorcerer, being killed, as an enemy to his own people. 
Or a person of one tribe will die of sickness. His tribe, not 
being able to place his death to the account of any of its own 
members, comes to the conclusion that the malevolence of 
some neighbouring tribe led the latter to kill the deceased by 
sorcery.9 
Even for those who had 'been for a long while in the Possession,' Winter 
opined, it would be difficult 'to thoroughly realise how widely spread and how 
7 Ibid. 
8 See, Annual Report on British New Guinea, /892-1893, p. 46; and see also Wolfers, Race 
Relations and Colonial Rule in Papua New Guinea, p. 16. 
9 Annual Report on British New Guinea, /897-1898, p. 70. 
4 
deeply seated this belief in sorcery is, and the mischief and unhappiness that it 
causes.'to But whilst these observations might be supposed only to have 
confirmed what was, in fact, already well known to the handful of Europeans who, 
by that time, were certain to have become acquainted with some of the harsher 
realities of Melanesian life, n there can be little doubt that they could have been 
substantiated by what countless New Guineans knew and understood only too 
well: to the natives of New Guinea, sorcery posed an ever-present and particularly 
insidious threat, as much to the welfare and stability of the larger community as to 
1o Ibid. 
ll This is not to say that the nuances of those realities were necessarily well understood in 
every case. Thus, for example, Joyce has suggested tha~ although he was most certainly familiar 
with the problems of violence to which native sorcery beliefs and practices so regularly gave rise, 
Sir William MacGregor (the Administrator of British New Guinea under whom Winter was 
serving at the time the Memorandum quoted from above was submitted), failed to develop an 
adequate appreciation of 'the important functions of sorcery in [the] native culture' of the people 
he was responsible for governing). R.B. Joyce, Sir William MacGregor (Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press, 1971 ), pp. 186-187. But cf. idem, 'William MacGregor: The Role of the 
Individual,' in The History of Melanesian, Second Waigani Seminar (Canberra and Port Moresby: 
Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University and University of Papua and 
New Guinea, 1971), p. 44 n. 22; and see also Wolfers, Race Relations and Colonial Rule, pp. 21-
~2 
By the same token, Nikolai Nikolaevich Mikloucho-Maclay, the Russian naturalist and proto-
ethnographer who lived intimately amongst villagers of the Astrolabe Bay coast of what was to 
become German New Guinea for a period of about three years between 1871 and 1883, displayed 
a relatively sophisticated knowledge and understanding of the depth of local convictions 
respecting sorcery beliefs and the importance of sorcery-related practices in the lives of the 
people. See Mikloucho-Maclay: New Guinea Diaries, 1871-1883, trans. C.L. Sentinella (Madang: 
Kristen Pres, 1975), pp. 82-83, 175, 181, 217, 253, 259, 279-284, 331, 336; F.S. Greenop, Who 
Travels Alone (Sydney: K.G. Murray, 1944); N. Putilov, Nikolai Miklouho-Mac/ay: Traveller, 
Scientist and Humanist (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1982). Many early missionary accounts of 
Melanesian culture and social life also demonstrated a detailed, if intolerant, familiarity with 
indigenous sorcery, witchcraft and magical beliefs, and the significance of those beliefs in the 
construction of Melanesian understandings and experiences of reality. See, e.g., R.H. Codrington, 
The Melanesians: Studies in their Anthropology and Folk-Lore (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1881), 
pp. 191-194; D. Langmore, Tamale-A King: James Chalmers in New Guinea I877-I90I 
(Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1974), pp. 93-94. For a succinct assessment of the attitudes 
of European missionaries towards sorcery beliefs and practices in New Guinea seeS. W. Reed, The 
Making of Modern New Guinea (Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1943), p. 112. 
A more general analysis of missionary attitudes towards these beliefs and practices throughout the 
Pacific Islands is provided in A.A. Koskinen, Missionary Influence as a Political Factor in the 
Pacific Islands (Helsinki: University of Helsinki, 1953). 
5 
individual existence itself. All manner of personal misfortune or natural 
catastrophe might be attributed to its practice, 12 and its practitioners were widely 
regarded as a scourge whose isolation or riddance was actively sought.l3 
Pernicious cycles of suspicion, accusation, recrimination and violent retaliation 
were thus played out inexorably, only to begin again when next a fatal illness 
befell a clansman in his prime, a child was stillborn, a garden crop failed for want 
of rain, or unseasonable storms brought about destructive flooding.l 4 
In the view of those colonial officials who, like Winter, had opportunity to 
witness its repercussions at firsthand, sorcery could quite reasonably be regarded 
as a pervasive and perennial 'curse of native life.'l5 But if the existence of sorcery 
in the context of traditional Melanesian society was 'universally deplored,'l6 its 
practice, and the responsive violence that practice commonly engendered, could 
nonetheless be said to entertain a considerable measure oftraditionallegitimacy.l7 
12 Annual Report on British New Guinea, 1902-1903, p. 25. 
13 Indeed, the dispatch of a sorcerer would as likely be met with praise as condonation, 
regardless of whether the method whereby this was achieved were itself to involve resort to acts of 
lethal counter-sorcery or some more conventional form of equally potent retribution. See A. 
Marat, 'The Official Recognition of Customary Responses to Homicide in Papua New Guinea' 
(PhD Thesis, University of Oxford, 1987), p. 127; L. Steadman, 'Cannibal Witches in the Hewa' 
(1975) 46(2) Oceania 114. 
14 Annual Report on British New Guinea, 1902-1903, p. 25. 
15 Ibid The words are actually those of A.M. Campbell, who had been appointed Resident 
Magistrate for the South-Eastern Division of British New Guinea in 1896 after having spent 
several years in the colonial service in Fiji and Tonga. See Joyce, Sir William MacGregor, pp. 
150,410-411 n. 19. For similar expressions see also J.H.P. Murray, Papua or British New Guinea 
(London: P.S. King & Son, 1912), pp. 202-203; C.A.W. Monckton, Some Experiences of a New 
Guinea Magistrate (London: John Lane, 1921), pp. 92, 113, 120-128. 
16 A. Forge, 'Prestige, Influence and Sorcery: A New Guinea Example' in Witchcraft 
Confessions and Accusations, ed. M. Douglas (London: Tavistock Publications, 1970), p. 257. 
17 See e.g. A. Chowning, 'Sorcery and the Social Order in Kove'; R. Bowden, 'Sorcery, Illness 
and Social Control in Kwoma Society' in Sorcerer and Witch in Melanesia, ed. M. Stephen 
(Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1987), pp. 149-182, 183-208. Robert Tonkinson has made 
similar observations regarding the 1iegitimaci of sorcery as an institution of social control in 
6 
Amongst the natives of New Guinea. the specific characterisation of sorcery-
related conduct as good or evil, as an egregious 'crime' of aggression or an invited 
and wholly justifiable 'punishment' for some prior wrongdoing, 18 was effectively 
dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the individuals and groups 
immediately involved.l9 As a practical matter the general recognition that sorcery 
was 'bad' was 'irrelevant to politicallife.'20 
At the same time, and largely on account of its status as a legitimate modality 
traditional Ni-Vanuatu society.' Sorcery and Social Change in Southeast Ambrym, Vanuatu' 
(1981) 8 Social AnalysiS 77 at 79. 
As it is used here, the term 'legitimacy' refers to the existence of a popular foundation of 
validity or consensual propriety, in respect of institutionalised social action, 'external to and 
independent of the mere assertion or opinion of the claimant. .. .' Thus, '[i]f a people holds the 
belief that existing institutions are "appropriate" or "morally proper" then those institutions are 
legitimate.' J.H. Schaar, 'Legitimacy in the Modern State' in Legitimacy and the State, ed. W. 
Connolly (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 108. This usage is consistent, though not 
necessarily synonymous, with Weber's concept of legitimacy. SeeM. Weber, The Theory of Social 
and Economic Organisation, trans. A.M. Henderson and T. Parsons (New York: The Free Press, 
1947), pp. 124-132. In a Melanesian context, for reasons that will be explored in subsequent 
chapters, the concepts of 'legitimacy' and 'legality' should not be assumed to be coterminous. See 
M. Strathern, 'Legality or Legitimacy: Hageners' Perception of the Judicial System' (1971) 1(2) 
Melanesian Law Journal 5-27 
18 See P.G. Sack, 'Crime or Punishment: The Role of the Sorcerer in Traditional Tolai Law 
(New Britain)' (1974) 69 Anthropos 40 l-408. 
19 'What is approved as war sorcery from one perspective may ... be regarded as unjustifiable 
homicide by another community.' M. Stephen, 'Introduction' in Sorcerer and Witch in Melanesia 
(Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1987), p. 9. See also M.G. Marwick, 'The Study of 
Witchcraft' in The Craft of Social Anthropology, ed. A.L. Epstein (London: Tavistock 
Publications, 1967), p. 233. 
zo Forge, 'Prestige, Influence and Sorcery,' p. 258. In his now classic legal ethnography of 
Trobriand society, Crime and Custom in Savage Society (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd, 
1926), Bronislaw Malinowski placed especial emphasis on this notion of an implicit legitimacy in 
the practice of sorcery, observing (at p. 93): 
Sorcery, in fine, is neither exclusively a method of 
administering justice, nor a form of criminal practice. It can be 
used both ways, though it is never employed in direct 
opposition to law .... 
Formulary constructs of Melanesian perspectives on sorcery beliefs and practices are 
examined in Chapter Four. 
7 
in traditional Melanesian socio-political relations, sorcery represented a pointed 
challenge to the inchoate hegemony of the colonial state and a palpable threat to 
the incipient colonial legal order. The salient dimensions of that challenge, and 
the fundamental nature of that threat, may be described essentially in terms of 
power-in the exercise of which Melanesian sorcery is said to be 'inescapably 
enmeshed,'21 and in the consolidation of which the colonial state recognised one 
of its most immediate and enduring priorities. 22 
More so, perhaps, than elsewhere in the imperial domains of the insular 
Pacific, the pursuit of administrative colonialism in New Guinea relied upon the 
effective monopolisation of those forms of power required to exercise a sufficient 
measure of control over the indigenous inhabitants of the areas into which the 
government gradually moved to establish its authority.23 Any advancement of the 
21 Thus, as Zelenietz argues: 
If we see power as a broad phenomenon, as the ability to 
control or influence the actions of one's self and others, then 
the use of sorcery and witchcraft become expressions of this 
ability to control, or attempt to control, both one's own fate 
and the destiny of other individuals and groups. 
'Sorcery and Social Change: An Introduction,' p. 5. See generally, M. Stephen, 'Contrasting 
Images of Power' in Sorcerer and Witch in Melanesia, pp. 249-304. 
22 See P. Fitzpatrick, Law and State in Papua New Guinea (London: Academic Press, 1980), 
pp. 65-69. See also J. Starr and J.F. Collier, 'Introduction: Dilogues in Legal Anthropology' in 
History and Power in the Study of Law: New Directions in Legal Anthropology (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 1-28; S.E. Merry, 'Law and Colonialism' (1991) 
25( 4) Law & Society Review 890-922. 
23 The expression 'administrative colonialism' is used here synonymously with 'colonial rule', 
and narrowly refers to 'the officially-sanctioned policies and practices of ... colonial governments 
and administrations,' exclusive of 'the broader complex of economic, political, religious and 
[other] social forces .. .' by which Europeans also endeavoured, with variable results, to direct and 
control the lives of Melanesians. See E. Wolfers, 'For the First "Generation ... with No Personal 
Recollection of Australian Rule": Reflections on the Impact of Colonial Rule in Papua New 
Guinea' in Papua New Guinea: A Century ofColoniallmpact, 1884-1984, ed. Sione Latukefu 
(Port Moresby: National Research Institute and the University of Papua New Guinea, 1989), p. 
417. See also J.D. Legge, Australian Colonial Policy: A Survey of Native Admimstration and 
European Development in Papua (Sydney: Angus Robertson, 1956); Wolfers, Race Relations and 
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colonial enterprise was implicitly dependent upon 'a reasonable degree of peace 
and good order,'24 the ultimate achievement of which was assumed to follow on 
only from the application or threat of superior force. 25 Hence, whatever 
importance might be attached to other items on the colonial agenda (and however 
one may be inclined to construe the underlying motives to which that larger 
agenda was meant to give expression), a pressing preliminary objective for New 
Guinea's colonial administrators was the 'pacification' of the native population. 26 
Colonial Rule in Papua New Guinea, p. 16. For more general considerations, see I. C. Campbell, A 
History of the Pacific Islands (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), pp. 161-162; 
Merry, 'Law and Colonialism,' pp. 894-895. 
'' J. Boutilier, 'Papua New Guinea's Colonial Century: Reflections on Imperialism, 
Accommodation, and Historical Consciousness' in History and Ethnohistory in Papua New 
Guinea, Oceania Monograph No. 28, ed. D. Gewertz and E. Schieffelin (Sydney: University of 
Sydney, 1985), p. 15. 
25 Colonialism in New Guinea, as elsewhere, was essentially a coercive process, initiated and 
advanced largely through the application or threat of force. See Fitzpatrick, Law and State in 
Papua New Guinea, pp. 66-67; P.J. Hempenstall, Pacific Islanders under German Rule: A Study I 
in the Meaning of Colonial Resistance (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1978), p. 
201; Merry, 'Law and Colonialism,' p. 895. Thus, as MacGregor candidly explained in 1888: 
There is only one thing they [the natives of New Guinea] 
respect, that is force. They have the most profound respect for 
that .... We had first to found our Government stations, and 
we have been using each station as a centre from which our 
authority is gradually radiating .... [W]hen we go into a new 
district we almost invariably have to fight the principal 
fighting tribe of the district. We never fight with them at all if 
we can possibly avoid it until we are in apposition to make it a 
final and decisive move. 
Quoted in I. Downs, The Australian Trusteeship, Papua New Guinea, 1945-75 (Canberra: AGPS, 
1980), p. 90. See also Campbell, A History of the Pacific Islands, p. 162. But cf. Wolfers, Race 
Relations and Colonial Rule in Papua New Guinea, p. 16, who maintains that, in practice, 
MacGregor may have been rather more reluctant to employ force than these remarks seem to 
suggest. 
26 As the term is used here, 'pacification' refers to: 
a critical period in the encapsulation of a native people in 
which a [native] group's use of armed force is constrained to 
comply with the actual or presumed demands of an 
encapsulating power. 
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Then, and only then, might traditional mechanisms of social control begin 
gradually to be supplanted by a new set of introduced institutions and processes in 
which the authority of the colonial regime could be vested on legitimately 
consensual (rather than nakedly coercive) bases,27 and the long-term viability of 
the colonial venture thereby made more secure.28 
From the outset, however, many of the prevalent socio-cultural predilections 
of indigenous Melanesians-polygyny, warfare, cannibalism, infanticide, adultery 
and head-hunting, as well as witchcraft, sorcery and magic--confronted New 
Guinea's administrative officials with a range of behaviours and underlying 
systems of belief that were, at once, 'incomprehensible, dangerous or repugnant to 
the European mind' and fundamentally inimical to the political, economic and 
ideological designs of the colonial project.29 In response, New Guinea's British 
administrators (like their Australian successors and German counterparts) 
intensified an already firm commitment 'to changing a number of aspects of 
M. Rodman, 'Introduction' in The Pacification of Melanesia, ASAO Monograph No. 7, ed. M. 
Rodman and M. Cooper (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1979), p. 1. See generally 
W.P. Morrell, Britain in the Pacific Islands (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960); W.D. Mcintyre, The 
Imperial Frontier in the Tropics, 1865-75: A Study of British Colonial Policy in West Africa, 
Malaya and the South Pacific in the Age of Gladstone and Disraeli (London: Macmilan and 
Company Ltd, 1967); C.H. Grattan, The Southwest Pacific to 1900: A Modern History (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1963); C.C. Eldridge, England's Mission: The Imperial Idea 
in the Age of Gladstone and Disraeli, 1868-1880 (Chapel Hill: University ofNotth Carolina Press, 
1973); W.D. Mcintyre, Colonies into Commonwealth (New York: Walker and Company, 1966). 
27 See P. Lawrence, 'The State Versus Stateless Societies in Papua and New Guinea', m 
Fashion of Law in New Guinea, ed. B.J. Brown (Sydney: Butterworths, 1969), p. 34. 
28 See M. Rodman, 'Introduction' in Rodman and Cooper, The Pacification of Melanesia, pp. 
2-7. The broad objectives and processes of pacification under British administration were 
essentially the same under the Australians in Papua and, later, in the former German Territory of 
New Guinea. See G.W.L. Townsend, 'The Administration of the Mandated Territory of New 
Guinea' (1933) 82(5) Geographical Journal 424-434; R.J. Gordon and M.J. Meggitt, Law and 
Order in the New Guinea Highlands: Encounters with Enga (Hanover, NH: University Press of 
New England, 1985), pp. 162-169. 
29 Boutilier, 'Papua New Guinea's Colonial Century,' p. 15. 
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[native]life,' with a view to the reconstruction of traditional Melanesian values, 
attitudes, beliefs and conduct in accordance with Western-that is to say, Anglo-
Australian-models. 30 
The realisation of this grand transformational plan was ultimately to prove 
elusive on many fronts, however; and in two significant respects, sorcery-related 
beliefs and practices in particular operated to frustrate this substitutive effort, 
effectively militating against the successful exercise of raw colonial power, and 
undermining the ideological basis upon which claims to the legitimacy of 
introduced colonial authority might be developed. Firstly, as said, sorcery was 
early identified as the direct or indirect cause of a good deal of trouble amongst 
and between natives and, therefore, as a particularly problematic impediment to 
the processes of pacification. 3! As a practical matter, one obvious solution to the 
administrative problems sorcery engendered was simply to root out those persons 
whom government officials had reason to believe were most immediately 
responsible and bring them to book. Thus, under the authority of the Native 
Board Ordinance of 1889,32 an administrative regulation was promulgated in 
1893 whereby, amongst other things, both the practice and the pretence to practice 
of sorcery were made 'forbidden acts' for which a native might be imprisoned for 
up to three months upon a finding of guilt by a European Magistrate.33 But the 
3o Ibid. 
31 See Annual Report on British New Guinea, 1892 to 1893, p. 46; Annual Report on British 
New Guinea, 1895 to 1896, p. 66. 
32 No. IX of 1889. 
33 Native Regulation Board, Regulation No. ll of 1893, Supplement to the British New Guinea 
Government Gazette, val. VI, no. ll (9 November 1893). According to the original Minutes of the 
Native Regulation Board, British New Guinea, the regulation was actually approved and passed on 
16 December 1893. (PNG National Archives/Box No. G-38). Native magistrates, for the 
appointment of whom provision was made in the principal Ordinance, were authorised to imprison 
II 
depth and pervasiveness of native beliefs in the power of sorcery, along with the 
sheer prevalence of its practice, consistently stymied administrative attempts to 
rein in suspected or even self-confessed sorcerers. 34 In the face of these inherent 
and seemingly insurmountable difficulties, direct efforts to suppress the practice 
of sorcery by forcibly subduing its practitioners invariably miscarried. 35 
Secondly, beyond the practical difficulties associated with gathering 'reliable 
evidence or proof against individual sorcerers36 and the daunting logistical 
problems presented by their profusion, the prevalence of sorcery-related beliefs 
and practices also operated to impugn the fundamental ideological bases of 
colonial supremacy (and hence, the prepotency of colonial law) by challenging the 
epistemological, ontological and cosmological underpinnings of Western culture 
and society. For except in so far as it was seen to exercise a powerful and 
a convicted person for a period of up to three days. Under the British, however, no indigenous 
magistrates were so appointed; and as Wolfers notes: 
after 1909, when the Australian administration promulgated a 
completely new Native Regulation Ordinance, this specific 
proviso and official faith in its short term applicability, both 
disappeared. [Wolfers, Race Relations and Colonial Rule, p. 
18] 
34 Annual Report on British New Guinea, 1892 to 1893, p. 46. 
35 Ten years after the anti-sorcery regulation had been promulgated, one Resident Magistrate 
lamented: 
[T]here is nearly always a difficulty in sheeting home a charge 
... owing to the extreme reluctance of many natives to give 
evidence of information against the most powerful of his class . 
. . . The native way of looking at this matter ... is that if he 
denounces a sorcerer and the sorcerer is sent to gaol when he 
returns home he will, in revenge, bewitch the informant and 
cause him his due. 
Annual Report on British New Guinea, 1902 to 1903, p. 25. 
as Annual Report on Papua, 1906-1907, p. 54. 
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dynamic 'effect by suggestion' upon the lives of the natives,37 to the minds of New 
Guinea's Anglo-Australian administrators, sorcery was phenomenologically irreal 
and conceptually irrational. From the administrator's perspective, native beliefs in 
sorcery were the very stuff of primitive superstition-fantastical, albeit widely and 
sincerely entertained. And however much they 'might have been expected in a 
people . . . in the early barbaric stage [of development],'38 such beliefs were 
invariably regarded as aberrant and absurd. The disruptive practices of native 
sorcerers were generally characterised in similar terms, although the active 
practice of sorcery (as opposed to mere ideation) tended to be portrayed by 
colonial officials as a patently manipulative and particularly insidious form of 
humbugery. 39 
Sorcery thus confronted New Guinea's colonial administrators with an 
operational dilemma and an epistemological paradox, both of which were 
pregnant with serious implications for the theory, practice and the ideology of 
colonial law: 
On the one hand, [administrators] recognized the importance 
of sorcery and witchcraft as systems of beliefs and actions in 
indigenous cultures. On the other hand, their own upbringing 
in cultures which stressed scientific empiricism did not allow 
the administrators to accept the validity of native beliefs. Thus 
they faced the challenge of saying that sorcery and witchcraft 
37 H. Murray, Papua of Today, or An Australian Colony in the Making (London: P.S. King & 
Son, Ltd, 1925), p. 65. 
38 Annual Report on British New Guinea, 1897 to 1898, p. 69. 
39 Murray, Papua of Today, pp. 65-70; R.T. Gore, Justice Versus Sorcery (Brisbane: The 
Jacaranda Press, 1965), pp. 109-110. For a contemporary (circa 1926) and moderately critical 
assessment of this perspective in an African context, see C. C. Roberts, 'Witchcraft and Colonial 
Legislation' (1935) 8(4) Africa 488-493. 
did not exist, and yet writing laws that would make these non-
existent phenomena illegai<O 
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It was obvious enough to the colonial authorities that the regnant powers of 
sorcery and sorcerers amongst the natives of New Guinea would eventually have 
to be suppressed, and ultimately supplanted, by the introduced forces of Western 
rationality and Anglo-Australian law.41 Far less certain were answers to the 
questions of precisely how that might be accomplished, how long it would take 
and what, in the interim, the most prudent and effective measures for dealing with 
the disruptive and often disastrous consequences of sorcery beliefs and practices 
would prove to be. 42 
At all events, throughout the late-nineteenth century and well into the 
twentieth, those responsible for the 'administration of justice in connection with 
the natives'43 of New Guinea were constantly, and often dramatically, reminded 
that sorcery-'the belief, and those practices associated with the belief, that one 
human being is capable of harming another by magical or supernatural 
means'44__played a determinative role in many, perhaps most, instances of 
40 M. Zelenietz, 'Sorcery and Social Change: An Introduction' ( 1981) 8 Social Analysis 3 at 
12. 
41 See Murray, Papua of Today, p. 225. 
42 See Wolfers, Race Relations and Colonial Rule in Papua New Guinea, pp. 21-22; D. 
Weisbrot, 'Integration of Laws in Papua New Guinea: Custom and the Criminal Law in Conflict' in 
Law and Social Change in Papua New Guinea, ed. D. Weisbrot, A. Paliwala and A. Sawyerr 
(Sydney: Butterworths, 1982), p. 64. 
43 Annual Report on British New Guinea. 1897 to 1898, p. 69. 
" M. Patterson, 'Sorcery and Witchcraft in Melanesia' (1974) 45 Oceania 132 (emphasis 
supplied). See also, L.B. Glick, 'Sorcery and Witchcraft', in Anthropology in Papua New Guinea: 
Readings from the Encyclopaedia of Papua and New Guinea (Carlton: Melbourne University 
Press, 1973 ), p. 182. As we shall see, not all forms and practices of sorcery or witchcraft in Papua 
New Guinea were (or are) necessarily considered by Papua New Guineans to be evil and 
destructive. 
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violence within, and between the members of, indigenous Melanesian 
communities. As such, sorcery was consistently seen to be a serious hindrance to 
the exercise of administrative authority, a major impediment to the extension of 
colonial law and a considerable obstacle to the overall success of the colonial 
enterprise.45 In terms of policy and practice alike, it proved to be 'a continual 
source of worry and anxiety to Govermnent Officers,'46 singularly constituting 
'one of the most difficult problems of the culture contact situation.'47 
What is more, and more to the point of the instant inquiry, the depth and 
dimensions of the 'problems' associated with sorcery in Papua New Guinea today 
are much the same as they were a century ago. 48 
45 See Annual Report on British New Guinea, I 893-I894, pp. vi-vii; R.T. Gore, Justice versus 
Sorcery (Brisbane: Jacaranda Press, 1965), p. 109; Wolfers, Race Relations and Colonial Rule in 
Papua New Guinea, pp. 21-22. 
46 Annual Report on British New Guinea, I902-I903, p. 25. See also D.M. Selby, 'Sorcery in 
New Guinea' (1945) 18 Australian LawJournal306. 
47 H.!. Hogbin, 'Sorcery and Administration' (1935) 6 Oceania 1. See also R.F. Fortune, 
'Administration and Sorcery' [Appendix Ill] in Sorcerers of Dobu: The Social Anthropology of the 
Dobu Islanders of the Western Pacific (1932 rpt; New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1963), pp. 288-
294. 
48 Personal communications, The Honourable Sir Buri Kidu, then Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court of Papua New Guinea (6 November 1990); Mr Gabriel Geuda, Office of the Public 
Solicitor, Rabaul, East New Britain Province (20 November 1990); Mr Stephen Madana, Office of 
the Public Prosecutor, Rabaul, East New Britain Province (I 6 November 1990); Ms Christine 
Bourke, formerly with the Office of the Public Prosecutor, Papua New Guinea (31 January 1991 ); 
Detective Chief Inspector Martin Powis, Criminal Investigations Division, Royal Papua New 
Guinea Constabulary, Rabaul, East New Britain Province ( 16 November 1990). 
2. SORCERY AS A PROBLEM OF LAW AND SOCIETY 
IN CONTEMPORARY PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
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From the most remote village enclaves in the Highlands to the isolated 
settlements scattered amongst the outer islands, from the secluded hamlets that dot 
the river banks in the jungled lowlands of the interior to the burgeoning towns and 
cosmopolitan urban centres of the coastal mainland, sorcery beliefs are rife today 
amongst the indigenous inhabitants of Papua New Guinea. 49 The mischief and 
unhappiness to which these beliefs continue to give rise are commensurately 
pervasive, and the occasions of conflict and violence which follow on from them 
still take a prolific toll in human life. 50 
Despite what, in many areas of the country, has involved a prolonged and 
seemingly thoroughgoing exposure to the supposedly countervailing influences of 
Christian missionisation, secular Western rationalism and a 'modem', scientifically 
constructed, materialist view of phenomenological reality, popular belief in the 
existence of sorcerers and witches, and in the potent efficacy of their malign 
practices, is at least as prevalent and deeply entrenched in modem Melanesian 
49 See, e.g., T. Marecek, 'The Death of Koliam: A Witchcraft Killing in a Changing 
Environment' (1979) 49 Oceania 221; P. Brown, Highland Peoples of New Guinea (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 212-213; N.D. Munn, 'Constructing Regional Worlds in 
Experience: Kula Exchange, Witchcraft and Gawan Local Events' ( 1990) 25 Man (N.S.) I; S. 
Nachman, 'Buai: Expressions of Sorcery in the Dance' (1981) 8 Social Analysis 42; LRC, Sorcery 
Among the East Sepiks, Occasional Paper No 10 (October 1978); LRC, Sorcery, Occasional Paper . 
No 4 (1977), pp. 1, 9-10; Cf. H. Norwood, 'Urbanization Dynamics and the Inflexible Law' in Law 
and Social Change in Papua New Guinea, ed. D. Weisbrot, A. Paliwala and A. Sawyerr (Sydney: 
Butterworths, 1982), pp. 281, 282 n. 6. 
50 See B. Knauft, Good Company and Violence: Sorcery and Social Action in a Lowland New 
Guinea Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 3; R Scaglion, ed., Customary 
Law in Papua New Guinea: A Melanesian View, Law Reform Commission Monograph No 2 (Port 
Moresby: Law Reform Commission of Papua New Guinea, 1983), pp. 14, 32, 93-94, 142-143, 
147, 157, 159; L. Steadman, 'Cannibal Witches in the Hewa' (1975) 46 Oceania 114 at 115. 
16 
culture and society as it was in the latter decades of the nineteenth century. 51 In a 
remarkable variety of forms, the endemic practice of sorcery is equally 
widespread, and it remains a major cause of 'fear, fighting, quarrels and killing' 
amongst a substantial portion of the population. 52 
Manifestly, sorcery beliefs are generative of a whole host of very real and 
serious problems of law and society in Papua New Guinea today.53 Findings to 
this effect are routinely supported by the scholarly products of focused 
ethnographic fieldwork54 and a veritable superabundance anecdotal evidence 
alike. 55 Individual case-studies readily corroborate the more generalised 
conclusions suggested by broad-based surveys assessing the prevalence and 
prepotency of sorcery beliefs throughout the country, 56 and both operate to lend a 
51 See Law Reform Commission of Papua New Guinea (hereinafter LRC), The Punishment 
for Willful Murder, Occasional PaperNo 1 (1976), pp. 6-7, 11. 
52 LRC, Sorcery, Occasional PaperNo 4 (1977), p. I. 
53 For the moment, the reality of sorcery beliefs and the actual existence of sorcerers is not 
centrally at issue here, since it is with the implications and ramifications of those beliefs-the 
reality of which is indisputable on any measure-with which we are primarily concerned. As 
Taussig suggests in a related context, the principal issue here, is not 'the truth of being but the 
social being of truth, not whether facts are real but what the politics of their [in this case, 
specifically legal] interpretation and representation are.' M. Taussig, Shamanism, Colonialism and 
the Wild Man: A Study in Terror and Healing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), p. 
xiii. 
54 See e.g., J. Barker, 'Encounters with Evil: Christianity and the Response to Sorcery among 
the Maisin Of Papua New Guinea' (1990) 61 Oceania 139; J. Hughes, 'Ancestors, Tricksters and 
Demons: An Examination of Chimbu Interaction with the Invisible World' (1988) 59 Oceania 59; 
K.J. Brison, 'Gossip, Innuendo and Sorcery: Village Politics among the Kwanga, East Sepik . 
Pro vice, Papua New Guinea (PhD Thesis, University of California at San Diego, 1988); B. Knauft, 
Good Company and Violence: Sorcery and Social Action in a Lowland New Guinea Society 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). 
55 Author's field notes and records of interview, October-December 1990; February-June 
1992. 
56 See, e.g., LRC, The Effects of Sorcery in Kilenge, West New Britain Province, Occasional 
Paper No 11 ( 1979); idem, Sorcery Among the East Sepiks, Occasional Paper No 10 ( 1978); idem, 
Sorcery Among the Tolai People of East New Britain, Occasional Paper No 8 (1978). 
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disturbing credibility to the graphic newspaper reports that seem to appear with an 
almost quotidian regularity.57 Ever more frequently nowadays, too, the 
implications and consequences of those beliefs are being canvassed in the 
pronouncements of the superior courts, 58 revealing what a judge of the Supreme 
Court described as 'a pattern of socially approved customary terror.'59 
Current research tends to indicate that measures of inter-personal violence and 
general social dislocation that can be attributed either directly to the active 
practice of sorcery, or indirectly to reactive (i.e. accusatory and retaliatory) forms 
of sorcery-related conduct, meet-and possibly exceed-the levels of such 
disturbances observed or otherwise noted during earlier colonial times.60 Indeed, 
with respect both to the frequency of its occurrence and the severity of its 
consequences, this kind of conduct now appears to be on the rise, 61 leading at least 
one anthropologist, who has devoted a substantial proportion of her career 
specifically to the study of sorcery in Papua New Guinea, ominously to conclude 
that 
57 See, e.g., 'Sorcerer Jailed for Six Months,' Post-Courier (25 June 1992); 'Police Check Out 
Reports of Witchcraft and Cannibalism,' Post-Courier (28 May 1992); FS Kolma, 'Spellbound: 
Sorcery in PNG,' Post-Courier (27 March 1992); L. Butut, "'Sorcery Killers" Jailed,' Post-Courier 
(4 March 1992); 'Police Flee Threats in Goilala Area,' Post-Courier (16 July 1990); 0. Philemon, 
'Five Men Who Killed a "Sorcerer" Get Jail,' Post-Courier (14 February 1989); L. Butut, 'Sorcery 
Assaults Alarm Magistrate,' Post-Courier (10 February 1989); J. Meava, 'Sorcery Suspect Axed to 
Death,' Post-Courier (2 August 1988). Occasionally pandering to popular tastes for sensationalism 
[see e.g. 'Sorcerers Get Spell in Jail for Murder,' The Canberra Times (5 March 1992); 
'Spellbound: Sorcery in PNG' Post-Courier (PNG) [Weekend Magazine] (27 March 1992). 
58 See, e.g. The State v Korohi Vagi & Ors Crim Nos 1046-53/90 (2 Aprill990). 
59 The State v Daniel Aigal and Gui Robert Kauna N 891 (12 July 1990) at 11 (per Brunton J, 
as he then was). 
GO See, e.g., M.J. Meggitt, 'Sorcery and Social Change among the Mae Enga of Papua New 
Guinea' (1981) 8 Social Analysis 28, 39; G. Westermark 'Sorcery and Economic Change in 
Agarabi' (1981) 8 Social Analysis 89, 99. 
61 See e.g. Westermark, 'Sorcery and Economic Change in Agarabi,' p. 94. 
[t]he phenomenon is so widespread and of such a magnitude, 
it may be compared with the reported efflorescence of 
witchcraft throughout Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries, 
and Africa in the 19th. 62 
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On the strength of these considerations alone, an examination of sorcery as a 
problem of law and society in Papua New Guinea today could easily be justified, 
both in terms of the instructive light it might shed on an important, idiosyncratic 
component of the country's larger, if sometimes exaggerated, problems of'law and 
order',63 and its potential elucidation of issues and problems of law, culture and 
society in other countries where patterns of 'supernatural' belief and associated 
behaviour can be seen to pose socio-legal difficulties of a similar character.64 But 
62 S. Lindenbaum, 'Images of the Sorcerer in Papua New Guinea' (1981) 8 Social Analysis 
119. 
63 Papua New Guinea's seemingly perennial crisis in 'law and order' is amongst the most 
prominently featured aspects of contemporary domestic socio-legal affairs. See S. Dorney, Papua 
New Guinea (Milsons Point, NSW: Random House Australia, 1990), p. 287. Yet the authors of 
what is generally considered to be the most comprehensive study of crime in Papua New Guinea 
to date, W. Clifford, L. Morauta and B. Stuart, Law and Order in Papua New Guinea [the Clifford 
Report] (Port Moresby: Institute of National Affairs, 1984), open their analysis with the following 
caveat (vol. I, p. 1): 
Available statistics on crime in Papua New Guinea are so 
inadequate that it is impossible to make informed statements 
about levels of and trends in crime. What figures are available 
do not support either the idea that crime is increasing or that 
crime is a more serious problem in Papua New Guinea than in 
other countries. 
For some cogent insights into how and why the 'law and order' situation in Papua New Guinea 
tends to be exaggerated in both scholarly and popular assessments, see S. Dinnen, 'Crime, Law 
and Order in Papua New Guinea' (1989) 17 Melanesian LawJournal10-25; Dorney, Papua New 
Guinea, pp. 286-318; Gordon and Meggitt, Law and Order in the New Guinea Highlands, pp. 1-7. 
For a succinct and balanced summary of the nature and dimensions of Papua New Guinea's 
contemporary 'law and order' problems, see M. Turner, Papua New Guinea: The Challenge of 
Independence (Ringwood, VIC: Penguin Books Australia Ltd, 1990), pp. 162-180. See generally 
L. Morauta, ed., Law and Order in a Changing Society, Political and Social Change Monograph 
No. 6 (Canberra: Department of Political and Social Change, Research School of Pacific Studies, 
Australian National University, 1986); D. Biles, ed., Crime in Papua New Guinea (Canberra: 
Australian Institute of Criminology, 1976). 
64 Socio-legal problems deriving from 'supernatural' beliefs involving sorcery and witchcraft 
commonly arise only in those societies in which a substantial proportion of the population actively 
entertain such beliefs, and the implications of these problems may therefore be regarded as 
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beyond the circwnscribed utility of exploring the ethnographic contours and 
content of sorcery as a distinctive feature of contemporary criminology in Papua 
New Guinea, and beyond the possibility of such an exploration providing 
serviceable empirical data and theoretical insights for valid, cross-cultural 
applications in connection with other societies in which analogous systems of 
'supernatural' belief hold sway, the instant analysis is principally concerned to 
investigate the nature and dynamics of sorcery in Papua New Guinea as importing 
a larger and more general problem for the law, for modern legal ratiocination and 
for the kind of jurisprudence which the common law tradition in Papua New 
Guinea-and in every socio-cultural environment in which that tradition 
operates-must be capable of bringing to bear upon a whole range of issues with 
which, as we shall see, the peculiar problems of sorcery are surprisingly 
isomorphic. 
extraordinary matters of arcane interest and commensurately limited significance. See e.g. P. 
lgbinovia, 'Ritual Murders in Nigeria' (1988) 32( I) International Journal of Offender Therapy and 
Comparative Criminology 37-43; K. Chukkol, 'Supernatural Beliefs and Criminal Law in Nigeria' 
(1983) 25(4) Journal of the Indian Law Institute 444-474; A. van Blerk, 'Sorcery and Crime' 
( 1978) II Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 330-336; P. Brietzke, 
'Witchcraft and Law in Malawi' (1972) 8 East African Law Journall-24; D. Clark, 'Witchcraft 
and Legal Pluralism: The Case of Celimo Miquirucarna' (1980) 15(4) Tulsa Law Journal679-698; 
G. Cavender, 'A Note on Voudou as an Alternative Mechanism for Addressing Legal Problems' 
(1988) 27 Journal of Legal Pluralism 17. As we shall see, however, the conceptual and 
ratiocinative problems which nominally 'supernatural' beliefs (and related conduct) pose for 
modem law and jurisprudence can-and more often than it might otherwise be thought, dQ-{)ccur 
in societies in which indigenous or immigrant minority groups maintain such beliefs: see e.g. B. 
Fisse, Howard's Criminal Law, 5th ed. (Sydney: The Law Book Company Ltd, 1990), pp. 90-91; 
Australian Law Reform Commission, The Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Laws, Report No. 
31 (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1986), vol. I, p. 310, para. 433, n. 94; 
S. Harring, 'Red Lilac of the Caygas: "Indians", "Indian Law" and Culture Conflict in a Witchcraft 
Trial in Buffalo, New York, 1930' (unpublished paper, 1990); and see generally R. Leikind, 
'Regulating the Criminal Conduct of Morally Innocent Persons: The Problem of the Indigenous 
Defendant' (!986) 6(2) Boston College Third World Law Journal 161-184; S. Poulter, English 
Law and Ethnic Minority Customs (London: Butterworths, 1986); and in connection with 
questions concerning the nature and 'reasonableness' of the beliefs of other individual members of 
the larger society: see e.g. S. Yeo, The Element of Belief in Self-Defence' (1989) 12(1) Sydney 
Law Review 132-158; Anno!., 'Degree of Homicide as Affected by Accused's Religious or Occult 
Belief in Harmlessness of Ceremonial or Ritual Acts Directly Causing Fatal Injury' (1977) 78 
American Law Reports, 3d series 1132-11-34. 
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3. CHANGE AND CONTINUITY 
IN SORCERY BELIEFS AND PRACTICES 
The persistence of traditional sorcery beliefs and their associated modes of 
active and reactive expression are, in themselves, tellingly significant features of 
the modem Melanesian socio-cultural landscape. 65 In characterising sorcery as a 
particularly intractable problem of law and society in Papua New Guinea, this 
demonstrable continuity in the expressive patterns of sorcery-related beliefs and 
behaviour is invariably identified as a determinatively significant factor. 66 This, 
however, is not to say that Melanesian sorcery beliefs and practices are 
intrinsically immutable, or that they have somehow remained unaffected by the 
wide range of influences-calculated and fortuitous-to which they have been 
exposed from the inception of sustained inter-cultural contact. On the contrary, as 
empirically accessible social phenomena, the specific dynamics of Melanesian 
sorcery can be seen to have changed markedly in recent years, in both form and 
content. In many instances, the nature and implications of these changes have 
been profound and far-reaching; and in most, though certainly not all, cases, those 
changes can be attributed, more or less directly, to a variety of inter-cultural 
65 See Glick, 'Sorcery and Witchcraft', p. 182. 
66 Writing in 1925, Sir Hubert Murray, Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Judicial Officer of 
Papua (formerly British New Guinea), made the general observation that: 'the belief in sorcery 
may be just as strong as ever-it will not die out for many generations, if it ever dies out at all. .. .' 
Papua of To-Day, p. 66. Sixty years later, referring specifically to sorcery practices amongst the 
Garia in southern Madang, Peter Lawrence similarly observed: 
[T]he Garia retain their belief in the effectiveness of these arts 
virtually unimpaired even though, since the mid-1920s, they 
have been incorporated in a modern administrative system and 
have come under strong Lutheran Mission influence . ... In a 
word, sorcery still makes sense to Garia villagers. 
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articulations.G7 
The salient effects of such inter-cultural articulations on the nature and 
direction of change in the expressive patterns of traditional Melanesian sorcery 
beliefs and practices, and the implications of those changing beliefs and practices 
for law and legal development in Papua New Guinea, will be considered in the 
sequel.68 Initially, however, two general observations concerning the qualities of 
change and continuity in sorcery-related conduct and beliefs are in order. 
A. Exogenous Influences on the Practice of Sorcery 
At an empirical level, many changes in traditional sorcery practices and related 
patterns of conduct in Papua New Guinea can be seen to have been brought about 
by the introduction of new technologies and elements of material culture from the 
,De Rerum Natura: The Garia View of Sorcery,' in Sorcerer and Witch in Melanesia, ed. M. 
Stephen (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1987), pp. 21, 30. See also LRC, Sorcery, p. 9; 
LRC, Sorcery among the East Sepiks, pp. 20-21; D.R.C. Chalmers, D. Weisbrot and W.J. Andrew, 
Criminal Law and Practice of Papua New Guinea 2nd ed. (Sydney: The Law Book Company, 
1985), pp. 738-749; R.S. O'Regan, 'Western Criminal Law in New Guinea' (1974) 7 Australia & 
New Zealand Journal of Criminology 5 at 13. 
67 Lindenbaum cautions that the ideologies of sorcery in many areas of Papua New Guinea are 
part of a 'repertoire of responses' to a variety of 'social tensions,' which have resulted from the 
intrusion of all manner of 'objects, illnesses, new cultigens and ideas that entered communities' 
long before the physical appearance of whites .... 'Images of the Sorcerer in Papua New Guinea,' 
p. 126 (emphasis supplied). In this connection, Maria Lepowsky makes the following important 
observation: 
One of the most influential directions in current anthropology 
is the accumulation of historical and ethnographic evidence 
substantiating the argument that small-scale societies were 
constantly changing and evolving long before contact with 
Europeans, not merely reacting afterwards to externally 
induced changes. 
'The Way of the Ancestors: Custom, Innovation and Resistance,' (1991) 30(3) 
Ethnology 217 at 219. 
GB See Chapters Four and Five. 
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West. Over the past century, these novel introductions have resulted, amongst 
other things, in a considerable expansion of the sorcerer's traditional arsenal and a 
concomitant sophistication in the techniques and methods of his or her practice. 69 
Even the most common-place instruments of Western transportation, 
communication, construction, medicine, science and warfare (along with their 
evident capacity to be turned to such seemingly remarkable use) have come to 
represent an extraordinarily powerful kind of magic, access to which has become 
increasingly available to the accomplished and aspiring sorcerer alike. 70 At the 
same time, the development of roads and aerodromes, the increased availability of 
modem means of transport and greater opportunities for Papua New Guineans to 
travel more widely within their own country have also served to create new 
opportunities in which these enhanced techniques and improved implements of 
sorcery can now be brought to bear.71 
Taken together, these essentially technological developments m the 
mechanics, logistics and paraphernalia of sorcery have substantially broadened the 
effective range within which it might be employed; and in so doing, they have 
69 See e.g. R. Lederman, 'Sorcery and Social Change in Mendi,' (1981) 8 Social Analysis 15; 
M.J. Meggitt, 'Sorcery and Social Change among the Mae Enga of Papua New Guinea,' (1981) 8 
Social Analysis 28; S. Nachman, 'Buai: Expressions of Sorcery in the Dance,' (1981) 8 Social 
Analysis 42; M. Zelenietz, 'One Step Too Far: Sorcery and Social Change in Kilenge, West New 
Britain,' (1981) 8 Social Analysis 101. 
70 Thus, as Lindenbaum suggests: 
It is not by chance ... that many of the new instruments of 
[sorcery] attack-battery acid and bicycle spokes, or 
sometimes umbrella spokes--come from the 'high technology' 
of Western transport and life on the road. ['Images of the 
Sorcerer in Papua New Guinea,' p. 122] 
71 Deaths resulting from automobile and aeroplane accidents are now commonly attributed to 
sorcery. Westermark, 'Sorcery and Economic Change in Agarabi,' p. 94. 
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effectively operated to multiply the number of persons against whom sorcerous 
attacks can now be directed. 72 One notable consequence of this situation has been 
an accelerated commoditisation of sorcery and the promotion of a growing 
commerce in sorcery-for-hire. With a new ease of mobility and enhanced 
methods at their disposal, sorcerers renowned in their local areas for their skills 
are now able to extend their lethal services on a contractual basis into larger, 
distant and increasingly more lucrative markets. 73 
B. Endogenous Influences on Sorcery-Related Beliefs 
At a deeper level-although integrally related to the same processes of inter-
cultural articulation by which many of the superficial changes mentioned above 
have been introduced into Melanesian culture and society-the exposure of Papua 
New Guineans to the disparate values, attitudes, beliefs and behaviour of Western 
missionaries, traders, planters, entrepreneurs, soldiers and administrative officers 
has also influenced the nature of change in traditional patterns of indigenous 
social, political and economic relations. More profoundly still, they have had a 
substantial influence on the underlying philosophical and ideological bases upon 
which traditional systems of inter-personal relations are experienced, understood 
and organised. Over time, this exposure, too, has affected the manner in which 
72 See e.g. Lawrence, 'The Garia View of Sorcery,' p. 30. 
73 In November of 1990, officers of the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary stationed at 
Rabaul (East New Britain Province) were investigating a homicide, in relation to which 
information had been gathered which suggested that the person killed had been the victim of a 
contract-sorcerer who had been 'brought in' from East Sepik Province. Personal communication, 
Detective Chief Inspector Martin Powis, Criminal Investigation Division, RPNGC (16 November 
1990). Several of the author's informants in Vunamami and Kokopo corroboratively indicated that 
sorcery 'imported' from the Sepik region was generally regarded as especially potent in the 
Gazelle, and that substantial prices attached to the purchase thereof. See also S. Lindenbaum, Kuru 
Sorcery: Disease and Danger in the New Guinea Highlands (Palo Alto, CA: Mayfield Publishing 
Company, 1979), pp. 28, 29, 140; Westermark, 'Sorcery and Social Change in Agarabi,' p. 89. 
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sorcery-related ideas and beliefs are themselves constructed and expressed m 
many respects. 74 
At this level of ideational analysis, more subtle indicia of change in the 
various modes of indigenous Melanesian sorcery beliefs (and closely associated 
changes in attendant sorcery practices) are often identified and distinguished on 
diachronistic bases. 75 Comparisons along these, amongst other relevant 
dimensions, will be explored and developed more fully in due course.76 At this 
point, however, it is important to understand that many of the distinctive changes 
by which significant differences between nominally 'traditional' and 'modem' 
expressions of sorcery in Papua New Guinea tend to be characterised essentially 
reflect contiguously adaptive modifications to pre-existing cognitive structures 
and complementary variations in the scope, magnitude and sophistication of 
associated patterns of behaviour, rather than entirely novel innovations. Thus, as 
Ardener has observed in respect of witchcraft beliefs in an African context, 77 in 
Melanesia, too, whereas particular manifestations of sorcery beliefs may be 
'subject to fashions,'78 there is an appreciable 'persistence of certain themes in 
belief from which "replication" occurs . . . when other elements in the social and 
physical environment permit this.' 79 In Papua New Guinea, it is rather these 
74 See e.g. Barker, 'Encounters with Evil: Christianity and the Response to Sorcery among the 
Maisin Of Papua New Guinea' (1990) 61 Oceania 139; M. Stephen, 'Contrasting Images of Power' 
in Sorcerer and Witch in Melanesia (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1987), pp. 277-280. 
75 See Zelenietz, 'Sorcery and Social Change: An Introduction,' pp. 11-14. 
76 See Chapters Four and Five. 
77 See E. Ardener, 'Witchcraft, Economics and the Continuity of Belief in Witchcraft 
Confessions and Accusations, ed. M. Douglas (London: Tavistock Publications, 1970), pp. 141-
160 (referring specifically to the Bakweri, a Bantu-speaking people of western Cameroon). 
78 Ibid., p. 141. 
79 Ibid., p. !56. 
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'circumstantial details of "content" through which the replicated element ts 
expressed' that may be seen to differ so greatly from time to time. so 
Notwithstanding the metamorphic variability of the 'circumstantial details' of 
their expression, the 'sorcery syndromes' of Papua New Guinea today are, in fact, 
'neither completely old nor entirely new.'81 In a thematic sense, therefore, it quite 
proper to say that there is really 'no such thing' as either purely traditional or 
uniquely modem Melanesian sorcery.82 Indeed, the fundamental epistemological 
bases of Melanesian sorcery beliefs, the nature of the social phenomena 
distinctively associated with the expressions of those beliefs and, as we shall see, 
the jurally relevant implications of sorcery-related conduct, have all remained 
remarkably constant over time. 
4. CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN LAW 
In a great many respects, of course, the conditions and experiences of life for a 
large and growing number of Papua New Guineans today are radically different to 
what they were only a century ago. Certainly in respect of the pace at which it has 
occurred, if not always in terms of the depth or extent of its impact, the qualitative 
transformation of pre-existing socio-cultural, economic, political and, perforce, 
legal relations over this comparatively short period of time has been nothing short 
ofphenomenal.83 Too often, the ramifications of such transitions may be depicted 
80 Ibid. 
81 Lindenbaum, 'Images of the Sorcerer in Papua New Guinea,' p. 127. 
82 Ibid. 
83 See generally S. Latukefu, ed., Papua New Guinea: A Century of Colonia/Impact, 1884-
/984 (Port Moresby: The National Research Institute and the University of Papua New Guinea, 
1989); H. Griffin, H. Nelson and S. Firth, Papua New Guinea: A Political History (Richmond: 
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m banal stereotypes which belie the complexity of 'traditional' Melanesian 
cultures and trivialise the sophistication of indigenous patterns of thought and 
action.s4 The fact remains, however, that for a great many Papua New Guineans 
the processes of social change over the past century have involved a virtual 
compression of the experience of ten thousand years into a single life time. 85 
No intellectually responsible attempt to address even the narrowly delimited 
range of issues having to do, more or less exclusively, with the nature and 
direction of distinctively legal transformations in Papua New Guinea over the 
course of the last century can fail to take some critical account of the broader 
context within which those changes occurred. Nor can such an analysis safely 
discount the significance or complexity of the relationship between the 
Heineman Educational Australia, 1979); K.S. Inglis, ed., The History of Melanesia (Canberra and 
Port Moresby: Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University and The 
University of Papua and New Guinea, 1969). With particular respect to the nature and direction of 
legal change, see Weisbrot, Paliwala and Sawyerr, Law and Social Change in Papua New Guinea; 
Fitzpatrick, Law and State in Papua New Guinea; B. Brown, ed. Fashion of Law in New Guinea 
(Sydney: Butterworths, 1969); K. Los, 'The Suitability of the Legal System and the Legal Method 
in Papua-New Guinea' (1971) 1(2) Melanesian Law Journal73-75; B. Narokobi, 'The Old and the 
New' (1986) 9 Point 3-16; B. Narokobi, 'Law and Custom in Melanesia' (1989) 14(1) Pacific 
Perspective 17-26; B. Narokobi, 'Adaptation of Western Law in Papua New Guinea' (1977) 5(1) 
Melanesian Law Journal 52-66; P. Sack, "'Law" and "Custom" in Papua New Guinea' (1990) 
51(1) Transactions of the Jean Bodin Society 249-274. 
84 Sean Dorney, the ABC's long-serving correspondent in Port Moresby, provides some 
typical examples of these popular caricatures in Papua New Guinea: People, Politics and History 
since 1975 (Milsons Point, NSW: Random House Australia, 1990), p. 24. Noting that 'a most 
effective taunt' amongst members of Papua New Guinea's National Parliament 'is to describe one's 
opponent as a "primitive",' Dorney sensitively acknowledges that: 
[a] quick way to cause grievous offence in Papua New Guinea 
is to compliment someone on how quickly their people are 
making the transition from the cannibalistic stone age. [Ibid.] 
Scholarly discussions of a more serious nature can fall prey to the same distortive 
characterisations. See, e.g. W.J. Stewart, 'Stone Age and Twentieth Century Law in the 
Independent State of Papua New Guinea' (1983) 4 Boston College Third World Law Journal49. 
85 See A.M. Kiki, Kiki: Ten Thousand Years in a Lifetime-A New Guinea Autobiography 
(Melbourne: Cheshire, 1968). 
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demonstrably exogenous features of those transformative experiences, on the one 
hand, and the substantive changes they may be seen to have wrought in 
contemporary society, on the other. Variable, imperfect and fragmented though 
the exogenously introduced elements in the processes of change may have been, it 
is eminently clear that their causal and catalytic contributions to the vicissitudes of 
Melanesian life in general-and of socio-legal life more specifically-have been 
extraordinary by any measure. 86 Equally clear, and equally important to 
recognise, however, is the fact that, amongst the principal driving forces behind 
the inauguration (and to a considerable extent the perpetuation) of these 
exogenously introduced transformational processes have been those which have 
come to be associated axiomatically with the advent of nineteenth-century 
European colonialism-of which 'the Jaw' is often regarded and aptly described as 
'the cutting edge.'87 
To say this much, however, is to say, at once, a great deal and very little; for in 
the whole modem discourse on the interrelations of Jaw, culture and social change 
in Papua New Guinea (and elsewhere, to be sure), few concepts bear a greater 
ideological loading than that of colonialism. Few phenomena seem to have 
undergone so many permutations of politicised signification, and few experiences 
continue to evoke such a wide range and intensity of characterisation. sa Thus, to 
86 Fifty years ago, S. W. Reed spoke eloquently to this point in The Making of Modern New 
Guinea, pp. 116-125,258-260. 
87 D. Weisbrot, 'Papua New Guinea's Indigenous Jurisprudence and the Legacy of 
Colonialism' (1988) 10 University of Hawaii Law Review 1 at 2. See also M. Chanock, Law, 
Custom and Social Order: The Colonial Experience in Malawi and Zambia (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 4. 
88 See e.g. P. Fitzpatrick, Law and State in Papua New Guinea (London: Academic Press, 
1980), p. 65; J. Kaputin, 'The Law: A Colonial Fraud?' (1975) 10(1) New Guinea and Australia, 
The Pacific and South-East Asia 4-15; B. Narokobi, Lo Bilong Yumi Yet (Suva and Goroka: 
University of the South Pacific and the Melanesian Institute for Pastoral and Socio-Economic 
Service, 1989); J. Goldring, Law and Cultural Colonialism: Questioning Some Assumptions about 
28 
engage even the most basic questions having to do with colonialism-as an idea, a 
phenomenon or an experience-is to enter immediately upon an expanse of 
fervently contested terrain, 89 and any attempt to canvass the full range of issues 
germane to nature and ramifications of colonialism and legal change in Papua 
New Guinea alone would quickly lead far beyond the scope of the instant project. 
By the same token, aspects of the complex and polemical issues of colonialism are 
implicit in many of the crucial questions necessarily raised, even within the 
narrow confines of the present inquiry. Although the aim here is merely to sink a 
single conceptual shaft rather than to map out the whole relevant topography, such 
questions cannot be begged entirely. 90 
A. Law and Colonialism 
In broad compass, the term 'colonialism' is meant here to refer to the sequence 
of more or less concerted attempts by official and unofficial representatives of 
European society in Papua New Guinea, beginning in the latter decades of the 
nineteenth century and continuing well into the twentieth, to bring about what 
Law and Development (Faculty of Law, University of Sydney, 1974) [mimeo]. Cf. P. Hasluck, A 
Time for Building: Australian Administration in Papua and New Guinea 1951-1963 (Carlton: 
Melbourne University Press, 1976), p. 189; Smithers, 'Law and the Territory of Papua and New 
Guinea' (1963) 4 Melbourne University Law Review 212-237. See generally S.E. Merry, 'Law and 
Colonialism' (1991) 25(4) Law & Society Review 889-922; Y. Ghai, R. Luckharn and R. Snyder, 
The Political Economy of Law: A Third World Reader (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987); D 
Sugarman, '"A Hatred of Disorder": Legal Science, Liberalism and Imperialism,' in Dangerous 
Supplements: Resistance and Renewal in Jurisprudence, ed. P. Fitzpatrick (London: Pluto Press, 
1991), pp. 56-57. 
89 See, e.g., R.M. Keesing, 'Creating the Past: Custom and Identity in the Contemporary 
Pacific' ( 1989) 1 The Contemporary Pacific !9; and cf. H.-K. Trask 'Natives and Anthropologists: 
The Colonial Struggle' (1991) 3 The Contemporary Pacific !59. See also, F. Helu 'The Democracy 
Bug Bites' Pacific Islands Monthly (September 1991), p. 21; and cf. M. Anderson, 'Letter to the 
Editor' Pacific Islands Monthly (November 1991), p. 6. 
90 SeeM. Ellinghaus, A. Bradbrook and A Duggan, eds., The Emergence of Australian Law 
(Sydney: Butterworths, 1989), p. ix, from whom I have borrowed this apt metaphor. 
Professor Brookfield has described as: 
a thoroughgoing, comprehensive and deliberate penetration of 
. . . local or 'residentiary' system[s] by agents of . . . 
external system[s], who aim to restructure the patterns of 
organization, resource use, circulation and outlook so as to 
bring these into a linked relationship with their own system[s]. 
The objective is an externally wrought or guided 
transfonnation of the residentiary system[ s ], revolutionary in 
the sense that it involves a tennination or diversion of fanner 
evolutionary trendsHl 
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At no time, perhaps, was such a 'revolutionary transformation' ever fully 
effected in Melanesia.92 Certainly the levels of comprehensive colonial 
penetration experienced by many African, Asian and other Pacific Island peoples 
were never achieved in Papua New Guinea to anywhere near the same extent.93 
Yet many of the same events and circumstances that served to divert former 
evolutionary trends in socio-cultural, political and economic development 
91 H.C. Brookfield, Colonialism, Development and Independence: The Case of the 
Melanesian Islands in the South Pacific (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), pp. 1-2. 
This broad usage is to be distinguished from the narrower concept of 'colonial rule' or 
'administrative colonialism', as discussed above at note 23. 
92 See D. Denoon, 'Capitalism in Papua New Guinea' (1985) 20(3) Journal of Pacific History 
119-134. Indeed, the largest concentrations of indigenous Papua New Guinean populations were 
not even thought to exist until the 1930s, and in most areas of the country, meaningful patterns of 
inter-cultural relations, colonial or otherwise, were not effectively established until after the 
Second World War. See P. Brown, Highland Peoples of New Guinea (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1978), pp. 96-97; A.M. Healey, 'Monocultural Administration in a Multicultural 
Environment: The Australians in Papua New Guinea,' in From Colony to Coloniser: Studies in 
Australian Administration History, ed. J.J. Eddy and J.R. Nethercote (Sydney: Hale & 
Ironmonger, 1987), pp. 207-224; B. Connolly and R. Anderson, First Contact (Ringwood, VIC: 
Penguin Books Australia, 1987). 
93 See M. Rodman and M. Cooper, eds. The Pacification of Melanesia, ASAO Monograph 
No. 7 (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1979); E. Dodge, Islands and Empires: 
Western Impact on the Pacific and East Asia, Europe and the World in the Age of Expansion 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1976); T. Adam, Western Interests in the Pacific 
Realm (New York: Random House, 1967); C. Grattan, The Southwest Pacific Since 1900: A 
Modern History (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1963); G. Nadel and P. Curtis, eds. 
Imperialism and Colonialism (New York: Macmillan Company, 1964); D. Scarr, Fragments of 
Empire: A History of the Western Pacific High Commission, 1877-1914 (Canberra: Australian 
National University Press, 1967). 
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throughout the insular Pacific did most definitely operate directly and profoundly, 
if not in every case absolutely, to shape the nature and direction of inter-cultural 
relations in Papua New Guinea as well. Moreover, where these events and 
circumstances did operate to such effect, they often did so with significant and 
enduring implications for all manner of traditional indigenous patterns of thought, 
action and institutional arrangements. 94 
Amongst other things, the processes of colonialism m Papua New Guinea 
involved a 'large-scale transfer of laws and legal institutions from one society to 
another, each of which had its own distinct sociocultural organization and legal 
culture.'95 Here, too, these transferential processes were part and parcel of a 
multiplex imperial enterprise, the penultimate objective of which was 'to rule and 
to transform' indigenous society. That is to say, the institutions of the colonial 
legal order were intended both to 'enforce[ ... ] compliance to a new political order 
and at the same time . .. to impose a new culture.' Here, too, a salient result of 
these processes was the erection of a dual legal system: one for the colonised and 
one for the colonisers. And here, too, as a consequence, Papua New Guineans 
today struggle with the contradictions inherent in the living legacy of colonialism, 
as they attempt 'to fashion a unified legal system out of this duality' in a 
sometimes seemingly ambivalent attempt 'to resurrect and implement the 
remnants of indigenous, precoloniallaw.'96 
94 Zelenietz, 'Sorcery and Social Change', pp. 11-13; and see generally M.B. Hooker, Legal 
Pluralism: An Introduction to Colonial and Neo-Colonial Laws (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 
p. 37 .. 
95 Merry, 'Law and Colonialism,' p. 890. 
96 Ibid (emphasis supplied). See also, J. Aleck, 'Introduction: Custom Is Law in Papua New 
Guinea' in Custom at the Crossroads: The Future of Customary Law in Papua New Gwnea, ed. J. 
Aleck and J. Rannells (Port Moresby: Faculty of Law, University of Papua New Guinea, 1995), 
31 
Obviously, the conjunction of distinctively legal means and particular colonial 
ends in Papua New Guinea was more than merely coincidental; and doubtless the 
interrelationship of the heuristically discrete legal components of colonialism-
transference, duality, transformation and hegemony-is best understood as a 
multifaceted, dynamic and organically integrated whole.97 For present purposes, 
however, it will be sufficient to focus our analytical attention rather more 
narrowly, emphasising the transferential and transformational aspects of the 
colonial process in Papua New Guinea (and, more specifically, the role and 
application of law in that process), as 'an instance of its capacity to reshape culture 
and consciousness.'98 
B. The Dialectical Nature of Socio-Legal Change 
in The Colonial Context 
Over the past century, the political administration of Papua New Guinea has 
involved nearly a dozen different forms of colonial rule under the direction of four 
foreign powers and at least the nominal jurisdiction of two international 
pp. 1-6. The contours and content of pre-colonial Jaw (custom) in Papua New Guinea will be 
considered at length and in detail in the sequel. 
97 As Merry cogently argues, the adoption of deliberately circumscribed analytical 
perspectives can operate to marginalise considerations of the more overtly hegemonic and 
exploitative implications of colonialism and the attendant institutionalisation of legal dualism. 
This, in tum, may serve to discount the significance of the ideological considerations which lay 
behind the mechanics of the colonial project (and with which the conduct and consequences of 
colonial policies were often deeply imbued). These results, however, do not automatically follow 
on as a necessary and inevitable consequence of such an approach. Indeed, predicating on a clear 
recognition of the relational integrity by which the multiplexity of colonialism is properly 
characterised, a circumspect examination of the correlates of any particular component should 
logically inform and enhance an understanding of the others, and of the colonial process as a 
whole. 'Law and Colonialism,' p. 890. See also J. Starr and J. Collier, 'Introduction: Dialogues in 
Legal Anthropology' in History and Power in the Study of Law: New Directions in Legal 
Anthropology (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1989); idem, 'Historical Studies of 
Legal Change' (1987) 28(3) Current Anthropology 367-372. 
98 Merry, 'Law and Colonialism,' p. 891. 
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organisations99 At various times during this period, Papua New Guineans found 
themselves governed--or, as often as not, ignored-by English, Australian, 
German and Japanese authorities, by soldiers, sailors and civilians, and by men 
who were 'rough and ready or by those with an element of administrative and 
anthropological sophistication.' loa Different to one another though each of these 
regimes may have been in terms of their respective colonial styles and methods of 
administration, to the indigenous Melanesians whose affairs they sought to 
govern, they were as one in their alien character, in their relentless demands for 
compliance with the imposed conditions of a transformational ethos and in their 
invariable presentation of the same responsive options. In the final analysis, 
colonialism offered only three alternatives to the native peoples of Papua New 
Guinea: acquiescence, submission or resistance. 
In this sense, as Boutilier, cogently argues, the inter-cultural dynamics of the 
colonial period can be seen to instantiate the single experience--or rather, an 
'assortment of experiences'-which, more than anything else, has served to unify 
all Papua New Guineans.101 Extending this notion of the experiential singularity 
99 Portions of Papua New Guinea were previously administered as a protectorate and then a 
colony by England and Germany. In 1905-6, the administration of British New Guinea (Papua) 
was passed to the Commonwealth of Australia. German New Guinea was occupied by Australian 
military forces in 1914 and, in 1921, the former German colony became a Class C Mandated 
Territory of the League of Nations, administered by Australia. During the Second World War, the 
Japanese briefly occupied New Guinea. Following the war, both Papua and New Guinea were 
under Australian military administration for a short time. With the return of civilian government, 
Papua was administered as an Australian external territory. New Guinea was also administered by 
the Australian government as a Trust Territory of the United Nations. 
!DO J. Boutilier, 'Papua New Guinea's Colonial Century: Reflections of Imperialism, 
Accommodation and Historical Consciousness' in History and Ethnography in Papua New 
Guinea, Oceania Monograph No 28, ed. D. Gewertz and E. Scheffelin (Sydney: University of 
Sydney, 1985), p. 9. 
10 1 !bid. As a broad historical truism, Boutilier's characterisation must be understood in light 
of the fact that the largest concentrations of indigenous Papua New Guineans had virtually no 
significant contact with Europeans (or any other non-Melanesian interlopers) until the 1930s. See 
note 92 above. 
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of European colonialism as a socio-cultural phenomenon, Wolfers underscores its 
functional implications for the development of an indigenous political response by 
suggesting that '[c]olonial rule united and divided Papua New Guineans in diverse 
ways':l02 
According to circumstances, it sharpened or blunted pre-
existing rivalries and conflicts. It generated and suppressed 
resistance. In short the ways in which both the integrative and 
oppositional elements in anti-colonial nationalism developed 
among Papua New Guineans owed much to colonial rule 
itseff.I03 
For all that, to the extent that the unifYing (if hardly uniform) and divisive 
experiences of colonialism may be said to have brought about meaningful and 
enduring change in the form and content of Melanesian attitudes, values, beliefs 
and behaviour, far and away the most catalytically influential sources of such 
exogenously induced change have been the products of a colonial culture that was 
distinctively Anglo-Australian. And in so far as the discernible effects of those 
transformative experiences can be linked, analytically and historically, to 
conceptual and phenomenological considerations of specifically jurisprudential 
significance, it is to the peculiarly colonial articulations of Anglo-Australian legal 
culture with its Melanesian counterparts that one must look to locate the origins of 
those particular exogenous determinants.l04 Both of these assertions deserve 
102 'For the First Generation .. .', p. 430 (emphasis supplied). 
103 Ibid 
1°4 The examination of the distinctively cultural determinants of inter-systemic legal relations 
(and corollary efforts to construct theoretical explanations for the nature and dynamics of those 
relations) have traditionally been matters of especial interest to social anthropologists, providing a 
particular focus for research and analysis in the sub-field of legal anthropology. Amongst social 
anthropologists today, however, there is said to be a 'fairly general consensus' that the isolation of 
'the "legal" as a separate field of study' should be abandoned in favour of studying law in a more 
(?) meaningful 'total social context.' P. Just, 'History, Power, Ideology and Culture: Current 
Directions in the Anthropology of Law' (1992) 26(2) Law & Society Review 373 at 375. For an 
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further elaboration, and support for each of them will be developed more fully in 
the sequel.l05 
C. Dialectics of Socio-Legal Change 
in the Post-Colonial Context 
If the advent of nineteenth-century Anglo-Australian colonialism in Papua 
New Guinea is fairly accorded its share of determinatively causal responsibility 
for the initiation of a series of transformative processes which have touched and 
altered so many aspects of 'traditional' Melanesian culture and indigenous patterns 
of social relations, 106 and if the introduction of the colonial state, and the 
concomitant 'imposition' of colonial law are properly regarded as seminal in the 
formal institutionalisation of the products of those trans formative processes, 107 
then the erection of the post-colonial state-signal in its character as both a 
earlier version of much the same argument, see S. Roberts, 'Do We Need and Anthropology of 
Law?' ( 1978) 25 Royal Anthropological Institute Newsletter 4-7. 
Although this is not a matter with which we need be distracted here, the question of precisely 
where particular heuristic boundaries ought to be drawn within the broad scope of social 
anthropological research (or, indeed, whether such intra-disciplinary boundaries should be drawn 
at all) is a matter of considerable debate amongst social anthropologists today. But whilst the 
analytical isolation of 'the legal' might usefully be eliminated from anthropological analyses 
concerned with 'total' socio-cultural contexts, an identification and operational isolation of 'the 
cultural' is absolutely integral to practical jurisprudential analyses of real socio-legal affairs. For 
theoretical jurisprudence, of course, clarification of conceptions of 'the legal' is at the heart of the 
enterprise. 
105 See Chapter Five. 
toe Brookfield, Colonialism, Development and Independence: The Case of the Melanesian 
Islands in the South Pacific; M. Cooper, 'On the Beginnings of Colonialism in Melanesia' in The 
Pacification of Melanesia, ASAO Monograph No 7, ed. M. Rodman and M. Cooper (Lanham, 
MD: University Press of America, 1983), pp. 25-41; Reed, The Making of Modern New Guinea, 
pp. 89ff. 
to7 See P. Fitzpatrick, Law and State in Papua New Guinea (London: Academic Press, 1980), 
pp. 65, 67; A. Paliwala, J. Zorn and P. Bayne, 'Economic Development and the Changing Legal 
System of Papua New Guinea' ( 1978) 16 African Law Studies 3, 11-14. 
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catalyst and a precipitate of the changes its very existence represents-must be 
seen as equally salient, if not paramount, amongst the more recent turn of events 
by which the transmutation of Melanesian cultural and social life may be 
marked.l08 
In the contemporary context of post-colonial of Papua New Guinea, it is 
readily, and often disturbingly, apparent that notions of violence and consent, 
domination and accommodation still retain their utility as apposite (if not 
necessarily exclusive) terms of reference by which the articulatory processes of 
social, cultural and legal change can be described and assessed. 109 But howsoever 
the historical circumstances which brought it about may be evaluated, and 
regardless of the ideological significance one may be inclined to attach to the 
contemporary fact, Papua New Guinea is today a post-colonial state, independent 
108 See P. Sack, '"Decolonisation", ulndependence Constitutions" and the "Modem State" in 
the Pacific Islands' (1984) 17 Verfassung und Recht in Obersee 5; S.P. Pokawin, 'Papua New 
Guinea: Aftermath of Colonialism' in Politics in Melanesia, ed. R. Crocombe & A, Ali (Suva: 
institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific, 1982), pp. 38-60; U. Sundhaussen, 
'Ideology and Nation-Building in Papua New Guinea' (1977) 31 Australian Outlook 308-319; I. H. 
Khan, 'The Politics of Integration: Papua New Guinea' (1974) 20 Australian Journal of Politics 
and History 360-369; and see also J. Linnekin, 'The Politics of Culture in the Pacific' in Cultural 
Identity in the Pacific, ed. J. Linnekin and L. Poyer (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990), 
pp. 149-173. 
109 In this, amongst other respects, a number of political and economic linkages between the 
colonial and post-colonial state in Papua New Guinea are certainly palpable. Doubtless these 
demonstrable continuities lend a compelling credibility to the characterisation of Papua New 
Guinea today as a neo-colonial, rather than a fully independent state. See Fitzpatrick, Law and 
State in Papua New Guinea; A. Amarshi, K. Good and R Mortimer, Development and 
Dependency: The Political Economy of Papua New Guinea (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 
1979). See generally Y. Ghai, R. Luckham and F. Snyder (eds), The Political Economy of Law: A 
Third World Reader (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987). In my view, however, it is simply 
untenable to assert that Papua New Guinea is bereft of sovereignty and no more than a hostage of 
metropolitan manipulators. See T. Wesley-Smith, 'Melanesia in Review: Issues and Events, 
1991-Papua New Guinea' (1992) 4(2) The Contemporary Pacific 394-396; M. Turner, Papua 
New Guinea: The Challenge of Independence (Ringwood, VIC: Penguin Books Australia, 1990), 
pp. 162-180; Dorney, Papua New Guinea, pp. 286-318; L. Morauta, 'Law and Order in Papua 
New Guinea: A Tenth Anniversary Report' in Law and Order in a Changing Society, Political and 
Social Change Monograph No 6 (Canberra: Department of Political and Social Change, Research 
School of Pacific Studies, 1986), pp.7-19. 
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and politically sovereign in its own right.ll0 It is certainly regarded as such by 
every other government in the world; and more importantly, it is so recognised by 
a growing number of Papua New Guineans who, as citizens, nolens volens, of an 
independent state, must now manage their affairs within its formal ambit, and to 
none of whom can the decidedly legal (as much as the economic or political) 
implications of that particular status safely remain a matter of complete 
indifference. 
no With respect to the legal concept of 'statehood', Professor Crawford writes: 'Despite its 
importance, or perhaps because of it, statehood has never been authoritatively defined in an 
international decision or instrument. ... ' J. Crawford, 'Islands as Sovereign Nations' (1989) 38 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 277 at 280. Essentially, however, 
the idea of statehood is that a particular territorial community 
is accepted as a separate entity with a sufficient degree of 
independence in international relations, and is not subject to 
the government or authority of another State. 
Ibid. See also, A. James, Sovereign Statehood: The Basis of International Society (London: Allen 
& Unwin, 1986), pp. 13-22. For present purposes, and as a point of analytical departure, this is an 
appropriate and adequate definition of the 'State' of Papua New Guinea. The question of Papua 
New Guinea's 'nationhood' is a rather different and more complex matter. See H. Seton-Watson, 
Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1977), p. I: 
The distinction between states and nations is fundamental. ... 
States can exist without a nation, or with several nations, 
among their subjects; and a nation can be coterminous with the 
population of one state, or be included together with other 
nations within one state, or be divided between several states .. 
. . The belief that every state is a nation, or that all sovereign 
states are national states, has done much to obfuscate human 
understanding of political realities. A state is a legal and 
political organisation, with the power to require obedience and 
loyalty from its citizens. A nation is a community of people, 
whose members are bound together by a sense of solidarity, a 
common culture, a national consciousness. Yet in the 
common usage of English and of otber modem languages 
these two distinct relationships are frequently confused. 
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(i) The Constitutional Parameters of Law and State 
In 1972, a committee comprised entirely of indigenous Papua New Guineans 
(although advised by a cadre of mostly expatriate consultants)lll was established 
to, inter alia, 'make recommendations for a constitution for full internal self-
government in a united Papua New Guinea with a view to eventual 
independence.'ll2 Two years later, in its Final Report, this Constitutional 
Planning Committee (CPC) prefaced its proposals and recommendations 
concerning the formulation of a socio-culturally appropriate set of 'National Goals 
and Directive Principles' with a poignant reflection on the nature of the colonial 
experience: 
The process of colonisation has been like a huge tidal wave. It 
has covered our land, submerging the natural life of our 
people. It leaves much dirt and some useful soil, as it 
subsides. The time of independence is our time of freedom 
and liberation. We must rebuild our society, not on the 
scattered good soil the tidal wave of colonisation has 
deposited, but on the solid foundations of our ancestral land. 
We must take the opportunity of digging up that which has 
been buried. We must not be afraid to rediscover our art, our 
culture and our political and social organizations. Wherever 
possible, we must make full use of our ways to achieve our 
national goals. We insist on this, despite the popular belief 
that the only viable means of dealing with the challenge of 
lack of economic development is through the efficiency of 
111 See T. Deklin, 'In Search of a Home-Grown Constitution: The Constitutional Development 
in Papua New Guinea between 1962 and 1975' in Latukefu, Papua New Guinea: A Century of 
Colonial Impact, p. 409; J. Goldring, The Constitution of Papua New Guinea: A Study in Legal 
Nationalism (Sydney: Law Book Company, pp. 19-20); L. Johnson, Colonial Sunset: Australia 
and Papua New Guinea, 1970-74 (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1983), p. 151-152. 
112 'Terms of Reference of the Constitutional Planning Committee,' announced by the then 
Chief (and later first Prime) Minister of Papua New Guinea, the Honourable (later Sir) Michael 
Somare. House of Assembly Debates, 3rd House, 2nd Meeting of the 1st Session, 3, no. 3 (23 June 
1972), p. 279. For a discussion of the Committee's origins, composition and activities, see CJ 
Lynch, 'The Achievement of Independence in Papua New Guinea' (1980) 15 Journal of Pacific 
History 175 at 176-182; E.P. Wolfers, 'Aspects of Political Culture and Institution-Building in 
Melanesia: Constitutional Planning in Papua New Guinea and the Special Committee on 
Provincial Government in Solomon Islands' (1982) 6(1) Pacific Studies 85. 
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Western techniques and institutions. 11:3 
With a keen appreciation for the practical implications of nearly a century of 
inter-cultural relations, the CPC qualified the mandate it had so eloquently set for 
itself, and for the people of Papua New Guinea, in the following terms: 
We should use the good that there is in the debris and deposits 
of colonisation, to improve, uplift and enhance the solid 
foundations of our own social, political and economic systems. 
The undesirable aspects of Western ways and institutions 
should be left aside. We recognise that some of our own 
institutions impose constraints on our vision of freedom, 
liberation and fulfilment. These should be left buried if they 
cannot be reshaped for our betterment. . . . 
Papua New Guinean ways . . . are not stagnant and closed. 
Our ways have always been open to external influences. It is 
this inherent openness which has enabled us to achieve so 
much in such short time and adapt to the new sttucture which 
has existed since Europeans first arrived here. Our ability to 
cope with new demands, our ability to readjust our ancient 
ways to new needs, have enabled us to develop. . . . 
It is inevitable that we should make intelligent use of foreign 
ways . . . to supplement our own resources. This is self-
reliance. This is self-respect. It is our way, a Papua New 
Guinean way114 
At about the same time, referring specifically to the development of the law 
and legal institutions in an independent Papua New Guinea, the then Chief 
Minister (later Prime Minister), the Honourable (now Sir) Michael Somare 
remarked: 
[W]e are facing, at this very momen~ the need to devise a 
system of laws appropriate to a self-governing, independent 
nation. The legal system that we are in the process of creating 
must ensure the orderly and progressive development of our 
nation. But, in addition, it must respond to our own needs and 
values. We do not want to create an imitation of the 
113 Constitutional Planning Committee (hereinafter CPC), Final Report (13 August 1974), p. 
2/13. 
114 Ibid. 
Australian, English or American legal systems. We want to 
build a framework of laws and procedures that the people of 
Papua New Guinea can recognize as their own-not 
something imposed on them by outsiders. us 
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With the achievement of independence and the attendant departure of Papua 
New Guinea's erstwhile colonial administrators, the reglementary emanations of 
the colonial order were formally supplanted by the terms of an autochthonous 
national constitution,l16 Nobly enshrining the 'worthy customs and traditional 
wisdoms' of the people as a touchstone for social, political and a fortiori legal 
policy-making, 117 and offering a veritable prean to the expression and further 
development of a distinctively Melanesian approach to the creation, interpretation 
and application of law, ns the Constitution of the Independent State of Papua New 
Guinea expounds an inspired vision for the development of a system of 
autonomous national law and legal institutions that faithfully reflect and respond 
to the attitudes, beliefs, values and needs of Melanesian cultures and societies. In 
clear and unequivocal terms, it lays the necessary and sufficient foundation for a 
self-conscious elaboration of an authentic Melanesian Jurisprudence. 1!9 Within 
us 'Law and the Needs of Papua New Guinea's People' in Lo Bi/ong Of Manmeri: Crime, 
Compensation and Village Courts, ed. J. Zorn and P. Bayne (Port Moresby: University of Papua 
New Guinea, 1975), p. 14. 
116 See C.J. Lynch, 'Achievement of Independence in Papua New Guinea: The Legal Aspect' 
(1980) 15 Journal of Pacific History 175; Y. Ghai, 'Constitution Making and Decolonisation' in 
Law, Government and Politics in the Pacific Island States (Suva: Institute of Pacific Studies, 
University of the South Pacific, 1988). 
117 Constitution of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea [hereinafter PNG 
Constitution], Preamble. 
118 Ibid., sees. 20, 21, 25, 60, 158; schs. I, 2.1 to 2.8, 2.14 
"
9 See B. Narokobi, La Silang Yumi Yet: Law and Custom in Melanesia (Suva and Goroka: 
Institute of Pacific Studies of the University of the South Pacific and The Melanesian Institute for 
Pastoral and Socio-Economic Service, 1989), pp. 3-11, 15-16. Cf. P. Sack, 'Melanesian 
Jurisprudence: A "Southern" Alternative?' in Philosophy of Law in the History of Human Thought, 
ed. S. Panou, G. Bozonis, D. Georgas and P. Trappe (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1988), p. 92. 
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such a framework, the law itself should naturally be expected to conform to 'the 
perceptions and world-views of the people,' corresponding as closely as possible 
with their ideas of legal propriety and impropriety, and their preferences for the 
manner in which instances of both are identified and addressed. 120 This, at any 
rate, was the fond hope of the framers. 
(ii) The Paradox of Law and State 
The period leading up to and immediately following the achievement of 
independence in Papua New Guinea was an understandably heady time for the 
founders of the new state.121 More so perhaps than in any of the other emerging 
Pacific Island countries, the making of Papua New Guinea's Constitution took on 
the veritable qualities of a millenarian enterprise, and one in which genuinely 
autochthonous ideas and institutions of law would play a particularly redemptive 
part,l22 Heralding the advent of a true 'Melanesian renaissance,' 123 even if their 
florid rhetoric bespoke the undisguised influence of a discernibly Western (and 
120 LRC, The Role of Customary Law in the Legal System, Report No 7 (1977), p. 47. 
121 See D. Weisbrot, 'The Post-Independence Development of Papua New Guinea's Legal 
Institutions' (1987) 15 Melanesian Law Journal9 at 13; B. Narokobi, 'History and Movement in 
law Reform in Papua New Guinea' in Weisbrot, Paliwala and Sawyerr, Law and Social Change in 
Papua New Guinea, pp. 13-24. See generally Y. Ghai, 'Constitutional Issues in the Transition to 
Independence' in Foreign Forces in Pacific Politics, ed. R. Crocombe and A. Ali (Suva: Institute 
of Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific, 1983), pp. 24-65. 
122 The reasons for this are discussed in Y. Ghai, 'The Making of Constitutions in the South 
Pacific Islands,' (1988) 13(1) Pacific Perspectives I at 3; See also Y. Ghai, 'Constitutional Issues 
in the Transition to Independence' in Foreign Forces in Pacific Politics, pp. 26. For a comparison 
with the post-colonial constitutional experience in Africa, see Y. Ghai, 'The Rule of Law in Africa: 
Reflections on the Limits of Constitutionalism' in Conference Papers, 9th Commonwealth Law 
Conference (Auckland: Commerce Clearing House N.Z. Ltd, 1990), pp. 495-499. See also Sir 
Julius Chan, 'A Prime Minister's Reflections on Papua New Guinea's Constitution' (1988) 13(1) 
Pacific Perspectives 55-58. 
123 D. Weisbrot, 'The Post-Independence Development of Papua New Guinea's Legal 
Institutions' (1987) 15 Melanesian LawJourna/9 at 12. 
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distinctively Anglo-Australian) liberal-democratic tradition, ' ... men spoke of 
the need to build a new nation from our ruins and from our ancestral heritage.'l24 
Law was no longer to be an instrument of oppression, but a 
tool for liberation. Law was no longer to be the exclusive 
privilege of the rich, but a basic right of all. Law was no 
longer to be a colonial fraud, but a genuine expression of the 
felt needs and aspirations of our Melanesian people. 
Newspapers, learned journals and white papers were filled 
with lofty calls for adaptation, reformation, simplification or 
outright revolution in the law to achieve the desired goals.125 
Today, more than twenty years on, the Constitution's bold expressions of 
political aspiration and zealous advocacy of a socio-legal renascence seem 
poignantly naive, if not extravagant, in their idealism. To be sure, quite different 
and far less charitable, characterisations of the post-colonial experience in Papua 
New Guinea have been proffered from time to time. 126 On balance, however, 
more measured prospects for the achievement of a socio-culturally appropriate 
mix of 'traditional' indigenous and 'modem' introduced values have increasingly 
tended to be viewed with a deepening if not abject pessimism.l27 
With particular respect to the development, application and refinement of 
decidedly autochthonous legal values in Papua New Guinea, it is now generally 
124 B. Narokobi, 'History and Movement in Law Reform,' p. 14. 
125 Ibid. 
126 See e.g. Fitzpatrick, Law and State in Papua New Guinea; Ntumy's paper at CL 
conference, Amarshi, Good and Mortimer and others of this ilk. 
127 See Weisbrot, 'Papua New Guinea's Indigenous Jurisprudence and the Legacy of 
Colonialism,' pp. 2-3, 7-8; Turner, Papua New Guinea: The Challenge of Independence, pp. 181-
186; Gordon and Meggitt, Law and Order in the New Guinea Highland.•, pp. 190-209, 237-251; 
Fitzpatrick, Law and State in Papua New Guinea, pp. 237-246; B. Sakora, 'Judicial Law-Making 
under the Papua New Guinea Constitution' in Pacific Constitutions, Proceedings of the Canberra 
Law Workshop VI, ed. P. Sack (Canberra: Law Department, Research School of Social Sciences, 
Australian National University, 1982), p. 256; N. O'Neill, 'The Judges and the Constitution-The 
First Year' (1976) 4 Melanesian Law Journal242-258. 
42 
conceded that the anticipated re-transformation has fallen far short of what the 
Constitution had envisaged. 12B Scarcely three years after independence, one 
commentator observed: 
The legal system in Papua New Guinea is a pennanent carrier 
of foreign ideas and culture, since it is tied to the English and 
Australian legal systems, the latest decisions of which are in 
practice binding on Papua New Guinean courts. The basic 
rules of interpretation and the presumptions of law fmd their 
sources in an alien system, whose hold continues even after 
independence. The crises of legal doctrine in England are all 
too readily assumed to be the crises of law in Papua New 
Guinea, and the latest law refonns in England and Australia 
are seen by many as setting the pace for Papua New Guinea. 
The development of law based on indigenous concepts and 
contemporary problems is stultified because of the force of 
foreign imitation. Foreign decisions are cited and applied as if 
they had some intrinsic merit and foreign textbooks are 
consulted as if they represented the authoritative law of the 
land129 
Although contemporary assessments may be somewhat less strident in their 
cynicism, and rather more sophisticated in their causal analyses, the 'failure'-if 
that, indeed, is how the situation ought properly to be characterised-to bring 
about promised institutional change still tends to be explained largely 'in terms of 
the social forces continuing on from the colonial situation.'l30 
It may well be that even the most pessimistic reflections on once-popular 
128 See Weisbrot, 'Papua New Guinea's Indigenous Jurisprudence and the Legacy of 
Colonialism,' p. 2. But cf. D. Roebuck, 'Custom, Common Law and Constructive Judicial 
Lawmaking' in Essays on the Constitution of Papua New Guinea, ed. R. DeVere, D. Colquhoun-
Kerr and J. Kaburise (Port Moresby: Tenth Independence Anniversary Advisory Committee, 
1985), p. 144; J. Zorn, 'Common Law Jurisprudence and Customary Law' in Legal Issues in a 
Developing Society, ed. R James and I. Fraser (Port Moresby: Faculty of Law, University of 
Papua New Guinea, 1992), pp. 103-127. 
129 Y. Ghai, 'Law and Another Development' (1978) 2 Development Dialogue 109. 
tao Fitzpatrick, Law and State in Papua New Guinea, p. 238. See, for example, Weisbrot, 
'Papua New Guinea's Indigenous Jurisprudence and the Legacy of Colonialism,' pp. I at 2-3. 
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preconceptions about how law and legal institutions were meant to operate in an 
independent Papua New Guinea, and why those expectations have not been 
realised, contain palpable elements of perspicacity and insight. These 
considerations, amongst others, are matters to which we shall return in due 
course.l31 For the moment, however, without intending to discount entirely the 
utility of inquiring critically into 'the relative influence of endogenous and 
exogenous factors in shaping the beliefs, values and patterned behaviour of 
Melanesian political leaders and their publics since establishment of those 
institutions,'l32 I submit, as a premise, that the extent to which the nature, quality 
arid direction of such legal changes as have occurred in post-colonial Papua New 
Guinea-and more importantly, those which may yet occur in the future-might 
meaningfully be regarded as the products of endogenous or exogenous influences, 
is really rather something of a 'moot point.'l33 
As with sorcery beliefs and practices, few if any aspects of contemporary 
Melanesian jurisprudential orientations, experiences or understandings may be 
apprehended or characterised usefully in purely traditional (if 'traditional' is taken 
to mean wholly indigenous) or entirely modem (if 'modem' is taken to mean 
exogenously introduced or imposed) terms.l34 At all events, the full measure of 
state legal authority in Papua New Guinea today is formally vested in the 
legislative and executive organs of a government made up almost entirely of 
131 See Chapter Seven. 
132 Wolfers, 'Aspects of Political Culture and Institution-Building in Melanesia,' p. 85. 
133 Ibid., p. I 0 I. 
134 See Narokobi, Lo Bilong Yumi Yet, pp. 15-16; J. Zorn, 'Common Law Jurisprudence and 
Customary Law' in Legal Issues in a Developing Society, ed. R.W. James and I. Fraser (Port 
Moresby: Faculty of Law, University of Papua New Guinea, 1992), p. I 03. 
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indigenous Melanesians.l35 The national judiciary, the local magistracy and the 
bar are, for the most part, similarly comprised, 136 as is the public service, the 
police force and correctional authority. By every outward sign, it would certainly 
seem that the technical accoutrements of political independence have set the 
institutional bases for an unfettered exercise of legal self-determination firmly in 
place. 
And yet, as a pre-eminent problem of law and society in Papua New Guinea 
today, sorcery continues to pose particular difficulties for the law, for the courts 
and for the administration of justice, which are still said to derive fundamentally 
from enduring and seemingly intractable problems of inter-cultural relations.t37 
135 Of the I 00+ members of the National Parliament only a handful not indigenous 
Melanesian or Papuan citizens. SeeM. Turner and D. Hegarty, The /987 National Elections in 
Papua New Guinea.' Australian Institute of International Affairs (Canberra, 1987). 
136 As at the year ended 31 December 1990, seven of the 14 judges of the Supreme and 
National Court (including the Chief Justice and the Deputy Chief Justice) were indigenous 
Melanesian Papua New Guineans. See Annual Report by the Judges (1990). Localisation of the 
lower-court bench has advanced even more rapidly. In 1982, less than ten percent of more than 
120 magistrates were expatriates. B. Mitchell, 'The Legal Profession and the Delivery of Legal 
Services in Papua New Guinea1 in Law and Social Change in Papua New Guinea, ed. D. Weisbrot, 
A. Paliwala and A. Sawyerr (Sydney: Butterworths, 1982), p. 242. 
'
37 This, as a matter of law, is said to be 'the real difficulty'. State v Noah Magou [1981] 
PNGLR I at 4; Osborn Kwayawako and 5 Others v State (1988) SC No. 392. See A. Marat, 'The 
Official Recognition of Customary Responses to Homicide in Papua New Guinea' (PhD Thesis, 
University of Oxford, 1987); B. Narokobi, 'In Search of a Melanesian Jurisprudence,' in Legal 
Pluralism: Proceedings of the Canberra Law Workshop VII, ed. P. Sack and E. Minchin 
(Canberra: Law Department, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 
1986), pp. 213-228; W.J. Stewart, 'Stone Age and Twentieth Century Law in the Independent 
State of Papua New Guinea' (1983) 4 Boston College Third World Law Journal 48, 61-64. 
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5. OBJECTS AND PURPOSES 
The principal aim of this thesis is to inquire critically into the nature and 
implications of this seeming paradox, and to develop, in a preliminary way, the 
conceptual foundation upon which a more constructive approach to an 
understanding of the problem of sorcery, as a problem of law, might be fashioned. 
In so doing, the distinctively jural dimensions of Melanesian sorcery beliefs and 
practices are examined here not as instances of a 'most bizarre and exotic aspect of 
native life,'138 which would be to trivialise a whole host of real and serious social 
issues of considerable depth and complexity; nor merely as unique, culturally 
marked tropes emblematically reflecting aspects of peculiarly Melanesian 
experiences and understandings of reality, (although, in a sense, that is precisely 
what they are). Rather, the mingled corpus of Melanesian sorcery beliefs and their 
associated behaviours is treated here as a protean, multi-faceted social 
phenomenon which is, at once, generative of a demonstrably real and practical 
problem of law, and tellingly indicative of a persistent misapprehension of the 
nature and dynamics of that problem, in terms of its socio-legal and 
jurisprudential implications. 
In broad scope, then, Melanesian sorcery beliefs and practices are employed 
here as a kind of vehicle by which means the contours and content of the larger, 
embracing conceptual dichotomy between law and custom can be explored and 
critically evaluated. For it is within this theoretical matrix that virtually all 
scholarly formulations of the nature of the relationship between nominally 
Western and Melanesian ideas of law are constructed; and it is within the context 
13B Marwick, Witchcraft and Sorcery, p. 15. 
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of the continuing, if occasionally becalmed, debate about law and custom in Papua 
New Guinea that the persistence of sorcery beliefs and practices presents itself as 
a distinctively legal problem.l39 
It is, in fact, a remarkably consistent vision--or rather, a remarkably persistent 
illusionl40--of 'simpler societies dominated by integrated traditions of ancient 
origin' that is said to have given Western scholars 'license to differentiate with 
exaggerated sharpness between the customs of such "early" societies and the 
139 See generally J. Aleck, 'Mismeasuring the Law: Some Anthropological Misconceptions 
about the Nature of Law and Custom in Papua New Guinea' (1993) !(I) TaimLain-Journal of 
Contemporary Melanesian Studies 93-1 09; B. Brunton and D. Roebuck, 'Customary Law and 
Statute in the Pacific: A Policy Framework' (1982) 10 Melanesian Law Journal6-!3; L.G. Forer, 
'Exporting the Law: The Papua New Guinea Experience' (1978) 64 American Bar Association 
Journal 1687-1690; J. Goldring, 'Just Law for a Primitive Society?' (1971) 6(3) Sydney Law 
Review 371-381; J.F. Hookey, 'The "Clapham Omnibus" in Papua and New Guinea' in Fashion of 
Law in New Guinea, ed. B.J. Brown (Sydney: Butterworths, 1969), pp. 117-135; International 
Commission of Jurists, Australian Section, The Rule of Law in an Emerging Society (Sydney: Int'l 
Comm'n of Jurists, 1965); M. Kapi, 'The Underlying Law in Papua New Guinea' Conference 
Papers-Proceedings of the 9th Commonwealth Law Conference (Auckland: CCH, 1990), pp. 
129-134; J. Kaputin, 'The Law: A Colonial Fraud?' (1975) 10(1) New Guinea and Australia, the 
Pacific and South-East Asia 4-15; P. Lawrence, 'The State versus Stateless Societies in Papua and 
New Guinea' in Fashion of Law in New Guinea, ed. B.J. Brown (Sydney: Butterworths, 1969), pp. 
15-37; K. Los, 'The Suitability of the Legal System and the Legal Method in Papua-New Guinea' 
(1971) 1(2) Melanesian Law Journal73-75; C.J. Lynch, 'The Adoption of an Underlying Law by 
the Constitution of Papua New Guinea' (1976) 4(1) Melanesian Law Journal 37-66; B.M. 
Narokobi, 'Law and Custom in Melanesia' (1989) 14(1) Pacific Perspective 19-26; idem, 
'Adaptation of Western Law in Papua New Guinea' (1977) 5(1) Melanesian LawJourna/52-69; P. 
Sack "'Law" and "Custom" in Papua New Guinea' (1990) 51(1) Transactions of the Jean Bodin 
Society 249-274; idem, "'Law" and "Custom" in Papua New Guinea: Separation, Unification or 
Co-operation?' (1987) 20 Verfassung und Recht in Obersee 329-342; R. Scaglion, 'Samukundi 
Abelam Conflict Management: Implications for Legal Planning in Papua New Guinea' (1981) 
52(1) Oceania 28-38; idem, ed., Customary Law in Papua New Guinea: A Melanesian View (Port 
Moresby: Law Reform Commission, 1983); D. Weisbrot, 'Integration of Laws in Papua New 
Guinea: Custom and the Criminal Law in Conflict' in Law and Social Change in Papua New 
Guinea, ed. D. Weisbrot, A. Paliwala and A. Sawyerr (Sydney: Butterworths, 1982), pp. 59-104; 
idem, 'Customizing the Common Law: The True Papua New Guinea Experience' (1981) 67 
American Bar Association Journa/727 -73 I. 
140 A. Kuper, The Invention of Primitive Society: Transformation of an Illusion (London: 
Routledge, 1988), pp. 7-14. 
statutes of self-conscious modem states.'l4t 
fn modem polities, they asserted, statutory and judicially 
declared rules of law were arrived at deliberately, reflectively 
and rationally by professional specialists. Not so in less 
advanced cultures. The idea seems to have been that, by 
contrast, in traditional society customs somehow arose from 
the opinions and practices of 'the people' like mists from a 
marsh142 
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As a powerful, enduring and effectively unchallenged paradigm of Western 
thought, it is this dichotomous representation of law and custom that is replicated, 
time and again, in a set of immanent and closely inter-related conceptual 
assumptions about the inherently contradictory features of 'traditional' Melanesian 
custom and 'modem' Western law. It is this set of assumptions which invariably 
underlies conventional considerations of sorcery in Papua New Guinea today, 
whether sorcery beliefs themselves (and the conduct attendant upon such beliefs) 
are regarded from a psycho-social, socio-political, anthropological or purely legal 
perspective; and it is this set of assumptions, along with the conceptual premises 
upon which it rests, that is called into question here, both in terms of its 
descriptive validity and its fundamental analytical utility. 
Because it is anchored in a foundation of epistemological presuppositions 
which, in certain crucial respects, are largely, if not wholly, illusory, it is my 
contention that the dichotomy between law and custom-like so many of the 
antinomic constructs which govern comparative representations of Melanesian 
and Western cultures and societies-is a deceptively simplistic construct.l43 
141 S.F. Moore, Law as Process: An Anthropological Approach (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1978), p. 14. 
142 Ibid. 
143 SeeP. Sack, '"Law" and "Custom" in Papua New Guinea' (1990) 51 Transactions of the 
Jean Bodin Society 249, 251. 
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Further to this proposition, I shall argue not only that the persistent, uncritical 
adherence to the heuristic dichotomy between law and custom has served to 
perpetuate (and even, perhaps, to exacerbate) many of the supposedly inter-
cultural conflicts which that model is intended to portray and explain, but that the 
misrepresentation of both the nature and the magnitude of the purportedly 
fundamental inter-cultural discrepancies that are said to separate and contrapose 
the ideas and realities of law and custom, may operate, in effect, to foreordain 
many of the conceptual dilemmas with which sorcery beliefs and practices vex the 
law in Papua New Guinea today. 
Providing, as it does, one of the most compelling examples of the continuing 
cogency of the dichotomy between law and custom, 144 the distinctive 
problematique of law and sorcery in Papua New Guinea offers an especially 
appropriate means by which to develop support for an equally compelling 
argument against the otherwise uncontested validity of that dichotomous model. 
In elaborating such a counter-argument, I shall attempt to demonstrate how the 
misconceived dichotomisation of law and custom presupposes and reifies the 
contraposition of certain essentialist notions of modernity and tradition, rationality 
and irrationality, and empirical (or 'scientific'), as opposed to metaphysical (or 
'supernatural'), explanations for a distinct category of irrefutably real 
phenomena; 145 how these integrally related contradistinctions operate to 
stigmatise, and thereby to preclude, a circumspect jurisprudential contemplation 
of sorcery-related beliefs as determinatively relevant features of social (and hence, 
144 See T.E. Barnett, 'Law and Justice Melanesian Style' in Clunies Ross and Langmore, 
Alternative Strategies for Papua New Guinea, pp. 59, 79-80. 
145 See especially Chapter Six. 
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legal) reality in Papua New Guinea today; 146 and how, as a consequence of this 
conceptual exclusionary process, the development of a genuinely autochthonous 
expression of a culturally responsive common law in Papua New Guinea is 
needlessly handicapped.l47 
For all that, let me be clear at the outset that, in advancing an argument against 
the merits of a dichotomous concept of law and custom, I do not for a moment 
deny that there were, and still are, real and significant differences between 
Western and Melanesian experiences and understandings of reality, or that these 
differences can, and do, set Anglo-Australian and Papua New Guinean 
Weltanschauungen apart from one another on antithetical, and sometimes 
irreconcilable, bases. Nor do I reject or discount the determinative implications of 
some of those differences for a wide range of inter-cultural and decidedly 
ethnojurisprudential considerations. Rather, I am concerned here to show how the 
misrendered polarisation of particular concepts and events all too readily conduces 
to a distorted, and arguably inverted, conception of the relationship between 
Western and Melanesian legal traditions, whereby real (and imagined) differences 
are unquestioningly assumed to supersede, subsume and preclude the recognition 
t46 See Chapters Five and Six. 
147 See Chapters Six and Seven. Cf. D.R. Kelley, The Human Measure: Social Thought in the 
Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 10: 
The Western legal tradition and its practitioners have always 
depended on what Clifford Geertz has called 'local 
knowledge'-and what eighteenth-century German scholars 
called Lokalvernunft--"'ven as they reach out for more 
universal expressions of that knowledge. In order to reach 
particular judgments, jurists have always been constrained to 
understand humanity in particular geographical, historical, and 
cultural terms; and Western social thought has inherited both 
the limiting conditions and the universalist aspirations of 
jurisprudence. 
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of demonstrable and equally significant similarities, resemblances and 
continuities.l48 
Indeed, with respect to certain characteristic features of Western and 
Melanesian legal traditions, I believe there are clear indicia of an identifiable 
inter-cultural isomorphism, the dimensions of which remain largely 
unacknowledged and almost entirely unexplored, because the very possibility of 
its existence is implicitly foreclosed by the assumptions of the paradigmatic 
dichotomisation of law and custom. Here, contrary to the quotidian expositions of 
conventional socio-legal and anthropologically informed wisdom, 'we may well be 
in the presence of a forensic logic that is near constant across cultures';149 and 
here, too, the evidence to be had from Melanesian ethnographies, in 
complementary conjunction with that to be had from a refined and similarly 
methodical inquiry into the socio-cultural dynamics of the common law, is highly 
suggestive and pertinent in this regard. Thus, by re-examining the conceptual 
basis upon which the dichotomy between law and custom rests, and by proffering 
in its stead a more accommodating theoretical construct-that is to say, an 
alternative jurisprudential perspective from which it is possible to recognise and 
identify indicia of inter-cultural similarities as well as differences-not only might 
some of the ostensibly 'bizarre and exotic' qualities of Melanesian sorcery beliefs 
and practices be apprehended with enhanced analytical clarity, but the 
groundwork might thereby be laid, upon which some of the seemingly intractable 
problems those beliefs and practices pose for the law in Papua New Guinea today 
148 See Chapters Six and Seven. See also J. Starr and J.F. Collier, 'Introduction: Dialogues in 
Legal Anthropology' in History and Power in the Study of Law: New Directions in Legal 
Anthropology (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. II. 
149 L. Goldman, The Culture of Coincidence: Accident and Absolute Liability in Huli (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 4!-42. 
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might begin to be addressed with a greater measure of socio-cultural propriety and 
practical remedial efficacy .1so 
Serious issues, as timely and topical as today's newspaper headlinesl51 and as 
portentous as the most recent judgements of the High Court, 152 are here thrown 
into sharp, critical relief. The demonstrable relevance of the distinctively 
Melanesian issues canvassed in the following chapters to the crucial interplay of 
'traditional beliefs' and 'customary values' in relation to both the legal rights of 
indigenous peoplesl53 and the pressing problems of law in a modem Australian 
150 See R. Horton, 'African Traditional Thought and Western Science' (1967) 37 Africa 50, 
whose approach to comparative inter-cultural analysis in an African context was 'guided by the 
conviction that an exhaustive exploration of features common to modem Western and traditional 
African thought should come before the enumeration of differences.' Like Horton, I too am 
convinced that-
[b ]y taking things in this order, we shall be less likely to 
mistake differences of idiom for differences of substance, and 
more likely to end up identifying those features which really 
do distinguish one kind of thought from the other. 
151 'Judges Must Update the Law: Kirby', Canberra Times (30 August 1993); and see also S. 
Kirk, 'Law Urged to Tolerate Ethnic Practices', Sydney Morning Herald (15 May 1991); R. 
Campbell, 'Child Visa Decision Wrong', Canberra Times (29 June 1991); G. Sheridan, 'Law an 
Ally in a Hostile Land', The Australian (9 December 1992). 
152 See Mabo v. Queensland (No.2) (1992) 175 CLR 1. 
153 See B. Hocking, 'Human Rights and Racial Discrimination after the Mabo Cases: No More 
Racist Theft?' in Essays on the Mabo Decision (North Ryde, NSW: Law Book Co., 1993), pp. 
178-204; H. McRae, G. Nettheim and L. Beacroft, Aboriginal Legal Issues (Sydney: Law Book 
Company, 1991); M.C. Blumm and J. Malbon, 'Aboriginal Title, the Common Law and 
Federalism' in The Emergence of Australian Law, ed. M.P. Ellinghaus, A.J. Bradbrook and A.J. 
Duggan (Sydney: Butterworths, 1989), pp. 27-43; J. Crawford, 'The Aboriginal Legal Heritage: 
Aboriginal Public Law and the Treaty Proposal' (1989) 63 Australian Law Journal 392-403; R. 
Mulgan, 'Should Indigenous People Have Special Rights?' (1989) 33 Orbis 375-388; C. 
McLachlan, The Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Law' (1988) 37(2) International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly 368-386; Australian Law Reform Commission, The Recognition of 
Aboriginal Customary Laws, Report No. 31 (Canberra: AGPS, 1986); M. Gumbert, Neither 
Justice Nor Reason: A Legal and Anthropological Analysis of Aboriginal Land Rights (St Lucia: 
University of Queensland Press, 1984); P. Hanks and B. Keon-Cohen, eds., Aborigines and the 
Law (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1984) and see also, e.g., Mabo; R v Bara Bara (1992) 87 NTR I; 
Case Note: 'Isobe1 Phillips' (1989) 13(1) Criminal Law Journal 52-56; R v Wedge [1976] 1 
NSWLR 581. 
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society of increasing cultural diversity, 154 will be readily apparent. It is, however, 
the hitherto unexamined, and yet determinative, significance of those issues, as 
they must now be seen to affect the fundamental principles and most basic 
understandings of the very nature and scope of the common law tradition itself, 
that I regard as a matter of deeper, further-reaching importance.t55 
6. APPROACH AND METHOD 
The active and reactive dimensions of sorcery-related conduct are to be 
considered here from an explicitly jurisprudential perspective. This, however, is 
by no means to reduce the broader implications and deeper significance of the 
diverse and changing manifestations of those phenomena in 'traditional' 
Melanesian cultures and societies to a discrete administrative problem of law-and-
order in the institutional context of the 'modern' state. Nor should the adoption of 
such a jurisprudential perspective be taken to suggest or imply that the subtle, 
convoluted nuances of Melanesian sorcery beliefs and practices might somehow 
be rendered fully comprehensible by regarding them exclusively in terms of their 
expression as cognisable delicts, in either a 'traditional' or 'modern' idiom. There 
is, as we shall see, a great deal more than that involved, and to so narrow the 
scope of analysis would be to cast the matters to hand in a spuriously, indeed 
154 See G. Bird, The Process of Law in Australia: Intercultural Perspectives, 2nd ed (Sydney: 
Butterworths, 1993); Australian Law Refonn Commission, Multiculturalism and the Law, Report 
No. 57 (Canberra: AGPS, 1992). 
155 A. Mason, 'Changing the Law in a Changing Society' (1993) 67 Australian Law Journal 
568-574; A. Mason, 'Future Directions in Australian Law' (1987) 13 Monash University Law 
Review 149; J. Toohey, 'Towards an Australian Common Law' (1990) 6 Australian Bar Review 
185. 
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dangerously oversimplified light.l56 
Notwithstanding their distinctive and patently jural manifestations, Melanesian 
sorcery beliefs are intimately and inextricably bound up with a whole host of 
psychological, epistemological, ontological and cosmological considerations.l57 
Moreover, most occurrences of sorcery-related conduct in Papua New Guinea are 
likewise certain to be enmeshed in an equally complex network of dynamic, cross-
cutting social relations.l58 The meaning and significance properly attributable to 
any given event or circumstance in which sorcery-related beliefs and practices are 
involved must, therefore, be understood as contextually dependent and socially 
contingent (whether or not that particular situation is regarded as bearing 
peculiarly 'jural' implications). In this respect, 'no matter how sympathetically 
understood from a relativist perspective,' the specific manifestations of 
Melanesian sorcery beliefs and their associated practices 'are only the tip of the 
iceberg. 1159 
The significance of the particular contextual contingencies germane to 
Melanesian sorcery beliefs and practices cannot be underestimated; and here, even 
within the confines of this explicitly jurisprudential analysis, these contingencies 
156 See L. Morauta, 'Law and Order in Papua New Guinea: A Tenth Anniversary Report' in 
Law and Order in a Changing Society, Political and Social Change Monograph No 6 (Canberra: 
Department of Political and Social Change, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian 
National University, 1986), p. 16. 
157 See M. Stephen, 'Contrasting Images of Power,' in Sorcerer and Witch in Melanesia 
(Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1987), pp. 249-304. 
158 See Glick, 'Sorcery and Witchcraft', p. 184; A.L. Epstein, 'Introduction,' in Contention and 
Dispute: Aspects of Law and Social Control in Melanesia (Canberra: Australian National 
University Press, 1974), pp. 17-18. See generally S. Roberts, Order and Dispute: an Introduction 
to Legal Anthropology (New York: StMartin's Press, 1979), pp. 55-56. 
159 Knauf!, Good Company and Violence, p. 334. 
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are duly acknowledged as salient, often determinative considerations. As a 
precept of analytical circumspection, however, this injunction demands no more, 
if nothing less, than the level of methodological rigour properly obtaining in the 
analysis of the specific, overt manifestations of a whole host of 'traditional' 
Melanesian beliefs and behaviours-including, not least of all, those which bear 
especial implications for matters of peculiarly jural import. 16° Hence, in what one 
Papua New Guinean legal commentator has described as the 'classical' Melanesian 
context: 161 
law is not an independent science or discipline, nor a highly 
specialised discipline restricted to an initiated few. It is an 
aspect of the total and cosmic way of life, an integral part of 
the whole way in which people go about undertaking various 
tasks in the community .... [l]t is more accurate to refer to 
the phenomenon of law as the way of life or the fashion of the 
people. In widely spoken Tok Pisin, the is the 'Pasin bilong ol' 
or 'Kastom'-their way/s of doing things. 162 
It is equally important, however, to recognise that the very same observations 
can be made with respect to the beliefs and behaviours with which Western law is, 
and has always been, concerned. Indeed, precisely the same observations can be 
made in regard to any fully operative concept of 'law' itself-into the fabric of 
which threads of morality, politics, economics, ideology, history, philosophy and 
religion are intricately woven, 163 and the replete autonomy of which, in the 
16° See A.L. Epstein, 'Law,' in Anthropology in Papua New Guinea: Readings from the 
Encyclopaedia of Papua and New Guinea, ed. I. Hogbin (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 
1973), pp. 174, 176. See also Moore, Law as Process, pp. 151-152. 
161 B. Narokobi, 'Law and Custom in Melanesia' (1989) 14 Pacific Perspective 17, 18. 
162 Narokobi, Lo Bilong Yumi Yet, p. 4. 
163 M. Wood, 'EC 1992: Free Market Framework or Grand Design,' in Law. Society and 
Change, ed. S. Livingstone and J. Morison (Aidershot: Dartmouth, 1990), p. 185. Cf. Lawrence. 
'The State versus Stateless Societies', p. 20. 
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Western and Melanesian social fields alike, cannot safely be regarded as other 
than a heuristic fiction_l64 
Thus, whilst my inquiry is decidedly jurisprudential in its orientation and 
focus, it is conducted within the broader parameters dictated, firstly, by a 
recognition of the polymorphic qualities of the contemporary Melanesian social 
field; secondly, by an appreciation for the integral plurality of law (as one of the 
many social forms which simultaneously occupy that field); and thirdly, by the 
realisation that law, sorcery and other social forms are bound together by a 
164 See G. Westermark, 'Court is an Arrow: Legal Pluralism in Papua New Guinea' (1986) 25 
Ethnology 131 at 132-133; S.F. Moore, 'Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social 
Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study' (1973) 7 Law & Society Review 719; Narokobi, 'Law 
and Custom in Melanesia' at 17. 
As Roberto Unger instructively points out: 'In societies with a heavy commitment to the rule 
of law, people often act on the belief that the legal system does possess a relative generality and 
autonomy.' Law in Modern Society: Toward a Criticism of Social Theory (New York: The Free 
Press, 1976), p. 56. In challenging the validity of this belief, however, Unger raises several 
probing questions: 
[I]s not the alleged autonomy of the legal order itself illusory? 
Has it not often been remarked that, notwithstanding all claims 
to the contrary, the institutions of the legal system in fact 
operate as other political agencies of the state and that the 
methods of legal reasoning do not in the end differ from the 
ones used in political, economic, and moral choice? The very 
idea of the rule of law might seem to be based on a 
misunderstanding, which is also a mystification; it confuses a 
dominant theory and the mentality which that theory 
represents with an accurate description of the actual place of 
law in society. To arrive at a proper appreciation of what the 
concept of a legal order is meant to describe, one must tread a 
narrow path between opposite errors. 
One misconception is to identify the workings of the legal 
order in social life with the way that order is pictured by the 
doctrines of which it makes use or which serve as its defense. 
When such an identification takes place, all the symbols and 
traditions that make the law appear radically autonomous are 
taken at face value. As a result, the true character of its 
relations to other aspects of society is obscured. [Ibid., pp. 55-
56] 
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multiplicity of variable and shifting inter-connections, all of which comprise the 
organic integument of contemporary Melanesian thought and action. 
Of necessity, my approach is cross-disciplinary, situated at the often turbulent 
confluence of emergent streams of thought in socio-legal theory, comparative law 
and legal anthropology.165 It is, moreover, an approach which bespeaks a method 
that has been deliberately fashioned with a view to the reconceptualisation of 
certain conventional propositions concerning the theoretical foundations of law in 
Papua New Guinea, and a corollary reformulation of extant patterns of legal 
reasoning and practical judicial decision-making. In advancing a frank critique of 
the dominant (dichotomous) socio-legal paradigm, however, the fundamental 
intendment of the approach adopted herein is demonstrably reconstructive rather 
than deconstructive, in terms of theory and practice alike. All good scholarship is 
bound to be polemic, but not all polemic is necessarily good scholarship.l66 
165 This, admittedly, is sometimes a rather difficult position to maintain. However, I believe it 
is the only position from which the jural implications of sorcery beliefs and practices in Papua 
New Guinea can be assessed with both empirical accuracy and theoretical adequacy; and it is far 
and away the best position from which to mount a serious effort to address constructively many of 
the practical problems of law to which sorcery beliefs and practices in Papua New Guinea give 
rise today. 
166 I. Wallerstein, 'Some Reflections on History, the Social Sciences and Politics,' in The 
Capitalist World Economy(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), x. 
Chapter Two 
PROLEGOMENA TO 
THE DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS 
OF MELANESIAN SORCERY (I) 
To the modern consciousness, the very idea of witchcraft is preposterous. To 
believe in the capacity of persons to exploit occult powers or spirits, whether 
for good or bad purposes, is absurd.... Indeed, the very 'absurdity' of 
witchcraft beliefs has constituted a serious problem for modern social theories: 
witchcraft is a major stumbling block for Western rationalist accounts of 
human mentality. I 
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Vanimo District Court has jailed two men for a year for practising 
sorcery, in a case which involved a man's death ... Wagari Bokoe, 55, ofOssol 
village and Bus Man, 28, of lsi village, Bevani District, pleaded guilty to being 
responsible for the death of Augustine Pohou, ofYako village .... [A] third 
person gave Bokoe and Man K20 with instructions to murder Pouhou through 
sorcery... A week later, Pohou became ill and vomited blood. He was taken to 
Vanimo Hospital where he died. Pohou's relatives conducted traditional 
investigations, and confronted Bokoe and Man, who admitted 
they had killed Pahou. 2 
1. CULTURAL AND CONCEPTUAL DETERMINANTS 
OF SOCIO-LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE 
Serviceable conceptions of reality tend to consist m the inter-dependent 
dynamics of knowledge, belief and action. Implicit in all meaningful human 
behaviour there IS inevitably some elaborate interplay of cognition and affect, 
even if the patterned intricacies of that process are not always or immediately 
discernible as such; and it is human behaviour, thus infused with meaning and 
1 P. Hirst and P. Woolley, Social Relations and Human Attributes (London: Tavistock 
Publications, 1982), p. 213. 
2 
"'Sorcery Killers" Jailed', Post-Courier (4 March 1992), p. 4. 
58 
significance, that serves in turn to shape the fundamental understandings which 
inform the ordinary and extraordinary experiences of life. 
Social reality, by which expression I refer to the general understanding of what 
is known to exist and what is believed to be true about the nature of the world that 
is shared in common amongst the members of an identifiable group or 
community, and the resultant attribution of meaning and significance to the 
behaviour of those who populate that community and the larger world alike, may 
thus be said to involve the perpetually interactive processes and products of a kind 
of dialectical self-composition generated at the level of both individual and 
collective consciousness.3 That reality simpliciter is neither more nor less than 
just such a social construction is a proposition for which there is an abundance of 
cogently supportive argument.4 The proposition itself may remain a matter of 
' So much cannot be gainsaid, although this is admittedly to expand the concept beyond the 
boundaries of conventional sociological formulations of 'empirically ascertainable regularities' or 
'patterned features of [meaningful] behaviour'. Cf C. Grace and P. Wilkinson, Sociological 
Inquiry and Legal Phenomena (New York: St Martin's Press, 1978), p. 32. It may also be to 
simplifY somewhat a complex and controversial matter in relation to which there is very much less 
than universal agreement even amongst Western philosophers and social scientists. See D.R. 
Hiley, J.F. Bohman and R. Shusterman eds, The Interpretive Turn (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1991); J.B. Thompson, Ideology and Modern Culture (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1990); A. Giddens, Profiles and Critiques in Social Theory (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1982); B. Barnes and D. Bloor, 'Relativism and the Sociology of Knowledge', in Rationality 
and Relativism, ed. M. Hollis and S. Lukes (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982); S.C. Brown, ed., 
Philosophical Disputes in the Social Sciences (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1979); P. Rabinow and 
W.M. Sullivan (eds), Interpretive Social Science (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979); 
N. Goldman, Ways of Worldmaking (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1978); B.R. Wilson, ed., 
Rationality (New York: Harper and Row, 1970); P. Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human 
Sciences, ed. and trans. J.B. Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
4 See especially P. Berger and T. Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (London: 
Allen Lane, 1967), who discuss the implications of the proposition for adjudicatory processes at 
pp. 92 et seq. See also D. Barnes and D. Bloor, 'Relativism, Rationalism and the Sociology of 
Knowledge' in Rationality and Relativism, ed. M. Hollis and S. Lukes (Cambridge, MA: 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1982), pp. 21-47; B. Lloyd and J. Gay, eds., 
Universals of Human Thought (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981); R. Finnegan and 
R. Horton, Modes of Thought: Essays on Thinking in Western and Non-Western Societies 
(London: Faber and Faber Publishers, 1973). For a cross-cultural consideration of the proposition 
from a distinctively Pacific perspective, see the several essays collected in G.M. White and J. 
Kirkpatrick, eds, Person, Self and Experience: Exploring Pacific Ethnopsychologies (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1985). 
59 
continuing philosophical and sociological debate,5 but in contemplation of the 
issues with which this chapter and much of the sequel are concerned, its 
demonstrable utility conduces persuasively to the propriety of its adoption as a 
viable analytical premise. 
Many of the issues raised in consideration of the larger questions that bear on 
the depth and dimensions of reality, as a transcendent concept, are necessarily 
implicated in the consideration of sorcery beliefs and practices, as significant 
features in the landscape of Melanesian social reality. In the interest of thematic 
fidelity, these issues cannot be canvassed exhaustively here. There need be no 
compromise of thematic integrity on that account, however, since it is the 
peculiarly jural parameters of a distinctive, culturally bounded social reality that 
command a focused attention here, and what is to be examined more closely is the 
narrower, subsidiary proposition that these demonstrably socio-legal parameters 
are likewise defined by what is known and what is regarded as knowable, by what 
is believed and what is credible, by the behaviour certain kinds of knowledge and 
belief appear to engender, and by the determinative characterisation of the 
concurrence of particular ideas, beliefs and behaviours in the prevailing terms of 
law and society6 
5 The history of this debate is traced out at length in R.C. Ulin, Understanding Cultures 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984). Joanna Overing offers a succinct account of the issues 
in her introduction to Reason and Morality, ASA Monograph No. 24 (London: Tavistock 
Publications Ltd., 1985), pp. 1-5. 
'Anthony Kenny makes a similar point in Freewill and Responsibility (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1978). Developing the argument that '[t]he mentalistic concepts which are used in the 
law cannot be understood apart from their function in explaining and rendering intelligible the 
behaviour of human agents' (p. 12), Kenny offers this admonition: 
When we explain action in terms of desires and beliefs we are 
not putting forward any explanatory theory to account for 
action. It is true that desires and beliefs explain action; but the 
explanation is not of any causal hypothetical form. It is not as 
if the actions of human beings constitute a set of raw data-
actions identifiable on their faces as the kinds of actions they 
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To the extent that the processes and outcomes of such determinative legal 
characterisations are themselves determinatively shaped and directed by certain 
values, attitudes, knowledge and beliefs about the nature and significance of cause 
are-for which we then seek an explanatory hypothesis. On 
the contrary, many human actions are not identifiable as 
actions of a particular kind unless they are already seen and 
interpreted as proceeding from a particular set of desires and 
beliefs. [/bid.] 
To illustrate this principle-which, for Kenny, involves a critical issue in a decidedly Western 
philosophical context-he turns immediately to an African sorcery case, Nyuzi and Kudemera v. 
Republic (1966-68) African Law Reports 249, heard on appeal in the High Court of Malawi. 
Freewill and Responsibility, pp. 12-21. 
For similarly illustrative purposes, and in order to demonstrate the cross-cultural reach of my 
own arguments, I am inclined to refer to the decision of an English court, Rex v. Duncan and 
Others [1944]1 KB 713, which involved an appeal against a conviction in what appears to be the 
last prosecution in England under the Witchcraft Act, 1735 (9 Geo. 2, c. 5) before that Act was 
finally repealed in 1951. In Duncan, the court found that it was not an abuse of discretion for the 
trial judge to reject the submission of evidence, by way of demonstration, of one of the appellants, 
the purport of which would have been to show that 'at all material times she was a materialization 
medium and to disprove the allegations made against her', because of the 'difficulty of arranging 
such a demonstration satisfactory in all its detail to both sides .. .'; and because the evidence 
'might well confuse the jury or operate to the great disadvantage of the appellants' themselves: 
[1944]1 KB at 715. 
In pertinent part, the provisions of the Act under which Mrs Duncan had been charged made 
the pretence of the practice of witchcraft (involving, amongst other things, the 'conjuration' of 
spirits) an offence. Prior legislation [2 James I, c. 12 (1604)] made the actual practice itself a 
felony, and referred expressly to the conjuration of 'evil or wicked spirits'. At trial, the accused 
had sought to demonstrate that she could, in fact, conjure spirits, and to introduce further evidence 
in support of her contention that the spirits she conjured were neither evil nor wicked. In 
upholding the decision to exclude that evidence Viscount Caldecote LCJ observed: 
[T]he only matter for the jury was whether there was a 
pretence or not. The prosecution did not seek to prove that 
spirits of deceased persons could not be called forth or 
materialized or embodied in any particular form. Their task 
was much more limited and prosaic. [1944]1 KB at 718 
The distinction the accused had sought to make between evil or wicked spirits, on the one hand, 
and benign spirits, on the other, would, in Viscount Caldecote's view, 'raise an issue of fact 
incapable of determination.' More to the point, the court concluded that, even in 1735, '[t]hese 
things were no longer believed in ... .' [ibid.]. 
In England, parts of the Witchcraft Act, 1735 were repealed by the Statute Law Revision Act 
of 1867 (30 & 31 Vic., c. 59), 1887 (50 & 51 Vic., c. 59) and 1948 (II & 12 Geo. 6, c. 62), 
respectively. Those provisions which remained in force were finally repealed and supplanted by 
the Fraudulent Mediums Act, 1951 (14 & 15 Geo. 6, c. 33). It is interesting to note, en passant, 
that the English legislation of 1735 was not formally repealed in the Australian Capital Territory 
untill988, by the Imperial Acts (Repeal) Ordinance 1988 (No. 94). 
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and effect in human relations, they will invariably bear the indelible imprints of 
the wider social context in which those characterisations are made. As with any 
other aspect of institutionalised human affairs, the operative nature of law cannot 
properly be known or understood simply on its own terms without taking some 
account of the social conditions of its creation and operation? Law itself, as Lon 
Fuller observed, is an integral constituent of society and its basic processes are 
pre-eminently social processes. 8 
Moreover, to the extent that culture may be seen to consist in particular 
'socially established structures of meaning,'9 it is the distinctively cultural context 
within which such social processes occur that must be recognised as being of a 
fundamentally determinative significance.10 This is especially so in relation to the 
processes of jural ratiocination and judicial decision-making. 
As the venerable jurist, Oliver Wendell Holmes, observed nearly a century 
ago: 'It is perfectly proper to regard and study tlle law as a great anthropological 
document.'11 In a more recent elaboration on that point from tlle complementary 
perspective of interpretative social anthropology, Clifford Geertz has argued that 
7 S. Bottmley, N. Gunningham and S. Parker, Law in Context (Leichhardt, NSW: Federation 
Press Pty Ltd, 1991), p. 57. 
8 See the remarks of Lon Fuller quoted in L. Nader, ed., Law in Culture and Society (Chicago: 
Aldine Publishers, 1969), p. 8. 
9 C. Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, Inc., !973), p. 12. 
10 That a thoroughgoing understanding of law in its wider social context provides the only 
basis upon which the nature and processes of law may properly be apprehended is the 
propositional mainstay of a whole range of contemporary legal thought, collectively informed by 
sociological, anthropological, political, historical and economic studies of broadly legal 
phenomena. See L.M. Friedman, 'The Law and Society Movement' (1986) 38 Stanford Law 
Review 763-780; S.S. Silbey and A. Sarat, 'Critical Traditions in Law and Society Research' 
(1987) 21(1) Law & Society Review 165-174; F. Munger, 'From the Editor' (1992) 26(1) Law & 
Society Review 5-9; Lord Lloyd and M.D.A. Freeman, Lloyd's Introduction to Jurisprudence, 5th 
ed. (London: Stevens & Sons, 1985), pp. 578-586. 
11 'Law in Science and Science in Law' (1899) 12(7) Harvard Law Review 443 at 444. 
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'the cultural contextualization of incident' is perhaps the singularly critical aspect 
of legal analysis1 2 Any features general to that process, Geertz maintains, will 
surely be located 'in the ways in which such contextualization is accomplished 
when the aim is adjudication ... ,'13 
The fact that we can-that is, that we think we can-take so 
much of this context for granted in our own society obscures 
from us a large part of what legal process really is: seeing to it 
that our visions and our verdicts ratify one another, indeed that 
they are, to borrow an idiom less offhand, the pure and the 
practical faces of the same constitutive reason.14 
Much of the discussion to which this chapter is devoted revolves around the 
central significance of culture as a determinative factor in the social processes and 
outcomes of jural characterisation and judicial decision-making. The implications 
of that proposition will be explored more fully in the sequel. As a preliminary 
proposition, however, it is submitted that, in so far as the object of analysis 
12 'Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective' in Local Knowledge: Further 
Essays in Interpretive Anthropology (New York: Basic Books, 1983), pp. 167-234, at 181. 
1' Ibid (emphasis supplied). Essaying in a rather different intellectual tradition to that which 
informs Geertz's analysis, Roberto Unger offers a complementary argument in Law in Modern 
Society: Towards a Criticism of Social Theory (New York: The Free Press, 1976), p. 46: 'Each 
society reveals through its law the inner-most secrets of the manner in which it holds men 
together.' 
14 Geertz, Local Knowledge, p. 181. There is nothing particularly radical in Geertz's 
observations. Western philosophers, anthropologists and socio-legal scholars have persistently 
sought to advance the logic, propriety and historical inevitability of culturally appropriate law. See 
J. Norgren and S. Nanda, American Cultural Pluralism and Law (New York: Praeger Publishers, 
1988); S. Poulter, English Law and Ethnic Minority Customs (London: Butterworths, 1986); J.K. 
Feibleman, Justice, Law and Culture (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985); A. Fenet, 'The 
Question of Minorities in the Order of Law' in Minority Peoples in the Age of the Nation-State, ed. 
Gerard Chaliand, trans. Tony Berrett (London: Pluto Press, 1989), pp. 12-51); F.L. Kirgis, Jr. 
'Tensions Between Religious or Ethnic Communities and the Larger Society' (1984) 41(1) 
Washington & Lee Law Review 31-32; A. Watson, 'Legal Change: Sources of Law and Legal 
Culture' (1983) 131(5) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1121-1157. And yet, the 
determinative salience of the cultural context in which fundamental principles of law are 
formulated and applied is only just beginning to be recognised and appreciated by Western jurists. 
See e.g. Cook v Cook (1986) 68 ALR 353 at 363; Leong v Takasaki (1974) 55 Hawaii 398, 520 
P.2d 758, 94 ALR 3d 471; R v Mon and Debong [1965-66] P. & N.G.L.R. 42 at 51; Sir Robin 
Cooke, 'Dynamics of the Common Law' in Conference Papers, 9th Commonwealth Law 
Conference (Auckland: Commerce Clearing House N.Z. Ltd, 1990), pp. 1-7. 
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involves an attempt to elucidate the determinatively jural and judicially 
determinative characterisations of the concurrence of particular ideas, beliefs and 
behaviour, the critical questions to be asked and answered with some certainty at 
the outset must be: what law? which society? and more critically still, whose 
culture? 
For present purposes, the answers to all three questions might appear to be 
obvious and the same in each case. The relevant socio-legal context is after all 
that of Papua New Guinea, and the cultural parameters in accordance with which a 
meaningful perspective on jurally determinative characterisations of sorcery-
related beliefs and behaviour in Papua New Guinea ought properly to be 
constructed are, ipso facto, Melanesian. It is here, however, that the 
presumptively antinomic constructs of law and custom, rationality and 
irrationality, science and superstition, instantiated as they are in the paradoxical 
union of the 'modem' Western state and 'traditional' Melanesian society, first 
present themselves as daunting (though not, I think, necessarily insurmountable) 
conceptual obstacles to analysis. And it is here, too, that these conceptual 
obstacles, characterised on the basis of the degree to which they may operate to 
impede useful analyses of the socio-legal implications of sorcery in contemporary 
Papua New Guinea, are themselves revealed to be fundamentally cultural in their 
origins and nature. 
2. CONCEPTUAL BARRIERS AND THE PROBLEM 
OF CULTURAL PREDILECTION IN THE CHARACTERISATION 
OF SORCERY BELIEFS AND PRACTICES 
The obstacles to analysis referred to immediately above are first and foremost 
cultural, in that they are demonstrably grounded in peculiarly Western 
constructions of social reality. Organised around distinctively Western 
assumptions of validity, meaning and significance in respect of particular beliefs 
about the nature of the world, such constructs necessarily give rise to certain 
decidedly Western situational predilections for particular forms of human 
behaviour consistent and coterminous with those assumptions.15 The conceptual 
dimensions of these obstacles are really only epiphenomenal, acquiring 
epistemological import (and hence, socio-legal significance) largely, if not 
entirely, as a function of the influence of their cultural foundations.16 
In so far as it takes as an analytical point d'appui the empirically demonstrable 
social fact that amongst the members of any group, community or society, there 
does tend to be some identifiable corpus of shared beliefs, ideas and values about 
the nature of the world and the conduct of human relations therein,17 this view is 
1s Amongst anthropologists, the debate about the meaning and definition of 'culture' is 
enduring and seemingly irresolvable. My use of the adjectival fonn here is consistent with the 
narrower application of the noun suggested by Roger Keesing, and refers to the ideational systems 
of shared beliefs, concepts, rules and meanings underlying and expressed in the ways in which 
identifiable communities of human beings live. Cultural Anthropology: A Contemporary 
Perspective, 2nd ed (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981 ), p. 68. 
Culture, so defined, refers to what humans learn, not what 
they do and make. . . . [T]his knowledge provides 'standards 
for deciding what is, ... for deciding what can be, ... for 
deciding how one feels about it, ... for deciding what to do 
about it, and ... for deciding how to go about doing it'. [Ibid., 
pp. 68-69] [Footnotes omitted] 
16 See M. Saltman, The Demise of the 'Reasonable Man': A Cross-Cultural Study of a Legal 
Concept (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1991), pp. 25-56. 
17 In adopting such an analytical premise, l take no position one way or the other in respect of 
some 'supra-historical human nature', nor do l think it necessary to do so. Cf Unger, Law in 
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consistent with elements of consensual or legitimacy-based theories of social 
order and organisation.18 Of course, such beliefs, ideas and values 'may vary as to 
the extension of agreement with them, as to their relative degree of abstraction or 
concreteness, as to the intensity of adherence to them, and as to their coherence.' 
But despite those inevitable 'variations in extension, concreteness, intensity, and 
coherence,' it is the presence of just such 'commonly held moral and cognitive 
orientations' that makes organized social life possible.19 
Shared beliefs allow people to understand one another and to 
know what they ought to expect from each other. The basic 
scheme of human conduct is therefore the internalization of 
shared understandings and values ... 2o 
Modern Society, p. 23. The instant analysis does not purport to extend to the larger field of society 
as an abstract whole, and my aim here is not to advance the enterprise of grand social theory. 
Being a far more modest undertaking, mine is not an 'attempt to arrive at an understanding of 
conduct that might be prior to, and independent of, an account of social relations.' Ibid. 
1B To recognise the explanatory utility of aspects of such theories, of course, is not necessarily to 
imply or require the uncritical, wholesale adoption of their doctrinal premises or conclusions. 
Durkheim, and those who have followed him in the functionalist tradition of sociology and 
anthropology, have been criticised for, amongst other things, appearing to argue that 'law is more 
than an index of social reality, [but] that it is the true reality in itself' C. Grace and P. Wilkinson, 
Sociological Inquiry and Legal Phenomena (New York: StMartin's Press, 1978), p. 48. 
Whereas the 'visible symbol (of moral phenomena) is law' and 
we find 'reflected in law all the essential varieties of social 
solidarity'; it is also the case that 'social life, especially where 
it exists durably, tends inevitably to assume a definite form 
and to organise itself, and law is nothing else than this very 
organisation in so far as it has greater stability and precision'. 
[Ibid., footnotes omitted) 
For related critiques, see 1. H. Turner, 'Legal System: An Analytical Model' in The Sociology of 
Law: A Social-Structural Perspective, ed. W.M. Evan (New York: The Free Press, 1980), pp. 377-
394; T. Campbell, Seven Theories of Human Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 
23-26; E. Leach, Custom, Law and Terrorist Violence (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
1977), pp. 6-15. 
19 Unger, Law in Modern Society, p. 30. 
20 Ibid. I see nothing in such a description that operates to preclude the existence of conflict 
Cf Unger, Law in Modern Society, pp. 31-32. Indeed, the 'variations' explicitly acknowledged to 
exist should tend to invite rather than minimise its occurrence. It may also be, as Unger suggests 
in his critique of the consensual paradigm, that '[t)he tighter the agreement that binds individuals 
together and the greater the power to determine their conduct, the less of a role remains for rules' 
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Grounding these theoretical issues in foundations of a more practical 
jurisprudence, Sir Anthony Mason describes the process of judicial decision-
making as necessarily involving a reconciliation of two considerations: the 
intrinsic 'justice of a rule' and 'the fairness and practical efficacy of its operation in 
the circumstances of contemporary society.'21 It seems to me, however, that to 
divorce considerations of justice', 'fairness' and 'practical efficacy' from the socio-
cultural integument in which those ideas are given concrete expression in 
experience is to reify a purely heuristic distinction, since all of these features may 
be seen to derive their meaning and significance from established and evolving 
social norms which are themselves but expressions of demonstrably cultural 
values.22 If the tenability of a judicial decision must ultimately depend upon its 
essential consistency with the fundamental values of the community in which 
context the decision is made and is intended to operate, 23 then so too must the 
legal rules and principles upon which that decision is seen and said to be based. 
Ultimately, the legitimacy of law in society is culturally grounded;24 and although 
(p. 32). Again, however, the presence of the same 'variations' that must inevitably give rise to 
conflict, implies that rules will be generated to contain and manage that conflict. Finally, I see no 
reason why an acceptance of the premise that some form of collective solidarity underpins the 
'basic scheme' of social relations within a group or community must mean, as Unger suggests it 
must, that a 'basis for taking the separateness of persons seriously' is thereby undercut, or that 'the 
claims of individual autonomy' are thereby rejected (pp. 32-33). Here too, it is perfectly 
reasonable (and entirely consistent with a consensus-based view) to assume that the same 
'variations' already referred to will often reflect the expression-and the assertion-of individuals 
and individualism. 
'''Future Directions in Australian Law' (1987) 13 Monash University Law Review 149 at 158. 
22 See M. Rosaldo, 'Toward an Anthropology of Self and Feeling' in Culture Theory, ed. R. 
Shweder and R. LeVine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 137-157. 
"' Mason, 'Future Directions in Australian Law', pp. 158-159. 
'
4 J.H. Scharr observes that political theorists, particularly concerned to elucidate the nature of 
the rule of law in Western democratic societies, have conventionally concentrated on: 
the element of law or right and rest the force of a claim ... 
upon foundations external to and independent of the mere 
assertion or opinion of the claimant .... Thus a claim to 
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Sir Anthony may avoid using the term, the ideas around which his arguments 
revolve implicitly bespeak a dynamic concept of culture. 
The cultural experience of Anglo-Australian judges in Papua New Guinea, and 
the inculcation of Melanesian judges in decidedly Western presumptions about 
and predilections for certain ideas, beliefs and behaviour (necessarily, perhaps, in 
the first instance, if somewhat more surprisingly in the second25) have consistently 
political power is legitimate only when the claimant can 
invoke some source of authority beyond or above himself. 
['Legitimacy in the Modem State' in Legitimacy and the State, 
ed. W.E. Connolly (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 
p. 108] 
In the introductory essay of their edited volume marking the centenary of Dicey's Law of the 
Constitution, Patrick McAuslan and John McEldowney suggest that more recent approaches to an 
adequate definition of 'legitimacy' (for the purposes of political analysis) tend to dissolve the 
concept into a notion of popular belief or opinion. 'Legitimacy and the Constitution: The 
Dissonance between Theory and Practice' in Law, Legitimacy and the Constitution, ed. P. 
McAuslan and J.F. McEldowney (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1985), p. 2. 
If a people holds the belief that existing institutions are 
'appropriate' or 'morally proper' then those institutions are 
legitimate. Popular opinion determines legitimacy and that 
legitimacy is 'a function of the system's ability to persuade 
members [of a society] of its own appropriateness. [Ibid, 
footnotes omitted] 
McAuslan and McEldowney reject such a definition of 'legitimacy' as unsatisfactory for the 
particular purposes of the political analysis which they are concerned to pursue. For the narrower, 
more modest purposes of the instant analysis, however, I believe a concept of'legitimacy' apposite 
to the description above is both adequate and appropriate. Ronald Dworkin advances a consistent 
argument in his discussion of integrity in Law's Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1986), pp. 190-215. 
25 In advancing his arguments in rejection of the cognitive-relativists' claim that 'all science is 
ethnoscience', Melford Spiro, 'Cultural Relativism and the Future of Anthropology' (1986) 1 (3) 
Cultural Anthropology 259 at 260, muses on the similar and seemingly illogical pattern of 
adoption and rejection of supposedly culturally determined theories of Western social science (as 
opposed to law) by Western and non-Western social scientists (as opposed to judges): 
The sweeping claim that social science theories merely reflect 
Western ethnoscience would have to be qualified in respect, at 
least, to some of the most influential ones. The Darwinian, 
Marxian, and Freudian theories, for example, were, and are, 
rejected by scientists and laymen alike on the grounds that 
they violate common sense or are counter-intuitive ... ; in 
short, because they contradict the prevailing ethnoscientific 
theories. Conversely, those who have accepted them have 
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predisposed those judicial arbiters of the law to reject as irreal the substantive 
bases of ideas and beliefs that are inconsistent with such culturally derived 
presumptions and predilections, and to discount as irrational the processes by 
which such beliefs and ideas have come to be held by indigenous Papua New 
Guineans. 26 Accordingly, and almost invariably, jurally determinative 
characterisations of the behaviour associated with those irreal and irrational 
beliefs have tended to reflect a reluctance (and hence, a failure) to place the events 
which come before the courts, and which consist in the concurrence of such ideas, 
beliefs and behaviour, in their proper-that is to say, their Melanesian---cultural 
context, for the supremely determinative purposes of dispositively characterising 
those events in the processes of judicial decision-making.27 
done so in spite of the fact that they were, or are, in conflict 
with prevailing ethnoscientific theories. Moreover, if that 
sweeping claim is correct, why is it that those three theories-
among others-have found acceptance by nonwWestern social 
scientists when they clearly contradict their own 
ethnoscientific theories? [Ibid, pp. 281-282, n. 5 (italicised 
emphasis supplied)] 
With particular reference to anthropological and historical renderings of Pacific Island 
societies, Roger Keesing has shed some instructive light on this apparent paradox, whereby 
Western conceptualisations of 'culture' may be seen to have passed through our scholarly 
discourses and into the 'cultural nationalist rhetoric' of Third world elites. 'Theories of Culture 
Revisited' (1990) Canberra Anthropology 46 at 53. In explaining that process, Keesing described 
how distinctively Western interpretations of aspects of 'traditional' Polynesian and Melanesian 
cultures, 'to which Islanders have been exposed through books and other media ... have fed back 
into contemporary (mis)representations of the Pacific past.' 'Creating the Past: Custom and 
Identity in the Contemporary Pacific' (1989) 1(1 & 2) The Contemporary Pacific 19 at 24. Given 
the hermeneutically bounded nature of the Anglo-Australian common law tradition, and the cross-
national judicial sub-culture to which it has given rise, it is perhaps not quite so surprising after all 
that the juridical reasonings of Papua New Guinean judges should reflect such decidedly 
Anglicised attitudes, values and beliefs. 
26 As we shall see in Chapter Five, similar inclinations have governed legislative 
determinations. 
27 In sentencing indigenous Papua New Guineans convicted of sorcery-related offences, the 
degree of'sophistication', 'civilisation' or 'primitiveness' of the offender have been, and continue to 
be, taken into account, and the severity of the punishment imposed adjusted accordingly. But this 
accommodation of 'irrational' beliefs in 'irreal' phenomena should not be mistaken for 
acknowledgement and acceptance by the courts of the validity of the beliefs in question or the 
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Variably articulated in the orthodox litany of classical legal positivism28 or the 
radical idiom of contemporary feminist jurisprudence,29 the conceptual bases of 
such fundamentally determinative characterisations are governed by 
epistemological principles30 firmly anchored in a decidedly Western cultural 
orientation.31 Sympathetically admitting of the fact that some or even many 
people-and in Papua New Guinea, surely most people-may hold 'irrational' 
beliefs in the existence of 'irreal' phenomena, this is a perspective from which the 
formal acknowledgement of the existence of those phenomena in reality is 
resolutely excluded.32 Thus, for judicial as much as for legislative purposes, the 
persistent rationale behind the characterisation and disposition of matters 
involving sorcery-related beliefs and practices in Papua New Guinea today 
reality of the phenomena. See H. Murray, Papua of Today, or an Australian Colony in the Making 
(London: P.S. King & Sons Ltd, 1925), p. 85; D.R.C. Chalmers, D. Weisbrot and W.J. Andrew, 
Criminal Law and Practice of Papua New Guinea, 2nd ed. (Sydney: Law Book Company, 1985), 
pp. 635-640; S. Dinnen, 'Sentencing, Custom and the Rule of Law in Papua New Guinea' (I 988) 
27 Journal of Legal Pluralism 19-54. 
'" See, e.g. Kapi J's discussion of the 'guiding' theories of criminal law, in accordance with 
which the sentencing of the accused in Uname Aumane (who had been convicted of killing a 
person believed to have been a sorcerer) was properly to be informed. (1980]510 at 537-538. 
29 See, e.g. The State v Daniel Aigal & Anor. N 891 (12 July 1990) at 12, in which Brunton J's 
assessment of the 'political role of the witch-hunt ... [as] a form of terror that holds women in 
their place' was frankly based on '(a] more recent understanding of the social role of witch-hunts 
emphasis[ing] their context in sexual-politics.' 
30 See S C Coval and J C Smith, Law and its Presuppositions: Actions, Agents and Rules 
(London: Rutledge & Kegan Paul, 1986). 
31 See D.R. Kelley, The Human Measure: Social Thought in the Western Legal Tradition 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990); H.J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The 
Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983; 
R.M. Unger, The Modern Law (New York: The Free Press, 1976). 
32 To be sure, not all judges in Papua New Guinea have been entirely influenced by their own 
or their adopted, Western cultural predilections. See e.g. the comments of Smithers J in R. v Man 
and Debong (1965-66] P&NGLR 42 at 51 and Narokobi AJ in The State v Noah Magou [1981] 
PNGLR I at 4. But these examples tend rather to provide the exceptions that prove the rule. 
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effectively remains as it was candidly described nearly a century ago by the then 
Lieutenant-Governor of Papua, J.H.P. Murray: 
The . . . Papuan looks upon sorcery as reality, whereas the 
European (as a rule) does not; to the former no punishment 
would be sufficient short of death, or at any rate a long term of 
imprisonment, either of which seems to us to be out of the 
question in the case of what is after all, according to our view, 
only an imaginary offence.33 
The prevailing epistemological premises of modern Western culture and 
society categorically and universally preclude the existence, in fact, of sorcery and 
witchcraft.34 Genuine beliefs in such phenomena, honestly held amongst members 
of our own society and others alike, are invariably regarded irrational or 
delusionary, irrespective of the depth or prevalence of those beliefs within a 
particular society or comrnunity35 Jurally characterised on the basis of these 
cultural cum epistemological criteria, behaviour predicated upon the belief in 
sorcery, witchcraft, magic and related supernatural phenomena, is regarded as 
essentially, if not always statistically, aberrant.36 Dispositive judicial 
determinations consistent with that characterisation inevitably follow on. 
Poignantly indicative of the culturally-bounded justificatory process by which 
the rational bases of Western law are explained and validated, it is just such 
'' Papua or British New Guinea Today (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1912), pp. 202-203 
(emphasis supplied). 
34 See D.L. Jorgensen and L. Jorgensen, 'Social Meanings of the Occult' (1982) 23(3) The 
Sociological Quarterly 373-389; E.A. Tiryakian, 'Toward the Sociology of Esoteric Culture' 
(1973) 78 American Journal of Sociology 491-512; E.A. Tiryakian, ed., On the Margin of the 
Visible (New York: Wiley Science, 1974). 
35 Except, of course, amongst those who actually and honestly hold those beliefs. See F.D. 
Goodman, Possession and Exorcism in the Modern World (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1988). 
36 The philosophical foundations of this characterisation and its psychological and medical 
implications are explored in J. Radden, Madness and Reason (London: George Allen & Unwin, 
1985). 
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beliefs and practices which provide ready examples of what the law must reject, 
because their admission is precluded by reason itself.37 Thus, with explicit 
reference to '[w]itchcraft, demonology, exorcism and healing rites', Coval and 
Smith observe:38 
There have existed and still exist practices which have no 
[rationally] sufficient causal basis. Inevitably, such practices 
will fail. Some will persist because of the belief that there is a 
causal basis, some hypothetical entity which gets the job done, 
when actually there is no such entity in existence. 39 
Indeed, virtually everything modem Western scholarship places on offer in 
respect of sorcery-related beliefs and practices tends to be formulated in implicit 
accordance with the conceptual premise that, since the existence of sorcery has no 
tenable basis in reality, belief in the existence of sorcery is perforce irrational.40 
The politesse of contemporary intellectual and scientific discourse may have 
supplanted the derision and arrogance with which such beliefs were dismissed in 
years past,41 but the dismissive import of the premise remains the same. To 
37 See G. Cavender, 'A Note on Voudou as an Alternative Mechanism for Addressing Legal 
Problems' (1988) 27 Journal of Legal Pluralism 1-17; D.S. Clark 'Witchcraft and Legal Pluralism: 
The Case of Celimo Miquirucama' (1980) 15(4) Tulsa Law Journal 679-698; J. Lewis, 'The 
Outlook for a Devil in the Colonies: A Colonial Viewpoint on Witchcraft, Homicide and the 
Supernatural' [1958] Criminal Law Review 661-675; G.L. Williams, 'Homicide and the 
Supernatural' (1949) 65 Law Quarterly Review 491-503. 
38 S.C. Coval and J.C. Smith, Law and its Presuppositions: Actions, Agents and Rules 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986). 
" Ibid., p. 56 (emphasis supplied). For a cntiCISm of the presumptively rational 
presuppositions of modern Western legal theory, see M. Saltman, "'The Law is a Ass": An 
Anthropological Appraisal' in Reason and Morality, ed. J. Overing (London: Tavistock 
Publications, 1985), pp. 226-239. 
40 See, for example, the remarks of Philip Mayer in a lecture on African witchcraft delivered 
at Rhodes University in 1954, reproduced under the title 'Witches' in Witchcraft and Sorcery: 
Selected Readings, 2nd ed., ed. M. Marwick (Hannondsworth: Penguin Books, 1982), pp. 54-70. 
41 John Barry's closing remarks in an address to the Medico-Legal Society of Victoria in 1936 
are illustrative. Having spoken on 'Some Aspects of Magic, Witchcraft and Sorcery', Barry 
concluded: 
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borrow a characterising aphorism from the popular press, they are all either 'myth 
or madness'. 42 
At all events, the premise itself reflects neither more nor less than the 
universal projection of a particular set of culturally determined assumptions about 
the nature and dimensions of reality, and an associated set of predilections for 
behaviour that is consistent with those assumptions. And it is this culturally 
derived premise which forms the epistemological justification for the 
determinative characterisation of the beliefs and behaviour of millions of people 
with whose own cultural orientations-which is to say, with whose own 
cosmological, ontological, epistemological, conceptual and experiential 
orientations-that premise is readily conceded to be fundamentally at variance. It 
may well be, as Roberto Unger insists, that '[o]ur theories of culture and social 
organization depend on the view we have of human conduct and of interpersonal 
relations.'43 There can be no doubt, however, that those underlying views of 
human conduct and interpersonal relations are themselves culturally derived and 
determined. 
It is our duty as members of professions which claim to apply 
man's most recently acquired faculty, that of reason, to see that 
we do not, in the discharge of our functions, act upon any 
assumption unless it can clearly be demonstrated to have a 
factual existence. As yet, reason has cleared but a little space 
in the dark jungle of superstition, opposed alike to true 
religion and to science, that chokes our minds. It is for us to 
see that space is kept cleared, and so far as it lies within each 
one of us to do so, to extend its boundaries. [(1936) 2 
Proceedings of the Medico-Legal Society of Victoria, pp. 114 
at 133] 
42 
'Satan in the Suburbs: Myth or Madness?' The Australian Magazine (30 November-! 
December 1991). 
" Unger, Law in Modern Society, p. 23 (emphasis supplied). 
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For all that, Western social, scientific and legal thought is perfectly prepared 
to accommodate the existence of irrational beliefs, even if their substantive basis 
in reality is denied outright. Thus characterised, irrational beliefs are theoretically 
explicable in the eminently rational terms of social science as objective indicia of 
deviance, amongst medical authorities, as symptoms of delusionary 
psychopathology and by judges and lawyers as manifestations of insanity. And 
yet, well within the realm of the 'acceptable' in contemporary Western science, 
society and culture, there are places and names for a whole host of irrational 
beliefs-and believers-not all of which necessarily bear the stigma of 
disapprobation.44 Indeed, a good deal of the richness and depth of Western 
aesthetics, passion and spirituality derives from the explicitly recognised virtue of 
the irrational, as an expression of creativity or inspiration, in art, music, poetry, 
literature and religious faith.45 
As a cultural predilection, however, the entertainment of rational beliefs is 
decidedly preferable to most members of Western societies and to an increasing 
number of the members of Westemised societies alike. As a practical matter, it is 
certainly more advantageous for those who wish to function effectively in any 
'modem' society to hold, and to conduct themselves in accordance with, such 
44 As Mayer noted: 'Rationalism teaches that everything may be interpreted as the outcome of 
natural causes ... , [and w]itches can only have a place in a cosmology that admits to the 
possibility of things ... departing from the natural order.' In spite of our rationalism, however, we 
ourselves 'appear to admit this possibility up to a point, as when we speak of "uncanny" luck, 
meaning contrary to natural order ... .''Witches', p. 60. 
45 The concept and experience of love, which must certainly be acknowledged as one of the 
principal and perennially enigmatic features of Western civilisation, is a social force pre-eminently 
'irrational' in its characteristic expression, and yet one that is seemingly valued all the more highly 
on that account. Michael Detmold provocatively juxtaposed the irrationality of love to the rational 
elements of law in an intriguing paper entitled, 'Love and Hate: Aspects of Law and Feminism', 
presented at a seminar in the Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 
16 August 1990. See also E. Gellner, 'Concepts and Society' in Rationality, ed. B. Wilson 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1970), pp. 18-49. 
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beliefs. A modem society is, perforce, a rational society, and it is on a decidedly 
Western model of rational thought and action that the greatest premium is placed. 
In the main, therefore, Western law, and the common law in particular perhaps, 
is--or at any rate, appears to be-rather less tolerant in its accommodation of 
irrational beliefs. Thus, when particular irrational beliefs are causally associated 
with certain forms of behaviour, the courts have been especially constrained to 
draw clear and sharp distinctions between what is, and what is not, acceptable, 
deterrninatively characterising (and, as appropriate, negatively sanctioning) 
conduct of the latter variety, whilst mitigating culpability and its attendant 
penalties only to the extent that the perpetrator might rationally be regarded as 
ignorant, deluded, insane--or, as the case may be, merely 'primitive' 46 
It is no accident that the law's requirements for rationality, both in the nature 
of the conduct subject to judicial scrutiny and in the process of deterrninatively 
characterising that conduct for the purposes of judicial decision-making, rest 
squarely on the foundation of necessarily shared beliefs about the content and 
contours of a decidedly Western social reality. Within that reality, what is true 
must be real and what is real must either be rational, or else it must be explicable 
in rational terrns.47 
'
6 See, for example, the judgement of Andrew J in Acting Public Prosecutor v Uname 
Aumane & Ors [1980) PNGLR 510 at 529. Although his Honour did not use the term 'primitive', 
in referring to the judgement of the Supreme Court in Public Prosecutor v. Tom Ake [1978) 
PNGLR 469, he clearly considered it appropriate to balance the "'degree of sophistication of the 
accused and the retributive and public deterrent elements of the punishment required"' in 
determining that, where the accused had been convicted of killing a woman he believed to have 
been a sorceress, the imposition of a greater sentence was warranted for 'educative' purposes. 
47 See F.S. Cohen, Ethical Systems and Legal/deals: An Essay on the Foundations of Legal 
Criticism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1933), pp. 16-17: 
[T]here is no way of escaping the final responsibility of law to 
ethics, and, since the field of law lies within the field of human 
conduct, to morality .... To delimit the realm of ethics which 
is relevant to law is merely to outline the realm of ethically 
The practice of truth-speaking implies that agents must be able 
to reckon, must be rational, since the appraisal of the truth-
value of beliefs will depend upon our ability to reckon 
according to certain rules. The first practice will then call 
forth a second, that of what we may call formal rationality. If, 
for example, prediction is a requirement of rationality in that 
we must have class terms in order to reason, it will also be the 
case that these terms must be used consistently. Prediction 
and truth will both depend upon such considerations, among 
others, from formal rationality.48 
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Nor is it merely a matter of coincidence that the rational parameters of the 
particular social reality articulated in that process will reflect the cultural 
predilections implicit in the institutions, traditions and experience of those to 
whom that determinative articulatory task has been entrusted (and who 
presumably share the cultural predilections of the larger community, or are at least 
conversant with them). This much is frankly acknowledged in Sir Anthony 
Mason's identification of the proper role of 'community values' in the process of 
judicial decision-making:49 
59. 
[I]t is impossible to interpret any instrument, let alone a 
constitution, divorced from values. To the extent that they 
are taken into account, they should be acknowledged and 
should be accepted community values rather than mere 
personal values. . When judges fail to discuss the 
underlying values influencing a judgment, it is difficult to 
debate the appropriateness of those values. As judges who are 
unaware of the original underlying values apply that precedent 
in accordance with the doctrine of stare decisis, those hidden 
values are reproduced in the new judgment-even though the 
community values may have changed."' 
justiciable facts which law can comprehend or affect. And 
that is a task involving positive [rational] science. 
48 Coval and Smith, Law and its Presuppositions, p. 31. 
49 'Future Directions in Australian Law' (1987) 13 Monash University Law Review 149 at 158-
so A. Mason, 'The Role of a Constitutional Court in a Federation: A Comparison of the 
Australian and United States Experience' (1986) 16 Federal Law Review 1 at 5. See also D. 
Solomon, The Politica/lmpact of the High Court (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1992), pp. 184-188. 
Elaborating on Sir Anthony's extra-curial arguments on the role and function of 'community 
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It is implicit, too, however, even in the ordinary exercise of the most conventional 
judicial discretion. 51 
Although it is a matter upon the nuances of which philosophical debate 
continues, the fundamental intendment of modern Western law is generally 
regarded as securely anchored in precepts of rationality and rationalism. 52 This, of 
course, is not to say that it is only or always the law that requires people's conduct 
to conform to particular, culturally specific criteria of formal rationality. Indeed, 
so long as their consequences remain innocuous, the irrational qualities of people's 
beliefs and behaviour in contemporary Anglo-Australian society are generally of 
far less concern to the law than they are to other normative systems of social 
control. 53 And, as mentioned above, in certain areas of human affairs and social 
endeavour, the expression of irrationality (or at any rate, the discernible influence 
values' in judicial decision-making, David Wood thoughtfully advocates the development of a 
more.self-conscious jurisprudence of community values'. 'Adjudication and Community Values: 
Sir Anthony Mason's Recommendations' in The Emergence of Australian Law. ed. M.P. 
Ellinghaus, A.J. Bradbrook and A.J. Duggan (Sydney: Butterworths, 1989), pp. 89 at 103. In The 
Nature of the Common Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), Melvin Eisenberg 
would appear to have gone some way towards the development of such a jurisprudence, albeit 
with a particular view to the American common-law system (see especially pp. 14-42, 43-49). 
51 See 0. Dixon, 'Concerning Judicial Method' (1956) 29 Australian Law Reports Journal468 
at 472; R. Pattenden, The Judge. Discretion, and the Criminal Trial (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1982), pp. 1-10; A. Barak, Judicial Discretion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), pp. 64-
72, 154, 165; Lord Lloyd and M.D.A. Freeman, Lloyd's Introduction to Jurisprudence, 5th ed. 
(London: Stevens & Sons Ltd, 1985), pp. 1120-1129. Even Weber was prepared to recognise this 
in his otherwise dichotomous analysis of (modern) rational and (primitive) irrational methods of 
legal decision-making. See N.S. Marsh, 'Principle and Discretion in the Judicial Process' (1952) 
68(270) Law Quarterly Review 226-237 at 227-228. 
52 See N.E. Simmonds, The Decline of Juridical Reason: Doctrine and Theory in the Legal 
Order (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), pp. 17-36; Unger, Law in Modern 
Society, pp. ll-12; D.J. Galligan, 'Arbitrariness and Formal Justice in Discretionary Decisions' in 
Essays in Legal Theory: A Collaborative Work, ed. D.J. Galligan (Carlton, VIC: Melbourne 
University Press, 1984), pp. 145-164. 
53 See R. Posner, The Economic Analysis of Law, 3rd ed. (Boston: Little Brown, 1986), pp. 4-
16. 
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of the irrational on such expression) may be regarded as an aesthetic or a spiritual 
virtue.54 
Our concern here, however, is with law; and as a rule, when people act in a 
manner affecting others in certain significant ways, the law will 'find them obliged 
to act within th[ e] norms of formal rationality'. Otherwise, no one is in a position 
rationally to predict the consequences of those actions-such consequences 
themselves 'being known (best) through prediction.'55 
Since prediction presupposes predication, universalizability 
(consistency), impartiality and other canons of formal 
rationality, we can see that formal rationality is a necessary 
condition of the function of any social practice or institution. 56 
3. SURMOUNTING THE 
CULTURAL-CONCEPTUAL OBSTACLES 
Overcoming the conceptual barriers which tend to impede the development of 
a clearer theoretical understanding of the nature and function of law and sorcery in 
Papua New Guinea today-and thus to inhibit a more constructive approach to the 
practical problems which sorcery is seen to pose for the law-requires the 
adoption of an analytical perspective from which a proper account of the 
prevailing constructs of Melanesian social reality may be taken. The adoption of 
such a perspective involves considerably more than simply recognising the 
difference between what has been described as the 'internal' and 'external' 
approaches to the study of legal phenomena in different, supposedly 'simple' 
societies, although a refined understanding of that difference is certainly 
54 See note 45 above. 
ss Coval and Smith, Law and its Presuppositions, p. 32. 
56 Ibid. 
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essentia!.57 More, too, is involved than merely acknowledging the existence of a 
multiplicity of legal ideas, institutions and 'systems', as these may be identified 
and their operations described in relation to the multitude of cultures and societies 
in which they are found; and more still is required than the development of a 
sensitive appreciation for the multiplexity of law's functions and concerns even 
within a single society. sa 
Beyond a necessary theoretical (and hence, methodological) acceptance of the 
plurality of law, there must also be an underlying acceptance of, and an abiding 
commitment to, a dynamic concept of legal pluralism, if analysis in relation to the 
problems of law and sorcery in Papua New Guinea today is to be meaningful and 
if proposals for responsive action are to be constructive.59 The nature and 
57 G. MacCormack, 'Anthropology and Legal Theory' (1978) The Juridical Review 216, 216-
217: 
The external approach may be manifested in a number of 
ways. At its most extreme it takes the form of the application 
to the society under investigation of a theory of law 
formulated in the context of a different society or culture. But 
it may take less overt forms; an investigator after describing 
the social life of a people may use a criterion not recognised 
by the people themselves to [amongst other things] divide the 
legal from the non-legal. The internal approach is adopted 
where an investigator, working without preconceptions, 
attempts to discover the classifications which members of the 
society use in applying normative notions to behaviour. 
58 See P. Sack, 'Legal Pluralism: Introductory Comments' in Legal Pluralism: Proceedings of 
the Canberra Law Workshop VII, ed. P. Sack and E. Minchin (Canberra: Law Department, 
Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1986), pp. 1-16. 
" See generally J. Vanderlinden, 'Return to Legal Pluralism: Twenty Years Later' (1989) 28 
Journal of Legal Pluralism 149-157; M. Chiba, Legal Pluralism: Toward a General Theory 
Through Japanese Legal Culture (Tokyo: Tokai University Press, 1989), pp. 1-9, 171-180; S. 
Merry, 'Legal Pluralism' (1988) 22(5) Law & Society Review 869-896; J. Griffiths, 'What is Legal 
Pluralism?' (1986) 24 Journal of Legal Pluralism 24-55; M. Hooker, Legal Pluralism: An 
Introduction to Colonial and Neo-Colonial Laws (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), pp. 6-14. As 
Alice Tay observes, the expression 'legal pluralism' has become something of a 'hurrah-word' to 
which reference is frequently confused and imprecise. In a broad sense, Professor Tay notes: 
[T]he phrase reminds us that there are many and different legal 
systems, legal arrangements, legal customs and legal 'cultures' 
in the world, and that they may and do conflict with each 
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dimensions of the particular pluralist perspective advocated here are developed in 
detail and explored at some length in Chapter Seven. At this point, however, it is 
important to recognise that its adoption involves something in the nature of an 
'ideological commitment',60 as a precondition to which one must be prepared to 
accept and predicate upon-not merely to acknowledge and accommodate where 
it is convenient to do so-three general propositions. 
First, it must be understood that every operative conception of reality is a 
social construction, the contours and content of which may shift and change in 
accordance with the prevailing terms of an amorphous popular consensus. 
Secondly, the specific content of such a construction must be recognised as 
consisting essentially in the products of culturally derived assumptions about the 
other. ['China and Legal Pluralism' in Sack and Minchin, 
Legal Pluralism, p. 29.] 
June Starr and Jane Collier endorse what they see as a rejection of the term, because they 
believe it implies a sense of 'equality' in the arrangement of relations amongst different legal 
orders which belies the actual (and, in their view, invariably) hierarchical status of those relations. 
Legal pluralism, they argue--
misrepresent[s] the asymmetrical power relations that inhere in 
the coexistence of multiple legal orders. Various legal 
systems may coexist, as occurs in many colonial and post 
colonial states, but the legal orders are hardly equal. 
['Introduction: Dialogues in Legal Anthropology' in History 
and Power in the Study of Law: New Directions in Legal 
Anthropology (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 
1989), p. 9]. 
60 Sack, 'Legal Pluralism', p. I: 
Legal pluralism is more than the acceptance of the plurality of 
law; it sees this plurality as a positive force to be utilised-and 
controlled-rather than eliminated. Legal pluralism thus 
involves an ideological commitment. 
Whilst the broad and relatively uncontroversial definition Professor Tay offers adequately 
captures the more generally accepted meaning of the term 'legal pluralism', because it is narrower 
and, in that sense, more precise, Sack's definition provides what I regard as a more appropriate 
point of analytical departure. More importantly, Sack's definition frankly embraces a distinct set 
of political sentiments that are quite different to those which Starr and Collier suggest the term 
necessarily imports, and which, mutatis mutandis. are demonstrably more pertinent to the political 
and legal circumstances of contemporary Papua New Guinea. 
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nature of the real world and culturally mediated predilections for particular forms 
of human action that are consistent with those assumptions. And thirdly, the 
parameters in accordance with which particular beliefs and behaviour are 
determinatively characterised for jural purposes must--or, at any rate, ought to--
be regarded as reflections of the prevailing presumptions and predilections of the 
culture and society in which those characterisations are determinatively operative. 
The ideological implications of the last-mentioned proposition 
notwithstanding, it does not seem to me that there is anything inherent in the 
adoption of such a perspective that is fundamentally inimical to a modem Western 
Weltanschauung or at radical odds with the actual processes of modem Western 
law.6I It can hardly be called novel-prefigured, as it was, in the proto-
anthropological political philosophy of Montesquieu, and instantiated in his now 
classic observation cum exhortation that 'the political and civil laws of each nation 
should be . . . so appropriate to the people for whom they are made that it is 
very unlikely that the laws of one nation can suit another. '62 Indeed, perhaps the 
greatest, if greatly under-valued, virtue of the common law tradition lies in the 
" See D.R. Kelley, The Human Measure: Social Thought in the Western Legal Tradition 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. II; B. Grossfeld, The Strength and 
Weakness of Comparative Law, trans. T. Weir (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p. 41. 
62 The Spirit of the Laws, trans and ed. A.M. Cobler, B.C. Miller and H.S. Stone (1748; rpt. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 8; and see also L. Pospisil, Anthropology of 
Law: A Comparative Theory (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 130. 
In Australia certainly, the point has not been lost on the High Court, which in recent years has 
played an increasingly active role in the articulation of a distinctively Australian jurisprudence. 
See M. Ellinghaus, A. Bradbrook and A. Duggan, eds., The Emergence of Australian Law 
(Sydney: Butterworths, 1989), x. The High Court's decision in Mabo v Queensland (1992) 107 
ALR I is only the most recent, if an exceptionally controversial, example. For an extensive 
discussion and analysis of other indicative examples the several essays collected in Ellinghaus, 
Bradbrook and Duggan, The Emergence of Australian Law. As we have seen, the Chief Justice 
himself has played an especially active role in the acknowledgement of the demonstrably cultural 
bases of an emerging, distinctively Australian jurisprudence. See Sir Anthony Mason, 'Changing 
the Law in a Changing Society' (1993) 67 Australian Law Journal568-574. See also D. Wood, 
'Adjudication and Community Values: Sir Anthony Mason's Recommendations' in Ellinghaus, 
Bradbrook and Duggan, The Emergence of Australian, pp. 89-103. 
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remarkable capacity of that tradition to adjust and adapt to the disparate and 
changing cultural values of the disparate societies and cultures in which it 
operates.63 
At a conceptual level, the transcending ideas of 'legal pluralism' and, to a 
lesser extent, the transcendent ideals of 'cultural relativism', have in fact achieved 
widespread acceptance amongst a considerable and increasing number of 
contemporary Western legal scholars and jurists-including those who, on 
patently moral or ideological grounds, feel obliged to reject some of the practical 
implications of the application of those ideas in particular circumstances. 64 It is at 
the underlying cultural level, however, that the real difficulties associated with 
determinative jural characterisations of sorcery-related beliefs and behaviour arise. 
Unless those difficulties are understood and addressed at that level, the essential 
nature of the problem of law and sorcery will remain obscure, and viable 
approaches to its practical resolution will remain elusive. 
63 Julius Stone's suggestion that a central function of the law should be to 'help rather than 
hinder an orderly and circumspect adjustment to change in social life' provides an apposite 
contemporary expression of the same idea. Precedent and Law (Sydney: Butterworths, 1985), p. 
27!. See also R. Cooke, 'The Dynamics of the Common Law' in Conference Papers: Proceedings 
of the 9th Commonwealth Law Conference (Auckland: Commerce Clearing House Ltd, 1990), pp. 
l-7; A. Mason, 'Changing Law in a Changing Society' (1993) 67 Australian Law Journal 568-574. 
This feature of the common law tradition is examined in Chapter Seven. 
64 See e.g. K. Brennan, 'The Influence of Cultural Relativism on International Human Rights 
Law: Female Circumcision as a Case Study' (1989) 7(3) Law & Inequality 367-398. In Australia, 
unsettled debate about the nature and direction of determinative socio-legal characterisations 
Qudicial and otherwise) of all manner of beliefs and behaviour appears to have less to do with 
either the recognition or acceptance of the fact that those determinations and determinative 
processes involve the expression and manifestation of essentially cultural values, than with the 
precise dimensions of those values and the extent to they 'ought to be modified'-if, indeed, they 
ought to be modified at ali-in response to the increasing cultural diversity of contemporary 
Australian society. See G. Bird, The Process of Law in Australia: Intercultural Perspectives, 2nd 
ed. (Sydney: Butterworths, 1993), p. 460. See also Australian Law Reform Commission, 
Multiculturalism and the Law, Report No. 57 (Canberra: AGPS, 1992), p. 9. 
4. THE PERSISTENCE OF CULTURAL PREDILECTION IN THE 
DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF SORCERY-RELATED 
BELIEFS AND PRACTICES 
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To the extent that salient aspects of social reality are constructed along 
dimensions of culturally derived significance, social phenomena of all kinds will 
necessarily assume such significance-or may be denied significance altogether-
as a consequence of the meaning ascribed to them on culturally determined bases. 
Judicial reasoning is, to say the least, 'heavily conditioned by culture, and 
consequently is itself a culturally relative phenomenon.'65 Thus, to the extent that 
the operative concepts and conceptions of Melanesian sorcery which inform the 
processes whereby jurally determinative characterisations of sorcery-related 
beliefs and behaviour are carried out are themselves recognised as the products of 
decidedly Western constructions of social reality, those determinative processes, 
and the dispositions to which they give rise, will necessarily reflect decidedly 
Western cultural predilections. 
For the purposes of theoretical jurisprudence and practical judicial decision-
making alike, the informing ideas and experiences that are brought to bear upon 
the processes by which the sorcery-related beliefs and practices of indigenous 
Melanesians are given determinative legal significance are, like the law itself, the 
products of distinctively Western cultural assumptions about the nature of reality 
as a transcendent concept, and the qualitative dynamics of human affairs as they 
are conducted within parameters of particular conceptions of social reality. With 
syllogistic simplicity, this proposition encapsulates the problematique of law and 
sorcery in Papua New Guinea today. For whereas the vast majority of indigenous 
Papua New Guineans recognise the existence of, and attribute a particular order of 
65 Saltman, The Demise of the 'Reasonable Man', p. I. 
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culturally derived significance to, the ideas and beliefs associated with sorcery and 
witchcraft, and whilst that recognition and attribution of significance is duly 
reflected in the jurally determinative characterisations of behaviour associated 
with those ideas and beliefs in terms demonstrably appropriate to contemporary 
Melanesian culture and society, the law of the State of Papua New Guinea is seen 
to operate to deny the existence of the phenomena on which sorcery-related ideas 
and beliefs are based, and to characterise those ideas, beliefs and the behaviour 
associated with them on equally determinative judicial bases that are consistent 
with the parameters of Western, rather than Melanesian, constructions of social 
reality. 
As a consequence, where ignorance, prejudice or abject bigotry may have 
informed the jurally determinative processes of legal characterisation in the 
colonial past, those processes and their outcomes tended, almost inevitably, to 
reflect distinctively Western (and peculiarly Anglo-Australian) varieties of 
ignorance, prejudice and bigotry. Just as inevitably, however, where ignorance, 
prejudice and bigotry have since been supplanted by new knowledge, wider 
experience, greater understanding and what might be described as an attendant 
wisdom, it remains nonetheless a distinctively Western kind of knowledge, 
experience, understanding and wisdom-burdened and buoyed by the ideas and 
ideals of peculiarly Western (and decidedly Anglo-Australian) ethics, morality 
and social philosophy that underlie the purportedly universalist teachings of 
modern anthropology, sociology, psychology, economics, history and political 
science-which are now brought to bear upon the determinative processes of legal 
8-i 
and judicial decision-making.66 In so many respects so much has changed; and 
yet, in this fundamental sense, so much remains the same. 
5. CRITICAL CIRCUMSPECTION IN THE EVALUATION OF THE 
LITERATURE OF SORCERY AND WITCHCRAFT 
The literature of witchcraft and sorcery is said to be 'understandably rich' 
largely on account of Western society's emancipation from those systems of 
beliefs and their associated practices. 67 As 'primitive' ideas and phenomena, 
singularly bespeaking 'the most bizarre and exotic aspect of native life,' sorcery 
and witchcraft have consistently attracted a disproportionate share of scholarly 
and popular attention alike.68 And in both instances, this focused attention 
appears to be based on the assumption that such beliefs and practices are 
demonstrably indicative of the profound differences between contemporary native 
cultures and societies and our own, on the one hand, and comparable measures of 
difference between the regnant beliefs and practices of modem Western society 
and those which prevailed amongst our forbears at the close of the medieval 
period, on the other.69 
66 This is not to adopt or advance a thesis built upon the kind of epistemological relativism 
Melford Spiro so effectively criticises in his article, 'Cultural Relativism and the Future of 
Anthropology (1986) 1(3) Cultural Anthropology 259-286. Mine is not an argument intended to 
appeal to the unreconstructed cultural determinist, and there is nothing in my suggestion that 
'distinctively' Western-or 'peculiarly' Anglo-Australian-norms and values Qural or otherwise) 
might not share something, and perhaps a great deal, in common with the norms and values 
attaching to similar beliefs, attitudes and behaviour as these occur in other cultures and societies 
(including, in this case, Melanesian cultures and societies). 
67 M. Marwick, 'Introduction' in Witchcraft and Sorcery: Selected Readings. 2nd ed 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1982), p. 15. 
68 Ibid. 
69 It was only until the close of the medieval period that 'European beliefs in witchcraft and 
sorcery seem to have had much in common with those prevailing among present-day non-literate 
peoples.' Ibid, p. 14. As we shall see, the witchcraft and sorcery beliefs which preoccupied 
British and continental European societies between the fifteenth and early eighteenth century are 
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From a contemporary Western perspective then, the sorcery beliefs and 
practices of native peoples are said to be intrinsically interesting because 'they 
represent the standardized delusions of the societies concerned,' and thus 
effectively serve to sharpen the reassuring assumptions of difference that separate 
our own modem, scientifically enlightened and eminently rational society from 
those primitive, pre-scientific, irrational others. From the same implicitly 
comparative perspective, sorcery beliefs and practices become important objects 
of scholarly study 'because of the light they throw on human behaviour in general, 
including that of ourselves among whom they no longer command credence. •70 
Emblematising significant indicia of the structure and values of the societies 
involved, the comparative study of sorcery and witchcraft beliefs 'is not merely an 
antiquarian exercise but one of the keys to the understanding of society' 
simpliciter.71 
Before unpacking some of the fundamental propositions upon which modem 
scholarly descriptions and analyses of sorcery and witchcraft generally predicate, 
and before examining more closely the theories and paradigmatic explanations 
that have been built upon those propositions and applied, mutatis mutandis, in 
particular Melanesian contexts, it will be instructive to reflect for a moment on the 
way in which conventional scholarly treatments of the subject presumptively (and, 
I would suggest, presumptuously) dismiss sorcery and witchcraft beliefs as 
irrational, unscientific or, more presumptuously still, pre-scientificn Such 
said to have been of a different order to that of the earlier periods, when their features shared 
much in common with the beliefs and practices of contemporary Melanesian and African societies. 
70 Marwick, Witchcraft and Sorcery, p. 16. 
71 Monica Hunter Wilson, 'Witch Beliefs and Social Structure' (1951) 56( 4) American Journal 
of Sociology 307, 313. 
72 Political rectitude in scholarly discourse has done away with the once-common adjectival 
appellations of 'native' and 'primitive' society, only to replace them with euphemisms of what 
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dismissals may be patent and overt: as, for example, in Goldthorpe's introductory 
sociology text where, 'from the standpoint of science,' the injurious acts of 
sorcerers are regarded as 'quite ineffectual', the powers attributed to witches are 
described as 'imaginary' and witchcraft accusations are likewise characterised as 
'of course . empty accusation[s].'73 More usually, however, preliminary 
assumptions of irrationality are implicit in the very method of descriptive 
representation itself, whereby purportedly objective depictions of the sorcery-
related beliefs and behaviour of other societies and cultures, as well as those of 
Western society at an earlier time (and including sub-groups within Western 
societies today), are cast in the unprepossessingly neutral terms of difference. 
Subtly, and without necessarily conscious intention, the latter, more 
commonplace expressions of experiential difference operate to distance the 
rational observer from the irrational objects and subjects of his or her scrutiny. 
In the spirit of what Roland Barthes described as the 'zero-degree writing' to 
which all scientific discourse aspires,74 rational, objective ethnographic 
scholarship necessarily eschews both the endorsement and the rejection of the 
irrational beliefs it seeks to describe; although no credible ethnographer would 
frankly acknowledge the real existence of phenomena which, on rational grounds, 
cannot be real. To adumbrate illustrative occurrences in the ethnographic 
literature would be otiose since, as a genre, that literature consists, in the main, of 
seems to me to be an equally offensive, and sometimes spurious, nature (viz. 'simple', 'tribal', 
'traditional', 'indigenous', etc.) Of all these, the evolutionistic designation 'pre-scientific' smacks 
of an especially unseemly kind of arrogance, suggesting, as it does, not only that the society in 
question lacks a scientific perspective of equal dignity to our own, but that it has not yet achieved 
that perspective to which one must assume all societies must naturally aspire. 
73 J. Goldthorpe, An Introduction to Sociology, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1985), p. 197. 
74 Writing Zero Degree (London: Jonathan Cape, 1967). See also J. Gusfie1d, 'The Literary 
Rhetoric of Science: Comedy and Pathos in Drinking Driver Research' (!976) 41 American 
Sociological Review 16-34. 
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descriptions of what they believe and re-presentations of their beliefs from the 
detached, implicitly privileged perspective of a rational ethnographic analysis.75 It 
is a literature in which the anthropologist's scholarly authority, deployed 
'heuristically, as a tactic' and often disguising, rather than rising above, the 
crudities of an earlier, abject ethnocentrism,76 continues to belie the equally 
persuasive and equally fictive (if, perhaps, rather less invidious) crypto-
ethnocentrism of modem anthropological scholarship. 77 
In a probing exegesis of the ethnographic method and genre, Paul Atkinson 
casts a critically discerning eye on the tension which lies at the very heart of the 
75 Over the past decade, a spate of reflexive critiques (and defences) of the ethnographic 
enterprise have focused intensely on the implications of this subtle, often unconscious and 
potentially pernicious process. See F. Barth, 'Method in Our Critique of Anthropology' (1992) 
27(1) Man (N.S.) 175-177; A. Biersack, 'Thinking Difference: A Review of Marilyn Strathern's 
The Gender of the Gift' (1991) 62(2) Oceania 147-153; K. Birth, 'Reading and the Righting of 
Ethnographies' (1990) 17(3) American Ethnologist 549'557; J. Clifford, The Predicament of 
Culture: Twentieth Century Ethnography, Literature and Art (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1988); J. Clifford and G. Marcus (eds), Writing Culture: The Poetics and 
Politics of Ethnography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986); M. Friedrich, 'Four 
Meanings of "Critical"' [Review Essay] ( 1988) 61 ( 4) Anthropological Quarterly 187 -198; R. 
Keesing, 'Anthropology as Interpretive Quest' (1987) 28(2) Current Anthropology 161-176; G. 
Marcus and D. Cushman, 'Ethnographies as Texts' (1982) 11 Annual Review of Anthropology 25-
69; P. Roth, 'Ethnography Without Tears' (1989) Current Anthropology 555-569; B. Shore, 
'Interpretation Under Fire' (1988) Anthropological Quarterly 161-176; M. Zamora, 'Crises and 
Concerns in Anthropology and the Validity of the Anthropological Enterprise' (1987) 40(4) 
Eastern Anthropologist 293-305. 
76 R. Paine, 'Our Authorial Authority' (1990) 9(2) Culture 35 at 39. The evolutionist Frazerian 
anthropology of the late-nineteenth century, Paine writes, was (p. 36): 
devoted to the detection of savagery that once underlay our 
now civilized society. . . . There is simple ethnocentrism of 
the white supremacist variety. For the post-Darwinian, 
Victorian reading public Frazier's message was comforting: 
not only was it more of men than of apes, but it justified 'the 
white man's burden.' lt was widely read. [Citation omitted] 
77 See M. Strathem, 'Out of Context: The Persuasive Fictions of Anthropology' (1987) 28(3) 
Current Anthropology 251 at 260. 
88 
ethnographic enterprise, namely, 'the contrast between the "self" of the observer 
and the "other" of the observed.'7S 
Whether or not 'strangeness' is thrust on the observer through 
an encounter with the exotic, or is achieved through 
imaginative bracketing of the familiar and the mundane, the 
confrontation of the self with the other is fundamental." 
The object of ethnography, Atkinson argues, is 'to persuade the reader of the 
existence of the world so represented and of the reasonableness of the account 
itse!f'BD In the end, our rational accounts of others' irrational beliefs and 
behaviour implicitly, albeit unequivocally, invite a sympathetic endorsement of 
the descriptive and analytical verisimilitude of those accounts.81 
78 The Ethnographic Imagination: Textual Constructions of Reality (London: Routledge, 
1990), p. 157. Although Atkinson's critique deals explicitly with ethnographic work in sociology, 
its relevance and application to all ethnographic work (and indeed, to all forms of modern 
scholarly writing) is readily apparent and duly acknowledged by the author himself. Idem, pp. 1-9, 
25-28 passim. 
" Ibid See also M. Herzfield, 'Looking Both Ways: The Ethnographer in the Text' (1983) 
46(2-4) Semiotica 151-166, who describes this tension in the following terms (p. 151 ): 
The ethnographer's marginality is not simply a passive 
structural anomaly or a safe perch on the cultural fence; most 
of the time, the ethnographer is either an insider or an outsider. 
But-and this is the real crux of the matter-no ethnographer 
can ever claim to have been one or the other in an absolute 
sense. The very fact of negotiating one's status in the 
community precludes any such possibility. Anthropologists 
have to learn to adapt to events in which they themselves are 
significant actors. This creates a sense of imperfect closure 
every bit as disconcerting for us as taxonomic anomalies in a 
symbolic system. 
so Atkinson, The Ethnographic Imagination, p. 62 (emphasis supplied). 
81 Ibid, p. 56. 'The plausibility of a text-of whatever genre--is referred to as its 
vraisemblance.' Drawing largely on Todorov's explication of the complexity of vraisemblance, 
Atkinson describes the various layers in which it may appear in ethnographic, amongst other 
persuasive texts, thus (p. 39): 
First, there is the relation between the given text and 'public 
opinion1; second, there is the text's degree of correspondence 
to the expectations or conventions of a given genre; third, 
there is the extent to which the text masks its own textual 
89 
In effect, ethnographers actively, if unconsciously, 'construct "descriptions" 
which warrant the plausible, factual nature of their accounts.'B2 Thus, the 
ostensibly neutral ethnographic account may be seen to reflect something quite 
different to, and considerably more than, 'mere descriptive writing (whatever 
"mere" description might connote ).'83 Contained, if not deliberately secreted, 
within the descriptive ethnography is the implicitly evaluative analytic message of 
anthropology. 
In other words, when we talk of the role of 'understanding' or 
'interpretation' in interpretative, qualitative studies, we are 
often dealing with something other than or additional to 
explicitly stated propositions. Often, the argument is 
conveyed at a more implicit level, through the very textual 
organization of accounts: in the way we select and write 
descriptions, narratives and so on; how we organize texts in 
thematic elements; how we draw upon metaphorical and 
metonymic uses of language; how, if at all, we shift point of 
view, and so on.84 
Where ethnographers purport to represent societies 'objectively' as comprised 
of people who, amongst other things, hold irrational beliefs in irreal phenomena, 
their descriptions of those beliefs and phenomena implicitly project a potently 
evaluative-and an implicitly devaluing-characterisation of the beliefs described 
which goes beyond any explicitly evaluative explanation of them. This tacit, 
conventions, appearing to conform to a 'reality' There are, 
therefore, two very general perspectives which can be drawn 
on in reading the text. There is the perspective of everyday 
discourse on the natural or social world, and there is the 
perspective which draws upon the literary discourse of other 
[in this case, ethnographic] texts. 
See M. Todorov, 'Introduction, Le Vraisemblable' (1968) II Communications l-4. For an 
expanded analysis of these basic relations, see J. Culler, Structuralist Poetics: Structuralism, 





epistemologically 'devaluing' characterisation of ideas and beliefs as 'irrational' 
does not necessarily involve authorial assertions of ethnocentric superiority.85 
The point is, however, that even those scholarly accounts of sorcery and 
witchcraft which may be regarded as 'primarily descriptive' of irrational ideas and 
phenomena must necessarily be grounded in rationally based theoretical 
assumptions in order to render them 'intelligible when viewed from some other 
society such as our own.'B6 
Atkinson insists that a critical assessment of the textual devices employed by 
ethnographers, amongst other scholars, who sincerely endeavour to describe 
'exotic' social phenomena and the parameters of the social reality in which those 
phenomena occur on genuinely objective bases, does not necessarily compromise 
the credibility and status of ethnographic scholarship: 'It would be all too easy ... 
to assume that "literary" or "rhetorical" forms and values were incompatible with 
"science" .'87 Rather, he argues: 
A recognition of the rhetorical forms that run through all 
scholarly and scientific discourse can only strengthen the 
awareness and discipline of our academic endeavours .. BB 
That such a critical awareness need not necessarily undermine the value of 
empirical research I do not doubt; although I am somewhat less certain than 
Atkinson seems to be that the development of greater vigour and productivity 
as Indeed, as Brown suggests, differing modes of descriptive ethnographic authority may be 
adopted, depending upon a whole host of motivational considerations and ranging along a 
continuum from 'superiority' through 'equality' to 'inferiority', without compromising the 
ethnographer's underlying fidelity to rational analysis. See R.H. Brown, A Poetic for Sociology 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 52-60. 
•• Marwick, Witchcraft and Sorcery, p. 16 (emphasis supplied). 
87 The Ethnographic Imagination, p. I. 
sa Ibid. 
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within the field is incumbent upon an expansion of ethnography's 'systematic self-
understanding of contemporary society' to encompass the 'processes and products' 
of the genre itself.89 The quest for a redemptively reflexive self-consciousness 
amongst anthropologists that has been engendered by well more than a decade of 
probing, introspective analyses certainly cannot, or at least cannot yet, be said to 
have redounded to the manifest advantage of the ethnographic genre. Indeed, for 
a great many anthropologists the consequences of that exercise seem rather to 
have involved a descent into obsessive narcissism, naked cynicism, intellectual 
paralysis and an ineluctable ennui.90 
Real, important and dauntingly problematic though the vicissitudes of 
contemporary anthropology's intellectual and ideological struggle to come to 
terms with itself (and with the ethnographic projects it continues to countenance) 
may be, and however disconcerting that experiential reality may be for the modem 
anthropologist abroad in a post-modern world,91 my principal concerns here are 
with the equally real, equally important and no less problematic implications of 
sorcery-related beliefs and practices in Papua New Guinea for the progressive 
89 Ibid. p. 181. 
90 I see little in Atkinson's buoyant optimism to insulate the self-consciously reflexive 
ethnographer from what Laura Nader has described as a kind of 'process fetishism'. 'Post-
Interpretive Anthropology' (!988) 61(4) Anthropological Quarterly 149 at 153. 
91 On these issues, see Fredrick Barth, 'Method in Our Critique of Anthropology' (1992) 27(1) 
Man (NS.) 175-177; Kevin K. Birth, 'Reading and the Righting of Ethnographies' (1990) 17(3) 
American Ethnologist 549-557; James Clifford, The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century 
Ethnography. Literature and Art (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988); James 
Clifford and George E. Marcus, eds., Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986); Michael Friedrich, 'Four Meanings of Critical' 
(1988) 61(4) Anthropological Quarterly 187-198; George E. Marcus and M.J. Fisher, 
Anthropology as Cultural Critique: An Experimental Moment in the Human Sciences (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1986); Paul A. Roth, 'Ethnography Without Tears' ( 1989) 30(5) 
Current Anthropology 555-569; Brad Shore, 'Interpretation Under Fire' (!988) 61(4) 
Anthropological Quarterly 161- 176; Mario D Zamora, 'Crises and Concerns in Anthropology and 
the Validity of the Anthropological Enterprise (1987) 40(4) Eastern Anthropologist 293-304. 
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refinement of modem law, the enhancement of judicial ratiocination, the 
development of a more circumspect jurisprudence-and the constructive 
contribution empirical ethnographic research and anthropological analysis can 
make towards the achievement of those objectives. Thus, in so far as the kinds of 
ideas and explanations explored in the following chapters92 can usefully serve to 
elucidate the mechanisms by which sorcery-related beliefs and practices are 
jurisprudentially and judicially characterised, it is in relation to that rather more 
narrowly focused interest that a critical awareness of the latent, if nonetheless 
persuasive, fictions implicit in all of the relevant scholarly discourses becomes 
particularly important. 
* * * 
In the end, all that Western anthropologists and socio-legal scholars may know 
and understand about Melanesian sorcery beliefs and practices must necessarily be 
viewed through the lens of Western culture. The inherent capacity of that cultural 
lens to resolve those ideas and phenomena with a measure of descriptive clarity, 
accuracy, precision and objectivity is not called into question here.93 It is 
crucially important to realise, however, that the processes of judicial decision-
making do not even pretend to attain to that level socio-cultural knowledge and 
understanding. The undisguised purpose of judicial decision-making is to pass 
judgement according to law. By design, the process is morally evaluative, its 
products deliberately and decidedly normative. In both respects, however, the 
n Chapters Three and Four. 
93 Which is not to say that capacity is, in any sense, beyond question. See Chapter Seven. 
93 
criteria are essentially and fundamentally Westem.94 More to the point, even the 
objective empirical data, which purport merely to describe a whole host of 
'irrational' beliefs and behaviour on objective bases (and this with a view to 
informing rational judgements of all kinds), have themselves been marshalled and 
arrayed in the interstices of an epistemological framework that is culturally 
constructed. 
In the context of academic discourse, a relatively wide berth may properly be 
given to discussion and debate about the nature and implications of the cultural 
predilections inherent in such descriptive enterprises, and the extent to which the 
effects of this implicit tendentiousness might (or might not) be amenable to 
internal correction. 95 It is in the nature of intellectual discourse-and this is 
particularly so in respect of the social sciences-to propound tenable theories as 
opposed to determinative judgements, and tentative theoretical propositions, based 
upon qualified assertions and cautiously guarded conclusions, are generally 
considered to be the more responsible. Indicatively, Michele Stephen 
characterises the anthropological essays collected in her edited volume on 
Melanesian sorcery and witchcraft as offering neither more nor less than 'a 
contribution to an existing debate' which 'cannot pretend to be the final word, nor 
94 I have no intention of entering here into a general discussion of the moral and ethical 
foundations of law or the eminently normative functions of judicial decision-making. 
Acknowledging the philosophical contentiousness of the proposition, however, I hold firmly with 
the view that the determinative connections between morality, ethics and law are palpable and 
profound. See F.S. Cohen, Ethical Systems and Legal Ideals: An Essay on the Foundations of 
Legal Criticism (1933; rpt Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1959). 
95 See, e.g. B. Scholle, 'Reason and Culture: The Universal and the Particular Revisited' 
(1984) 86 American Anthropologist 960-965; D. Barnes and B. Bloor, 'Rationalism and the 
Sociology of Knowledge' in Rationality and Relativism, ed. M. Hollis and S. Lukes (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1982), pp. 21-47. Cf Spiro's arguments in support of the proposition that 
anthropology is, and should be regarded as, a 'science' nevertheless. 'Cultural Relativism and the 
Future of Anthropology', pp. 269-273. 
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claim to have tackled all the relevant issues', because no 'single volume can do 
justice to the diversity ofMelanesia':96 
The task of rethinking our way through the conceptual 
categories and explanatory models that have been applied to 
Melanesian sorcery and witchcraft has only begun. We hope, 
however, by placing the problem in clearer perspective, and in 
providing new data and interpretations, that this book will 
serve to stimulate further debate, and point to some new 
directions for future research. 97 
As said, however, the distinguishing feature of judicial decision-making is the 
determinative act of rendering a decision. In the process, assertions as to the 
veracity of facts are necessarily advanced with conviction and, at least in theory, 
with some semblance of ingenuousness. Conclusions are necessarily drawn with 
certainty; and judgements, by their nature, must ultimately be final. Faced with 
the same inadequacies in the quantity and quality of the information available to 
them, and confronted with the same human fallibilities in their capacity to 
evaluate and interpret the 'data' upon which they are obliged to rely, neither judges 
nor lawyers enjoy the scholar's luxury of putting off for another day--or avoiding 
altogether-the determinative characterisation of certain beliefs, ideas and 
behaviour. 
Judges are obliged to act decisively. What is more, they must do so in 
circumstances calculated to affect the course of people's lives in serious, 
significant and often irreversible ways. Therefore, if judicial decision-making in 
respect of issues involving sorcery-related beliefs and behaviour in Papua New 
Guinea is to be based on a circumspect understanding of those beliefs and 
behaviour informed by the best available data and analyses, it is imperative that a 
96 Sorcerer and Witch in Melanesia (Carlton, VIC: Melbourne University Press, 1987), p. II. 
97 Ibid. 
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jurisprudential assessment of that information look beyond the trepidiations and 
the polemics which serve, at once, to constrain and to fuel the academic debates in 
the context of which modern scholarly descriptions and explanations of sorcery 
beliefs and practices have been, and continue to be, formulated. 
In this, I own, the responsibility falls to bench and bar alike. In the first 
instance, perhaps even more so to the latter than the former, since lawyers 
constitute the 'social institution, intermediate between the courts and the larger 
society, to which the courts are structured to be directly responsive.'98 
The courts are not obliged to follow the profession, but they 
are obliged to be responsive to what the profession has to say. 
This obligation entails that the courts attend to the professional 
discourse and stand ready either to modify their views when 
that discourse is convincing or to give good reason showing 
why it is not convincing. 99 
With respect to the development of both a theoretical and a practical 
jurisprudence that takes due account of the force and effect of culture in relation to 
the nature and function of law, informed scholarly descriptions and explanations 
of sorcery, amongst other 'traditional' social beliefs and practices, have long 
provided the raw materials out of which the relevant legal discourses are 
fabricated.J 00 In advocating a critical contemplation of those materials generally, 
98 Eisenberg, The Nature of the Common Law. p. 12. 
99 Ibid. This, Eisenberg explains, 'serves as the basis of a critical feedback mechanism and 
enhances the courts' legitimacy by providing a mechanism of judicial accountability.' 
100 Anthropological contributions in this respect touch upon virtually every substantive 
concept with which conventional Western legal thought has been, and continues to be, concerned. 
See generally Lloyd and Freeman, Lloyd's Introduction to Jurisprudence, pp. 873-880. And see 
also H. Cairns, 'Law and Anthropology' (1931) 31(1) Columbia Law Review 32-55; E.A. Hoebel, 
'Law and Anthropology' (1946) 32(4) Virginia Law Review 835-854; J.G. Hund, 'Jurisprudence 
and Legal Anthropology: The Roles of Theory and Method Revisited' ( 1979) 12 Comparative & 
International Law Journal of South Africa 188-198; Koch, K-F., 'Law and Anthropology: Notes 
on Interdisciplinary Research' (1969) 4(1) Law & Society Review 11-27; P. Lawrence, 'Law and 
Anthropology: The Need for Collaboration' (1970) 1(1) Melanesian Law Journal 40-50; G. 
MacCormack, 'Anthropology and Legal Theory' (1978) The Juridical Review 216-232; D. 
Riesman, 'Toward an Anthropological Science of Law and the Legal Profession' (1951) 57(2) 
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and with reference to Melanesia more particularly, my intention here is not so 
much to cast doubt on the substantive accuracy of the data upon which relevant 
descriptions are based, as to draw critical attention to the intrinsically evaluative 
quality of those descriptions and the explanatory analyses built upon and around 
them. 
To make this distinction and to embrace such an unreservedly self-conscious 
perspective, even in relation to the ostensibly objective reportage of the field 
ethnographer or cultural historian, is crucial-if for no other reason then because, 
for the purposes of jurally determinative characterisations of sorcery-related 
beliefs and practices in Papua New Guinea today, that determinatively evaluative 
function is ultimately and pre-eminently a judicial task. It is, moreover, a task that 
is no more properly or safely abrogated in deference to 'true' science and 
scholarship than it might be made captive to the once self-satisfied assumptions 
about Western society's monopoly on 'true' religion.l01 
American Journal of Sociology 121-135; J.G. Zorn, 'Lawyers, Anthropologists and the Study of 
Law: Encounters in the New Guinea Highlands' (1990) 15(2) Law & Social inquiry 271-304. See 
also I. Freckelton, 'The Anthropologist on Trial' (1985) 15 Melbourne University Law R<rView 360-
386; L. Rosen, 'The Anthropologist as Expert Witness' (1977) 79(3) American Anthropologist 
555-578; Australian Law Refonn Commission, Multiculturalism and the Law, Report No. 57 
(Canberra: AGPS, 1992), pp. 130-131; S. Poulter, English Law and Ethnic Minority Customs 
(London: Butterworths, 1986), pp. 6-7; Australian Law Refonn Commission, The Recognition of 
Aboriginal Customary Laws, Report No. 31 (Canberr~: AGPS, 1986) 1:497-507. 
101 Cf Barry, 'Some Aspects of Magic, Witchcraft and Sorcery', p. 133. 
Chapter Three 
PROLEGOMENA TO 
THE DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS 
OF MELANESIAN SORCERY (II) 
The anthropologist seeks his subjects in a harsh light. Traditionally, he has studied 
them in raw environments, undiluted by the domestication of civilization. And 
wherever he studies, he participates in the nitty-gritty-daily habits, from excretion to 
copulation, birth to death, as these are revealed in close contact rather than veiled 
through the myths and refinements of high culture. 
97 
Anthropology also favors a soft focus, in a certain sense. Lest they perceive too 
sharply any object while missing its place in context, anthropologists peer broadly, 
trying to glimpse foreground and background all at once. Aware that any object, any 
act is a convergence of myriad forces, they endeavor to capture the whole field, 
necessarily sacrificing precision of focus for breadth of vision. 1 
1. WESTERN REPRESENTATIONS 
OF SORCERY AND WITCHCRAFT BELIEFS 
Since the beginning of this century, the task of describing and analysing the 
nature and dynamics of cultural and social life amongst native, tribal and other 
indigenous, generally non-western, peoples has come to fall increasingly within 
the province of cultural or, more narrowly, social anthropology.2 As a 
1 James L. Peacock, The Anthropological Lens: Harsh Light, Soft Focus (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 114. 
2 See generally A. Kuper, Anthropology and Anthropologists: The Modern British School, rev 
ed. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983); J.J. Honigmann, The Development of 
Anthropological ideas (Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press, 1976); M. Fried, The Study of Anthropology 
(New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1972); S. Tax, ed., Horizons of Anthropology 
(Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1964). The terms cultural anthropology and social 
anthropology are often used interchangeably (see, e.g., L. Mair, An Introduction to Social 
Anthropology, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 1), and sometimes merely to 
differentiate between American and British academic institutional traditions, respectively. 
However, a substantive distinction may be drawn between 'cultural anthropology', as concerned 
more broadly with human customs: 'that is. the comparative study of cultures and societies', and 
'social anthropology', the latter of which 'has increasingly taken as its central problem the search 
98 
consequence of this intellectual division of labour, and the academic cleavages to 
which it has given rise, empirical, theoretical and interpretative research focusing 
on the beliefs and behaviours associated with sorcery, witchcraft and magic in the 
context of such cultures and societies is today almost exclusively the prerogative 
of social anthropologists and ethnographers.3 In the main, therefore, the scholarly 
literature dealing with the sorcery-related beliefs and practices of the indigenous 
peoples of Melanesia consists in the products of social anthropological and 
ethnographic research,< and it is to that circumscribed body of literature in 
particular that we must turn in order to acquire a meaningful and relevant 
appreciation for the origins, nature and dynamics of those beliefs and practices. 
In light of the issues raised in the preceding chapter, however, a circumspect 
application of the ideas and explanations represented in the relevant 
anthropological and ethnographic literature requires that we regard that body of 
literature critically. As suggested above, the adoption of such a critical 
perspective means recognising that, whilst it is the anthropological literature 
for generalizations and theories about human social behavior and cultures.' R. Keesing, Cultural 
Anthropology: A Contemporary Perspective, 2nd ed (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 
1981), pp. 2-3. As it is with this narrower range of social anthropology, and the work product of 
ethnographers working with that intellectual tradition, that I am principally concerned here, unless 
the context otherwise requires, that is the expression I will use throughout the text. 
3 In the context of modern Western society, such beliefs and behaviours tend to be considered 
principally from a sociological perspective as manifestations of occultism, aberrant religious 
practices or instances social and psychological deviance. See A. Giddens, Sociology, 2nd ed 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989), pp. 115-159, 455-459; D. Downes and P. Rock, Understanding 
Deviance: A Guide to the Sociology of Crime and Rule Breaking. 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1988), pp. 137-165; J.E. Goldthorpe, An Introduction to Sociology. 3rd ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 193-200. Luhrrnann, Persuasions of the Witches Craft, is 
one of the very few anthropological analyses of witchcraft and sorcery in contemporary Western 
society. 
4 See the bibliographic entries appearing in M. Zelenietz and S. Lindenbaum, eds., 'Sorcery 
and Social Change in Melanesia' (1981) 8 Social Analysis 129-136; M. Patterson, 'Sorcery and 
Witchcraft in Melanesia' (1975) 75(3) Oceania 231-234; B.M. Knauft, Good Company and 
Violence: Sorcery and Social Action in a Lowland New Guinea Society (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1985), pp. 425-456; and at the end of each chapter in M. Stephen, ed., Sorcerer 
and Witch in Melanesia (Carlton, VIC: Melbourne University Press. 1987). 
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which best serves to inform the basis on which Melanesian sorcery-related beliefs 
and practices (and such conduct as can be seen to be contingent upon those beliefs 
and practices) may be described and understood, the anthropological formulations 
are themselves reflections of a set of understandings and experiences that are 
decidedly non-Melanesian. What must also be borne in mind are the very 
different purposes and objects served by anthropological characterisations of those 
beliefs, practices and contingent behaviours, on the one hand, and their 
determinatively jural characterisations, on the other.' 
At the outset, however, it seems to me that the purposes of such a critical 
scrutiny in respect of the kinds of issues with which we are particularly concerned 
here may be further served by locating the anthropological literature and the ideas 
and phenomena of which that literature treats, in a larger historical and intellectual 
context. Nothing so grand as a comprehensive analytical historiography of the 
ideas that have been brought to bear on the formulation of Western conceptions 
and constructs of sorcery and witchcraft can be attempted here. Nevertheless, the 
literature in which these ideas have been expressed can be organised in such a 
fashion as to provide a useful backdrop against which our understanding of the 
ideas that have shaped those concepts and constructs can be sharpened, and in so 
5 John Ellard makes a similar point with respect to psychiatric and jural charaterisations 
human behaviour in 'Some Notes on Non-insane Automatism and the Will' (1995) 69 Australian 
Law Journa/833-840: 
To fulfil its functions the law must develop a vocabulary with 
which to describe human behaviour and categories within 
which to locate those descriptions. Psychiatrists pursue the 
same goals but are not driven by the same imperatives. They 
can be more comfortable with the uncertainties of dimensions 
rather than the apparent reality of categories. [Ibid., p. 833] 
In this connection, Ellard observes, judges, who must decide cases in which psychiatric evidence 
is introduced to inform the process whereby certain conduct is to be jurally characterised, have a 
rather more difficult task than the psychiatrists providing that evidence, since judges are 
'[r]esponsible for applying the rules which govern society ... [and] must come to a final 
determination in each case, no matter how subtle and complex the issues may be.' Ibid. 
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doing, to shed an instructive light on the continuing utility and propriety of their 
application in the context of a distinctively jural analysis. 
2. CREDULOUS AND CRITICAL REPRESENTATIONS 
OF SORCERY AND WITCHCRAFT BELIEFS 
The entire body of Western literature concerned with sorcery, witchcraft and 
magic may be classified broadly into two mutually exclusive categories on the 
basis of the fundamental assumptions underlying the epistemological perspective 
and approach adopted in the consideration of such beliefs and practices. 6 The first 
of these categories embraces what may be described as credulous representations, 
on account of the unifying feature of credulity shared amongst its exemplars. The 
second category comprises what may be described as critical representations, 
which are characterised by an approach to witchcraft and sorcery from a position 
of incredulity, invariably coupled with a critical component ranging from guarded 
scepticism to outright rejection. 
Virtually all of the modem scholarly literature falls within the second 
category. This is predictable enough, given the rationalist dictates of modem 
scholarly discourse, and the preclusive irrationality that discourse necessarily 
ascribes to the purported legitimisation of belief in the real existence of patently 
'supernatural' phenomena. As said, it is on the anthropological contributions to 
the scholarly critical literature that this consideration of Melanesian sorcery 
beliefs and practices principally relies. Yet the influence of a credulous ideology 
on the construction of contemporary Western conceptions of social reality-and in 
6 Although my examination has been limited to literature appearing in the English language 
(originally and, in some cases, in translation), historiographic assessments contemplating original 
works in Greek, Latin, French, Italian, Spanish and Russian provide assessments that are 
essentially consistent with this division. See E. W. Monter, 'The Historiography of European 
Witchcraft: Progress and Prospects' (1972) 2(4) Journal of Interdisciplinary History 435-451. 
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consequence, on the premeditations of modem Western thought respecting the 
jural characterisation of witchcraft and sorcery-has been such that certain strains 
of the credulous literature cannot be dismissed tout court. 
A. Credulous Representations 
The common thread which draws the otherwise disparate elements of this 
genre in the literature together is the underlying premise of credulity. In every 
exemplary instance, credulous considerations of witchcraft, sorcery and related 
beliefs and practices may thus be seen to predicate on the assumption (express or 
implied) that the phenomena themselves are real and significant, occurring in 
actuality within the contours of a mundane social reality the parameters of which 
are accepted-{)r purportedly accepted-by the author as veritably authentic on 
demonstrably factual grounds.7 
Belief in the reality of sorcery and witchcraft, in the existence of sorcerers and 
witches and in the potency of their practices, is represented in the credulous 
literature as being entirely consistent with the broadly accepted epistemological 
parameters of that reality. Rare or eminently commonplace, events of sorcery or 
witchcraft are thus regarded as part and parcel of the natural order. Exceptional 
and even extraordinary, they are in no sense 'supernatural'. So too, the persons or 
entities responsible for the occurrence of such phenomena (witches, sorcerers, 
wizards, demons, spirits, and so forth) are understood to co-exist and interact with 
7 Whether or not a "credulous" author genuinely believes that the ideas and phenomena he or 
she describes and discusses actually exist and occur in reality is not a question I am capable of 
answering with certainty. For present purposes, the classification of a piece of literature as 
'credulous' reflects only the apparent assumptions and intentions of an author as these are revealed 
in the text. There may always be some colourable incentive for an author to misrepresent the true 
nature of his or her beliefs in, or descriptions of, phenomena of any kind; and any critical analysis 
of the credulous literature would necessarily involve the identification and examination of such 
motives, should there be reason to suspect their existence. That kind of analysis, however, is not 
contemplated here. 
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ordinary human beings, even if some of those persons and entities themselves are 
neither ordinary nor, in many cases, entirely 'human'. 
For classificatory purposes, the credulous literature may conveniently be 
divided into two analytically discrete sub-categories, reflecting the moral, 
ideological and otherwise evaluative associations by which variants of their 
fundamentally credulous assertions are characterised. The first of these sub-
categories, embracing what may be described as approbatory and advocatory 
representations, need not detain us here, although some general comments are in 
order. The second sub-category, embracing what may be described as 
denunciatory or condemnatory representations, is of greater significance, and thus 
deserving of commensurate attention. 
(1) Approbatory and Advocatory Representations 
Approbatory variants of the credulous literature serve to validate belief in the 
efficacy of the phenomena of witchcraft and sorcery and to legitimise, on various 
bases, the practices by which those phenomena can be made to occur. Overtly, the 
intendment of such literature may be merely to describe the technical elements or 
procedures involved in the performance of particular acts of witchcraft or sorcery, 
and to specify the results a successful performance may be expected to bring 
about. Offering mere technical descriptions, however, such treatments oftentimes 
provide what amounts to practical 'instruction' in the exercise of special, and 
potentially destructive, powers. Whilst the purposeful application of those powers 
may be a matter that is left un-addressed (that is, to be determined ultimately by 
the practitioner), the preparation and dissemination of such literature, even on a 
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selective or consciously restricted basis, imports at the very least a qualified 
approbation of its use.8 
Actively advocatory variants of the credulous literature move beyond mere 
approbation, seeking deliberately not only to advance an operational knowledge 
and understanding of the practical techniques and methods of witchcraft and 
sorcery, but to explain and elaborate the underlying nature and significance of 
those practices from an ideological perspective on which basis their employment 
may be justified. Typically, examples of advocatory literature place a particular 
set of beliefs about the purposeful practice of sorcery, witchcraft or magic within a 
larger cosmological framework, the fundamental validity of which is assumed, 
and in the dynamics of which such practices are seen to play a real and meaningful 
part. The mechanics of practical application may then be described with a view 
the furtherance of the underlying purposes they are intended to serve.9 
Thus, where approbatory variants of the credulous literature operate to 
legitimise belief in and, if only passively, to countenance the practice of, 
witchcraft and sorcery by describing what those powers consist in, how they may 
be used and to what particular ends they may effectively be applied, advocatory 
variants actively advance a structured context for those beliefs, specifying in 
8 A contemporary analogy can be drawn in respect of the many, purportedly amoral, 
publications which provide readers with detailed instructions on the construction of effective 
explosive devices or the manufacture of psychedelic drugs. Without delving into the issues of the 
moral (to say nothing of legal) responsibility attaching to the dissemination of such literature, an 
author would be hard put to deny that he or she did not intend, or could not expect, that someone 
would read and follow the proffered instructions and apply the results to some purposeful end. 
Whilst the author may protest his or her disapproval of the specific objectives to which a particular 
reader may have applied the information provided, the provision of the information in itself 
necessarily imports some measure of general approbation, however qualified. 
9 Tanya Luhrmann describes a variety of such contemporary publications in Persuasions of 
the Witch's Craft: Ritual Magic in Contemporary England (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, !989), 
pp 4-6. See also J.S. Victor, Satanic Panic: The Creation of a Contemporary Legend (Chicago: 
Open Court, !993). 
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particular ideological terms how, when and where such powers ought (or ought 
not) to be used, by and against whom, and the reasons why such powers should 
(or should not) be so employed. 
Whilst approbatory and advocatory accounts of sorcery and witchcraft may 
constitute a small and arcane sub-category within the larger body of credulous 
literature, this is not to say that such treatments have played an insignificant role 
in the construction of evolving Western conceptions of social reality. Indeed, 
examples of both of have enjoyed an enduring currency and influence. Their 
message has been widely received across all strata of Western society: from 
classical Greek and Roman civilisations, amongst whose populations a range of 
witchcraft, sorcery and related beliefs and practices were not only recognised, but 
often regarded as socially desirable and economically necessary; 10 and 
10 J.C. Baroja, 'Magic and Religion in the Classical World' in Witchcraft and Sorcery: Selected 
Readings, 2nd ed., ed. M. Marwick (Harrnondsworth: Penguin Books, 1982), p. 74: 
It was commonly practised by a great variety of people: the 
priests of specific deities on the one hand, and professional 
people, such as doctors, on the other. The state itself 
supported those whose business it was to augur the future or 
make prognostications for special occasions, and those who, in 
the public interest, discovered by divination what had 
happened or what was about to happen .... Even the austerest 
Roman authors included magic formulae for obtaining useful 
and beneficial results in their work. Treatises on agriculture 
and medicine and the offices used by priests for certain cults 
and rites contain collections of spells and obscure writings 
probably of an invocational nature [references omitted]. 
Baroja cites numerous references in the works of Plato, Cato, Columela, Lucan, Virgil, Ovid, 
Horace, Theritus and Seneca, amongst others, as indicative of the wide-spread acceptance of a 
range of sorcery and witchcraft beliefs and practices throughout the Greek and Roman empires. 
Many of the works to which Baroja refers are themselves examples ofapprobatory and advocatory 
variants of credulous literature. The World of Witches, trans. Nigel Glendinning (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1964), pp. 18-20, 24-28, 39-40. See also H.H. Penner, 'Rationality, 
Ritual and Science' in Religion. Science and Magic in Concert and Conflict, ed. J. Neusner, E.S. 
Frerichs and P.V.M. Flesher (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 11-24. 
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consistently, both before and since ancient times throughout the Western world. 11 
Even today, if the increasingly crowded shelves of the 'occult' sections in so many 
book shops provide any indication, credulous literature on sorcery and witchcraft 
representing both sub-variants of the genre seems to enjoy a remarkable 
popularity. 12 
11 See A. Macfarlane, Witchcraft and Sorcery in Tudor and Stuart England: A Regional and 
Comparative Study (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970); R. Zguta, 'Witchcraft Trials in 
Seventeenth-Century Russia' (1977) 82(5) American Historical Review 1187-1207; E.W. Monter, 
Witchcraft in France and Switzerland: The Borderlands during the Reformation (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1976); R. Kieckhefer, European Witch Trials: Their Foundations in Popular and 
Learned Culture. I 300-1500 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976); C. Lamer, Witchcraft and 
Religion: The Politics of Popular Belief(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984). 
12 In the United States, it was reported in 1983 that: '[b ]y the quantitative indices of books 
published and organizations founded, there can be little doubt that public interest in the occult has 
grown rapidly since the mid-sixties.' R. Galbreath, 'Explaining Modem Occultism' in The Occult 
in America. ed. H. Kerr and C.L. Crow (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983), II at 20. 
More recently, and with respect to England, Luhrmann documents what she describes as a 
ballooning interest in sorcery, witchcraft and magic. Persuasions of the Witch's Craft, p. 5: 
The largest mail order occult store, The Sorcerer's Apprentice, 
has over 25,000 customers who have placed at least two orders 
with them over the last thirteen years. Many of these regular 
customers buy once a month; most, the proprietor said, but at 
least once a year. The store turns over between 800 and I 000 
items each week-books, magical robes, incenses-and 
employs ten people full time. [Ibid] 
Much of this interest, one supposes, may be more indicative of a cynical tendency on the part 
of disingenuous writers and publishers to exploit the gullibility of a large and growing number of 
otherwise intelligent, urbane, well-educated and presumably rational members of the modem 
reading public than an accurate measure of genuine credulity. See e.g., A. Lavers, 'The Darker 
Side of Darkest Africa', The Canberra Times (5 October 1988): 
Television reports of a witches' coven or wizards' convention 
in Canberra recently sounded interesting till the broadcast 
gave details: it seems that most of the witches were public 
servants or similarly harmless folk with time on their hands 
and a yen for drawing pentagrams and dispensing love 
potions. 
See also See B. Williamson, 'The Devil Hides Out', She (October 1988), pp. 84-87, 107. For 
more thoughtful assessments of the nature and implications of contemporary pre-occupations with 
a variety of 'occult' phenomena, see T. Robbins, Cults. Converts and Charisma: The Sociology of 
New Religious Movements (London: Sage Publications, 1988); DL and L Jorgensen, 'Social 
Meanings of the Occult' ( 1982) 23 The Sociological Quarterly 373-389; EA Tiryakian, 'Toward 
the Sociology of Esoteric Culture' (1973) 78 American Journal of Sociology 491-512; M. Truzzi, 
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(2) Denunciatory or Condemnatory Representations 
Far more telling in its effect on Western conceptions of sorcery and witchcraft 
has been the equally credulous, albeit ideologically inverted, response to the ideas 
espoused in the approbatory and advocatory literature. Informed by, and 
embraced within, the prevailing Judea-Christian cosmological traditions of 
Western society since at least the fourteenth century, most of the Anglo-European 
literature which has treated credulously of witchcraft and sorcery was 
unequivocally denunciatory or condemnatory of such beliefs and practices, and it 
remains so today. 13 
The Old Testament injunction 'Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live' is clear 
enough in its import;14 and if the date of the Deuteronomic code given by modem 
'The Occult Revival as Popular Culture: Some Random Observations on the Old and the Nouveau 
Witch' (1972) 13 The Sociological Quarterly 16-36. 
13 See K. Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic: Studies in Popular Belieft in Sixteenth-
and Seventeenth-Century England (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 1971), pp. 301-332. Before that 
time, ecclesiastical and popular sentiments alike tended rather to reflect a measure of diffident 
ambivalence towards sorcery and witchcraft beliefs. Thus, amongst the ancient Greeks and 
Romans, even where certain harmful practices were condemned, and their practitioners subject to 
a range of negative social and legal sanctions, a clear distinction was made between 'those with a 
professional knowledge of maleficent practices and amateurs'; and whilst 'almost anyone' might 
make use various magical or sorcerous practices 'in moments of violent stress, it was generally felt 
that they were more usually used by a particular type of person and in very specific 
circumstances.' Baroja, 'Magic and Religion in the Classical World', p. 74. 
[S]peaking as a statesman rather than as a religious individual, 
Plato thought that professionals who tried to do evil should be 
condemned to death. Amateurs, on the other hand, ought to be 
let off more lightly' [Ibid.] 
Amongst the ancient Hebrews, witchcraft and sorcery-terms which, in Biblical use, tend to 
refer to a range of magical and divinational practices-are said to have been generally 'tabooed by 
orthodox religious sentiment.' The Jewish Encyclopedia (New York: K'tav Publishing House, 
1967), vol. 12, p. 543. However, 
[a]s this orthodox sentiment was not a constant quantity, 
practises which at one time were regarded as innocent at 
another were relegated to the domain of sorcery or witchcraft. 
[Ibid.] 
14 Ex. 22:18. The condemnation of the 'sorceress' is in the apodictic form in which the 
Decalogue is written. For the most part sorcery is considered a preoccupation of women (see I 
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biblical scholars, about 650 B.C., is accepted, even by that time the popular 
practices of sorcery and witchcraft, 'which had before been esteemed innocent, or 
regarded as the handmaidens of religion', were increasingly subject to formal 
condemnation and punishment.15 Like the Romans and Greeks and the Hebrews 
before them, 16 the early Church recognised an implicit distinction between the 
innocuous motives and the sometimes seemingly salutary effects of what was 
called 'white witchcraft', which was traditionally employed to heal the sick, 
foretell the future or ensure fecundity, and 'black witchcraft', or maleficiurn, which 
relied on similar systems of belief and involved the harnessing of similar forces, 
but which was employed for harmful and destructive purposes. 17 Whereas an 
ecclesiastical modus vivendi might have been achieved in respect of the former, 
toleration of the latter was rather more difficult for the Church to countenance. 18 
Characterising witchcraft generally as involving 'the practice of black magic, 
sorcery, or intercourse with evil spirits or demons in order, through supernatural 
aid, to accomplish evil of various kinds', contemporary Catholic authorities 
acknowledge that, until about the sixth century, the Church's position on the 
Sam. 28; Jer. 7:18; 44:15). However, sorcerers are also mentioned (see Deut. 18:10; Mal. 3:5). 
The Interpreter's Bible (New York: Abingdon Press, 1952), vol. I, p. 1006. 
15 The Jewish Encyclopedia, vol. 12, p. 545. 
16 See J. Neusner, 'Science and Magic, Miracle and Magic in Formative Judaism: The System 
and the Difference' and M. !del, 'Jewish Magic from the Renaissance Period to Early Hasidism', in 
Neusner, Frerichs and Flesher (eds.), Religion, Science and Magic, pp. 61-81 and 82-117, 
respectively. 
17 Lamer, Witchcraft and Religion, p. 5. See generally C.H. Lea, Materials Toward a History 
of Witchcraft (!939; rpt. New York: AMS Press, 1986); J. Middleton (ed.), Magic, Witchcraft and 
Curing (Garden City, NY: Natural History Press, 1967). 
18 See H. C. Kee, 'Magic and Messiah', S. R. Garrett, 'Light on a Dark Subject and Vice Versa: 
Magic and Magicians in the New Testament' and K.L. Jolly, 'Magic, Miracle and Popular Practice 
in the Early Medieval West: Anglo-Saxon England', in Neusner, Frerichs and Flesher, Religion, 
Science and Magic, pp. 121-141, 142-165 and 166-182, respectively. See also Thomas, Religion 
and the Decline of Magic, pp. 301-303. 
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existence of witches and sorcerers reflected a kind of ambivalent scepticism, 
rejecting the substance of many popular and prevalent beliefs as fanciful and mere 
superstition. 19 Synodal decrees dating back to that time called for the 
excommunication of magicians, and the active practice of malevolent witchcraft 
or destructive magic could attract a range of ecclesiastical penalties.20 Even as late 
as the ninth century, however, doctrinal pronouncements were essentially 
dismissive of popular belief in such practices.21 
During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, however-a period roughly 
concurrent with the early development of important aspects of the modem 
Western legal tradition22-theological and ecclesiastical perspectives on the 
existence and nature of sorcery and witchcraft underwent a decided shift. 23 As the 
19 D. McRoberts, 'Witchcraft' in The New Catholic Encyclopedia (New York: McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, 1967), val. 14, p. 978. Cf. Vergilius Ferm (ed.), 'Witchcraft' in An Encyclopedia 
of Religion (London: Peter Owen, 1956), p. 827, who argues that: 
[ d]uring the first twelve centuries of the Christian era, 
ecclesiastical authorities generally doubted the reality of 
witchcraft or belittled its importance. 
20 McRoberts, 'Witchcraft', p. 978. 
21 Thus, in his penitential Corrector et Medicus, Bishop Burchard of Worms was inclined to 
characterise 'witches' riding, flying demons, and the ability of witches to turn into animals (e.g., 
cats and wolves) as superstitious notions.' Ibid See also S.G.F. Brandon (Gen. Ed.), 'Witchcraft' 
in A Dictionary of Comparative Religion (London: Weidenfield & Nicolson, 1970), p. 650. 
22 D.R. Kelley, The Human Measure: Social Thought in the Western Legal Tradition 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 1 09; H.J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The 
Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), pp. 
165-198. 
23 This shift was the product of what Berman refers to as the 'new theology ... created by the 
canonists of the eleventh and twelfth centuries,' which came to be reflected in a 'new system of 
criminal law ... which differed substantially from "God's Law" ... .'. Law and Revolution, p. 185. 
ln the earlier period the words 'crime' and 'sin' had been used 
interchangeably. Generally speaking, not only were all crimes 
sins but all sins were also crimes. There was not a sharp 
distinction in underlying nature between offenses to be atoned 
for by ecclesiastical penance, on the one hand, and offenses to 
be dealt with by kinship negotiations (or blood feuds), by local 
or feudal assemblies, or by royal or imperial procedures, on 
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Scholastic theologians, 'with their insistence on literal acceptance of the Bible, 
their professed elaborate knowledge of the supernatural world, and their ardent 
warfare against heresy, returned the belief in witchcraft to respectability and called 
on church and state to enforce the command, "Thou shalt not suffer a witch to 
live" ... ',24 what had theretofore involved a dismissive, relatively innocuous 
scepticism turned inexorably to a credulous and virulently condemnatory 
conviction. 
It was only in the late Middle Ages that 'a new element was added to the 
European concept of witchcraft', which was to distinguish it not only 'from the 
witch-beliefs of other primitive peoples',25 but from the way in which such beliefs 
had theretofore been generally regarded from the dominant perspectives of 
Western society, culture and law. This 'new element' was the notion of the 
demonic compact, whereby the witch was believed to have been granted a range 
the other hand. Homicide, robbery, and other major violations 
were considered to be at the same time violations of God's 
law; conversely~ sexual and marital offenses, witchcraft and 
magic, sacrilege, and other major violations of God's law were 
considered to be at the same time violations of man's law. The 
clergy played a predominant role in 'secular' adjudication, and 
the supreme royal or imperial authority was itself considered 
to have a sacral and sacerdotal character. [Ibid. Emphasis 
supplied]. 
A gross exception ... to the principle of the division between 
ecclesiastical and secular jurisdictions was contained in the 
law applicable to heretics. In the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries, heresy, which previously had been only a spiritual 
offense, punishable by anathema, became also a legal offense, 
punishable as treason. The inquisitorial procedure was used 
for the first time to expose it, and the death penalty was for the 
first time made applicable to it. [Ibid., p. !86.] 
24 Ferm, 'Witchcraft', p. 827. 
25 Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic, p. 52!. 
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of malevolent supernatural powers in exchange for his or her promise of 
allegiance to the devil. From this perspective:26 
the essence of witchcraft was not the damage it did to other 
persons, but its heretical character-devil-worship. Witchcraft 
had become a Christian heresy, the greatest of all sins, because 
it involved the renunciation of God and deliberate adherence 
to his greatest enemy .... Whether or not the witch injured 
other people, she deserved to die for her disloyalty to God27 
Examining the cultural foundations of European beliefs m sorcery and 
witchcraft between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries, 28 Richard Kieckhefer 
has drawn a useful distinction between sorcery, which he defines as involving 
'maleficent magical practices'; invocation, which consists in 'calling upon the devil 
to obtain instruction or execution of one's wishes'; and diabolism, or a 'deliberate 
worship of the devil, or of demons,' which involves the conclusion of 'a pact in 
which the devotee submits himself wholly before the devil, accepting him as 
lord.m Kieckhefer himself concedes that these analytical distinctions may be 
overly subtle, and he is unable to cite any evidence of their popular adoption 
amongst those whose beliefs he essays at length to explore. Significantly, 
however, it is clear that, in the credulous literature of the learned tradition of the 
period, the notions were inextricably inter-connected, and that the Scholastic 
theologians responsible for that literature held firmly to the view that 'in principle 
26 Ibid. For an examination of the role of the devil in earlier Christian theology see J.B. 
Russell, Satan: The Early Christian Tradition (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 
1981 ). 
27 Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic, p. 521. 
28 European Witch Trials: Their Foundations in Popular and Learned Culture, 1300-1500 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976). The geographic scope of Kieckhefer's survey extends 
to England, the Low Countries, France, Italy, Switzerland and Germany. 
29 Ibid., 5-6. 
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both invocation and sorcery were accomplished only thorough alliance with the 
devil.'30 
This bond might take the fonn of an explicit, deliberate pact, 
or it might be merely an implicit pact, entered upon through 
the simple consent of the devotee, without fonnalities. In 
either event, it would be through pre-established association 
with the devil that invocation and sorcery have their effect. 31 
Thus, whereas the prevailing Western perspective on the nature and social 
implications of witchcraft and sorcery up until the fifteenth century had 
maintained a critical distinction between the beliefs and practices associated with 
'white witchcraft', on the one hand, and 'black witchcraft' (or maleficium), on the 
other, by the beginning of the sixteenth century that distinction had been largely 
eroded. Ascending in its stead was a third form or style of belief, effectively 
subsuming the other two, and in which the idea of the demonic pact played a 
central role.32 
30 Ibid., p. 7. 
31 Ibid. Thus, for example, 
a man who began by invoking the devil would find himself 
persuaded to make a submissive pact with Satan, committing 
him to both diabolism and sorcery; he would receive his 
magical unguents and powders, along with instructions on 
how to use them, directly from the devil. [Ibid.] 
32 Lamer, Witchcraft and Religion, p. 3: 
The witch became a witch by virtue of a personal arrangement 
with the Devil who appeared to his potential recruit in some 
physical fonn. At this meeting, in return for renunciation of 
baptism, services on earth and the soul of the witch at death, 
the Devil promised material advantages and magical powers. 
In addition, an integral part of the Christian witch theory was 
that the witch did not operate alone. Witchcraft involved 
midnight meetings to worship the Devil, to receive his orders 
and to have sexual intercourse with him or his subordinate 
spirits. [Ibid.] 
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In continental Europe, the agency principally responsible for the introduction 
of this new concept was the Roman Catholic Church, 'whose intellectuals rapidly 
built up a large literature of demonology, outlining the manner in which the 
witches or devil-worshippers were thought to conduct themselves, and laying 
down the procedure for their prosecution.'33 To be sure, the association of magical 
activities of any kind with some sort of illicit relationship with the devil is 'as old 
as Christianity', and probably older.34 The development of what had theretofore 
tended to be regarded as only a vague, tacit connection with Satan into a new 
doctrine of heresy grounded in an explicit covenant, however, followed on more 
directly from two events: the promulgation of the papal bull, Summis desiderantes 
affectibus in 1484, whereby Innocent VIII directed the Inquisition to investigate 
persons accused of practising witchcraft; 35 and the publication, two years later, of 
the Malleus Malejicarum (Hammer of Witches), the notorious forensic manual 
designed to further that particular inquisitorial purpose.36 
33 Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic, p. 521. See also E. W. Monter, Witchcraft in 
France and Switzerland: The Borderlands during the Reformation (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 1976), p. 24; N. Ben-Yehuda, 'Witchcraft and the Occult as Boundary 
Maintenance Devices' in Neusner, Frerichs and Flesher, Religion, Science and Magic, pp. 234-35; 
New Catholic Encyclopaedia (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), vol XIV, p. 978; R.H. Robbins, 
The Encyclopedia of Witchcraft and Demonology (New York: Crown Publishers, 1959), p. 337 
34 Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic, p. 522. See also Russell, Satan: The Early 
Christian Tradition, p. 99; G.L. Kittredge, Witchcraft in Old and New England (1929; rpt New 
York: Russell & Russell, 1956), p. 51. 
35 See B. Russell, The History of Western Philosophy (1946; rpt London: George Allen and 
Unwin, 1961), p 489. 
36 The product of two Dominican Inquisitors, Heinrich Kramer and James Sprenger, The 
Malleus has been described as 'the most important book on demonology ever written. . . .' 
Robbins, Encyclopedia of Witchcraft and Demonology, p. 337. Ben-Yehuda summarises its 
contents as follows: 
The book is divided into three parts. The first section attempts 
to prove the existence of witches and devils. To be more 
accurate, this section proves by argumentation (rather than 
factual demonstration) that those who do not believe in the 
existence of witches are themselves victims of witchcraft 
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The Malleus was by no means the only denunciatory theological treatise on 
sorcery and witchcraft: Jacquier's Flagellum haereticorum fascinariorum, which 
sought to disabuse the faithful of the idea that witches did not exist or that they 
were not inherently inclined to do evil, preceded it by 30 years.37 Beyond its 
extraordinary popularity, however-the book was printed fourteen times between 
1487 and 152038-the Malleus was singularly significant for its establishment of a 
'persuasive causal connection between the maleficia of popular sorcery and 
elements of heresy, through the agency of the Christian devil.'39 As Monter 
explains: 
The momentous achievement of the Malleus was to emphasize 
the Devil as the common source of both sorcery and heresy 
more comprehensively than had any of its predecessors-and 
in such a way as to persuade secular courts and judges to pay 
increasing attention to witchcraft as a diabolical crime: the 
Malleus managed to join an ecclesiastical crime (heresy) to a 
secular crime (sorcery) in a uniquely deadly way. In late 
medieval Europe, witchcraft was already viewed as a delictum 
mixti fori, a crime that could be judged by either lay or church 
courts, or by both. By stressing the concrete damage of 
maleflcia, this book helped accelerate witchcraft's transition 
from an Inquisitorially defined crime, most of whose horrors 
were founded in Inquisitors' beliefs about heretics and 
heretical behavior, into a crime to be normally judged by 
secular courts. 40 
practices. . . . The second section tells the reader how to 
identify a witch-what signs, techniques and tests to use .... 
The third section of the book describes the legalities of 
investigating and sentencing a witch. ['Witchcraft and the 
Occult as Boundary Maintenance Devices', p. 235] 
37 Ben-Yehuda, 'Witchcraft and the Occult as Boundary Maintenance Devices', p. 234. 
38 According to Monter, 'far more often than any previous work and most subsequent ones on 
the subject'. Witchcraft in France and Switzerland, p. 24. 
39 Ibid., p. 25. 
'"'Ibid. 
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In England, of course, there was no Inquisition. By the late-fifteenth century, 
Roman Law was of little practical importance there,'1 and papal authority was 
very much reduced.<2 Innocent VIII's bull of 1484 extended only to Germany in 
any case; and although copies of the Malleus Maleficarum did find their way into 
the libraries of learned Englishmen, the volume was not actually translated into 
the English language until 1928.<3 In principle, there was no reason why England 
should have been any less receptive to the kinds of demonological treatises that 
proliferated throughout continental Europe at the time:4 Their content, after all, 
was only 'an extension of ideas latent in early medieval Christian theology',45 and 
their common themes would certainly not have been unfamiliar to the late Anglo-
Saxons.46 Yet 'medieval England does seem to have been largely isolated from the 
intellectual and judicial trends which encouraged witch persecution on the 
Continent.'47 
41 See, R.J. Walker, The English Legal System, 6th ed. (London: Butterworths, 1985), pp. 74-
75. As Plucknett notes: 'With the close of the age ofBracton the most influential period of Roman 
law in England c[ame]to an end ... .'. T.F.T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law, 5th 
ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1956), p. 298. 
42 Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic, pp. 522-23. 
43 Thomas mentions the first English translation of the Malleus as having appeared only 'in 
modem times'. Ibid., p. 522. Monter, however, refers explicitly to Montague Summers' 1928 
translation as the 'only' (and presumably, therefore, the first) English translation. Witchcraft in 
France and Switzerland, p. 24. 
44 Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic, p. 522. For specific considerations of the 
nature and dimensions of witchcraft beliefs, and the denunciatory literature associated with those 
beliefs, in continental Europe during the medieval period, see the introductory discussions in 
Kieckhefer, European Witch Trials and H. C. Midelfort, Witch-Hunting in Southwestern Germany, 
1562-1684 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972); and see also Baroja, The World of 
Witches, pp. 47-57; R. Zguta, 'Witchcraft Trials in Seventeenth-Century Russia' (1977) 82(5) 
American Historical Review 1187, 1188-1190. 
" Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic, p. 522. 
46 See J.S.P. Tatlock, The Legendary History of Britain (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1950), pp. 170-173. 
47 Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic, p. 522. 
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During the early to mid-sixteenth century, when much of Europe is often 
characterised as writhing in the throes of an unmitigated 'witch mania', England is 
said to have remained something of a 'special case', principally on account of its 
geographic, cultural, religious and legal separation from the European mainland. 48 
By the later Elizabethan period, when Protestant writers in England (and rather 
more so, in Scotland) had begun to take up many of the arguments, explanations 
and zeal which had fuelled the dissemination of European concepts of witchcraft 
in the preceding decades, 'the influence of these new ideas upon the people at 
large was only partial.'49 
In England, where most demonological treatises remained 
locked up in Latin or some other alien language, witchcraft for 
most men was still an activity-doing harm to others by 
supernatural means-not a belief in heresy.50 
Unlike the witchcraft beliefs common throughout Europe at the time, English 
witchcraft beliefs in the late sixteenth century were 'simple, related to local 
experience and not very closely integrated with official Christianity.'51 But if the 
spate of publications-authored, in the main, by clergymen-which first began to 
appear in about 1590 and continued to proliferate into the middle of the 
48 Lamer, Witchcraft and Religion, p. 4. Thomas regards 'the substantial independence of the 
English Church' as having been largely responsible for this circumstance. Religion and the 
Decline of Magic, p. 522. 
49 Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic, p. 525. In his forward to Lamer's Witchcraft 
and Religion, viii, Alan Macfarlane summarises key elements of Lamer's explanation for the 
difference between Scottish and English attitudes and approaches to witchcraft at the time: 
50 Ibid. 
Scotland lies at the mid-point between English and 
Continental cultures. Roman law and the inquisitorial process, 
the remains of the Celtic clan structure and another language, 
gave Scotland many similarities with parts of Europe, that are 
reflected in the pattern of witch-hunting. 
51 Lamer, Witchcraft and Religion, p. 21. 
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seventeenth century, provides any indication, even by the early years of the 
seventeenth century a growing number of English intellectuals and theologians 
were being 'converted more or less totally to the continental conception of 
witchcraft.'52 
To the extent its reflection in the literature to which it gave rise may be taken 
as a measure of the depth and dimensions of popular belief, the ascendancy of 
denunciatory and condemnatory variants of credulous representations of sorcery 
and witchcraft was comprehensive and inexorable in continental Europe and 
Britain alike, albeit later and less intensively developed in the latter case. And 
even today, amongst those who openly profess a belief in the existence of sorcery 
and witchcraft, far and away the most vocal, active and organised proponents of 
such credulous perspectives are aligned or allied with the anti-diabolistic tradition 
engendered by a theological ideology that continues to provide a remarkably 
consistent basis of justificatory support for a range of otherwise divergent 
arguments. 53 
52 Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic, p. 524. A catalogue of such treatises is 
provided at pp. 523 to 528. 
53 In the United States, Huntington House Publishers of Lafeyette, Louisiana, disseminates a 
number of publications actively advancing a credulous, anti-diabolistic credo. See, e.g., Teens and 
Devil-Worship: What Everyone Should Know (Lafayette, LA: Huntington House Publishers, 
1991), in which the author, Charles G.B. Evans (a self-confessed former Satanist), draws out what, 
to him, demonstrate clear connections between the elements and attractions of a range of 
contemporary witchcraft and sorcery-related activities and their palpable demonic origins. 
Publications of this ilk have been widely distributed throughout North America. See J.S. Victor, 
Satanic Panic: The Creation of a Contemporary Legend (Chicago: Open Court Publishing 
Company, 1993), pp. 311-318; S. Carlson and L. Gerald, Satanism in America (El Cerrito, CA: 
Gaia Press, 1989). The popularity of credulous, theologically-based denunciatory and 
condemnatory literature of this kind is by no means a uniquely American phenomenon. See T.M. 
Luhrmann, Persuasions of the Witch's Craft: Ritual Magic in Contemporary England (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1989). In expressing his views on the ordination of women in 1993, Anthony 
Kennedy, Anglican vicar of Luton in Lincolnshire, is reported as having remarked: 
Priestesses should be burnt at the stake because they are 
assuming powers they have no right to. . . . In the mediaeval 
world, that was called sorcery. The way of dealing with 
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B. Critical Representations 
Like their credulous counterparts, critical, or incredulous, representations of 
sorcery and witchcraft can also be characterised by the fundamental premise upon 
which such analyses predicate. As we have seen, the sub-variants of the credulous 
literature assume that the phenomena of sorcery and witchcraft are real, that 
sorcerers and witches actually exist, and that belief in their existence and in the 
efficacy of their practices (whether those practices are regarded as beneficial, 
innocuous or malevolent) are consistent with a tenable conception of the nature of 
reality. Contrariwise, critical representations of the same beliefs and practices 
predicate on the express or implicit assumption that sorcery and witchcraft are 
entirely irreal, that belief in the existence of the phenomena is perforce irrational 
and that the essential nature of reality, at least in so far as the parameters of reality 
can be known, is such that the possibility of their existence is precluded 
absolutely. 
Relevant forms of this critical literature, including the anthropological and 
ethnographic representations from which our knowledge and understanding of 
contemporary Melanesian sorcery-related beliefs and practices are primarily 
derived, may be grouped broadly within three major classifications: historical, 
sociological and anthropological. 54 And in so far as the 'legal' literature may be 
seen to instantiate the representational mode with which we are principally 
sorcerers was to bum them at the stake. [Courier-Mail 
(Brisbane), 10 March 1993]. 
54 Other classificatory models have been devised by historians and social anthropologists for 
use in connection with the various 'theories' of sorcery, witchcraft and related beliefs that have 
been developed within their respective disciplines (and, in some cases, on more or less inter~ 
disciplinary bases). Where relevant, these models will be considered below. For present 
purposes, however, the classificatory structure suggested here is intended to capture a broader 
range of the critical literature, and to organise that literature on terms less limiting than those that 
tend to govern the more particularised theoretical expositions with which those models are 
associated. 
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concerned here, it is particularly important to have regard to the historical and 
socio-anthropological formulations that have so influenced its development. 
(1) Historical Representations 
In the enlightened view of Dr Johnson, 'a history of magick' would surely be 
amongst 'the most interesting and instructive' works an enterprising scholar might 
undertake to write.55 But if the modern historical bibliography is replete with 
studies of magic and witchcraft that attempt to be both, 56 the subject matter has 
proved in many cases to be what one of its own contributors has characterised as 
55 Quoted in M. Summers, Witchcraft and Black Magic (1946; rpt London: Arrow Books Ltd, 
1964), p. 7. 
56 The principal works consulted include: G.L. Kittredge, Witchcraft in Old and New England 
(1929; rpt New York: Russell and Russell, 1956); C.H. Lea, Materials Toward a History of 
Witchcraft, 3 vols (1939; rpt New York: AMS Press, 1986); J. C. Wall, Devils: Their Origins and 
History (1904; rpt London: Studio Editions, 1992); C.L. Ewen, Witch Hunting and Witch Trials: 
The Indictments for Witchcraft from the Records of 1373 Assizes held for the Home Circuit AD 
/559-I736 (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Company, 1929); Witchcraft and 
Demonianism: A Concise Account Derived from Sworn Depositions and Confessions Obtained in 
the Courts of England and Wales (London: Heath Cranton, 1933); R.H. Robbins, The 
Encyclopaedia of Witchcraft and Demonology (New York: Crown Publishers, 1960); H.R. Trevor-
Roper, 'The European Witch-Craze of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries' in Religion, 
Reformation and Social Change (London: Macmillan, 1967), pp. 90-192; N. Cohn, Europe's Inner 
Demons (New York: New American Library, 1975); P. Boyer and S. Nissenbaum, Salem 
Possessed: The Social Origins of Witchcraft (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974); 
R. Kieckbefer, European Witch Trials: Their Foundations in Popular and Learned Culture, I 300-
I 500 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976); C. Lamer, Witchcraft and Religion: The 
Politics of Popular Belief(London: Basil Blackwell, 1984); W.E. Monter, Witchcraft in France 
and Switzerland: The Borderlands during the Reformation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1976); H. Sebald, Witchcraft: The Heritage of a Heresy (New York: ElsivierNorth Holland, Inc., 
1978); H.C.E. Midelfort, Witch-Hunting in Southwestern Germany, I562-I684 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1972); A. Macfarlane, Witchcraft in Tudor and Stuart England: A 
Regional and Comparative Study (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970); M. Summers, 
Witchcraft and Black Magic (1946; rpt London: Arrow Books Ltd, 1964); K. Thomas, Religion 
and the Decline of Magic: Studies in Popular Belief in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century 
England (1971; rpt Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd, 1973); J. Demos, Entertaining Satan 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982); J. Russell, Witchcraft in the Middle Ages (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1972) R. Zguta, 'Witchcraft Trials in Seventeenth Century Russia' ( 1977) 
82(5) American Historical Review 1187-1207; C. Webster, From Paraclesus to Newton: Magic 
and the Making of Modern Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); G. 
Henningsen, The Witches' Advocate: Basque Witchcraft and the Spanish Inquisition, 1609-1614 
(Reno, NE: University of Nevada Press, 1980). 
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'an irresistible lure to not a few freakish and facile pens.'57 Somewhat more 
prosaically, Keith Thomas warns the general reader that '[ m ]uch nonsense has 
been written on this subject', and one must pick his or her way through the 
available materials with caution.58 Mindful of this admonition, and my own 
limitations as very much a 'general reader' of history, I have been obliged to rely 
largely on the discrimination of institutional academia to separate the sensible 
literary wheat from the less tenable chaff. 
Even within the confines of a select bibliography reflecting the work product 
of scholars with demonstrably sound academic credentials, however, there are 
further difficulties to be encountered; difficulties which, in this case, have rather 
more to do with the representational methods of historical scholarship than with 
the peculiar subject of such representations. For on one widely held view, E.H. 
Carr has observed that the stuff of history may be prudently regarded as 'a corpus 
of ascertained facts,' available to the historian primarily, if not exclusively, in 
documentary forms, like so many 'fish on the fish-monger's slab.' These the 
historian collects and takes home, cooks and then 'serves them in whatever style 
appeals to him.'59 Invoking Croce's aphorism, Carr reminds us that, in so far as it 
'consists essentially in seeing the past through the eyes of the present,' all history 
is effectively 'contemporary history', and that the principal task of the historian is 
not merely to record such facts as may be discerned in the accessible textual 
sources, but to engage actively and deliberately in their evaluation.60 
57 Summers, Witchcraft and Black Magic, p. 7. As it happens, Summers himself has not 
escaped criticism of this kind. See Keickhefer, European Witch Trials, p. 3. 
58 Religion and the Decline of Magic, p. 519. 
59 What is History? (1961; rpt Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd, 1987), p. 9. 
fiJ !bid., p. 21. 
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Thus committed to such a self-consciously evaluative process, senous 
historians of witchcraft and sorcery must continuously ask themselves, not only 
what the available facts convey, in terms of the beliefs and behaviours they depict, 
but why those beliefs were entertained amongst the communities in whose midst 
they flourished. 61 Because they are obliged to extrapolate the substantive evidence 
on which their responses to both questions are based from the few and, in many 
cases, fragmentary documents that are available-theological tracts, Inquisitor's 
manuals, church records, trial reports and popular pamphlets-in formulating their 
answers, historians 'must ultimately rely on taste or intuition, the feel of the 
language employed.'62 And because their explanatory interpretations are 
necessarily derived from documentary sources generated within a particular 
segment of the societies in which they were produced, the resultant vagaries of 
this exercise can be especially problematic. In this connection, as Kieckhefer 
suggests, the general problem confronting historians of witchcraft is this: 
it is notoriously difficult to glean the beliefs of the illiterate 
masses when the only sources are texts drawn up by the 
literate elite. 63 
To fully canvas the implications of this problem for the construction of 
tenable, historically informed theories of witchcraft would involve an enterprise 
larger than that contemplated here. For present purposes, however, it is sufficient, 
firstly, to take cognisance of the doubt it has tended to cast on any assumption that 
the available facts accurately reflect the contours and content of the beliefs of the 
majority of the populations of the Anglo-European societies in which those beliefs 
61 Ibid., p. 87. 
62 Elliott Rose, A Razor for a Goat ( 1962), quoted in Kieckhefer, European Witch Trials, p. 3. 
63 Kieckhefer, European Witch Trials, p. 2. 
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appear to have been rife;64 and secondly, to note that, in their effort to plumb the 
depths of genuinely popular beliefs and practices, a growing number of historians 
have turned, nolens volens, to the methods of social anthropology.65 
The documentary evidence of Anglo-European witchcraft beliefs that is 
available to historians consists largely of materials having to do with the 
persecution and prosecution of alleged witches, rather than the substantive nature 
of such beliefs and practices as may have given rise to those distinctive responses. 
Relying principally on these kinds of materials, the views advanced in critical 
historical analyses tend to be grouped within three general sub-categories. These I 
64 See Monter, 'The Historiography of European Witchcraft: Progress and Prospects'; 
Middlefort, 'Recent Witch-Hunting Research, or Where Do We Go From Here?'. 
65 See e.g. A. Macfarlane, Witchcraft in Tudor and Stuart England: A Regional and 
Comparative Study (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), pp. 211-253; K. Thomas, 'The 
Relevance of Social Anthropology to the Historical Study of English Witchcraft' in Witchcraft 
Confessions and Accusations, ed. M. Douglas (London: Tavistock Publications, 1970), pp. 47-79. 
Not all historians regard the adoption of anthropological methods as particularly useful, or even 
appropriate, in the study of Anglo-European witchcraft and magic. Kieckhefer's comments are 
indicative: 
Recognizing the close correspondence between European 
witchcraft and witchcraft in non-Western societies, [some 
historians] have made use of anthropological comparisons in 
analyzing the development of witch beliefs and the motives 
for witch persecutions. Most importantly, they have followed 
anthropologists in attending to the social context that gave rise 
to accusations of witchcraft. Studies of this kind lend 
themselves to an important criticism: European society at the 
time of the witch trials was already distinct in many ways from 
primitive societies. Its political systems, family-structure, and 
educational development were significantly different from 
those of non-Western societies, and it is misleading to suggest 
that the social mechanisms in Early Europe are directly 
comparable to those of African or American Indian cultures. 
[European Witch Trials, p. 1.) 
Erik Midelfort criticises Macfarlane's and Thomas's work on similar grounds. RC.E. Midelfort, 
Witch Hunting in Southwestern Germany, 1562-1684 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), 
p. 4. 
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have styled 'top-down', 'bottom-up' and interactive analyses,66 based on their 
characterisation of the witch beliefs under scrutiny as products of elite or learned 
culture; popular or mass culture; and particular processes of ideational interaction 
involving elements of learned and popular culture, respectively. 
(a) 'Top-Down' Analyses-Witchcraft Beliefs as 
a Reflection of Learned Culture 
Historians adopting a 'top-down' approach argue that the documentary sources 
of information about Anglo-European witchcraft beliefs on which they must rely 
necessarily reflect the beliefs of the elite, educated classes responsible for the 
literature examined in the course of historical analysis. Heavily influenced by 
credulous, theologically-based denunciatory doctrines-because they, themselves, 
66 This sub-division of the historical literature is broadly, though not entirely, consistent with 
the analytically discrepant approaches recognised and debated by contemporary scholars of 
Anglo-European witchcraft. Most historians today are prepared to acknowledge that there are 
tenable (if not ultimately persuasive) bodies of argument revolving around the dominance of 
learned and popular beliefs respecting the origins and nature of witch beliefs, irrespective of which 
side of tbe line their own views may fall on. There is less agreement, however, in relation to the 
parameters of other or alternative explanatory categories. Kieckhefer, for example (himself a 'top-
down' theorist) also identifies three approaches. The first two of these reflect a conventional bi-
polar distinction between learned and popular levels of witch belief. The tbird, however, which 
Kieckheffer characterises as an approach wherein witchcraft is regarded as a phenomenon 'rooted 
not merely in popular tradition but in actual practice', bears certain features which, on his own 
terms, would associate it more closely with what I have described as a credulous perspective. 
European Witch Trials, pp. 2-3, 103-105. Exponents of tbis 'actual practice' approach include 
Montague Summers, 'whose faith in the real existence of demons and in the genuine alliance 
between witches and Satan remained unshakable' (ibid., p. 3); Emesto de Martino, Primitive 
Magic: The Psychic Powers of Shamans and Sorcerers (1972; rpt Bridgeport: Prism Press, 1988); 
Jeffrey Russell, Witchcraft in the Middle Ages (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972); and, 
perhaps most notably, Margaret Murray, whose principal work advanced the thesis tbat witches 
were practising adherents to vestigial pagan religions. See Summers, The History of Witchcraft 
and Demonology; M. Murray, The Witch Cult in Western Europe (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1921). 
Whilst Kieckhefer suggests that none of these three divergent views 'is either manifestly 
absurd or self-evidently correct' (ibid., p. 3), he is clearly dismissive of the last; as are Thomas, 
Religion and the Decline of Magic, pp. 518, 614-15; Macfarlane, Witchcraft in Tudor and Stuart 
England, p. 10; Cohn, Europe's Inner Demons, pp. 99-125; and Lamer, Witchcraft and Religion, 
pp. 47-48. 
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actually held such beliefs, because the expression of such beliefs could be put to 
particular forms of hegemonic advantage, or both-members and representatives 
of the privileged and powerful elite classes then projected those beliefs onto the 
uneducated peasant masses. 67 In the event, rather than depicting the specific 
nature and dynamics of genuinely popular beliefs, the ideas of witchcraft reflected 
in the literature examined are said to represent the attitudes and fears of public 
disorder on the part of those who had a particular interest in the maintenance of 
social order. 68 
ExemplifYing this historical approach, Robbins has argued that, as 'a form of 
religion, a Christian heresy,' instantiated in the idea of the diabolical compact, 
witchcraft was 'never of the people.'69 Rather, 'clerics and lawyers ... made a 
trade of their witch-hunting, and by employing torture and leading questions, 
extracted from their victims the confessions of devil-worship which they 
themselves had invented.' On this view, the European populace in general is said 
to have come to accept witchcraft as a species of heresy only 'after decades of 
pounding in the new doctrine.'70 
In essence the persecution of witches was the product of a 
cold-blooded campaign launched by self-interested clerics and 
inquisitors. It had no genuine social roots, but was imposed 
from above.71 
67 See, e.g. R.H. Robbins, The Encyclopedia of Witchcraft and Demonology (New York: 
Crown Publishers, 1959); H.R. Trevor-Roper, 'The European Witch-Craze of the Sixteenth and 
Seventeenth Centuries' in Religion, Reformation and Social Change (London: Macmillan, 1967), 
pp. 90-192; N. Cohn, Europe's Inner Demons (St. Albans: Paladin, 1975). 
68 Witchcraft and Religion, p. 49. 
69 Robbins, Encyclopedia of Witchcraft and Demonology, pp. 9, 144. 
70 Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic, pp. 542-43. 
71 Ibid. (footnotes omitted). See also Kieckhefer, European Witch Trials, p. 2. Noting that 
Robbins's interpretation provides 'a valuable reminder' that the witch-beliefs current in England 
during the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century 'contained an element for which no earlier precedent 
(b) 'Bottom-Up' Analyses:-Witchcraft Beliefs as 
a Reflection of Popular Culture 
12-1 
Relying on the same primary materials, and employing the interpolative 
methods, historians adopting a 'bottom-up' approach to the analysis of those 
materials discern evidence of what. to them, appears to reveal elements of 
genuinely popular beliefs about witchcraft, sorcery and magic and the social role 
of 'the witch in the community.'72 Attending to the ancient origins and enduring 
nature of popular witchcraft and related beliefs, and the more immediate socio-
political and economic functions those beliefs may be seen to have served at the 
level of local, inter-communal and more intimate inter-personal relations,73 the 
motives, intentions and objectives of those who sought to control, suppress, 
manipulate or even invent such beliefs for larger political or economic purposes 
become secondary, if not altogether unimportant, features in such analyses. From 
this perspective, it is the underlying foundations of popular belief upon which 
formal accusations of witchcraft were based that stand out as meaningful and 
historically significant. 
Formal accusations of witchcraft may indeed have given rise to the official 
processes of ecclesiastical and secular disposition, overseen and directed by 
is to be found,' Thomas is critical of the application of Robbins's analysis of the European 
materials to the English situation for two reasons. Firstly, because: 
it does not explain why there should have been such a time-lag 
between the propagation of continental ideas, in the fourteenth 
and fifteenth centuries, and the beginning of English 
persecution, well over a hundred years later. [Religion and the 
Decline of Magic, p. 543.] 
But also, and more importantly, because 'the great bulk of witchcraft accusations in England did 
not relate to any alleged heretical activities upon the part of the witch, but to her maleficium (or 
'sorcery' ... ).' Ibid. 
72 Lamer, Witchcraft and Religion, p. 50. 
73 See, e.g., Macfarlane, Witchcraft in Tudor and Stuart England; Thompson, Religion and the 
Decline of Magic; Boyer and Nissenbaum, Salem Possessed. 
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individuals holding particular positions of religious, political and legal authority, 
in connection with which proceedings the available documentary records were 
initially produced. Catastrophic as the consequences of those official processes 
may have been for the people affected by them, however, the processes 
themselves tend to be regarded as epiphenomenal; for without a firm basis of 
underlying popular belief in the existence of witchcraft, sorcery and malevolent 
magic, the institutionalised persecution and prosecutions of alleged practitioners 
would not have arisen in the first instance, nor could they have been maintained 
without a secure grounding of popular support. 
Viewed historically in this light, the accused witch ceases to be regarded as an 
entirely 'innocent' victim, selected more or less at random by secular or religious 
authorities as an exemplary sacrifice to the aberrant beliefs or political 
machinations of the educated elite. Instead he (or, far more often than not, she) 
becomes: 'someone with particular social characteristics who had been accused of 
witchcraft by neighbours who also had particular social characteristics.' Of 
English witches, for example, it has been said that they were 'predictably old, 
poor, and female. Less obviously, they were older and poorer than, and 
sometimes dependent on, those who accused them.' What is more, '[t]hey were 
nearly always in a fairly close relationship to the accused, a relationship in which 
the accepted norms were those oflove, neighbourliness, or charity .'74 
Quarrels and damaged relationships followed by specific 
accidents and misfortunes for which the accused witch could 
be blamed, were nearly always part of the evidence recorded 
at English trials for witchcraft75 
74 Lamer, Witchcraft and Religion, p. 50. 
75 Ibid. 
(c) Interactive Analyses:-Witchcraft Beliefs as a Reflection of 
the Interaction between Popular and Learned Culture 
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A third category of historical analysis advances an intermediate proposition 
that goes some way towards reconciling the apparent differences between the 'top-
down' and 'bottom-up' approaches described above, positing in their stead an 
alternative, and in my view a more compelling, explanation for the development 
of Anglo-European witchcraft and sorcery-related beliefs, which regards the 
process as necessarily involving fundamentally interactive features. As seems so 
often to be the case when analytical quests for truth-historical and otherwise-
give rise to a polarisation of ideas, here too it is in the uncertain middle-ground 
between opposing views that a path towards more satisfactory understanding can 
be found. 
Himself a staunch proponent of the 'top-down' approach, Kieckhefer concedes 
that one may well question the validity of distinguishing between popular and 
learned witch beliefs in early European society, and that the existence of certain 
commonalities between the two was not unlikely.76 There were, after all, 
numerous possibilities for contact and exchange between the 
literate and illiterate classes. Parish priests, and perhaps 
merchants and other groups, might stand midway between the 
two extremes; they were frequently from the lower or middle 
classes, yet at the same time they were exposed to the beliefs 
of cultured individuals. Sermons and plays could readily serve 
as media for popular dissemination of originally learned 
notions. . . . even woodcuts could fulfil a similar function so 
long as there was someone on hand to interpret their 
representations in the intended sense. The scandal aroused by 
trials for witchcraft might in itself spread learned notions 
about witches among the populace, whose presence at the 
executions would be a matter of common occurrence.77 
76 European Witch Trials, p. 4. 
77 Ibid. 
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Yet Kieckhefer is adamant that there was always a 'substantial difference between 
the educated elite ... and the illiterate masses'. The barrier between them might 
not have been entirely impenetrable, but 'the gap was wide enough that the 
preoccupations of one class can scarcely be assumed to have been shared by the 
other.'78 
Having closely examined the breadth of the historical literature, however, and 
having carefully assessed the analyses and the underlying evidence developed on 
the basis of both 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' approaches to the materials dealing 
with Anglo-European witch beliefs, Christine Lamer found that a certain 
confusion 'has arisen out of the sharp distinction between learned and popular 
witch beliefs', particularly where that distinction operates to identify, on rigidly 
segregative bases, ideas of and about witchcraft grounded implicitly and 
inextricably in Judeo-Christian diabolism as learned, and belief in the malevolent 
and beneficial powers of sorcery and sorcerers as popular.79 According to Lamer, 
the historical data seem rather to indicate that: 
there was more than one level of popular belief, that popular 
belief could vary from region to region, and that popular 
belief, like learned belief, was not static. Where there is more 
than one cultural level these will always interact. . . . In any 
society in which the educated mingle with the uneducated, 
ideas will pass from one to the other80 
For the purposes of an analysis of the relationship between law and sorcery in 
Papua New Guinea today-a relationship in which the jural characterisation of 
sorcery-related beliefs and behaviours can and does have such determinative 
78 Ibid. 
79 Witchcraft and Religion, p. 53. 
80 Ibid., pp. 53, 55. 
128 
social implications-it is interesting and not unimportant to note that critical 
elements of the interactive processes Lamer has identified as historically 
significant in Europe and Britain are seen to have occurred in a distinctively legal 
context: 
Canon Law synthesizers of the late fifteenth century were 
doing two things at once: they were learning from the courts 
about the possible activities of witchcraft and they were 
developing a rational doctrine of evil. Just as popular witch 
beliefs are an inversion of positive cultural values, so educated 
demonology is an inversion of official theology on the nature 
of God. The mutual learning of popular and educated 
inversions was a process which was greatly accelerated in the 
courts, both ecclesiastical and secular. In those courts, lawyer 
and peasant confronted each other and fmally emerged, 
through accusation, boasting, torture and confession with an 
agreed story acceptable to both. 81 
More importantly, perhaps, consistent with their decidedly critical premises, 
and seemingly irrespective of the analytical camp with which a particular scholar 
may be associated, historical representations of Anglo-European magic, witchcraft 
and sorcery almost invariably adopt an approach to the description and analysis of 
the origins, nature and patterns of witchcraft and sorcery-related beliefs, as 
'beliefs' only--and irrational beliefs in any case, when assessed from the diverse 
perspectives afforded by an otherwise modem, Western rational and scientific 
view of the world. 82 
81 Ibid., p. 55. 
82 A sub-grouping of 'radical' historians, adhering to views that might be classified as falling 
broadly within what I have described as a 'bottom-up' analytical perspective, have advanced the 
argument that witchcraft beliefs were 'rooted not merely in popular tradition but in actual practice', 
and that 'people accused of witchcraft did in fact engage in some kind of illicit rites.' Montague 
Summers, 'whose faith in the real existence of demons and in the genuine alliance between witches 
and Satan remained unshakable,' has been described as '[t]he most extreme advocate of this view'. 
Kieckhefer, European Witch Trials, p. 3. I have excluded a consideration of the work of these 
historians from the instant discussion because their credentials as 'critical' scholars (in the sense of 
that term as I have defined it here) have been so seriously called into question, and the quality of 
their scholarship so roundly criticised by their modem, unequivocally 'critical' colleagues. See, 
e.g., M.J. Kephart, 'Rationalists vs. Romantics among Scholars of Witchcraft' in Marwick, 
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Thus, when approached from the 'bottom up', historical analyses of Anglo-
European witchcraft and sorcery tend to characterise variable forms of ancient and 
enduring traditional beliefs in maleficium as genuinely entertained, a priori, at the 
level of popular culture, and as having been given historically significant forms of 
public expression through the articulatory mechanisms of evolving religious and 
secular institutions, which did neither more nor less than respond to those beliefs, 
and to popular demands for 'appropriate' socio-legal action in the face of their 
behavioural consequences. Assessed from a 'top down' historical perspective, 
even where such beliefs might be characterised as bereft of, or no longer retaining, 
an active currency within the parameters of contemporary modes of popular 
thought, elite custodians and sources of authoritative knowledge about the nature 
of reality are said to have successfully re-activated those ancient beliefs (or at least 
a vestigial propensity to believe), superimposing upon them a distinctively 
theological concept of Satanic witchcraft. On the strength of that conceptual 
synthesis of a 'new myth,'83 the collective will and actions of malleable, largely 
illiterate masses were then marshalled and directed in the service of particular 
theological-and political-objectives by a plausible belief, not only in the 
existence of identifiable individuals who were able and inclined to exercise a 
Witchcraft and Sorcery, pp. 326-342; Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic, pp. 518,614-
15; Lamer, Witchcraft and Religion, pp. 47-48; Luhnnann, Persuasions of the Witch's Craft, pp. 
43-44. 
Indicative of the view that popular witchcraft beliefs were anchored in 'actual practice' are the 
arguments of Margaret Murray, The Witch-Cult in Western Europe (1921), who suggested that 
witchcraft was 'a pre-Christian fertility religion that survived as an underground cult after the 
nominal adoption of Christianity in Europe'; Jules Michele!, Satanism and Witchcraft (1939), who 
characterised popular diabolic practices 'as a protest against medieval society'; Pennethome 
Hughes, Witchcraft. 2nd ed. (1965), who regards such practices as 'largely a female reaction 
against male domination; and Jeffrey Russell, Witchcraft in the Middle Ages (1972), who explains 
witchcraft as 'an outgrowth of heresy, and a manifestation of dissent against the established 
Church.' Kieckhefer, European Witch Trials, pp. 2-3, 154-155. 
83 Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic, p. 542. 
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range of malevolent occult powers, but in the diabolical origins of the powers that 
had been conferred on them. 
On yet another view, wherein neither a 'bottom up' nor a 'top down' 
perspective is seen, in itself, to provide a sufficient explanation for the historical 
origins and development of Anglo-European ideas about witchcraft and sorcery, it 
is rather the interaction between, and the cross-fertilisation of, the beliefs 
entertaining a common currency amongst members of all levels of society and 
culture. In the end, however, as Hanlon suggests, '[t]he literature from centuries 
of ... historical discourse in the European world has been committed to the 
rationalisation or interpretation of sorcery as something other than experienced. '84 
(d) Magic, Religion and Science-Deficiencies in Historical 
Representations of Witchcraft and Sorcery-Related Beliefs 
Whatever approach they may adopt in the attempt to account for the 
distribution of witch-beliefs and 'for the developments within a particular society 
that have given rise to its characteristic pattern of beliefs,'85 historians of the larger 
social and intellectual developments in Anglo-European society with which the 
occurrence of those beliefs are associated generally tend to locate such 
occurrences along a temporal continuum, reflecting evolutionary advancements 
the development of Western thought. 86 On this basis, a recognition of the primacy 
of certain ideas about the nature and contours of reality are portrayed as having 
84 
'Sorcery, "Savage Memories", and the Edge of Commensurability for History in the Pacific' 
in Pacific Island Histories: Journeys and Transformations (Canberra: Division of Pacific and 
Asian History, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 1992), p. 123 
(emphasis provided). 
85 Marwick, Witchcraft and Sorcery. p. 16. 
86 See generally, R.A. Nisbet, Social Change and History: Aspects of the Western Theory of 
Development (New York: Oxford University Press. 1969), pp. 139-187. 
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progressed from explanatory beliefs in the powers of magic, witchcraft and 
sorcery, through more cognitively, intellectually and sociologically sophisticated 
forms of religious conviction and ultimately to science, in a manner at once 
consistent with, and arguably indicative of the ascendancy of a modem rationalist 
world view over traditional variants of an irrational world view.87 
Anchored in the principles of Greek science, with its insistence on logical 
argument and the necessary quality of demonstrability in relation to factual 
assertions about the natural world, the age of enlightened European rationalism 
has come to be characterised by its extension and refinement of empirically based 
explanations for phenomenological relationships of cause and effect. By the 
nineteenth century, under the influence of the proto-anthropological speculations 
of missionaries and other sojourners in the African and Pacific Island colonies and 
a growing inclination to 'historicise the Enlightenment's rationalist approach' to 
the study of religion, 88 historical representations of the development of Western 
cosmological belief systems came to be cast within a decidedly evolutionary 
framework, taking on the comparative dimension that was to become the hallmark 
of anthropological studies of religion. 89 Prior to the introduction of those 
elaborative refinements, however, and abetted by a Reformationist theology, 
with its individual questioning of authority, its advocacy of a 
systematic, rational and empirical study of nature for the 
87 See S.J. Tambiah, Magic. Science. Religion. and the Scope of Rationality (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990); Neusner, 'Introduction' in Neusner, Frerichs and Flesher, 
Religion. Science and Magic, pp. 3-7; T. Settle, The Rationality of Science versus the Rationality 
of Magic' (1971) I Philosophy of Social Science 173, 175-179. 
88 Hanlon, 'Sorcery and the Edge of Commensurability', p. 122. 
89 Tambiah, Magic Science, Religion, pp. 4-15. 
glorification of God, and its promotion of productive 
utilitarian economic activity both within Europe and beyond,90 
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it was the linked developments of a scientific revolution and a range of 
concomitant intellectual, social and philosophical changes, that historians of 
Anglo-European witchcraft and sorcery regarded, and still regard, as leading 
inevitably to the liminality of those beliefs.91 
What is troubling about this historical premise-or rather, perhaps, this 
conclusion-about the evolution of Anglo-European beliefs in witchcraft and 
magic, is the paradox implicit in the assertion that, whereas magical beliefs are 
said to have inexorably 'succumbed to the more persuasive, explanatory, and 
democratic powers of science,' religious beliefs are seen to have effected 
something in the nature of 'an epistemological compromise' that has allowed them 
to co-exist with science.92 For it seems to me that to contrapose magic and science 
on the basis that the evolved rationality which carne to support the latter 
necessarily operated to preclude an acceptance of the former, but had no such 
necessary effect in relation to religion, must either denigrate the integrity of 
Anglo-European rationalism on its own terms, or impute to post-Reformationist 
religious belief qualities of rationality which are, at best, difficult to identify as 
such. 
90 Hanlon, 'Sorcery and the Edge of Commensurability for History in the Pacific', p. 123. 
91 See Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic, pp. 767-800; S. Sharot, 'Magic, Religion, 
Science and Secularization' in Neusner, Frerichs and Flesher, Religion, Science and Magic, pp. 
261-283. In specific relation to the cessation of witch trials in England in the seventeenth century, 
as opposed to the denouement of popular magical and witch-beliefs, Thomas is somewhat more 
guarded in his characterisation of these changes as deterrninatively causal. 'The Relevance of 
Social Anthropology to the Historical Study of English Witchcraft', 70. 
92 Hanlon, 'Sorcery and the Edge of Commensurability for History in the Pacific', p. 123. 
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In his analysis of the decline of witchcraft and magic in England, Thomas 
advances just such an argument, exploring the separation of magic and religion-a 
distinction the medieval Church had done much to blur-as an historical process, 
which he traces to evolutionary developments in Christian theology and the 
accompanying ecclesiastical practices associated with the Reformation. 93 
Summarising his arguments in this connection, Thomas maintains that what he 
endeavoured to suggest: 
was that a reclassification took place during the period with 
which I was concerned, whereby those elements in religion 
which ultimately came to be regarded as magical were 
gradually identified as such . . . . I further urged that a 
fundamental change took place in the idea of religion itself, as 
the emphasis carne to be placed on formal belief rather than on 
a mode of living. Far from ignoring the emergence of the term 
'magic' as something separate from 'religion,' I pointed out that 
the classic distinction between the two . . . was in fact 
originally formulated by the sixteenth-century Protestant 
reformers. It was they who first declared that magic was 
coercive and religion intercessionary, and that magic was not a 
false religion, but a different sort of activity altogether. 94 
Drawing on the arguments elaborated by Stanley Tambiah,95 Hanlon suggests 
that the idea of idea of 'magic as opposed to religion' was influenced by the Judaic 
distinction between 'god' and 'nature':96 
Judaism separated God from nature. Yahweh carne to be 
regarded as omniscient, omnipotent, and eternal. Pagan 
cosmology, in contrast to Judaic thought, has been represented 
as accepting the existence of a primordial realm, anterior and 
parallel to the natural world. Thus, unlike Yaweh, pagan gods 
or spirits did not transcend the universe but were rooted in it. 
Approaches to this primordial realm included ritual action of 
"Religion and the Decline of Magic, pp. 27-89, 301-332. 
94 
'An Anthropology of Religion and Magic ll,' 6(X) (1975) Journal of Interdisciplinary 
History 96. 
95 Magic. Science, Religion, pp. 4-15. 
96 Hanlon, 'Sorcery and the Edge of Commensurability for History in the Pacific', p. 122. 
the type identified as magic. Influenced by the tone of Judaic 
though~ magic came to be viewed as a ritual action valued for 
its effectiveness in dealing with forces or objects outside the 
realm of God.97 
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To distinguish magic and religion on such terms, however, may be to elevate 
historical forms over experiential substance. Indeed, Thomas himself was obliged 
to resort to an anthropologically informed explanation to account for the apparent 
increase post-Reformation English witchcraft accusations revealed by his own 
research.98 In developing this explanation, Thomas points to the unavailability of 
erstwhile quasi-magical techniques of the Church-confession and absolution, 
exorcism and protective blessing-for dealing with personal problems and 
interpersonal conflicts in the intimate context of the English village:99 
A man who decided that God was responsible for his illness 
could do little about it. He could pray that it might be cured, 
but with no very certain prospect of success, for God's ways 
were mysterious, and, though he could be supplicated, he 
could not be coerced. Protestant theologians taught that 
Christians should suffer stoically like Job, but this doctrine 
was not a comfortable one. The attraction of witch beliefs, by 
contrast, was that they held out precisely that certainty of 
redress which the theologians denied. A man who feared that 
a witch might attack him could invoke a number of magical 
preservatives in order to ensure his self-protection. If the 
witch had already struck, it was still open to him to practise 
counter-magic against his supposed persecutor. 100 
To the extent that it provided an explanatory system of belief and a coherent 
basis for action whereby an English villager might effectively cope with the 
vicissitudes of an inhospitable social reality, magic may well have been regarded 
97 Ibid., pp. 122-23. 
98 
'The Relevance of Social Anthropology to the Historical Study of English Witchcraft' in 
Douglas, Witchcraft Confessions and Accusations, pp. 47-79. 
99 /bid. See also, Douglas, 'Introduction: Thirty Years after Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic', in 
Witchcraft Confessions and Accusations, xxxiii. 
100 Thomas, 'The Relevance of Social Anthropology to Witchcraft', p. 57. 
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as more serviceable than religion. Measured against the criteria of validity 
embraced by contemporary Western science, however, it is difficult to see how the 
perceived impracticability of religious belief serves to render that mode of belief 
somehow more rational than a magical alternative. If the tenets of a modem, 
scientifically informed rationality are meant to provide a secure intellectual and 
epistemological foundation, upon which the historical evidence proffered in 
support of a tenable analytical distinction between religion and magic is seen to be 
based, it is a distinction without much in the way of substantive difference. 
A further feature revealed in an examination of the historical literature is more 
telling still, although it is one which historians and, until recently, most 
anthropologists, have been disinclined to recognise and reluctant to explore in any 
depth. Modem historical evaluations of earlier expressions of Anglo-European 
beliefs in and about witchcraft and sorcery readily acknowledge that, from the 
earliest times in recorded history, variants of a demonstrably critical literature, on 
the one hand, in which the plausibility of witchcraft and sorcery beliefs was 
disputed and the existence of persons capable of exercising or manipulating super-
natural powers was rejected (even if such incredulity as may be seen to have been 
expressed was of a qualified nature101), have co-existed with a literature 
101 Thus, for example, whereas Plato is said to have 'attacked those who believed they could 
summon up the dead' or 'bend the gods to do their will' by the incantation of spells, he was quite 
prepared to accept that similar results might be achieved through prayer. See Baroja, 'Magic and 
Religion in the Classical World', p. 74. By the same token, Hebraic scholars have argued that the 
biblical condemnation of those who purported to consult with the dead and 'familiar spirits' (Isaiah 
8: 19-22) evidences a contemporary recognition that the feat very probably involved clever acts of 
ventriloquism rather than wizardry. The Jewish Encyclopedia, vol. 12, p. 544. And whilst 
magicians may have been excommunicated from the Catholic Church as early as the 6th century, 
up until about the 9th century, Church doctrine continued, in the main, to relegate witchcraft and 
related beliefs to the realm of mere superstition. It was not until the early thirteenth century that 
witchcraft, sorcery and related practices came to be formally recognised by religious authorities as 
both real and sufficiently serious as to attract potentially severe ecclesiastical penalties. See 
McRoberts, New Catholic Encyclopedta, vol. 14, p. 978. 
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instantiating patently credulous representations of those beliefs. 102 At the same 
time, except to the extent that one is prepared to regard religious belief as rational, 
and subject to the contention that alternative forms of contemporary belief in 
magic and the occult are necessarily disingenuous, or at the very least, 
theoretically inconvenient, 103 there exists today, in the very midst of the most 
industrialised, technologically sophisticated and highly educated societies of the 
Western world, a considerable-and by some accounts, a growing-number of 
people, who profess and act upon a variety of magical belief systems, inclusive in 
many instances of sorcery and witchcraft. However these systems may depart in 
form from the kinds of beliefs entertained amongst early modem Anglo-European 
societies (or contemporary, pre-industrial native societies elsewhere in the world), 
they are otherwise quite similarly irrational in their substantive content. 104 
102 See e.g. Cohn, Europe's Inner Demons, p. 224. 
103 In her essay, 'Witchcraft Past and Present', Lamer succinctly expressed such a view: 
So-called witchcraft today in modem industrial cities is an 
entirely different phenomenon from the witchcraft of pre-
industrial Europe or the witchcraft of primitive tribes. The 
difference lies in the social context: in pre-industrial witchcraft 
the community as a whole believed in the possibility and 
power of witchcraft and the witch was, therefore, seen as a 
public menace; an enemy of the people. . . . Witches today are 
private people persons doing their thing. They inhabit the 
world of fringe religion. They do not matter to anyone but 
themselves. [in Witchcraft and Religion, p. 79] 
On this basis, Lamer was content to assume 'that the witchcraft that is ascribed to early modem 
Europe and to today's primitive societies should be allowed to set the standard as to what 
constitutes witchcraft.' [Ibid.] Without invoking, in this context, the determinative distinction 
between rational and irrational beliefs, however, she was evidently prepared to regard 'fringe 
religion' as irrational; whereas, by implication, conventional religious beliefs fall within the realm 
of rational beliefs. For similar considerations, see Tiryakian, 'Toward the Sociology of Esoteric 
Culture'; Truzzi, 'The Occult Revival as Popular Culture'; Jorgensen and Jorgensen, 'Social 
Meanings of the Occult'. For a more circumspect assessment, see Luhrmann, Persuasions of the 
Witches' Craft, pp. 7-15. 
104 As Overing points out. serious consideration of this paradox, and the epistemological 
issues to which such consideration gives rise, has been the focus of discussion and debate within 
the fields of social theory and the philosophy of science only since the early 1970s, before which 
time such intellectual attention as it had attracted was shown more by continental European 
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The point is significant for several reasons. Firstly, it is important historically 
because it shows that pockets of doubt and critical scepticism could and did exist 
in the midst of Anglo-European society at a time when the dominant 
Weltanschauung strongly favoured a credulous perspective, and well before the 
advent of a flourishing scientific rationalism. 105 It is also important from a 
sociological perspective, because it indicates that even today, when to hold 
anything other than a critical view in relation to witchcraft, sorcery and related 
beliefs is so readily regarded as manifestly irrational, a large, and arguably 
growing, number of people profess, or at any rate, respond with acceptance to, 
such beliefs. 106 
For present purposes, however, the continuing co-existence of credulous and 
critical perspectives on, if not, perhaps, the same specific forms of belief in magic, 
witchcraft and sorcery current in Anglo-European society between the fourteenth 
and seventeenth centuries (and the forms of such belief that are current today in 
Papua New Guinea), then certainly on the expansive parameters of a social reality 
that admits of the nominally 'irrational' assumptions on which such beliefs are said 
to be based, is particularly important because it suggests that Western society-
and as we shall see, Western law-has always entertained, and continues to 
scholars than their Anglo-American counterparts. 'Introduction' in Reason and Morality. ed. J. 
Overing (London: Tavistock Publications, 1985), pp. 1-28. 
105 See B. Russell, History of Western Philosophy (1946; rpt London: George Allen & Unwin 
1961), pp. 512-525). There were, of course, strains of rationalist thought evident in Western 
philosophical thinking from the times of classical antiquity. See D.J. O'Connor, ed., A Critical 
History of Western Philosophy (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1964), pp. 36-61. In 
England, as Thomas notes, 'the earliest opponents of magic made more extensive use of these 
classical authors than they ever did of contemporary science.' Religion and the Decline of Magic. 
p. 773. See also, Settle, 'The Rationality of Science versus the Rationality of Magic', pp. 175-179. 
106 See Tiryakian, 'Toward the Sociology of Esoteric Culture', pp. 491-512; F.D. Goodman, 
Possession and Exorcism in the Modern World (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 
1988). 
138 
entertain, a palpable measure of credulity in respect of patently irrational and, in 
some instances, ostensibly supernatural phenomena. 
* * * 
Historians disagree about the extent to which the representations depicted in 
the available documentary evidence of supposedly popular sorcery and witchcraft 
beliefs amongst the masses of largely illiterate Anglo-European societies in 
centuries past provide an accurate index of the nature and dynamics of those 
beliefs, or whether they may not rather reflect a projection of the beliefs of the 
educated elite-or the tendentious assumptions of the educated class about the 
nature, depth and dimensions of popular beliefs. 107 But we have seen, too, as 
Lamer observed, that '[i]n any society in which the educated mingle with the 
uneducated, ideas will pass from one to the other.' 108 
Studies of beliefs in and about witchcraft and sorcery, m Britain and the 
United States today lend credence to Lamer's view, revealing, as they appear to 
do, that the specific content and demographic dispersion of credulous and critical 
orientations can vary considerably from time to time and from place to place, 
though by no means necessarily depending upon the intelligence, education or 
sophistication of the population involved. 109 The intensity with which such beliefs 
107 Distinguishing historical differences in the nature and content of systems of belief on the 
basis of literacy and education is itself problematic. Even today, well educated people are quite 
capable of entertaining 'irrational' beliefs, and low measures of literacy certainly cannot be said to 
preclude a capacity for 'rational' belief. 
108 Witchcraft and Religion, p. 53. 
109 See G. Gallup, 'Belief in Occult is Common in U.S.' (Princeton, NJ: Gallup Poll, 1978); 
Jorgensen and Jorgensen, 'Social Meanings of the Occult' (1982) 23(3) Sociological Quarterly 
373, 377; Luhrrnann, Persuasions of the Witch's Craft, p. 29; Victor, Satanic Panic, pp. 29-56. 
Cf. Thomas, who reports that, in England, by 1660 'there was a grammar school for every 4,400 
persons, and that two and a half per cent of the relevant age group of the male population was 
receiving some form of higher education ... .' Religion and the Decline of Magic, p. 4. 
Acknowledging the limitations of the available evidence, however, he notes that this was also a 
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are held may wax and wane, and the kinds of conduct those beliefs may serve to 
provoke, condone or condemn may differ across a wide range of variable bases. 110 
In so far as comparatively recent scholarly efforts to construct a general theory of 
witchcraft may be concerned, the vagaries of the available evidence, historical and 
contemporary, have proven problematic to say the least. 
And yet, for the purposes of an analysis that seeks only to assess the processes 
by which sorcery and related 'supernatural' beliefs have been determinatively 
characterised within the narrower confines of a jurisprudential consideration-
and, more narrowly still, in relation to the supremely determinative 
characterisation of particular judicial dispositions-the data are remarkably stable 
and consistent. Indeed, the relativities in the data that have vexed historians bent 
on the achievement of a diachronic theoretical reconciliation, or anthropologists in 
search of a satisfactory cross-cultural paradigm, are far less troublesome in the 
context of a legal analysis; if only because, for better or for worse, the relativities 
with which the law has been concerned are not, and need not be, constrained by 
nearly such rigid constructs of rationality.'" 
time 'when a large, but as yet unknown, proportion of the population (perhaps between half and 
two thirds of adult males ... ) was unable to read ... .' Ibid., p. 5. 
110 For contemporary examples of varying popular responses to such conduct, see the 
following newspaper reports dealing with incidents occurring in Melbourne (Australia): 'Four 
Charged Over Exorcism Death', The Age, 22 July 1993; Los Angeles (USA): 'Parents Found 
Guilty of "Exorcism" Murder of Daughter, Aged 5 ', Canberra Times, 21 October 1992; Harare 
(Zimbabwe): 'Killings Indicate Belief in Witchcraft is Widespread', Canberra Times, 16 March 
1995. 
111 Thus, for example, Holdsworth writes of Sir Matthew Hale's disposition of a particularly 
notorious case of witchcraft in the mid-seventeenth century: 
It is probable ... that his sincere religious beliefs led him to 
see no harm in the act which posterity, and more especially the 
unhistorically minded Whig historians of the last century, have 
most condemned-the sentencing of two witches to death, at a 
time when the rationalizing and sceptical spirit of the day was 
beginning to cause the more en lightened to doubt the existence 
of witchcraft. But we should remember that the sentence was 
(2) Sociological Representations-Dichotomous Formulations of 
the Relationship between Magic and Religion, 
Religion and Science 
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Where the apparent, if not necessarily the intended, object of historical 
analyses of sorcery and witchcraft beliefs in Anglo-European societies has been to 
chart the decline of magic's explanatory powers in the face of particular religious, 
scientific, intellectual and economic developments, sociological representations 
have sought to rationalise those beliefs and practices in terms more amenable to 
the theoretical grammar of a modem science of human social development. ll2 
Acknowledging that 'the borderlines are by no means clear-cut', sociologists are 
nonetheless concerned to distinguish magical and religious beliefs on similarly 
in accordance with the law, and that the existence of witches 
was vouched for by the Bible. Therefore a man of Hale's mind 
and temper could hardly be expected to doubt [W.S. 
Holdsworth, A History of English Law, 2nd ed. (London: 
Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1898), vol. VI, pp. 578-579] 
In his summing up of the case, Hale's reported observations are especially poignant: 
That there were such creatures as witches he made no doubt at 
all; For first, the scriptures had affirmed so much. Secondly, 
the wisdom of all nations had provided laws against such 
persons, which is an argument of their confidence in such a 
crime. And such hath been the judgment of this kingdom, as 
appears by that act of parliament which hath provided 
punishments proportionate to the quality of the offence. [A 
Trial of Witches at the Assizes held at Bury St. Edmond's for 
the County of Suffolk (1665) 6 S.T. 647 at 700-701] 
Even by the end of the seventeenth century, however, when the 'more enlightened' judges of 
the English courts exhibited a growing scepticism in relation to the existence of witchcraft and 
routinely discountenanced prosecutions on that account, Holdworth observes that it would still 
have been 'difficult for an honest Christian to deny the existence of witchcraft.' A History of 
English Law, 2nd ed., vol. XI, p. 546. For an appraisal of Hale's approach to the trials of witches, 
amongst other matters involving women, as indicative of his alleged misogynistic inclinations see 
Geis, 'Lord Hale, Witches and Rape' (1978) 5 British Journal of Law and Society 26. For a 
rebuttal to this allegation see D. Lanham, 'Hale, Misogyny and Rape' (1983) 7(1) Criminal Law 
Journal148, 152-153. 
112 Hanlon, 'Sorcery and the Edge of Commensurability for History in the Pacific', p. 123. 
141 
evolutionary bases. 113 It is, as Goldthorpe remarks, only usual that they should do 
We nonnally think of magic as an attempt by individuals to 
attain particular private ends-the success of a crop, good 
hunting, the death of an enemy, a favourable decision in a law 
case-by invoking supernatural means. . . . The aim is to 
manipulate or control occult forces in one's own favour and a 
person who wishes to do this may either do it for him- or 
herself, or call in a professional magician who will do it for a 
fee or reward .... By contrast we think of religion as a public 
matter, devoted to public, general ends-not just the fertility 
of one particular garden, for example, but the fertility of the 
land. 115 
Emphasising the significance of the distinction between religion and magic on 
the basis of this public/private dichotomy, Giddens argues that all religions share 
the common characteristic of entertaining 'a set of symbols, invoking feelings of 
reverence or awe,' linked to rituals or ceremonials engaged in by a distinctive 
'community of believers.'n6 The nature of such rituals and ceremonies may vary 
from community to community and, in some instances, they may be carried on 
individually and even secretly. But it is the existence of the collective objects of 
the ceremonial and the participation of a congregation in its performance, on the 
one hand, and the absence of such public and communalistically orientated 
elements, on the other, that sociologists generally tend to regard as the principal 
features distinguishing religion from magic.m Consistent with this dichotomous 
113 Giddens, Sociology, p. 458. 
114 Goldthorpe, An Introduction to Sociology, p. 195. 
115 Ibid., pp. 195-196. 
116 Giddens, Sociology, p. 454. 
117 Ibid; Goldthorpe, An Introduction to Sociology, p. 196. 
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analysis, the roles of religious and magical practitioners can be similarly 
distinguished: 
The priest is accordingly a publicly designated leader, not a 
privately rewarded professional. The priest leads a 
congregation, a magician [or sorcerer] has a clientele. And so 
far from manipulation or control, religious acts aim (in 
Frazer's classic definition) 'at the propitiation or conciliation of 
powers superior to man which are believed to control the 
course of nature and of human life'. 118 
The Weberian grounding of such sociological assessments of the development 
of religious ideas, institutions and practices in evolutionary analyses of the 
historical development of Western civilisation is palpable. Indeed, in his effort to 
account scientifically for the dynamics of the modem, technologically advanced 
capitalism of the occidental societies with which he was familiar, Weber 
specifically identified the displacement of irrational magical beliefs by the more 
rational protocols of the Judeo-Christian tradition as a matter of singular 
developmental significance, and one of the principal bases on which late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth century European society and culture were so 
favourably compared with its own classical precursors, as well as the classical 
civilisations of China and India: 119 
Judaism was ... of notable significance for modem rational 
capitalism, insofar as it transmitted to Christianity the latter's 
hostility to magic. Apart from Judaism and Christianity, and 
two or three other oriental sects (one of which is in Japan), 
there is no religion with the character of outspoken hostility to 
magic. . . . Since Judaism made Christianity possible and gave 
it the character of a religion essentially free from magic, it 
rendered an important service from the point of view of 
118 Goldthorpe, An Introduction to Sociology, p. 196. Here, too, 'a wide category of borderline 
and ambiguous cases' must be accommodated, 'as, for example, when a Christian priest conducts 
weddings and funerals for a fee.' 
119 See Talcott Parson's introduction in M. Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic 
Organization, trans. A.M. Henderson and T. Parsons (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 
1964), pp.78, 82-83. 
economic history. For the dominance of magic outside the 
sphere in which Christianity has prevailed is one of the most 
serious obstructions to the rationalization of economic life. 120 
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Weber's articulation of the contrasting roles of priests and magicians, and the 
distinctive implications of their respective functions in society, is clearly echoed 
in the contemporary sociological expressions cited above. 121 His persistent effort 
to qualify this, amongst other apparently 'hard and fast distinctions' that appear 
throughout his work notwithstanding, 122 Weber's evaluative contraposition of 
religion and magic-that is, his contraposition of the Western 'systematisation of 
man's relation to the divine and a religious ethic based on such metaphysical 
conceptions,' on the one hand, and the absence of such conceptions in societies 
'without an established priesthood or where magicians prevail', on the other-is 
12° From M. Weber, General Economic History (1923; New York: Greenberg publishers, 
1927), reproduced in R. Collins, ed., Three Sociological Traditions: Selected Readings (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 48. 
121 See text accompanying notes 113 to 118 above. 
'Priests' superintend the worship of the 'gods,' while magicians 
seek to compel 'demons'; priests are employed functionaries in 
a permanent organization for influencing the deities, while 
magicians are free-lance professionals hired by individuals 
from time to time; priests possess a knowledge of formulated 
doctrines and hence a professional qualification, while 
magicians-and prophets also-prove their personal charisma 
through miracles and personal revelation. . . . [T]he decisive 
criterion of a priesthood is the regular organization of religious 
worship that is bound by definite norms and occurs at 
specified times and places. Although such worship can occur 
without a separate priesthood, the latter does not occur without 
the former; and although magicians often were organized in 
guilds and developed religious doctrines, they have nowhere 
been associated with a religious organization. [R. Bendix, Max 
Weber: An Intellectual Portrait, (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 
1960), p. 88, footnotes omitted] 
122 According to Reinhard Bendix, the complexity of Weber's writing is often a product of his 
attempt to show the validity of a proposed distinction only 'after a full discussion of the "gradual 
transitions" of the phenomena in question.' Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (London: 
Methuen & Co Ltd, 1960), p. 88, n. 14. 
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said to be very much the keystone in the structure on which his notion of the 
rationalisation of religious life is based. 123 
Indeed, for Weber it was only in the context of such a rational religious 
structure that an ethical concept of a deity could develop, and in accordance with 
which an essentially ordered understanding and experience of life in human 
society could develop. Thus, as magical ideas of evil came gradually to be 
replaced by a religious ethic, social norms became sanctified norms from which 
unacceptable deviations were punishable in this life and the next. Misfortune 
came to be explained and understood as resulting, not from a failure or deficiency 
in the power of God, but from God's wrath, which might be aroused by violations 
of His commandments. 124 In this way, the secularising processes of science and 
technology, and their attendant political and economic compromises between state 
and religious authorities, fostered the development of the utilitarian 
industriousness which transformed the religious ethic into a recognisably 
derivative, albeit 'specifically bourgeois ethos.' 125 
Weber was prolifically interested in the implications of religious beliefs for the 
nature and dynamics of human affairs in Western and non-western societies 
alike. 126 He devoted a considerable proportion of his intellectual energy to an 
extensive analysis of the influence of religion in the development of Western 
123 Ibid., pp. 88-89. 
124 Ibid., p. 89. 
125 Ibid., pp. 67, 318-325. 
126 SeeM. Weber, The Sociology of Religion, trans. E. Fischoff (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963); 
The Religion of China: ConfUcianism and Taoism, trans. H.H. Gerth (New York: The Free Press, 
!951); Ancient Judaism, trans. H.H. Gerth (New York: The Free Press, !952); The Religion of 
India: The Sociology of Hinduism and Buddhism, trans. H.H. Gerth and D. Martindale (New York: 
The Free Press, 1958). A proposed study of Islam was never completed. See Bendix, Max 
Weber: An Intellectual Portrait, pp. 91, 95. 
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society in particular, m and in the context of this kind of analysis he underscored 
the innovative and progressive contributions of Christianity outlined above. 
Unlike Weber, Karl Marx regarded the role of religion as merely subservient to 
essentially conservative political and economic forces, in the service of which 
religion, amongst other institutionalised social forms, was deployed 
hegemonically to advance and preserve tl!e interests of the dominant class. 128 
Beyond this, however, Marx's views on religion are largely derivative, drawing 
principally from the ideas of Ludwig Feuerbach, 129 according to whom religion 
consisted in tl!e ideological and ethical handiwork of human beings who, lacking a 
comprehensive understanding of their own cultural history, mistakenly attributed 
tl!e origins of aspirational social norms to the divine. 130 
By and large, Marxist sociological tl!eory has produced little commentary on 
the general relationship between magic and religion, and less still on tl!e role of 
witchcraft and sorcery-related beliefs in early European society and culture. 
Explaining this area of neglect in contemporary Marxist social theory, Lamer 
suggested tl!at, while Marx himself could hardly be said to have underestimated 
the power of religion as a social force in history, 
modem Marxists are not encouraged to investigate forms of 
false consciousness, but rather to explore the historic 
development of true class consciousness. Much of the 
considerable sociological talent around today is, therefore, 
127 See especially The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1904-05; rpt London: 
Allen and Unwin, 1976) 
128 SeeK. Marx, 'Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction', in 
Karl Marx: Early Writings, ed. T.B. Bottomore (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1962), pp. 43-44; F. 
Engels, 'The History of Primitive Christianity', in K. Marx and F. Engels, Pre-Capitalist Socio-
Economic Formations: A Collection ( 1894; rpt Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1979), pp. 482-486. 
129 See especially The Essence of Christianity, trans. G. Elliott (1841; rpt New York: Harper 
and Row, 1957). 
130 See Giddens, Sociology, pp. 463-64. 
concentrated on the reinterpretation of historical materialism 
in relation to fonns of contemporary capitalism. 131 
146 
Emile Durkheim's work, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, 132 is still 
described as 'perhaps the single most influential study in the sociology of 
religion.' 133 Like Weber, and consistent with the evolutionary presumptions of a 
universally applicable progression from magical to religious and, ultimately, to 
scientifically informed, explanations for natural and social phenomena, Durkheim 
similarly accepted the supercession of rational over irrational beliefs as inevitable. 
At the same time, however, he believed that social order and rational thought 
themselves could be seen to rest on a non-rational foundation: 134 
that this substructure is a flow of emotions determined by the 
density of social interactions and especially by the tightly 
focused mutual actions of rituals; [and] that symbols like gods 
are charged with moral energies by the group whose 
membership they reflect. 135 
Durkheim insisted that religion is never merely a matter of belief only. 
Rather, all religious activity is built upon regularised systems of ceremony and 
ritual which, as collectively practised communal exercises, inculcate, affirm and 
heighten a profound sense of group solidarity. In this sense, magical practices too 
are ritual acts, and not just spontaneous individual creations: 136 
131 Witchcraft and Religion, p. llO. 
132 trans. J. Swain (!915; rpt New York: The Free Press, 1965). 
133 Giddens, Sociology, p. 465. 
134 Collins, Three Sociological Traditions, p. l6l. 
135 Ibid. 
136 E.R. Leach, 'Magical Hair' in Myth and Cosmos: Readings in Mythology and Symbolism, 
ed. J. Middleton (Garden City, NY: The Natural History Press, 1967), p. 104. 
they are products of society handed down from generation to 
generation. They are acts which derive their potency from the 
values of society as a whole .... 137 
J./7 
Where Durkheim regarded the collective nature of expressive religious activity as 
driving the process whereby individuals were transported away from the profane 
preoccupations of social life to the elevated plane of the sacred, Henri Hubert and 
Marcel Mauss, contemporaries of Durkheim who advanced an elaboration of his 
theoretical propositions in this connection, could explain away the seemingly 
counter-social, individual expression of magical beliefs as 'a private appropriation 
of an emotional force that is, nevertheless, social in its origins.' 138 
Both Weber and Durkheim considered the processes of secularisation as 
involving 'a reduction in the whole area of thought appropriate to the supernatural 
and a reduction in the area of the sacred-that must not be scrutinized.'139 In 
different ways, both were implicitly committed to an evolutionary conception of 
social progress in which magical and religious explanations were, or would 
ultimately be, supplanted by scientific ideas. In the process, ceremonial and ritual 
activities would inevitably come to play a diminishing role in the lives of 
members of the affected societies.140 
137 Ibid. See also, M. Douglas, Natural Symbols: Explorations in Cosmology 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd, 1970), pp. 77-78,91-92. 
138 Collins, Three Sociological Traditions, p. 187. 
139 Lamer, Witchcraft and Religion, p. 1 09. 
140 Durkheim himself made vague references to the continuation of religious beliefs and 
practices in some altered form, involving, perhaps, as Giddens suggests, 'the celebration of 
humanist and political values such as freedom, equality and social cooperation.' Sociology, p. 446. 
In this connection, Robert Bellah has argued that most modem industrialised societies already 
foster a range of secularised 'civil religions', replete with a range of sophisticated range of 
symbols, rituals and ceremonials, all intended to reaffirm a kind of social cohesion. Beyond Belief 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1970). See also, A.D. Smith, National Identity (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin Books Ltd, 1991 ), p. 77, who expressly invokes this Dukheimian characterisation in 
relation to the rituals, ceremonials and other symbolic accoutrements of nationalism. 
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In the context of his focused study of religion, mag1c and witchcraft in 
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England, Thomas is particularly critical of the 
deficiencies evident in the theoretical explanations generated within the 
conventional sociological traditions of Weber and Durkheim alike: 
If it is by religious ritual that society affirms its collective 
unity, they argue, then the decline of that ritual reflects the 
disappearance of that unity. The breaking of shared values, 
consequent upon the growth of urbanism and industrialism, 
makes such collective affirmations increasingly difficult. ... 
Norms which had previously seemed God-given henceforth 
appeared as mere rules of utility needing adaptation in the face 
of changing circumstances. In the country villages, where 
some moral unity survived, it was possible for organized 
religion to retain some social meaning. But in the cities 
religious indifference became most marked, because it was 
there that society's moral unity had most obviously been 
broken. 141 
This kind of interpretation, Thomas argues, exaggerates and idealises the 
moral unity of medieval society, romanticising the period as a time when 'men 
were cosily bound to each other in little units of manor, village and gild ... .'142 
We simply 'do not know enough about the religious beliefs and practices of our 
remote ancestors to be certain of the extent to which religious faith and practice 
have actually declined,' he continues, nor can we speak with certainty about the 
levels and extent of apathy and agnosticism that existed before the advent of 
industrialism. 143 
Implicit m Thomas's criticism 1s the recognition that sociological 
explanations-no more so, perhaps, than historical explanations---of change in the 
"
1 Religion and the Decline of Magic, p. 205. 
"
2 Ibid. For a similar critique of the sociological literature from the perspective of symbolic-
interactivist anthropology, see C. Geertz, 'Religion as a Cultural System' in The Interpretation of 
Cultures: Selected Essays by Clifford Geertz (New York: Basic Books, 1973), pp. 87-125. 
143 Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic, pp. 205-206. 
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depth, extent and quality of religiously inspired, as opposed to scientifically 
informed, beliefs and practices in Anglo-European society, which claim to be 
supported by demonstrable indicia of a linear progression in human thought and 
action from the irrational to the rational, and which contrapose the epistemological 
currency, first of magic and religion, and then of religion and science on 
diachronic bases, are problematic at best. Even the most primitive societies have 
had their religious sceptics; 144 and Anglo-European society has always entertained 
(if not always sympathetically) a considerable measure of heterodoxy. No less so 
than historians, sociologists similarly struggle with, and similarly resist, a 
recognition of the continuing co-existence of what has been described above as 
credulous and critical systems of belief in Western society. 145 
In this respect, the deployment of dichotomous models of nominally rational, 
as opposed to irrational, patterns of belief and behaviour in human society, even 
for the limited heuristic purposes of sociological theory, really provides little more 
in the way of explaining human experience, than has the more overtly ideological 
deployment of such models by those who have undisguisedly sought only to 
validate the moral judgements implicit in the characterisation of the distance 
between 'modem' Western and 'traditional' non-western societies as constituting 
the developmental heights achieved by the former, but which the latter have yet to 
scale146 
144 Ibid, p. 206. 
145 See discussion of the 'credulous' and 'critical' literature of sorcery an witchcraft in the 
earlier portions of this chapter. As we shall see, anthropologists have been far less reluctant to 
acknowledge the co-existence of such belief systems in non-Western societies, and at least to 
suggest their co-existence in contemporary Western society. 
146 See B.D. Wyche, 'The Use of Dichotomies: Speculations on the Influence of 
Enlightenment Patterns of Thinking on Sociology'. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Boston 
University, 1985. 
3. ANTHROPOLOGICAL REPRESENTATIONS OF 
SORCERY AND WITCHCRAFT BELIEFS 
A. The Origins and Development of Anthropological Studies 
of Sorcery and Witchcraft 
!50 
'Anthropology must choose,' Maitland warned at the close of the nineteenth 
century, 'between being history and being nothing.' 147 The import of his 
admonition is poignantly echoed today in the introduction to a recent collection of 
ethnographic essays concerned with the dynamics of sorcery and social change in 
modem Melanesia, 148 in which the reader and practitioner alike are reminded that 
the ultimate objective of social anthropology is 'the formation of general 
statements regarding the human condition.' 149 
We strive to understand human beliefs and behaviour not only 
in one society or situation, but in many. Social anthropology 
is built on ethnography, but the goal is ethnology.'" 
In many ways, of course, it has been through the anthropologist's and 
sociologist's (and for that matter, the historian's) deliberate departure from the 
evolutionist paths of nineteenth-century Eurocentric scholarship that has served, at 
once, to facilitate a more meaningful understanding of the nature and dynamics of 
147 F.W. Maitland, Selected Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1936), p. 249. 
The relationship between historical and anthropological scholarship is explored generally in J.L. 
Comaroff, 'Dialectical Systems, History and Anthropology: Units of Study and Questions of 
Theory' (1982) 8 Journal of Southern African Studies 143-172; B.S. Cohen, 'History and 
Anthropology: The State of Play' ( 1980) 22(2) Comparative Studies in Society and History 198-
221. With particular reference to the implications of that relationship for the study of Papua New 
Guinea cultures and societies, see the introductory essay in 'History and Ethnohistory in Papua 
New Guinea', eds. E. Schieffelin and D. Gewertz, Oceania Monograph, No. 28 (Sydney: 
University of Sydney, 1985), pp. 1-5. 
148 
'Sorcery and Social Change in Melanesia' (1981) 8 Social Analysis [special issue], ed. M. 
Zelenietz and S. Lindenbaum. 
149 Ibid., p. 5. 
150 Ibid., p. 5. 
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the beliefs and behaviour associated with witchcraft and sorcery amongst non-
western peoples, and to shed instructive new light on our understanding of those 
phenomena as they have occurred, 151 and may occur still, in Western society and 
culture. 152 To the extent that those early influences still 'haunt the mind of any 
scholar interested in the topic' of magic, religion, witchcraft and sorcery, 153 
however, their impress may continue to be reflected in contemporary scholarship, 
if only in the attenuated sense discussed above.154 And in so far as those 
continuing influences bear important implications for our understanding of 
witchcraft and sorcery-related beliefs in Papua New Guinea today, mediated as 
that understanding must be by the interpretations and analyses of contemporary 
anthropological studies, it behoves us to consider them critically, if briefly, at the 
outset. 
(1) The Patrimony of Victorian Intellectualism 
Anticipated in Homer, and reaching back at least as far as the sixteenth 
century, 155 the more immediate intellectual origins of contemporary 
151 See Macfarlane, Witchcraft in Tudor and Stuart England, pp. 211-253; Thomas, 'The 
Relevance of Social Anthropology to the Historical Study of English Witchcraft'; R. Briggs, 
Witches and Neighbours: The Social and Cultural Context of European Witchcraft (London: 
Harper-Collins Publishers, 1996), p 142, 439-440. 
152 Luhrmann, Persuasions of the Witch's Craft, pp. 345-356; Tiryakian, 'Toward the 
Sociology of Esoteric Culture'; Truzzi, 'The Occult Revival as Popular Culture'; Jorgensen and 
Jorgensen, 'Social Meanings of the Occult'. 
153 H. Penner, 'Rationality, Ritual and Science' in Religion, Science and Magic in Concert and 
Conflict, ed. J. Neusner, E.S. Frerichs and P.V.M. Flesher (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1989), p. 13. See also M. Douglas, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and 
Taboo (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1970), p. 40. 
154 See Chapter Two. 
155 See M. Torgovnick, Gone Primitive: Savage Intellects, Modern Lives (Chicago, University 
of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 23-26. 
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anthropological interests in witchcraft and sorcery-related beliefs and practices 
can be identified with the spirit of inquiry by which the whole of Western 
scholarship was charged in the mid- to late-nineteenth century. This was an era 
'imbued with a pervasive ideology of social progress,' driven by 'hopes for a 
general science of Man,' and committed to the discovery of 'social laws in the long 
evolution of humans toward ever higher standards ofrationality.' 156 
Searching in earnest for such tenable generalisations about humankind as 
might be discerned in what was known-or believed to be known-about 
Western, Asian and Near Eastern civilisations in the past, and the contemporary 
native societies of Africa, Australia, Oceania and the Americas, scholarly 
contributors to what still amounted largely to a kind of 'armchair' ethnology 
pursued a range of ambitious intellectual projects, the ultimate object of which 
was to uncover 'the origins of modern institutions, rituals, customs, and habits of 
thought through the contrasts of evolutionary stages in the development of human 
society.' In this process, the assembled materials on 'contemporaneous "savage," 
or "primitive," peoples served them as living cultural analogies with the past.' 157 
Grounded in the then current theories of social evolution, 158 this earnest search 
for a general understanding of the human condition was predicated on the implicit, 
156 G.E. Marcus and M.M.J. Fischer, Anthropology as Cultural Critique: An Experimental 
Moment in the Human Sciences (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), p. 17. For a 
broader contextualisation of the philosophical and intellectual motivations of the period, see R.A. 
Nisbet, Social Change and History: Aspects of the Western Theory of Development (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 159-208. 
157 Marcus and Fischer, Anthropology as Cultural Critique, p. 17. 
158 It is important to distinguish between these nineteenth-century theories of social evolution 
and contemporaneous developments relating to biological theories of evolution. Although the 
former 'acquired a certain luster from about 1859,' largely as a consequence of the popularity of 
Darwin's work, they were not, in any substantive sense, dependent on the latter. Nisbet, Social 
Change and History, p. 161: 
In the first placed, all of the principal works in the formation 
of the theory of social evolution had made their appearance 
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underlying assumption that the rationalism of modem Western society and 
culture--which, after all, had given rise to both the intellectual capacity to ask the 
relevant questions, and the scientific wherewithal by which reliable answers to 
those questions might be found-provided self-evident proof that modem Western 
civilisation represented the most advanced point to which humankind had thus far 
progressed along the social-evolutionary path. Why and how we had become who 
we were constituted the fundamental question. Why we were once less than what 
we had become, and why contemporary primitive societies had not, or at least not 
yet, progressed so far as we had done, were subsidiary questions, the answers to 
which became interesting and important primarily because of they light it was 
before the publication of Darwin's book. This was true of 
Comte, Hegel, Marx, and Spencer. And even those which 
appeared shortly after the publication of The Origin of Species 
clearly involved work that had begun much earlier. I refer to 
the works of such men as Sir Henry Maine, Edward Tyler, and 
Lewis Morgan. None of these classics in social evolution refer 
to, or show any objective evidence of relation to, the line of 
study in biological speciation that carne out of the eighteenth 
century and culminated in Darwin's great book .... [~] In the 
second place ... whereas the biological theory became ... a 
populational and statistical theory, the theory of social 
evolution was, and remains to this day, a typological 
construction. [Ibid., pp. 161-162] 
A similarly significant distinction can be drawn between the nineteenth-century 
historiography associated with the theories of von Ranke, Mommsen, Motely and Prescott, and the 
'historical method' by which the social evolutionists often characterised their own approaches. 
The latter, as Nisbet explains, regarded history as 'abstract history' (Cornie's term), that is, 'history 
divorced from all particularity of the events, actions, personages, places, and periods that was the 
very substance of what the historians were concerned with.' Social Change and History, p. 165. 
In sum: 
The theory of social evolution is no more than the eighteenth-
century theory of natural history-broadened, extended, 
ramified, and filled with a volume of ethnographic data not 
known to such men as Ferguson, Smith, and Rousseau (and 
also largely, though not wholly freed of the tendentiousness of 
eighteenth-century natural history), but the same basic theory, 
nevertheless. [Ibid.] 
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believed they would throw on the fundamental question, which was ultimately 
concerned with nature and anticipated evolution of Western society. 159 
To be sure, the appearance, language and behaviour of traditional non-western 
peoples and the indigenous tribal societies of North and South America and 
Australia were markedly different to those of the modem Western world. Their 
technologies and other elements of their material culture were likewise different 
and, from the perspective of the civilised nineteenth-century Western observer, 
clearly simpler, cruder, less efficient and generally inferior to his or her own 
(similar though they may have been to those of our ancient forbears). Beyond 
such superficial and material differences, however, the assumption of Western 
evolutionary superiority was underscored by the apparent differences between 
modem and primitive beliefs about the nature of the world, the parameters of 
159 This is not to carp on what Marcus and Fischer describe as the 'faddishly popular' tendency 
nowadays to 'dismiss the evolutionary thought of the nineteenth century as ethnocentric, crude, 
and self-serving of domestic elites and colonial rulers.' Indeed, as these authors suggest, one does 
well to remember that, in the circumstances, such thinking 'played a profound role in nineteenth-
century battles to establish a secular-scientific outlook, to argue for the malleability, and thus the 
reformability, of society, and finally to initiate the modern sense of tolerant pluralism.' 
Anthropology as Cultural Critique, p. 128. For all that, however, Marcus and Fischer 
ackoowledge that the 'subliminal message' of much of the twentieth-century anthropology, which 
derived from the intellectual process begun by the evolutionists, tends-like the more overt 
message imported in the nineteenth-century scholarship itself-to affirm the basic superiority of 
modern Western society. This legacy of evolutionism seems to remain firmly embedded in 
popular contemporary thought, instantiated in 'the continua of modernization or development, or 
the paired schemata of traditional/modem, pre literate/literate, peasant/industrial', each of which 
draws support from the Victorian doctrine of progress and serves to reinforce a distinctively 
Western self-congratulatory complacency. [Ibid., p. 129] 
Nisbet makes the same observation in his analysis of the directionality of change as a 
principal element of nineteenth-century theories of social evolution, referring, by way of 
illustration, to the ideas of progress and social development elaborated by Comte, Hegel, Marx, de 
Toquville, Maine and Morgan: 
No one can miss the fact that in every instance-there is no 
exception-the direction of change found by the evolutionist 
was toward the specific set of qualities possessed by Western 
Europe alone . . . . [W]e should not overlook the ethnocentric 
overtones of the allegedly universal patterns of development 
uncovered. [Social Change and History, pp. 169-170]. 
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experiential reality and the cosmological constructs in accordance with which men 
and women might correctly and rationally apprehend their place in the universe. 
Indeed, in so far as the social, ethical, political, economic and technical 
emoluments of modem Western society were regarded as the products of an 
ongoing evolutionary process whereby true scientific knowledge and a rationally 
grounded understanding of the universe came increasingly to supplant the 
ignorance of our own ancestors, it was the patently irrational beliefS of primitive 
peoples that were seen to be at the bottom of their abject state. It was this 
recognition which served to draw the attention of nineteenth-century sociologists 
to the apparently evolutionary relationship between magic and religion (and the 
somewhat more troublesome relationship between religion and science) in 
Western society, and which likewise served to attract the interest of 
anthropology's nineteenth-century founders to beliefs in, and the related practices 
of, magic, witchcraft and sorcery. 160 
In England, the development of anthropological analyses of systems of 
religious, magical and scientific belief relate back directly, if by no means 
exclusively, to the ideas of Edward Burnett Tylor (1832-1917) and Sir James 
160 See M. Harris, The Rise of Anthropological Theory (London: Routeledge & Kegan Paul, 
1969); M. Banton, ed., Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion (London: Tavistock 
Publications, 1966); I.C. Jaravie, The Revolution in Anthropology (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1963; E. Ardener, 'Social Anthropology and the Decline of Modernism' in Overing, Reason 
and Morality, pp. 47-70; B. Malinowski, Magic, Science and Religion and Other Essays, ed. R. 
Redfield (New York: The Free Press, 1948); E.E. Evans-Pritchard, Theories of Primitive Religion 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965); J.W. Burrow, Evolution and Society: A Study in Victorian Social 
Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966). For differing views from within the 
discipline on the nature, depth, persistence and implications of the influences of Tylor and Frazer, 
amongst others, see E. Leach, !.C. Jarvie and E. Gellner, 'Frazer and Malinowski: On the 
Founding Fathers' (1966) 7(5) Current Anthropology 560-576; R. Ackerman, 'Frazer on Myth and 
Ritual' (1975) 36 Journal of the History of Ideas 115-134; R. Horton, 'Neo-Tylorianism: Sound 
Sense or Sinister Prejudice?'; 'Back to Frazer?' in Patterns of Thought in Africa and the West: 
Essays on Magic, Religion and Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 53-
62, 105-137. 
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Frazer ( 1854-1941 ), 161 as initially explicated in the two principal works of 
evolutionist, proto-anthropological theory for which they are best known: Tyler's 
Primitive Culture 162 and Frazer's The Golden Bough. 163 
Consistent with an evolutionist analytical perspective, m accordance with 
which a rationally-based, scientifically informed system of beliefs about the 
natural world was understood as having come to supplant the irrational and 
supernatural modes of explanation and understanding by which earlier Western 
societies comprehended even the most ordinary elements of phenomenological 
and experiential reality, both Tylor and Frazer regarded the magical and religious 
beliefs of primitive non-western peoples as involving a genuine, albeit inadequate, 
attempt to provide a rational interpretation of the world, and a means by which 
worldly goals might be achieved. Like our own, the beliefs of primitive peoples 
were seen to be based on their observations of the events and phenomena 
occurring and existing in the world around them. The thought processes through 
which they explained and imported significance into such events and phenomena 
might not necessarily be intrinsically less rational than ours. Bereft of the 
advantages of modern Western science and ignorant of the evolved intellectual 
processes an experience of the world informed by a scientific understanding 
would have afforded them, however, the observations of primitive peoples must 
161 See A. Kuper, Anthropology and Anthropologists: The Modern British School (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983), pp. 2-9; Marcus and Fischer, Anthropology as Cultural 
Critique, pp. 13, 17; Mair, An Introduction to Social Anthropology, 2nd ed., pp. 210-215. See also 
C. Lamer, 'Relativism and Ethnocentrism: Popular and Educated Belief in Pre-Industrial Culture' 
(The Gifford Lectures in Natural Theology, April/May 1982) in Witchcraft and Religion, pp. 97-
1 11. 
162 Primitive Culture: Researches into the Development of Mythology. Philosophy, Religion, 
Language, Art and Custom, 2 vo1s. (1871; rpt New York: Harper and Row, 1958), particularly 
Part I, The Origins of Culture. 
163 The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion, 12 vols (1890-1915; author's 
abridgement, 1922; rpt Ware, Herts: Wordsworth Editions Ltd, 1993). 
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be either mistaken or insufficient, or both. To that extent, their deductions must 
be faulty, their conclusions incorrect and the systems of belief in accordance with 
which their cosmological and phenomenological explanations were constructed 
necessarily false. 
On such an analysis, there is no clear distinction between the magical beliefs 
of primitive societies, on the one hand, and the religious beliefs still widely 
entertained by the otherwise enlightened minds of nineteenth-century Western 
society, on the other. Moreover, to the extent that religious beliefs might properly 
be regarded as similarly false, the co-existence of science and religion in modern 
Western society is difficult to reconcile with the premise of a more advanced and 
superior Western rationality, short of assuming that some forms of irrational belief 
(religious) are simply more advanced than other forms (magical}-a view which 
neither Tylor nor Frazer frankly disavowed. 164 
(a) Social Evolution and the Comparative Method 
of Ethnological Analysis 
In their own ways, Tylor and Frazer did seek to clarifY the difference between 
magical and religious beliefs; although Frazer was more inclined to recognise that 
an evolutionary relationship between the two must exist, and both were rather 
more concerned with articulating the distinction between the irrationality of magic 
and the rationality of science than to account for the persistence of religious 
beliefs. 165 The analytical technique they utilised in the process was the 
164 See S. Sharot, 'Magic, Religion, Science and Secularisation' in Neusner, Frerichs and 
Flescher, Religion, Science and Magic, pp. 262-263; Mair, An Introduction to Social 
Anthropology, pp. 211-212 
165 Much of the following discussion relies on Penner, 'Rationality, Ritual and Science; 
Sharot, Magic, Religion, Science and Secularisation'; Horton, 'Neo-Tylorianism: Sound Sense or 
Sinister Prejudice?'; 'Back to Frazer?'; Mair, An Introduction to Social Anthropology, pp. 21 0-216; 
Luhrmann, Persuasions of the Witch's Craft, pp. 345-356; and E. De Martino, 'The Problem of 
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comparative method; and it was by this method that Tylor and Frazer, amongst 
many other nineteenth-century proto-anthropologists and natural historians, 
sought to make sense of the range of contemporary societies with which they 
became increasingly interested, fitting each one into its proper place m a 
serviceable evolutionary sequence. 166 Before examining the results and 
implications of their efforts in this regard, it will be instructive to consider certain 
features of the comparative method itself. 
Of the comparative method of historical and socio-cultural analysis, Nisbet 
writes, '[f]ew subjects . have been more thoroughly and widely 
misunderstood.' 167 
The Comparative Method is thought to be the consequence of 
the 'scientific' anthropology of the late nineteenth century. It 
is not. Its roots and basic framework are as old in Western 
thought as Greek and Roman interest in origins and cultural 
stages. It is thought to have disappeared in the twentieth 
century along with the theories of Spencer and Morgan. It has 
not. It remains the framework of countless 'comparative' 
treatments of institutions and cultures. It is thought to provide 
evidence for the reality of the general line of social 
development put forth by the theory of social evolution. It 
does not, for fundamental to the Comparative Method and its 
assumed validity as a body of evidence are the very 
preconceptions--conclusions, too, actually-of the theory of 
social evolution that the Comparative Method purportedly 
verifies. 168 
In fairness, Marcus and Fischer have argued-without, I think, intending to 
pun-that the comparative method was 'progressive for its day,' providing a 
compelling defence, in the form of the 'psychic unity of mankind,' against the 
Magical Powers in the History of Ethnology' in Primitive Magic (Lindfield, NSW: Bay Books Pty 
Ltd, 1972), pp. 157-201. 
166 Marcus and Fischer, Anthropology as Cultural Critique, p. 128. 
167 Nisbet, Social Change and History, p. 189. 
168 Ibid., pp. 189-190. 
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blatant racism of the day; forceful arguments for 'the principle of 
uniformitarianism against theological assertions of arbitrary acts of divine 
intervention'; a rejection of theological claims that 'the primitive was an example 
of the fall from grace (and hence subjectable on moral grounds to slavery and 
other tutelary dependencies)'; and a host of exemplary cases from the non-western 
world and the traditional indigenous societies of North and South America by 
which the values and practices of Victorian society might bear a more critical 
scrutiny in respect of property rights, political and domestic relations, law and 
religious authority. 169 
As Nisbet points out, however, it is, perhaps, this very assertion of 
universalism, and the assumption that the comparative method marked the 
beginning of a 'dispassionate and objective comparison of cultures and institutions 
of the world,' providing the 'instrument of Western scholarship's release from 
thraldom to its own past' and, at once, an intellectual and a moral point of 
departure 'from which new and more universalized criteria of history and 
development were gained', that represents the greatest misconception about 
comparative method.170 In fact, he continues, in its nineteenth-century iterations 
(and in some of its subsequent, more refined expressions in Western socio-cultural 
scholarship as well), the comparative method may be described as: 
hardly more than a shoring-up of the idea of progressive 
development generally, and more particularly, of the belief 
that the recent history of the West could be taken as evidence 
of the direction in which mankind as a whole would more and, 
flowing from this, should move. The specific set of cultural 
qualities that seemed to most rationalists in the nineteenth 
century to manifest the direction of Western history were 
169 Anthropology as Cultural Critique, p. 128. 
170 Social Change and History, p. 190. 
adapted for comparative purposes to become the criteria of 
classification of the peoples and cultures of the world. 171 
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Regarding the beliefs and customs of contemporary primitive societies, by 
way of an evaluative comparison with those of his own, to be 'rude' and 
'barbarous', Frazer was thus emboldened to opine that the irrational beliefs and 
practices with which the ancient (and, one may suggest, not so ancient) history of 
Western European society is replete might themselves be rendered explicable 
through an examination and understanding of former. Thus, with specific 
reference to a particularly gruesome ritual, supposed to have been carried out in 
the times of Roman antiquity at a lake near the Italian village ofNemi, he wrote: 
It is the very rudeness and barbarity of the custom which allow 
us a hope of explaining it. For recent researches into the early 
history of man have revealed the essential similarity with 
which, under many superficial differences, the human mind 
has elaborated its first crude philosophy of life. Accordingly, 
if we can show that a barbarous custom . . . has existed 
elsewhere; if we can detect the motives which led to its 
institution; if we can prove that these motives have operated 
widely, perhaps universally, in human society, producing in 
varied circumstances a variety of institutions specifically 
different but generically alike; if we can show, lastly, that 
these very motives, with some of their derivative institutions, 
were actually at work in classical antiquity; then we may fairly 
infer that at a remoter age the same motives gave birth to [the 
first mentioned custom ]. 172 
Somewhat more prosaically, but in very much the same comparative-
evolutionist vein, Tyler posited the view that: 
the institutions of man are as distinctly stratified as the earth 
on which he lives. They succeed each other in series 
substantially uniform over the globe, independent of what 
seem comparatively superficial differences of race and 
language, but shaped by similar human nature acting through 
171 /bid., pp. 190-191. 
172 The Golden Bough, p. 2. 
successively changed conditions in savage, barbaric, and 
civilized life. 173 
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Appending this claim with the passing caveat that such comparison 'is but a guide, 
not a full explanation,' he confidently concluded: 174 
So far as the evidence goes, it seems that civilization has 
actually grown up in the world through these three stages, so 
that to look at a savage of the Brazilian forests, a barbarous 
New Zealander or Dahoman, and a civilized European, may be 
the student's best guide to understanding the progress of 
civilization . .. ys 
It may seem that I labour the point that the rationalist-intellectualist 
underpinnings of nineteenth-century proto-anthropological analysis, anchored in 
the foundation of the comparative-comparative method, involved so profound 
(and profoundly uncritical) a commitment to the substantiation of a lineal model 
of progressive socio-cultural development and the manifestly superior position of 
contemporary Western society on that continuum; that the classificatory protocols 
implicit in this paradigm effectively required the 'primitive' beliefs of indigenous 
Africans, Australians, the American Indians and most certainly Melanesians to be 
categorised not simply as exotic or different, but as reflecting a demonstrably 
lower stage along a developmental path regarded as universal. I do so, however, 
to underscore the significance of the impact of this perspective, not only on the 
nineteenth-century scholars who, like Tylor and Frazer, were so convinced of its 
173 
'On a Method of Investigating the Development of Institutions: Applied to Laws of 
Marriage and Descent' (1889) Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 269 [quoted in 
Nisbet, Social Change and History, p. 199 (emphasis provided)] 
174 Anthropology: An Introduction to the Study of Man and Civilization (New York: J.A. Hill 
and Company, 1904), p. 19 [quoted in Nisbet, Social Change and History, p. 199] 
175 Ibid. 
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validity, 176 but on a later generation of anthropologists, whose works have served 
to perpetuate, mutatis mutandis, the idea that the technological and institutional 
sophistication of Western society necessarily implied the possession of superior 
intellectual capital (if not necessarily an innate intellectual superiority), and an 
effective monopoly on the prerogative to describe, in decidedly Western terms, the 
contours and content of human rationality.m 
For present purposes, an appreciation of the potency and pervasiveness of the 
nineteenth-century comparative-evolutionist perspective provides an essential 
backdrop to a meaningful consideration of the seminal-and still influential-
anthropological and anthropologically-informed studies of witchcraft and sorcery-
related beliefs in non-western societies. 
(b) Tylor and Frazer on the Interrelations of Magic, 
Religion and Science 
In broad scope, the religious beliefs of a people may be said to consist in the 
set of shared cosmological and ontological understandings around which their 
fundamental orientations towards, and their explanations of, social and 
experiential reality are organised, and in the active or symbolic expression of 
176 Amongst whom are included Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, Lewis Henry Morgan, Karl 
Mark and Friedrich Engels and, of particular significance in the present context, Henry Sumner 
Maine. See, D.R. Kelley, The Human Measure: Social Thought in the Western Legal Tradition 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), pp. 266-268. 
177 The ethnographic paradigm developed in the 1920s and 1930s purported to tum many of 
these assumptions on their head, entailing, as it did, 'a submerged, unrelenting critique of Western 
Civilization'. But the lamentation that we in the West had lost what they-the cultural other-still 
had, and that we must learn from them in order that we might recover (from our own past? from a 
universal past?) a greater respect for nature, a more intimate and satisfying experience of social 
communalism and a renewed sense of the sacred in everyday life seems itself to imply a 
metaphorical turning-back of the evolutionary clock, bespeaking more of a romantic inversion of 
the evolutionary premise, than a rejection of it. See Nisbet, Social Change and History, pp. 205-
208. Cf. Marcus and Fischer, Anthropology as Cultural Critique, p. 129. 
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which these elements of overarching collectivity are affirmed. Simply put, 
religious beliefs are concerned with the essential inter-relations between human 
beings, and between human beings and the totality of the physical and 
metaphysical world of which they consider themselves to be involved. 178 More 
simply still, religious beliefs are concerned with 'what is and why it is-with the 
nature of the universe and man's place in it, what the nineteenth-century 
anthropologists, along with most theologians, called the "great mysteries" .' 179 
No society, past or present, modem or primitive, would appear to have been 
without some form of religious belief. Moreover, given the existential and socio-
cultural significance of such immanent conceptions within their own society, it is 
hardly surprising that-beyond the variety of the modes by which the religious 
beliefs of other peoples might be expressed-the nature and variety of their 
religious beliefs themselves should have attracted the interest and attention of the 
comparative-evolutionist ethnologists of the nineteenth-century.18° Consistent 
with the evaluative ethos of their classificatory enterprise, it is no less surprising 
that nineteenth-century anthropologists should have analysed the cosmological 
and mystical beliefs of the more primitive peoples of the world against the 
rationalistic criteria of their own scientifically informed intellectualism, or that the 
conclusions netted by such analyses should have resulted in the placement of the 
178 See, J. Middleton, ed., Myth and Cosmos: Readings in Mythology and Symbolism (Garden 
City, NY: Natural History Press, 1967); M. Douglas, Natural Symbols; B. Wilson, Religion in 
Sociological Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982); J. Wilson, Religion (London: 
Heinemann, 1972). For an exploration of the problematics implicit in constructing a 
comprehensive definition of 'religion', and a survey of the range of alternatives that have been put 
on offer for, and in relation to, anthropological enquiries, see R. Horton, 'A Definition of Religion, 
and Its Uses' in Patterns of Thought in Africa and the West, pp. 19-49. 
179 Mair, An Introduction to Social Anthropology, p. 210. 
180 What is surprising, perhaps, is that of all the discrete social institutions to which such 
attention was turned at the time-kinship, marriage, transportation, agriculture, warfare, law, 
etc.--comparatively few focused specifically on religion. 
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belief systems under study at positions lower down on the evolutionary scale than 
the religious, and certainly the scientific, beliefs of the modem West. 
Amongst theologians, ideologically driven discriminatory exercises in respect 
of magical and religious beliefs had been going on for centuries. 181 Indeed, 
important elements of the Protestant Reformation involved a deliberate attempt to 
eliminate much of what had come to be regarded as the magical embellishments of 
Catholic doctrine and ecclesiastical practice, which in many ways were seen to 
have blurred the distinction.182 For Tylor and Frazer, however, and for a 
considerable number of their intellectual progeny, the enterprise was more purely 
analytical and, in keeping with the Linnaean protocols of a distinctively scientific 
analysis, largely (and in certain respects, distractedly) taxonomical. 183 
Tylor adopted a 'minimum definition' of religion as involving a belief in 
'spiritual beings' simpliciter. He introduced the idea of animism to capture all 
such forms of belief, which he divided into two categories: the doctrine of souls, 
which captured beliefs involving the idea that human beings entertained an 
essential spiritual existence that survived the cessation of their corporeal 
existence; and the doctrine of spirits, embracing beliefs in the existence of a range 
of other spiritual beings.184 In Tylor's view, animistic beliefs of both forms arose 
181 See Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic, pp. 46-48, 738-745; Briggs, Witches and 
Neighbours, pp. 125-129. 
182 Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic, pp. 58-89; Briggs, Witches and Neighbours, 
pp. 100-101, 125-129. 
183 For a critical consideration of the implications of a preoccupation with such taxonomical 
exercises in more recent anthropological studies of witchcraft and sorcery, see T.O. Beidlelman, 
'Towards More Open Theoretical Interpretations' in Douglas, Witchcraft Confessions and 
Accusations, pp. 351-356; V.W. Turner, 'Witchcraft and Sorcery: Taxonomy versus Dynamics' 
( 1964) 34(4) Africa 314-324. 
184 Tylor, Primitive Culture, vol. I, p. 383. See Horton, 'A Definition of Religion', pp. 24-25. 
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from universal human expenences. In relation to his doctrine of souls, Mair 
offered the following explanation: 
When a person dies, something seems to leave his body; and, 
short of death, people can be observed in conditions of 
unconsciousness, in trances or asleep. People dream that they 
see other people, and that they themselves are in strange 
places. All these experiences can be explained if one supposes 
that inside the body there is a soul which can leave it, 
temporarily or permanently, and go elsewhere."' 
Tylor invoked the doctrine of spirits to account for the attribution of a spiritual 
or supernatural quality to non-human entities in the natural environment, and the 
ascription to those objects and entities of a capacity to act and react in ways not 
unfamiliar to human experience.186 'Spirits,' he wrote, 'are simply personified 
causes', and the belief in their existence reflected the 'childlike philosophy' of 
primitive peoples whereby trees, stones, snakes or rivers are thus personified.187 
Animistic beliefs in spiritual beings of any kind were, on Tylor's analysis, the 
products of primitive delusions, which he was concerned to distinguish from the 
equally delusional, but potentially more pernicious, belief in magic, which, like 
185 An Introduction to Social Anthropology, p. 213. For a discussion of some subsequent 
anthropological elaborations of the doctrine of the soul, see G. White, 'Premises and Purposes in a 
Solomon Islands Ethnopsychology' in Person, Self and Experience: Exploring Pacific 
Ethnopsychologies, ed. G.M. White and J. Kirkpatrick (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1985), pp. 328, 330-333. In Tylor's view, the variety of widely held forms of ancestor worship 
provided a classic exemplification of the animistic doctrine of souls. See, Middleton, Myth and 
Cosmos, ix-xi. 
186 Animism might be distinguished from totem ism in that the latter involves the worship of a 
spiritual entity or object, as opposed to the mere ascription of a spiritual quality to it. See E. 
Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, trans. J. Swain (1915; rpt London: Allen 
and Unwin, 1976); Giddens, Sociology, pp. 459, 465. 
187 Tylor, Primitive Culture, vol. II, p. l 00. See, Keesing, Cultural Anthropology, p. 330; 
Giddens, Sociology, pp. 459-460. 
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science, arose from otherwise rational thought processes and observations, except 
that the resultant associations were wrong: 188 
[H]aving come to associate in thought those things which he 
found by experience to be connected in fact, [the primitive 
man] proceeded erroneously to invert this action, and he 
concluded that the association in thought must involve similar 
connections in reality. 189 
For Tyler, magic was not so much an expresswn of religious belief as 
evidence of the primitive belief in bad science ('occult science'), often 
malevolently directed, and indicative of a society at the 'the lowest level of 
civilization.' 190 Forsworn by modem, scientifically enlightened societies, where 
variants of magical beliefs were seen to persist in pockets of Western society (and 
elsewhere in the world where the scientific knowledge was, if not well known, at 
least known of), they did so as vestigial survivals of an earlier evolutional stage.191 
Indeed, it was is in the context of his discussion of such survivals, 192 not his 
consideration of religion, that Tylor addressed the topic of magic in Primitive 
Culture, describing them as: 
processes, customs, opinions, and so forth, which have been 
carried on by force of habit into a new state of society 
different from that in which they had their original home, and 
they thus remain as proofs and examples of an older condition 
of culture out of which a newer has been evolved. 193 
188 Primitive Culture, vol. I, p. 112. 
189 Ibid, p. 116. 
190 Sharot, 'Magic, Religion, Science and Secularisation', p. 262. 
191 Ibid. 
192 Tylor is credited with introducing the term into anthropological usage, although the 
concept was presaged in the writings of Morgan and McLennan. See Mair, An Introduction to 
Social Anthropology, p. 28. 
193 Primitive Culture 1 vol. I, p. 16. 
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It is interesting to note that Tylor's classification of contemporary indicia of 
magical and related beliefs in Western society as survivals, and his very 
elaboration of the concept itself, may have involved something of a tactical 
gambit in defence of the comparative method, and in support of the Western 
European ethnocentric ideal that method could not fail to serve when employed 
for the purposes of comparative cultural analysis. 194 
194 As Nisbet notes, in the latter part of the nineteenth century, 'some shrewd, if sometimes 
fundamentalist, minds' had come to challenge the theory of progressive development, raising 
compelling questions about the certainty with which ethnologists had ordered particular societies 
along the developmental continuum; and, indeed, about the directional assumptions underlying the 
consttuct of a developmental continuum itself [Social Change and History, p. 203]. Thus, for 
example, it was asked: 
Why, on strictly logical and even empirical grounds, could not 
a very different order be contrived, one in which, say, China 
or India is placed at the top in the status of 'developed' or 
'more developed' instead of England or France and Western 
Europe as a whole? . . . . On what logical and empirical 
grounds do we assume that change in time tends to be 
progressive rather than regressive? [Ibid.] 
Although Nisbet suggests that many such questions might have been officially disregarded, 
Tylor, it would seem, felt obliged to respond, so stung was he 'by the attacks on his cherished 
theory of developmental progress.' It was in the composition of that response 'that he literally 
created the idea of survivals as a form of counter-attack,' which he deftly proceeded to mount by 
elaborating the overarching distinction between traditionalism and modernism in Western society 
[Ibid.]: 
Close inspection of some of the elements of traditionalism-to 
be found among the rural, the peasantry, the backward, even in 
children's games, as well as in the whole gamut of 
superstition-revealed, Tylor declared, very close similarity 
with elements of culture in one or other preliterate people, 
where such elements existed in perfect conformity with the 
consensus or social structure of that pre literate people. If this 
were the case, Tylor argued, could not the presence of these 
same traits among the 'backward' sections of Western 
populations or within purely superstitious or ritualistic or 
ceremonial contexts be taken as proof that Western society had 
once known a stage in which these elements were also 
perfectly conjoined to the larger belief system of the social 
order? Tylor ... thought the answer was a clear affirmative. 
Once the kind of beliefs represented today by, say, Hallowe'en 
observances were standard, were quite literally functional 
parts of the Western cultural order. Time, however, has 
passed them by. The processes of progressive development 
have, by elevating rationalism and other more progressive 
168 
Like Tylor, Frazer also recognised that magical and other equally irrational 
beliefs could still be found amongst the rural and less-well educated members of 
otherwise modem European societies. Rather than emphasising an explanation for 
the persistence of such beliefs in terms of Tylorian survivals, however, he focused 
instead on the correspondence between magic and science. In his view, although 
magic might have been amongst the most primitive forms of belief, it shared with 
modem science the essential quality of reliance on the existence of a set of 
immutable laws, the operation of which could be predicted and calculated with a 
measurable degree of precision. 195 On Frazer's analysis, however, such science as 
might be discerned in primitive systems of magical belief and practice was 
spurious, and its theoretical dynamics unknown and unknowable to the primitive 
believer and practitioner, for whom 'the very idea of science is lacking in his 
undeveloped mind.' 196 
'The primitive magician,' he wrote, 'knows magic only on its practical side' as 
the 'bastard art', behind which lay the logic of a 'spurious science' comprehensible 
only to the 'philosophic student' capable of disentangling 'the abstract principles 
from their concrete applications'. 197 Formulating those principles theoretically, 
Frazer described primitive magical beliefs as grounded in a pseudo-scientific Law 
of Sympathy, the underlying assumption of which was that: 
modes of belief, made Hallowe'en observances what they are 
today in the West-the sport of children, the belief of the 
backward elements in the population. [Ibid., p. 204] 
195 Sharot, 'Magic, Religion, Science and Secularisation', p. 263. 
196 The Golden Bough, p. 12. On the implicit relationship between Frazer's comparative 
characterisations and the premeditations of nineteenth-century ethnological analyses of magic, 
sorcery and witchcraft, see H. T. Wilson, Tradition and Innovation: The Idea of Civilization as 
Culture and its Significance (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), pp. !99-205. 
197 The Golden Bough p. 12. 
things act on each other at a distance through a secret 
sympathy, the impulse being transmitted from one to the other 
by means of what we may conceive as a kind of invisible 
ether, not unlike that which is postulated by modem science 
for a precisely similar purpose, namely, to explain how things 
can physically affect each other through a space which appears 
to be empty.'" 
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Application of the Law of Sympathy gives rise to the belief in sympathetic 
magic, which Frazer said is of two kinds: Homoeopathic (or Imitative) Magic, 
founded on the false association of ideas by virtue of their apparent similarity; and 
Contagious Magic, founded on the similarly false association of ideas by 
contiguity. 199 In the first instance, objects appearing to have similar characteristics 
are regarded as capable of affecting one another, so that an effect on one can be 
produced by imitating that effect on the other. By way of illustration, Frazer 
refers to the fairly widespread belief and practice amongst ancient and primitive 
peoples whereby a person may be caused to suffer an injury, illness or death by 
inflicting damage on an image of the intended victim200-the classic example of 
which might involve sticking pins into a doll representing one's enemy.201 




things which have once been conjoined must remain ever 
afterwards, even when quite dissevered from each other, in 
200 Ibid., pp. 12-13. A number of other examples are given of similar beliefs and practices 
amongst 'the sorcerers of ancient India, Babylon, and Egypt, as well as of Greece and Rome .. .', 
and such as are still resorted to 'by cunning and malignant savages in Australia, Africa, and 
Scotland' (pp. 13, 14-37). A New Guinea example is offered at pp. 18-19. 
201 See Mair, An Introduction to Social Anthropology, p. 214. 
such a sympathetic relation that whatever is done to one must 
similarly affect the other202 
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Examples of contagious magic cited by Frazer include a variety of beliefs and 
practices based in the supposed relationship between an individual, on the one 
hand, and a range of objects, materials and substances which once were part or 
products of that person's body (fingers, eyes, limbs, hair, nails, teeth, blood, 
saliva, sweat, excreta) or otherwise closely associated with him or her (clothing, 
weapons, eating utensils, jewellery).203 Here, too, Frazer illustrates these 
exemplary propositions with descriptions of practices drawn from a variety of 
historical and contemporary accounts.'04 
In his depiction of sympathetic magtc, Frazer draws a distinction between 
what he describes as private and public magic, and practitioners (magicians and 
sorcerers) who apply their art privately for the benefit or injury of individuals, and 
publicly for, or in relation to, the community as a whole.205 In relation to the latter 
he wrote: 
Wherever ceremonies [magical rites and incantations J are 
observed for the common good, it is obvious that the magician 
ceases to be merely a private practitioner and becomes to some 
extent a public functionary. The development of such a class 
of functionaries is of great importance for the political as well 
as the religious evolution of society.206 
202 Fra2er, The Golden Bough, p. 37. 
203 Ibid., pp. 37-38. 
204 Ibid., pp. 38-45. 
205 Ibid., p. 45. 
206 Ibid. 
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It is, in part, on the basis of this distinction between the private and public sphere 
of magical beliefs and practices that Frazer's effort to distinguish between magic 
and religion predicates.207 
Recognising that the practices of sympathetic magic could involve elements of 
what Tylor considered animistic beliefs, Frazer regarded such instances as 
exceptional. In its 'pure unadulterated form,' magic operates on the assumption 
that natural events follow on, one from another, 'necessarily and invariably 
without the intervention of any spiritual or personal agency. '208 Indeed, it is in this 
particular sense that Frazer saw the fundamental conception of magic as identical 
with that of modem science: 
[U]nderlying the whole system is a faith, implicit but real and 
firm, in the order and uniformity of nature. The magician does 
not doubt that the same causes will always produce the same 
effects, that the performance of the proper ceremony, 
accompanied by the appropriate spell, will inevitably be 
attended by the desired result, unless, indeed, his incantations 
should chance to be thwarted and foiled by the more potent 
charms of another sorcerer. . . . Yet his power ... is by no 
means arbitrary and unlimited. He can wield it only so long as 
he strictly conforms to the rules of his art, or to what may be 
called the laws of nature as conceived by him.209 
207 As to the political implications of publicly expressed magical beliefs and practices, Frazer 
discusses the logical ascription and imputation of prestige, influence, honour, wealth and power to 
those individuals regarded as the ablest practitioners, upon whom the general welfare of the 
community might be seen to depend. But in so far as the premises of magic are demonstrably 
false (or at least potentially so), it is the ablest and most sagacious practitioner who must also have 
come to 'see through the fallacies which impose on duller wits', and who must, therefore, be 'more 
or less conscious deceivers. 1 The honest sorcerer, who sincerely believes himself to have mastered 
or possess the powers ascribed to him, is in far greater peril than the deliberate impostor, since he 
is much less likely to be ready with a plausible explanation for the eventual and inevitable failure 
of his efforts, and more likely to be 'knocked on the head by his angry and disappointed 
employers' before he can find one. In a 'savage society', therefore, the general result is that 
'supreme power tends to fall into the hands of the keenest intelligence and most unscrupulous 
character.' [Ibid., pp. 46, 47-48] 
208 Ibid., pp. 48-49. 
209 Ibid., p. 49. 
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The failing of magic is not a function of its general assumption that sequential 
events are determined by immutable laws, but only in the fundamental 
misconception of the laws governing the sequence. In Frazer's view, the logic of 
the thought processes giving rise to magical beliefs is as sound as that of science. 
It is only the perceived associations that are false; if they were true, magic would 
be science.210 
However close he may have seen magic to stand in relation to science, Frazer's 
conception of religion operated to place the two systems of belief on qualitatively 
different levels; even if magic might be said to have preceded religion in an 
evolutionary sense. By religion, Frazer said: 'I understand a propitiation or 
conciliation of powers superior to man which are believed to direct and control the 
course of nature and of human life.' Thus defined, he continued, religion could be 
said to consist in the essential conjunction of two aspects: a theoretical belief in 
'powers higher than man', and a practical attempt to propitiate or please those 
powers. Of these two elements, 'belief clearly comes first, since we must believe 
in the existence of a divine being before we can attempt to please him'; but it is the 
combination of the two components that Frazer regarded as essential to a 
serviceable concept and definition of religion, since belief without practice is mere 
theology.211 
Even in the absence of a corroborative invocation of St James's dictum: 'faith, 
if it hath not works, is dead, being alone',212 Frazer's elevation of a distinctively, if 
not necessarily uniquely, Western Judea-Christian conception of religion to the 




status of a universally applicable set of comparative criteria would be patent.213 
But whatever form its theological structure and ceremonial expression might take, 
to the extent that religion can be said to involve essentially a belief in 'superhuman 
beings' who are capable of controlling and directing a range of natural phenomena, 
and the endeavour of human beings to secure the favour of those deities, 'it clearly 
assumes that the course of nature is to some extent elastic or variable, and that we 
can persuade or induce the mighty beings who control it to deflect, for our benefit, 
the current of events from the channel in which they would otherwise flow.'214 
Thus, in so far as religion assumes the world to be directed by 
conscious agents who may be turned from their purpose by 
persuasion, it stands in fundamental antagonism to magic as 
well as science, both of which take for granted that the course 
of nature is determined, not by the passions or caprice of 
personal beings, but by the operation of immutable laws acting 
mechanically215 
It was this 'radical conflict of principle' which Frazer regarded as serving to 
differentiate so clearly magical and religious systems of belief, and by which 'the 
213 Cf. Giddens, who counsels the avoidance of 'the pitfalls of culturally biased thinking' in the 
understanding of religious ideas and practices by ruling out the necessary application of just such 
criteria. Sociology, pp. 457-458. See also Douglas, Natural Symbols, pp. 17-43; P. Lawrence, 
'Religion and Magic' in Anthropology in Papua New Guinea: Readings from the Encyclopaedia of 
Papua and New Guinea, ed. I. Hogbin (Carlton VIC: University of Melbourne Press, 1973), pp. 
20 1-226; and see generally Wilson, Religion in Sociological Perspective. 
214 Frazer, The Golden Bough, p. 51. 
215 Ibid., emphasis provided. In accounting for the presence of animistic elements in certain 
systems of magical belief, Frazer argues that such spirits and other supernatural agents are 
regarded in precisely the same way as inanimate elements of the natural world; that is, they too are 
magically constrained or coerced, rather than religiously conciliated or propitiated. Thus: 
[magic] assumes that all personal beings, whether human or 
divine, are in the last resort subject to those impersonal forces 
which control all things, but which nevertheless can be turned 
to account by anyone who knows how to manipulate them by 
the appropriate ceremonies and spells. [Ibid.] 
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relentless hostility with which in history the priest has often pursued the magician' 
might be explained.Z'6 
The haughty self-sufficiency of the magiCian, his arrogant 
demeanour towards the higher powers, and his unabashed 
claim to exercise a sway like theirs could not but revolt the 
priest, to whom, with his awful sense of the divine majesty, 
and his humble prostration in the presence of it, such claims 
and such a demeanour must have appeared an impious and 
blasphemous usurpation of prerogatives that belong to God 
alone.217 
At the same time, however, Frazer was obliged to acknowledge that amongst 
early European peoples elements of magic and religion were often combined 'or, 
to speak perhaps more correctly, were not yet differentiated from each other.'218 
There was, too, he observed, a seeming fusion-or confusion-of magic with 
religion in the practices of Melanesian and other contemporary primitive societies; 
and even amongst the 'ignorant classes' of modem Europe there was evidence of a 
similar confusion of religious and magical ideas.219 Thus, for example, he 
reported how, in France: 
'the majority of the peasants still believe that the priest 
possesses a secret and irresistible power over the elements. By 
reciting certain prayers which he alone knows and has the 
right to utter, yet for the utterance of which he must afterwards 
demand absolution, he can, on an occasion of pressing danger, 
arrest or reverse for a moment the action of the eternal laws of 
the physical world.'220 
216 Ibid., p. 52. 
217 Ibid. 
218 Ibid. 
219 Ibid., pp. 52-53. 
220 Ibid., p. 53 (Frazer cites no source for the text appearing within quotation marks). 
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Responding to this, amongst other examples of the religious beliefs and 
practices of otherwise civilised European peoples, Frazer was compelled to 
concede the appearance of clear counterparts in the magical ideas of ancient and 
contemporary primitive societies.221 But in surmising that magic nonetheless 
represented a system of belief that was both historically antecedent to religion and, 
in an evolutionary sense, more primitive than religion, Frazer's arguments are 
analytically at their weakest and most transparent;222 his explanations, a paean to 
the theory of progressive evolutionary development and the comparative 
superiority of modem Western intellectual rationality, coupled with a poignantly 
ironic piety: 
We have seen that on the one hand magic is nothing but a 
mistaken application of the very simplest and most elementary 
processes of the mind, namely the association of ideas by 
virtue of resemblance or contiguity; and that on the other 
hand, religion assumes the operation of conscious or personal 
agents, superior to man, being the visible screen of nature. 
Obviously the conception of personal agents is more complex 
than a simple recognition of the similarity or contiguity of 
ideas; and a theory which assumes that the course of nature is 
determined by conscious agents is more abstruse and 
recondite, and requires for its apprehension a far higher degree 
of intelligence and reflection, than the view that things 
succeed each other simply by reason of their contiguity or 
resemblance . .. ?23 
Thus religion, beginning as a slight and partial 
acknowledgement of powers superior to man, tends with the 
growth of knowledge to deepen into a confession of man's 
entire and absolute dependence on the divine; his old free 
bearing is exchanged for an attitude of the lowliest prostration 
before the mysterious powers of the unseen, and his highest 
virtue is to submit his will to theirs. . . . But this deepening 
sense of religion, this more perfect submission to the divine 
will in all things, affects only those of higher intelligences who 
221 Ibid., pp52-54. 
222 See Sharot, 'Magic, Religion, Science and Secularisation', p. 263; Horton, 'Back to 
Frazer?',pp. 105,106-108. 
223 Frazer, The Golden Bough. p. 54. 
have breadth of view enough to comprehend the vastness of 
the universe and the littleness of man224 
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As a man of his time, Frazer could confidently assert that magic was 
conspicuously present, and religion conspicuously absent, in 'the most backward 
state of human society' then known. 225 Accounting for the persistence of 
sympathetic associations amongst the less-sophisticated, but otherwise 
conventionally religious, communities of Europe (Scottish, Irish and Russian 
examples being cited for the purpose of illustrating the point), and reconciling the 
fast hold of religion amongst the better educated members of Western society with 
the manifestly more tenable explanations proffered by science, was rather more 
problematic. In the event, Frazer could but avoid the issues: 
It is not our business here to consider what bearing the 
permanent existence of such a solid layer of savagery beneath 
the surface of society, and unaffected by the superficial 
changes of religion and culture has upon the future of 
humanity . . . . When we reflect upon the multitude, the 
variety, and the complexity of the facts to be explained, and 
the scantiness of our information regarding them, we shall be 
ready to acknowledge that a full and satisfactory solution to so 
profound a problem is hardly to be hoped for .... 226 
In fairness, however, it might also be said that these critical, if troublesome, 
questions were not so much begged as they were deliberately held in abeyance, to 
be addressed more fully and more satisfactorily by a later generation of 
anthropologists in what Frazer himself may have anticipated would be a more 
amenable intellectual environment.227 
224 Ibid., pp. 58-59. 
225 Ibid., p. 55. 
226 Ibid., pp. 56-57. 
227 Horton's observations on this score are telling: 
Modem social anthropologists have often presented Frazer to 
us as a rather simple man immersed in the ethnocentric 
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(2) Evans-Pritchard and the 
Ethnography of African Witchcraft and Sorcery 
Over the past 60 years, virtually all scholarly considerations of witchcraft, 
sorcery and magic, anthropological and otherwise, contain at least some 
discussion of the work of Sir Edward Evans-Pritchard, whose fieldwork amongst 
the Azande of southern Sudan between 1926 and 1930 is generally regarded as the 
first detailed and focused ethnographic study witchcraft and sorcery-related 
beliefs. 228 Even today, as Eva Gillies noted in the introduction to her abridgement 
of Evans-Pritchard's Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande:229 
prejudices of nineteenth-century Britain. My own feeling is 
that he was far from simple, and that his prejudices may not 
have run very deep. One cannot, of course, ignore the 
arrogance implicit in his evolutionary theorizing. Nor can one 
ignore his summary dismissal of the entire corpus of magical 
and religious thought as a 'melancholy record of human error 
and folly'. These generalities, however, are belied by a 
thousand instances of sympathetic, imaginative identification 
with particular examples of such thought. To me, the 
generalities sound like the official noises Frazer felt he had to 
make to cover himself vis-a-vis the decidedly ethnocentric 
intellectual establishment of his time and place. ['Back to 
Frazer?', p. I 08 (footnote omitted)] 
It has also been suggested that Frazer himself was anti-religious, and that The Golden Bough 
was 'obviously a conscious attempt to discredit religion-especially Christianity-by tracing its 
line of descent to primitive superstition.' I. C. Jarvie and J. Agassi, 'The Problem of Rationality 
and Magic' in Rationality, ed. B. Wilson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1970), pp. 172, 177. Not so 
many years ago, the question of Frazer's intentions and attitudes itself became a matter of some 
academic debate. See E.R. Leach, 'Frazer and Malinowski' (1965) 15 Encounter 24-36; l.C. 
Jarvie, 'Academic Fashions and Grandfather Killing-In Defense of Frazer' (1966) 16 Encounter 
53-55. 
228 See e.g., L. Goldman, The Culture of Coincidence: Accident and Absolute Liability in Huli 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 68-69; Briggs, Witches and Neighbours, p. 304; C. Geertz, 
Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology (New York: Basic Books, 1983) 
pp. 78-80; The Interpretation of Cultures, p. I 00-l 0 I; Marwick, Witchcraft and Sorcery, pp. 12-
13; Luhrrnann, Persuasions of the Witch's Craft, p. 345-347; Penner, 'Rationality, Ritual and 
Science', p. 13; Sharot, 'Magic, Religion, Science and Secularisation', p. 277; P. Hirst and P. 
Woolley, Social Relations and Human Attributes (London: Tavistock Publications, 1982), pp. 
258-267. Giddens, Sociology, p. 460; Goldthorpe, An Introduction to Sociology, pp. 198-199. 
229 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1937). 
it is quite difficult to write about witchcraft, magic, beliefs 
concerning causation, the expression of social conflicts and 
tensions in mystical idiom, or indeed the general sociology of 
knowledge, without mentioning the name of Evans-
Pritchard.230 
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As it happens, Evans-Pritchard's work was not the first ethnographic study to 
treat of witchcraft and sorcery-related beliefs and practices amongst what were 
still referred to as 'primitive' societies. Indeed, the publication of at least three 
important ethnographically based anthropological monographs dealing, to a 
greater or lesser degree, with aspects of sorcery-related beliefs and practices, 
preceded that of Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic-all of which, interestingly, were 
the products of field work undertaken not in Africa, but in New Guinea?31 Albeit, 
the impress of Evans-Pritchard's analysis of Zande magic, witchcraft and sorcery 
on subsequent anthropological inquiries into such beliefs and practices in 
Melanesia and elsewhere has been particularly profound and enduring.232 On that 
230 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), xx. 
231 The publication of Reo Fortune's ethnography of sorcery-related beliefs and practices on 
Dobu Island in the D'Entrecasteaux group, lying off the eastern tip of the New Guinea mainland, 
preceded Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic by some five years. See R.F. Fortune, Sorcerers of 
Dobu: The Social Anthropology of the Dobu Islanders of the Western Pacific (1932; rpt New 
York: E.P. Dutton & Company, 1963). Gregory Bateson's Naven: A Survey of the Problems 
suggested by a Composite Picture of the Culture of a New Guinea Tribe drawn from Three Points 
of View (1936; 2nd ed., rpt Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), a sophisticated analysis of 
the ceremonial ritual of that name as practised by the latrnul in what is today the East Sepik 
Province of Papua New Guinea, was published in 1936, and contains a chapter devoted to the 
subject (pp. 54-73), as does Bronislaw Malinowski's classic ethnography of law in the Trobriand 
Islands, Crime and Custom in Savage Society (1926; rpt Totowa, NJ: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 
1976), pp. 85-99. 
232 See M. Stephen, 'Introduction' in Sorcerer and Witch in Melanesia, pp. 1-2. The counter-
productive influence of African-based anthropological models on Melanesian studies generally 
was itself a matter of some debate at one time. See J.A. Barnes, 'African Models in the New 
Guinea Highlands' (1962) 62 Man 5-9; L.L. Langness, 'Traditional Political Organization' in 
Anthropology in Papua New Guinea, pp. 142, 143. And with respect to studies of sorcery and 
witchcraft in particular, Mary Douglas has remarked: 'It is interesting to reflect on what would 
have happened in British anthropology if work in New Guinea had developed as quickly as in 
Africa': 'Thirty Years after Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic', xxiii. In a similar vein, Kuper 
suggests that Bateson's Naven was somewhat overshadowed by the contributions of his 
contemporaries, at least in part, on account of his isolation in New Guinea: Anthropology and 
Anthropologists, p. 77. 
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account, both the substance of Evans-Pritchard's work and, more importantly 
perhaps, its theoretical premeditations, invite especial scrutiny here. 
Like Frazer and Tyler, Evans-Pritchard regarded the belief m magtc, 
witchcraft and sorcery amongst the Azande as grounded in a fundamental mistake 
of fact: 'Witches, as the Azande conceive them,' he wrote, 'clearly cannot exist.'233 
His analysis of such beliefs, however, represented a radical departure from the 
intellectualist approach of his predecessors in two important respects: first, in its 
commitment to the necessity of examining and assessing the content and 
dynamics of those beliefs in their natural social context; and second, in the 
recognition that, when carefully considered in situ, such beliefs and their 
associated practices could be seen to entertain a coherent and tenable logic of their 
own. 
In rejecting the intellectualist predisposition to explicate the basis of an 
African system of magical belief in accordance with the rigid and implicitly 
evaluative tenets of a decidedly modem Western European epistemology, limited 
as he regarded such an ethnocentric orientation to be by its preponderate emphasis 
on formulary concepts of rationalism and the individuation of thought, Evans-
Pritchard drew heavily on the ideas Durkheim and others associated with the 
Annee Sociologique. 234 Of these Continental influences on development of Evans-
Pritchard's thinking, far and away the most significant was Lucien Levy-Bruhl,235 
the French philosopher cum sociologist of thought whose own earlier work was 
233 Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic, p. 18. Unless otherwise indicated, all subsequent 
references are to Gillies' abridgement. 
234 See Kuper, Anthropology and Anthropologists, p. 5. In the introduction to her abridgement 
of Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic, Gillies suggests that Marx, too, may have stood as 'a less 
overtly acknowledged ancestor in the dimmer background' (xx). 
235 See E.E. Evans-Pritchard, A History of Anthropological Thought, ed. Andre Singer 
(London: Faber & Faber, 1981 ). 
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openly critical of his British counterparts, and was itself much affected by 
Durkheimian notions of the primacy of a sociological over a psychological 
understanding of the human condition in primitive societies.236 Thus, whereas 
Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic continues to be regarded as a seminal work in the 
ethnography of magic, witchcraft and sorcery, it was also, and more 
fundamentally, a study in the sociology of knowledge and perception.237 It is in 
this sense that Levy-Bruhl's early influence on Evans-Pritchard is most apparent. 
(a) The Social Context and Sociological Contextualisation 
of 'Primitive' Beliefs in Magic, Witchcraft and Sorcery 
Levy-Bruhl used the term collective representations to describe the set of 
ideas common to all members of a primitive society, passed on from one 
generation to the next and effectively imposed upon individual members by an 
'external source, both pre-existing them and surviving them.'238 It was this 
decidedly social process which he took to be the essential subject matter of a 
sociology of thought. And it was his firm conviction in the centrality of that 
process that fuelled Levy-Bruhl's critique of English intellectualism, the 
proponents of which he accused of arrogantly accounting for the explanatory 
deficiencies of primitive thought patterns on the basis of a 'rudimentary, infantile 
236 See L. Levy-Bruhl, How Natives Think, trans. L.A. Clare (1926; rpt New York: 
Washington Square Press, 1966); R. Needham, Belief Language and Experience (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1972), pp. 160-175. For a summary discussion of contemporary 
formulations of the relationship between individualistic and sociocentric orientations in 
anthropological analyses of Pacific Island cultures, see J. Kirkpatrick and G.M. White, 'Exploring 
Ethnopsychologies' in Kirkpatrick and White, Person, Self and Experience, pp. 2, 12-13. 
237 M. Douglas, 'Thirty Years after Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic' in Douglas, Witchcraft 
Confessions and Accusations, xiv. 
238 Horton, 'Levy-Bruhl, Durkheim and the Scientific Revolution', p. 64. In the introduction 
to her abridgement of Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic, xxi, Gillies suggests that the concept of 
'collective representations', though elaborated considerably by Levy-Bruhl, was initially developed 
by Durkheim. 
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and erroneous use of processes of reasoning found fully developed only in highly 
educated Westemers.'239 Further to this critique, Levy-Bruhl challenged the 
underlying intellectualist assumption that the object of primitive thinking was 
directed towards explanation at all. Rather, he argued that in primitive societies a 
variable set of emotional needs far outweighs any need for explanation, and it is 
these emotional needs which are, in the main, determinative of the content of a 
particular society's collective representations?40 
[T]he simpler the society, the greater the importance of 
collective representations in the individual's world-view, and 
the less the importance of beliefs arrived at by his own 
exercise ofreason.241 
On Levy-Bruhl's analysis, the key to the interpretation of primitive ideation 
was not to be found in the protocols of reason but in the vicissitudes of emotion, 
the latter of which are played out collectively, rather than individually, in the 
mystical orientation of the thought by which the distinctively 'primitive mind' was 
characterised. For primitive peoples, the content of every perception is coloured 
by and invested with emotion. The feelings they associate with objects become 
part and parcel of their conscious images, and it is in those images that the 
distinctively 'mystical' element is formed?42 As between different groups, 
communities and societies, the particular form in which this mystical aspect of 
experience is represented may vary widely. Irrespective of the manner in which it 
might be depicted or described, however, 'it is always represented as an invisible, 
239 Horton, 'Levy-Bruhl, Durkheim and the Scientific Revolution', p. 64. 
240 Ibid. 
241 Ibid. SeeP. Lawrence, 'Magic and Religion', pp. 202-203. 
242 Horton, 'Levy-Bruhl, Durkheim and the Scientific Revolution', p. 65 
18:! 
intangible power.'243 It was this experiential foundation of the mystical orientation 
that Levy-Bruhl elaborated in his theory of a distinctive 'primitive mentality' _244 
An important constant in Levy-Bruhl's analysis of primitive mentality was his 
insistence that consciousness and cognition were derived from and within a 
societal integument in which the orientations and objects of an individual's 
thought and actions were, of necessity, subordinated to those of the larger 
243 Ibid. 
244 Levy-Bruhl identified four further salient characteristics of primitive thought, all of which 
derive from this underlying construct. Relying on Horton's analysis in 'Levy-Bruh, Durkheim and 
the Scientific Revolution', pp. 65-68, and Needham's extended discussion in Belief Language and 
Experience, pp. 160-175, these characteristics features may be summarised as follows: 
(!) There is an absence, or subordination, of objectivity, involving a diminution of any 
distinction between the perceptual and the experiential, coupled with a subordination of the former 
to the latter, whereby dreams and visions are admitted to primitive reality on the same footing as 
ordinary, everyday perceptions. 
(ii) Participation is Levy-Bruhl's term for the inextricable linkage between visual and tactual 
experience, on the one hand, and the emotional or mystical content of that experience, on the 
other, the effect of which is to virtually eliminate any conceptual difference between the two, 
rendering the material (natural) and spiritual or mystical (supernatural) qualities of an object 
effectively inseparable. Where two objects share the same or similar mystical associations, the 
objects themselves may acquire a close, effectively inseparable association. To the extent that 
primitive man is overwhelmingly mystical in his orientation, the way in which he associates the 
elements of the physical and metaphysical environment he inhabits is almost invariably in terms of 
such participation. 
(iii) An indifference to logical contradictions follows on consequentially where 
'participations' are involved. Thus, in affirming that an object may be both itself and something 
else-at once itself and not itself-the implicit and otherwise apparent contradiction is effectively 
overridden. Levy-Bruhl described this feature of primitive thought as the quality of a 'pre-logical 
mentality'. He carefully qualified his use of this expression, however, negating the implication 
that contradictions are necessarily valued in primitive thought, or that primitive man is incapable 
of recognising them. Rather, he said, where participations are involved, they merely take 
precedence over any felt need to eliminate what might otherwise be a troublesome logical 
contradiction. 
(iv) A special communion with the world similarly follows on from the emotional (mystical) 
content with which primitive people so heavily invest their perceptions of phenomena in everyday 
life. In Horton's words, primitive man 'does not so much perceive the world around him as feel it' 
(p. 66); and in so far as the elements of a world thus experienced are so thoroughly imbued with 
the subjective qualities of a projected mystical emotion, his relationship with the world that much 
more intimate. Because human beings, animals, plants and other material elements of the natural 
world are all similarly associated with this mystical influence, the tendency of primitive man is to 
regard all such creatures and objects 'as though they were in some sense personal.' [ibid.] 
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community. In such circumstances, 'the individual acquires the greater part of his 
idea-system via the accredited socializing agents of the community.245 Like the 
disciple he fairly admitted himself to be, Evans-Pritchard vigorously defended 
Levy-Bruhl's arguments in support of the view that beliefs (mystical or otherwise), 
and the understanding of reality to which such beliefs give meaning and 
significance, are fundamentally social constructs.Z46 In 1934, after Evans-
Pritchard had completed the significant period of his field work amongst the 
Azande, but prior to the publication Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic, he wrote: 
'The criticisms of Levy-Bruhl's theories are so obvious and so 
forcible that only books of exceptional brilliance and 
originality could have survived them. . . . Levy-Bruhl is 
speaking of patterns or modes of thought which, after 
eliminating all individual variation, are the same among all the 
members of a primitive community and are what are called 
their beliefs. . . . Every individual is compelled to adopt these 
beliefs by pressure of social circumstances. . . . When Levy-
Bruhl says that a representation is collective, he means that it 
is a socially determined mode of thought and is therefore 
common to all members of a society ... .'247 
The 'obvious criticisms' to which Evans-Pritchard alludes in the passage 
quoted immediately above involved, in part, Levy-Bruhl's postulate of a 
distinctively 'primitive' cast of mind to explain the apparently irrational beliefs of 
the native and tribal peoples in the real existence of spiritual beings, as well as the 
245 Ibid., p. 67. 
246 Reflecting on his own work, Evans-Pritchard eventually came to distance himself 
theoretically from Levy-Bruhl, and to challenge many of the latter's conclusions concerning the 
qualitative differences by which a distinctively 'primitive' cast of mind might be characterised. In 
later years, however, and partly on the basis of Evans-Pritchard's contributions, Levy-Bruhl 
himself came to modify much of his own thinking in this regard. See Horton, 'Levy-Bruhl, 
Durkheim and the Scientific Revolution', pp. 68-69; Luhrmann, Persuasions of the Witch's Craft, 
pp. 346-347. 
247 
'Levy-Bruhl's Theory of Primitive Mentality' (1934) 2(1) Bulletin of Faculty of Arts 
(Egyptian University, Cairo), p. 9, quoted in Douglas, 'Thirty Years after Witchcraft, Oracles and 
Magid, xv. 
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magical powers of witches and sorcerers. According to Levy-Bruhl, 'the thought 
of primitive man was different not in degree but in quality from his civilized 
counterpart.'248 
The primitive did not think less well or less reasonably: he 
started from different assumptions, noticed different things 
about the world, and was untroubled by the contradictions in 
some of the conclusions to which this led him.249 
His own experience living amongst the Azande led Evans-Pritchard to reject 
the view that there was any qualitative difference between the mind and thought 
processes of 'primitive' African and 'modem' Western peoples. In his view, the 
mental structure of the Azande mind was not fundamentally different to that of an 
Englishman's, nor were the thought processes by which both understood and 
experienced their respective worlds essentially dissimilar. Indeed, the very thrust 
of his arguments in Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic has been described as an 
implicit attack on this particular aspect of Levy-Bruhl's theory.250 At the same 
time, however, Evans-Pritchard held fast to Levy-Bruhl's insights into the nature 
of 'collective representations', which provided an enduring theoretical platform for 
the development of his own arguments that the nominally irrational, collectively 
held and unconsciously accepted beliefs of the Azande were neither more nor less 
than the result of the pervasive influences of Azande society. 
Even by the early decades of the twentieth century there would have been no 
great novelty in Evans-Pritchard's recognition that the mystical or religious beliefs 
of primitive people were influenced by social experience, or that the choice of one 
248 Luhrmann, Persuasions of the Witch's Craft, p. 346. 
249 Ibid. 
250 Ibid., p. 347. For an interesting commentary on what to some anthropologists appears to 
be an element of inconsistency in Evans-Pritchard's assessment of Levy-Bruhl's ideas see R. Firth, 
'Degrees of Intelligibility' in Overing, Reason and Morality, pp. 29,32-33. 
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set of such beliefs as opposed to another was largely a reflection of social 
processes and experience.251 But whereas Levy-Bruhl had refined the issue to 
raise the deeper question of why, in the context of primitive society, any particular 
set of religious or mystical beliefs might be accepted for its explanatory value,252 
Evans-Pritchard refined the issue further still, broadening his inquiry to include 
the problem of explanation itself, and raising the more fundamental question of 
why any metaphysical system should be accepted. By addressing the question at 
this level, Evans-Pritchard effectively relegated the issue of the difference 
between mystical explanations and other explanations to one of secondary 
importance.253 Thus, as Douglas explains: 
In an inquiry into witchcraft as a principle of causation, no 
mysterious spiritual beings are postulated, only the mysterious 
powers of humans. The belief is on the same footing as belief 
in the conspiracy theory in history, in the baneful effects of 
fluoridation or the curative value of psychoanalysis-or any 
proposition that can be presented in an unverifiable form. The 
question then becomes one of rationality."' 
For Evans-Pritchard, the question was simply this: 'Is Zande thought so 
different from ours that we can only describe their speech and actions without 
comprehending them, or is it essentially like our own thought expressed in an 
25
' Douglas, 'Thirty Years after Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic', xv. 
252 As we have seen, Levy-Bruhl answered this question by postulating a special 'primitive' 
cast of mind that differed qualitatively from that of its civilised counterpart, and which, by virtue 
of that difference, readily accommodated the contradictions inherent in metaphysical explanations 
which, to the modern Western mind must prove unacceptably irrational. C.H. Hallpike develops a 
thematically similar argument in support of essential differences in primitive and modern 
mentalities, based on the developmental psychology of Piaget, in The Foundations of Primitive 
Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), pp. 32-40. For a critical assessment of Piaget's ideas, 
and a succinct critique of 'primitive mind' theories generally, see Goldman, The Culture of 
Coincidence, pp. 75-79. 
253 Douglas, 'Thirty Years after Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic', xvi; see also Luhrmann, 
Persuasions of the Witch's Craft, p. 346. 
254 
'Thirty Years after Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic', xvi. 
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idiom to which we are unaccustomed?255 His analysis of the Zande system of 
mystical belief and action marked a watershed in anthropological thinking, with 
significantly broader implications for the development of Western ideas about the 
human condition per se, as a consequence of which the answer to the question he 
posed has come increasingly to reflect an affirmation of the latter proposition. 
(b) The Zande System of Mystical Belief and Action: 
Witchcraft and Sorcery as Social Facts 
According to Evans-Pritchard, the Zande scheme of mystical belief and action 
society consisted in an inter-related set of belief/action complexes constituting a 
single, comprehensible and self-sustaining system comprised of (i) witches and 
witchcraft; (ii) sorcerers and magic; and, of less significance for present purposes 
(iii) diviners and oracles?56 In the opening paragraphs of Witchcraft, Oracles and 
Magic, he identifies the key components and principal interactions of this system 
thus: 
Azande believe that some people are witches and can injure 
them in virtue of an inherent quality. A witch performs no 
rite, utters no spell, and possesses no medicines. An act of 
witchcraft is a psychic act. They believe also that sorcerers 
may do them ill by performing magic rites with bad 
medicines. Azande distinguish clearly between witches and 
sorcerers. Against both they employ diviners, oracles, and 
medicines. 257 
255 Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic (I 937 edition), p. 4. 
256 Evans-Pritchard himself captures these components more broadly within the triadic model 
instantiated in the book's title: witchcraft, oracles and magic. The material lends itself to a variety 
of subsidiary structures, and others have certainly been suggested. Kuper, for example, proposes 
four: witchcraft, witch doctors, oracles and magic: Anthropology and Anthropologists, p. 78. The 
categories employed here have been devised to preserve the basic, tri-partite structure of Evans-
Pritchard's model, expanded slightly in order to identify the principal actors involved in specified 
processes, as well as the relevant forms of belief and action themselves. 
257 Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic, p. l. 
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Much of the remainder of the book is devoted to the description and analysis 
of the nature of these elements, the relationships between them and the social 
determinants of their interaction in Zande life. The ethnographic minutiae need 
not concern us here. To the extent that certain structural features of the Zande 
system, and Evans-Pritchard's analysis of those features more particularly, are 
reflected today in modem anthropological and anthropologically-informed 
understandings of sorcery-related beliefs and behaviour in Papua New Guinea, 
however, some of those features and their salient interrelations are discussed 
below. 
(i) Witches and Witchcraft 
To the Azande, witchcraft (mangu) itself was a material substance, described 
to Evans-Pritchard as 'an oval blackish swelling or bag', located in the bodies of 
persons who are, by virtue of the presence of that substance, witches. Carriage of 
the substance, and thus, the fact of being a witch, is an inherited trait that is 
transmitted by unilinear descent from parent to child. All male offspring of a 
male witch will be witches, though none of his daughters will be. Likewise, all of 
the daughters of a female witch will be witches, though none of her sons will be. 
Amongst the Azande Evans-Pritchard found that men and women were equally 
likely to be witches. Whereas a man might be bewitched by a witch of either sex, 
however, women tended to be the victims only of female witches258 
Empowered by the presence of the witchcraft substance in his or her body, the 
Zande witch was capable of causing injury, illness or death to others, interfering 
with a range of social, domestic and economic activities, and damaging or 
258 Ibid., pp. 1-8. 
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destroying crops, animals and property in a variety of indirect-though not, from 
the Zande perspective-supernatural means: 
While witchcraft itself is part of the human organism its action 
is psychic. What Azande call mbisimo mango, the soul of 
witchcraft, is a concept that bridges over the distance between 
the person of tbe witch and the person of his victim. . . . The 
soul of the witch may leave its corporeal home at any time 
during the day or night, but Azande generally think of a witch 
sending his soul on errands by night when his victim is 
asleep.259 
Because it is organically integral to the witch's physical person, the witchcraft-
substance grows as the person grows, becoming increasingly potent as the witch 
advances in age. As a consequence, Evans-Pritchard noted, Azande were inclined 
to be generally more apprehensive of older persons who might be witches, 
whereas children were only very rarely implicated as perpetrators in witchcraft 
accusations.260 Irrespective of a person's age, however, a witch may be entirely 
unaware of the fact that he or she is a witch, reacting to the accusation with 
astonishment and insisting on his or her innocence-if not of the act, then at least 
in so far as any element of intent or conscious knowledge is concerned. Once 
made aware of his or her powers, however, a witch is more likely to employ those 
powers with design and deliberation. 261 
A man cannot help being a witch; it is not his fault tbat he is 
born with witchcraft in his belly. He may be quite ignorant 
that he is a witch and quite innocent of acts of witchcraft. In 
this state of innocence he might do someone an injury 
unwittingly, but when he as on several occasions been exposed 
259 Ibid., pp. lO- 11. Evans-Pritchard noted that some witches possess a special ointtnent, 
which, when rubbed into their skins, renders them invisible, suggesting that, in some instances, 
they may move about corporeally rather than psychically. Ibid., p. 14. 
260 Ibid., pp. 7-8. 
261 Ibid., pp. 56-64. 
... he is then conscious of his powers and begins to use them, 
with malice.262 
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Witchcraft was ubiquitous in Zande society and it was seen to play a part in 
every aspect of life, mental and physical, individual, interpersonal and communal. 
Success in any activity was routinely attributed to the absence of, or the triumph 
over witchcraft; although unusual success might itself be seen as brought about 
with mystical assistance. Failure in any important venture was invariably ascribed 
to its presence and supervening efficacy. Indeed, for the Azande witchcraft was at 
least potentially participatory in every instance of misfortune. It was the idiom in 
which they generally spoke about misfortune and the basis on which misfortune 
was commonly explained. On this view, because any misfortune could be due to 
witchcraft, all such misfortune might be, and as often as not, would be attributed 
to it, unless there was 'strong evidence, and subsequent oracular confirmation,' to 
support an alternative explanation.'63 
At the same time, it was clear to Evans-Pritchard that the Azande did not 
attempt to account for the phenomenological consequences of witchcraft in terms 
of attribution involving an entirely mystical process of causation. Rather, what 
they explained were 'the particular conditions in a chain of causation which related 
an individual to natural happenings in such a way that he sustained an injury . .z64 
This is a critical element in the process of Zande ratiocination, in that it highlights 
a cultural predilection, in the face of misfortune, for answers to the questions of 
why something happened and, in an ultimate sense, who was responsible, over and 
262 Ibid., p. 58. 
263 Tenable alternative explanations might include sorcery or the malevolent intervention of 
some other evil agent, as well as the clear incompetence or invitational wrong-doing on the part of 
the persons, if any, seen to be more immediately responsible for the event or occurrence of 
misfortune. Ibid., pp. 21-22. 
264 Ibid., p. 21. 
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above (though by no means to the exclusion of) answers to the questions of what 
happened, how it happened and, only in a much more immediate sense, who might 
have been responsible. The point is well-illustrated in Evans-Pritchard's 
description of the Zande explanation for the collapse of a granary. 
'Sometimes,' he wrote, 'an old granary collapses'-an event about which there 
is nothing inherently remarkable, since '[ e ]very Zan de knows that termites eat the 
supports in the course of time and that even the hardest wood decays after years of 
service.'265 As the summer house of a Zande homestead, it was quite common for 
people to sit beneath a granary to escape the heat of the day. Consequently, it may 
happen that there are people sitting beneath a granary when it collapses, and that 
they should be injured as a result. In the event, the important, socio-culturally 
relevant question for the Zande is: why should these particular people have been 
sitting under this particular granary at the particular moment when it collapsed?266 
That it should collapse is easily intelligible, but why should it 
have collapsed at the particular moment when these particular 
people were sitting beneath it? Through years it might have 
collapsed, so why should it fall just when certain people 
sought its kindly shelter?267 
Faced with questions like these, the explanatory limitations of a Western 
causal analysis became obvious to Evans-Pritchard: 
We say that the granary collapsed because its supports were 
eaten by termites; that is the cause that explains the collapse of 
the granary. We also say that people were sitting under it at 
the time because it was in the heat of the day and they thought 
it would be a comfortable place to talk and work; that is the 
cause of people being under the granary at the time it 
collapsed. To our minds, the only relationship between these 
265 Ibid., p. 22. 
266 Ibid. 
267 Ibid. 
two independently caused facts is their coincidence in time in 
space. We have no explanation of why the two chains of 
causation intersected at a certain time and in a certain place, 
for there is no interdependence between them.268 
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The Zande analysis, however, is capable of providing what, for the Azande, is 
the crucial linkage. For in addition to an understanding of what caused the 
granary to collapse (viz. the supporting timber had been undermined by termites) 
and how it came to be that the injured people happened to be sitting underneath it 
at the time (viz. they had sought shelter from the summer sun), the Azande also 
understand why these two events occurred at precisely the same moment in time 
and space (viz. witchcraft). In the absence of witchcraft, although these people 
may have been sitting under the granary, it would not have collapsed on them; or 
whilst the granary may have collapsed, these particular people, perhaps no one at 
all, would have been sitting under it at the time.269 
Evans-Pritchard insisted that the powers of perception and relational 
apprehension of the Azande are every bit as acute as those of the Western 
observer. Even if the Azande did not articulate theories of causation in terms that 
were consistent with the formalities of Western logic and an empirically-based 
phenomenology of causation, they could and did describe events in an explanatory 
idiom that was perfectly serviceable in terms of Zande culture and society. 
Moreover, Zande witchcraft beliefs did not contradict empirical relations of cause 
and effect, they complemented them. Thus, the attribution of misfortune to 
268 Ibid., pp. 22-23. 
269 Ibid., p. 23. It may be suggested, in passing, that, when faced with serious misfortune, the 
extent to which we are, in fact, entirely satisfied with empirically validated phenomenological 
explanations of causation, coupled with a vague acceptance of chance and probability where 
particular causal conclusions cannot be demonstrated or validated, might be queried. Quickly 
dismissed as irrelevant in socio-cultural terms (or neurotically obsessive in the terms of a 
culturally bounded psychology), the question 'Why me?' remains as much an epistemological as a 
philosophical conundrum for modern Western society. 
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witchcraft did not serve so much to exclude what we might regard as 'real' causes 
as to superimpose an additional complementary, albeit mystical, dimension on the 
process of causal ratiocination, instilling particular social events with meaning, 
significance and value.Z70 
Zande witchcraft beliefs form part of an explanatory system that recognises a 
plurality of causes, the relevant causes in any given situation being those which 
are determined to be such on socio-cultural bases. Therefore, whilst witchcraft 
might be readily implicated for explanatory purposes in a wide range of 
circumstances, there was a range of situations in which something other than a 
mystical judgement of causes was required. Significantly, as Evans-Pritchard 
pointed out, Azande did not tend to entertain explanations based on witchcraft to 
account for instances of theft, adultery, lying or disloyalty. In such situations, 
'witchcraft is irrelevant and, if not totally excluded, is not indicated as the 
principal factor in causation.'271 
As in our own society a scientific theory of causation, if not 
excluded, is deemed irrelevant in questions of moral and legal 
responsibility, so in Zande society the doctrine of witchcraft, if 
not excluded, is deemed irrelevant in the same situations .... 
The Zande accepts a mystical explanation of the causes of 
misfortune, sickness, and death, but he does not allow this 
explanation if it conflicts with social exigencies expressed in 
law and morals.272 
270 Ibid., pp. 24-25. 
271 Ibid., p. 26. 
272 Ibid., p. 27. 
/93 
(ii) Sorcerers and Magic 
Magic is a critical variable in Evans-Pritchard's study of the triadic scheme of 
Zande mystical belief and action, integrally related, but significantly different, to 
the nature and functions of witchcraft and oracular processes. Indeed, with respect 
to the latter two features, Evans-Pritchard regarded magic as almost incidental.273 
In describing the contours and content of Zande magic, Evans-Pritchard placed 
especial emphasis on this difference. It is in his effort to draw out the salient 
distinctions between witchcraft and magic in particular that we find the basis of 
the dichotomy between witchcraft and sorcery which still stands as one of the 
most important and enduring aspects of Evans-Pritchard's analytical legacy, and 
one which continues to inform-and complicate-much of our current 
understanding of Melanesian sorcery and witchcraft.274 
As discussed above, Zande witchcraft (mangu) is a hereditary trait and an 
anatomical fact of life, the physical presence of which in a person's body makes 
the person a witch and empowers him or her to act destructively against others by 
purely psychic means. To be sure, the perpetration of an act of witchcraft may, in 
some cases, be accompanied by the performance of certain rites or rituals, and a 
witch may, on occasion, facilitate such actions through the employment of other 
material substances. By its very nature, however, the practice of efficacious 
witchcraft does not require these magical additives. 
On Evans-Pritchard's analysis of the Zande understanding, magic (ngwa) 
constitutes the full panoply of rituals, special objects and substances, including the 
condition of the performer. Particular importance is placed on the material 
273 Ibid., p. I 76. 
274 See Stephen, Sorcerer and Witch in Melanesia, pp. 249-250, 265-277, 287-288. 
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elements, generally botanical, which Evans-Pritchard called 'medicine', as it is 
around such medicines that the magical process could be seen to revolve.275 In its 
wider sense, then, magic refers to: 
the whole complex of which medicine fonns the nucleus, i.e., 
the spell (simasima in Zan de), the rite, the condition of the 
perfonner, and the 'representatives magiques' which comprise 
ideas and beliefs (embodied in myth or current tradition) 
associated with the perfonnance.276 
Unlike witchcraft, which is perforce malevolent in its orientation, magic may 
be either good (wene) or evil (gbitabita), depending upon the objectives and 
objects of its application, the intentions of the performer and the perspective from 
which such an evaluative assessment is made. Whether it is adjudged to be good 
or evil, however, to the Azande it is all magic, and all practitioners of magic, 
professionals and amateurs alike, are magicians. In the absence of a discrete 
Zande lexicographic expression, Evans-Pritchard adopted the use of the English 
term sorcery to specify the practice of illicit or evil magic, and its cognate, 
sorcerers, to identify its practitioners.277 
The practice of magic involved the utilisation by the magiCian of powers 
believed by the Azande to inhere in, or to be facilitated by the employment of, 
particular medicines. As said, medicines themselves tended to be materials and 
substances derived or fashioned from various trees and plants, typically bulbs 
(ranga), arboreal parasites (ngbimi) and creepers (gire). Some of these things 
were used in the form in which they were found. Often, however, they might be 
prepared in a special way for use in a magical rite. The wood of certain trees, for 
275 Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic, pp. 176-177. 
276 E.E. Evans-Pritchard, 'Sorcery and Native Opinion' (1931) reproduced in Marwick, 
Witchcraft and Sorcery, pp. 24, 26 
277 Ibid, pp. 26-27; Evans-Pritchard, Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic, p. 176. 
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example, might be carved to make a whistle; the fluids of certain shrubs might be 
incorporated in ointments, infusions and potions of various kinds; and creepers 
might be twisted into ceremonial cords. In some, though by no means all, 
instances there was a demonstrably homoeopathic relationship between the 
medicines selected and the object or purposes of the magical act in which they 
were employed. Certain medicines were specifically associated with particular 
magical purposes, however. In relation to non-sorcerous magic Evans-Pritchard 
identified seven such associative classifications, embracing medicines connected 
with natural forces and phenomena (e.g., rain and the setting of the sun); 
agricultural pursuits; hunting fishing and collecting; arts and crafts; other mystical 
powers (e.g., to warn off witches or sorcerers, to qualify as a diviner); social 
attitudes (e.g., to attract a wife or lover, to procure the return of stolen property, to 
ensure pregnancy); and the treatment of illness and disease.'78 
Generally, the magical powers contained in Zande medicines could not be 
released and directed towards their intended objects unless the magician 
performed the appropriate rites or rituals. Such performances might involve the 
observance of various taboos by the magician for a period preceding the 
performance of the magical act or during the collection and preparation of the 
relevant medicines. Spells or chants normally accompanied the performance of 
magical acts themselves, during the course of which the magician instructs the 
medicine in objects, purposes and targets its particular task.279 
A good many medicines and their associated magical rites appeared to be 
commonly known, so that anyone who wished to use them might do so whenever 
circumstances warranted the employment of magic. Included amongst this 
278 Evans-Pritchard, Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic, pp. 177-181. 
279 lbid., pp. 177-178 
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common fund of magical knowledge were the medicines and rites used in the 
cultivation of food-plants and simple hunting medicines. According to Evans-
Pritchard, every Zande knew that the setting of the sun could be delayed by 
placing a stone in the fork of a tree.280 With few exceptions, however, more 
sophisticated magical techniques and magic having especial potency (and in both 
instances, the medicines required in the performance of such advanced or 
powerful magical acts) were individual possessions, used by their owner at his 
personal discretion. The existence of such proprietary rights, however, did not 
prevent a magician from selling his services to others, or, in effect, licensing the 
use of his knowledge by others for a fee.281 
In the main, Evans-Pritchard reported, magic in Zande society was a male 
prerogative. Although this was partly a reflection of the fact that a considerable 
number of activities with which the employment of magic might be appropriate 
were male activities, it appears to have had as much to do with the general norms 
of Zande gender relations: 'Magic gives power which is best in the hands of men'; 
and in so far as women might require the protection of magic, they could rely on 
their husbands to perform the necessary rites.282 
In much the same way as certain technical specialists in Western society-
plumbers, electricians, appliance repair-persons and so forth-are regarded as 
necessary and, when their services are required, important, but not otherwise 
remarkable individuals, with the possible exception of those possessing powerful 
forms of vengeance-magic (for the use of which they might extract a considerable 
280 Ibid., p. 185. 
281 Ibid., p. 182-185. 
282 Ibid., p. 184. Some medicines and associated magical practices which concerned matters 
of peculiar importance to women (e.g., childbirth, menstruation, lactation, abortion) were utilised 
exclusively by women. 
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price), magicians in Zande society did not appear to Evans-Pritchard to erljoy any 
great prestige or high status on account of their knowledge and skills.Z83 This is 
not to say that what magicians knew and were capable of doing was not 
recognised as involving a valued and, in many respects, essential contribution to 
ordinary life in Zande society. There was nothing in the knowledge and 
capabilities of magicians, or about magicians themselves, however, which to the 
Azande was in any sense extraordinary. 
As said, the distinction drawn by the Azande between good magic and sorcery 
was essentially a function of its perceived objects and purposes, as assessed from 
the perspective of the person making the judgement. As Evans-Pritchard 
explained: 
Azande do not stigmatize [sorcery] because it destroys the 
health and property of others, but because it flouts moral and 
legal rules. Good magic may be destructive, even lethal, but it 
strikes only at persons who have committed a crime, whereas 
bad magic is used out of spite against men who have not 
broken any law or moral convention."' 
Vengeance-magic (bagbuduma), for example, was regarded as the most potent and 
destructive of Zande medicines, yet its employment was considered one of the 
most honourable uses to which magic could be put. Bagbuduma was typically 
invoked in the face of a death of a kinsman, which was believed to have been 
brought about by witchcraft or sorcery, and was directed retributively at the witch 
or sorcerer supposedly responsible.Z85 
283 Ibid. 
284 Witchcraft. Oracles and Magic, p. I 87. 
285 Ibid. 
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Thus, whereas good magic gives effect to and, in that sense, is a veritable 
instrument of justice in Zande society-an idea which, in this context, Evans-
Pritchard suggested, was commensurable with Western use of that term-neither 
the practice nor the practitioner of sorcery predicates on anything a Zande would 
regard as judicious or equitable. Rather, it is neither more nor less than a personal 
weapon intended to cause harm or injury out of sheer malice or enmity.286 
Conceptualised in this way, the social boundaries that framed the perspectival 
feature of the Zande distinction between good magic and sorcery are manifest: 
Good magic is moral because it is used against unknown 
persons .... It is only when [a man] does not know who has 
committed a crime that he uses good magic against unknown 
persons. Bad magic, on the other hand, is made against 
definite persons.287 
To Evans-Pritchard it seemed that the Azande feared sorcery far more than 
witchcraft. This, he suggested, was partly a result of the observation that the 
sicknesses sorcery was believed to produce were more serious than those caused 
by witchcraft. But it was also because its perpetrators were so much more 
difficult to detect, and the means for countering its effects so much more difficult 
to come by; the latter circumstance being compounded by the fact that, at the time, 
particular forms of sorcery were increasingly being imported from distant places 
and unknown peoples.Z88 
286 Ibid., p. 189. 
287 Ibid. 
288 Ibid., pp. 194-195. 
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(iiiJ Diviners and Oracles 
In rationalising Zande mystical beliefs, Evans-Pritchard observed an important 
similarity in Western and Zande understandings of misfortune. Retrospectively 
attributing the cause of a range of untoward and otherwise inexplicable 
occurrences to witchcraft or sorcery, the explanatory concepts marshalled by the 
Azande in the face of such events, he argued, were on a par with equally common, 
unselfconscious Western explanations, which linked them causally to amorphous 
notions of chance or fate: 
When, in spite of human knowledge, forethought, and 
technical efficiency, a man suffers a mishap, we say that it is 
his bad luck, whereas Azande say that he has been bewitched. 
. . . If the misfortune has already taken place and is concluded 
Azande content themselves with the thought that their failure 
has been due to witchcraft, just as we content ourselves with 
the reflection that our failure is due to our hard luck. In such 
situations there is no great difference between our reactions 
and theirs289 
In the anticipation of misfortune, however, that Evans-Pritchard registered a 
marked difference between Zande and Western approaches to understanding and 
predictive causal explanation. Like the Azande, he noted, we too '[ m Jake every 
effort to rid ourselves of, or elude, a misfortune by our knowledge of the objective 
conditions which cause it'. To this extent our respective orientations are not at all 
dissimilar. But because the Zande believes that witchcraft or sorcery is likely to 
be the underlying cause of any misfortune, 'he concentrates his attention upon this 
factor of supreme importance.' Thus, whereas both a Zande and Western man 
similarly apply inherently rational means to control the conditions that can and do 
289 Ibid., p. 65. 
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give rise to misfortune, we differ in our respective conceptions of the nature of 
those conditions and their susceptibility to human control and influence.290 
On Evans-Pritchard's analysis, it was the absence of a culturally constructed 
barrier between the physical and metaphysical world, and the presence of a clear 
conceptual nexus between the mystical and the material, that explained so much 
about the ability of the Azande to coherently apprehend and constructively engage 
the vicissitudes of life in what, to Western consciousness, involves two 
irreconcilable realms, one natural, the other supernatural, to the latter of which 
Western rationality denies real existence. In the face of perennial threats of 
witchcraft and sorcery, this feature of Zan de epistemology and phenomenology 
had significant implications for social action. 
Since Azande believe that witches may at any time bring 
sickness and death upon them they are anxious to establish and 
maintain contact with those evil powers and by counteracting 
them control their own destiny. . . . Azande need not live in 
continual dread of witchcraft, since they can enter into 
relations with it and thereby control it. ... 291 
It is in this endeavour to foresee and effectively manage countless, inevitable 
encounters with witchcraft and sorcery that diviners and oracles were seen to play 
so central a role in Zande social life. 
The Zande witch-doctor was both a diviner and a magician, exposing witches 
with his oracular powers and thwarting their malevolent acts with his magic. 
When a person feared that he was, or might become, the victim of witchcraft, he 
would arrange for one or more witch-doctors to come to his home and there 




be put and answers provided about the nature and origins of existing or potential 
threats. Such ceremonies were usually public, drawing much of their persuasive 
force from the collective enthusiasm and participation of the group. They also 
offered a convenient opportunity for members of the assembled to query a witch-
doctor themselves, effectively at their host's expense; although it was customary 
that everyone involved in the ceremony should present a gift or payment of some 
kind to the presiding diviner. Energetic dancing and elaborate chanting ensued, in 
the latter of which the congregants were expected to participate actively and 
supportively. At appropriate times in the ritual, questions would then asked of the 
diviner concerning the identity of a feared witch, the nature of the malevolence 
that might be expected (if it had not already been visited upon the victim), the 
reasons or motives behind the malevolence and, most importantly perhaps, what 
steps might be taken to induce the witch to desist, and what magic might be used 
either to counteract the effects of the witchcraft, or to incapacitate or destroy a 
witch whose actions might not otherwise be stopped. In some instances, the 
performance itself, involving and invoking such magical rites as might be 
necessary in the circumstances, would be sufficient to drive a witch away from its 
victim. 292 
Whilst resort to witch-doctors was a common enough method of identifying 
and, in many cases, dealing with witches and witchcraft, the Azande did not tend 
to regard divination of this kind as capable of providing more than general and 
tentative information. Useful and important because they could quickly answer 
many questions and sort out likely suspects in a preliminary way, witch-doctors 
were not considered to be especially reliable, nor were their methods regarded as 
particularly dependable. Where significant responsive action against a suspected 
292 Ibid., pp. 66-89. 
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witch was called for, a person would have been ill-advised to take such action on 
the evidence of a witch-doctor alone. 293 
Amongst the Azande, oracles were generally considered to be a more 
satisfactory means than consulting diviners for ascertaining the future and 
uncovering covert mystical threats in the present. Hence, in all matters of any 
moment, and especially if one were contemplating taking determinative retaliatory 
action, the prognostications of the witch-doctor would be tested against one or 
another of the greater oracles for corroboration or confirmation?94 A variety of 
oracular procedures were available to the Azande, many of which involved simple 
techniques and readily available devices.295 Of these, however, far and away the 
most reliable was the poison oracle, or benge: 
In many situations where we seek to base a verdict upon 
evidence or try to regulate our conduct by weighing of 
probabilities the Zande consults, without hesitation, the poison 
oracle and follows its directions with implicit trust. No 
important venture is undertaken without authorisation of the 
poison oracle. In important collective undertakings, in all 
crises of life, in all serious legal disputes, in all matters 
strongly affecting individual welfare, in short, on all occasions 
regarded by the Azande as dangerous or socially important, 
the activity is preceded by consultation with the poison 
oracle?96 
In essence, the pOison oracle involved the administration of a particular 
medicine to fowls owned by the person seeking answers or corroboration from the 
oracle. Once the medicine had been ingested by a fowl, the relevant question was 
293 Ibid., p. 120. 
294 Ibid. See also E.E. Evans-Pritchard, 'Witchcraft (Mangu) Amongst the Azande' (1929) 12 
Sudan Notes and Records, pp. 163-249, reproduced in part in Marwick, Witchcraft and Sorcery, 
pp. 27, 30-31. 
295 Evans-Pritchard, Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic, pp. 164-175. See also A.S. Gregor, 
Witchcraft and Magic (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1972), pp. 85-88. 
296 Evans-Pritchard, Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic, pp. 121-122. 
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repeatedly put to the benge inside of it by an interlocutor experienced in framing 
questions in the appropriate fashion. Each query would be followed with the 
instruction that the chicken should live or die, depending upon the answer to the 
question. The result then provided the answer sought, or served to corroborate (or 
repudiate) such answers as might have been previously provided by a witch-doctor 
or a lesser oracle. Evans-Pritchard described the critical elements of the procedure 
thus: 
There may be only one man or there may be several who have 
questions to put to the oracle. Each brings his fowls with him 
in an open-wove basket. . . . As each person arrives he hands 
over his basket of fowls to the operator who places it on the 
ground near him .... 
When everyone is seated they discuss in low tones whose fowl 
they will take first and how the question shall be framed. 
Meanwhile the operator ... mixes the poison and water with 
his finger-tips into a paste of the right consistency and, when 
instructed by the questioner, takes one of the fowls and draws 
down its wings over its legs and pins them between and under 
his toes .... He holds open the beak ofthe fowl and tips ... 
the liquid into the throat of the fowl. He bobs the head of the 
fowl up and down to compel it to swallow the poison. 
At this point the questioner, having previously been instructed 
by the owner of the fowl on the facts which he is to put before 
the oracle, commences to address the poison inside the fowl. . 
. . The questioner does not cease his address to the oracle, but 
puts his questions again and again, in different forms, though 
always with the same refrain, 'If such is the case, poison oracle 
kill the fowl,' or 'If such is the case, poison oracle spare the 
fowl' .... When the last dose of poison has been administered 
and he has further addressed it, he tells the operator to raise 
the fowl. The operator takes it in his hand and, holding its 
legs between its fingers so that it faces him, gives it an 
occasional jerk backwards and forwards. The questioner 
redoubles his oratory ... , and if the fowl is not already dead 
he then, after a further bout of oratory, tells the operator to put 
it on the ground. He continues to address the poison inside the 
fowl while they watch its movements on the ground297 
297 Ibid., pp. 135-136. 
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On the basis of a chemical analysis Evans-Pritchard had arranged to be carried 
out in England, the poisonous substance was found to be alkaloidal in character 
and apparently related to strychnine.298 Its effects on fowls varied from almost 
instantaneous death to no unusual reactions whatsoever. Normally, at least two, 
and sometimes as many as four, tests would be conducted in relation to the same 
question, and it was only when the results were consistent that the answer thus 
confirmed was regarded as reliable. Where results were inconsistent-a 
consequence attributed to a deficiency in the quality of the benge, or sometimes to 
the disruptive influences of witchcraft or sorcery directed by someone with an 
interest in thwarting the oracular process-the procedure would be declared 
invalid and would have to be repeated again, immediately afterwards if the 
questions were of pressing importance, or at some later date. When a fowl died, 
and the death served to confirm or corroborate the presence and source of 
witchcraft or sorcery, a wing of the bird would be cut off and used as evidence of 
the verdict. 299 
(c) From the Nemi to Zandeland: 
Evans-Pritchard's Analytical Legacy 
In Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic, Evans-Pritchard provided a replete and 
detailed ethnographic account of Zande mystical belief and action. His data were 
methodically developed within an analytical framework that identified and 
organised the salient components of a coherent system with clarity and precision, 
and demonstrated the determinative social dynamics governing the interrelations 
of those components with a compelling cogency. In the process, and apparently 
298 /bid., p. 121. 
299 Ibid., pp. 136-138. 
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without intending to do so, he also standardised the terminology and definitions 
that carne to be used in most, if not all, anthropological studies of witchcraft, 
sorcery and magic, in Africa and elsewhere, for the next thirty years.3(JO 
Beyond this, however, Evans-Pritchard's crucial contribution lay m his 
recognition that, considered from the Zande perspective, mystical explanations for 
relations of cause and effect in the material world were sufficient and perfectly 
serviceable. When apprehended within the contours of their social reality, the 
nuances of Zande beliefs in witchcraft, sorcery and magic, and the persistence 
with which those beliefs could be held in the face of seemingly patent 
contradictions and inconsistencies, were inherently logical. This, in fact, had been 
Evans-Prtichard's principal objective, and he was much less concerned with 
refining ethnographic methodology or the nuances of a descriptive taxonomy than 
with persuading his readers of 'the intellectual consistency of Zande notions', 
which, he argued, only appeared to be inconsistent 'when ranged like lifeless 
museum objects':301 
When we see how an individual uses them we may say that 
they are mystical but we cannot say that his use of them is 
illogical or even that it is uncritical. I had no difficulty in 
using Zande notions as Azande themselves used them. Once 
the idiom is learnt the rest is easy, for in Zandeland one 
mystical idea follows on another as reasonably as one 
common-sense idea follows on another in our own society. 302 
A considerable portion of Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic is devoted to the 
exploration of what, to Evans-Pritchard, was a compelling conundrum: Why did a 
300 See M. Marwick, 'The Study of Witchcraft' in The Craft of Social Anthropology, ed. A.L. 
Epstein (London: Tavistock Publications, 1967), p. 232; J. Middleton and E.H. Winter, eds., 
Witchcraft and Sorcery in East Africa (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963 ), pp. 2-3. 
301 Evans-Pritchard, Witchcraji, Oracles and Magic (1937 edition), p. 540. 
302 Ibid., pp. 540-541. 
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people otherwise so eminently and demonstrably capable of perfectly rational 
thinking persist in practices deriving from mystical beliefs about non-existent 
entities? The Azande did so, he suggested, for two reasons: first, because the 
socially determined structure of their thought prevented them from discerning the 
errors in their beliefs;303 and secondly, because the integrity of those beliefs was 
inextricably enmeshed in a set of social relationships that were critical to the 
Zande's sense of identity and essential to his existence as a member of society.304 
303 The Azande, observed Evans-Pritchard 'reason excellently in the idiom of their beliefs, but 
they cannot reason outside, or against, their beliefs because they have no other idiom in which to 
express their thoughts.' Ibid., p. 159. 
304 These two reasons are distilled from Evans-Pritchard's specification of no fewer than 
twenty-two reasons why the Azande did not perceive the futility of their mystical beliefs. Ibid, 
pp. 201-204. Hirst and Woolley have condensed those twenty-two reasons into five thematically 
orientated categories of explanation: 
I. Social structural obstacles to the generalization of beliefS and the collation of 
information. Social situations and mores determine the concept to be applied in any 
given case. The doctrine of witchcraft does not explain any misfortune, only a class of 
sudden and inexplicable deaths, illnesses and failures. . . . Beliefs ... articulate specific 
contexts of action and conduct. Beliefs are thus fragmented across a series of situations 
and are never present at the same time. This means that contradictions between context-
specific beliefs do not emerge .... 
2. 'Categorical' reasons. The Azande make no distinction between 1Uatural' and 
'supernatural' phenomena. . . . They therefore lack the categorical conditions for the 
exclusion of phenomena as beyond the realm of demonstrable causality. This does not 
mean that the Azande ignore what we would call 'natural' causality, nor do they deny it a 
place in the events surrounding witchcraft. They employ what would be in our terms a 
plural or multiple scheme of causation. . . . Witchcraft explains the conjunction of 
elements in [an] event. .. , [and this] permits explanations of an order we would not 
permit. The conjunction of elements is for us a matter of coincidence or chance. 
3. Limits in the mode of experimentation practised by the Azande. The Azande both 
incorporate the results of 'experience' into their conduct and are often sceptical of the 
reliability of oracles, the power of witch doctors, etc. But this reference to 'experience' 
and this scepticism alike operate to cotifirm the basic structure of belief, for they can 
account for experiences of failure in divination and healing. This is exemplified by the 
practices surrounding the poison oracle ... , which includes a cross check on erroneous 
answers due to the failure of bad poison or the intervention of witchcraft. . . . The 
Azande thus use procedures of testing and checks as to the efficacy of practices. But they 
do not experiment systematically to test whether their beliefs as such are true or not. 
Failures of the poison oracle cannot therefore serve to disconfirm the structure of their 
beliefs surrounding it. ... The failure of the oracle ... is 'explained' by reference to the 
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In effect, then, Zande mystical beliefs were protected by a set of social 
processes that served to sustain important moral values and cultural institutions, 
the operation of which served, in tum, to ensure that witchcraft and sorcery-related 
beliefs were only deployed in situations in which conflicts and contradictions 
were either unlikely to arise at all or, if they did arise, it was in situations in which 
they could either be disregarded or easily rationalised.305 At the same time, the 
Azande were able to ignore, or at least discount, the social implications of 
hereditary witchcraft and non-hereditary sorcery where individual relationships 
were at stake and their mystical beliefs were most vulnerable to challenge. Thus, 
for example, the Azande found no difficulty in the theoretical view that every 
death was caused either by witchcraft or by vengeance magic directed against a 
guilty witch. In their practical experience, however, every death was blamed on 
witchcraft; and when asked to tally the number of deaths attributable to witchcraft 
against the number of deaths of witches killed in vengeance, no one seemed to 
intervention of entities or forces which depend on other or the very same mystical 
notions . ... 
4. The absence of the technology of reason. The Azande lack means of the 
rationalization of existence, of memory, of movement, and calculation of forces such that 
they could make an objective assessment of states of affairs. Having no clocks, they are 
unable to measure and therefore to recognize that the ritual of placing a stone in a tree in 
no way retards the arrival of sunset. 
5. Thought as a 'mental structure'. Evans-Pritchard ... treats the Zande as people 
capable of and often using 'common sense' who are nonetheless trapped within a self-
reinforcing structure of 'mystical notions'. Witchcraft, oracles, and magic form a 
coherent and self-reinforcing system, each element of which explains away the 
contradictions and problems raised by others. [Social Relations and Human Attributes, 
pp. 260-262] 
305 Douglas, 'Thirty Years After Witchcraft. Oracles and Magic', xvi. In this way, Zande 
beliefs in the hereditary quality of witchcraft fostered domestic stability, since a son could not 
accuse his father of being a witch without, at the same time, identifying himself as an heir to a 
tainted line of descent. Conservative political interests were similarly serviced by the hereditary 
nature of witchcraft, since the genetic trait was believed to be found only amongst Zande 
commoners, thereby eliminating the likelihood of accusations being levelled by a commoner 
against a Zande aristocrat. Evans-Pritchard, Witchcraft. Oracles and Magic, pp. 46-48. 
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know anything about the latter.306. For Evans-Pritchard, it was not difficult to 
identify the set of interests that enabled the Azande countenance an explanatory 
system of mystical belief that served so many practical needs, but was rife with so 
many apparent contradictions:307 
The source of his insight lay in examining beliefs always from 
the point of view of the actors in a given situation. Thus he 
disclosed the areas of the greatest concern, and those in which 
their curiosity could lie dormant. Gaps and discrepancies 
could be tolerated without in the least disturbing the illusion of 
a completed circle ofbeliefs.308 
Scepticism existed, but it was unproblematic for the Azande, and doubts about 
the reliability of an oracle or the competence of a witch-doctor were no more 
disruptive of the integrity of their belief system than our own doubts about the 
competence of a particular physician or the effectiveness of a particular drug serve 
to undermine a fundamental belief in the reliability of modem medicine and 
pharmacology. Discrepancies in the beliefs widely entertained and strongly held 
by members of a society can be tolerated when the kinds of questions one might 
otherwise be inclined to ask are limited by the terms of a socially constructed 
understanding of the universe.309 And on this score, as Horton suggests, there 
306 Douglas, 'Thirty Years After Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic', xvi. 
307 Ibid., xvi-xvii. 
308 Ibid., xvii. This insight constitutes the essence of what Kuper describes as Evans-
Pritchard's most powerful argument: 
[G]iven the initial premise that harm can be caused by 
mystical agencies, the notion that ill-luck took the form of a 
person, an evildoer, then the rest of the beliefs follow logically 
enough. Moreover they are constantly reinforced by 
experience. Somebody becomes ill, hence witches are active. 
Oracles confirm this. Vengeance magic is made. Somebody 
in the neighbourhood dies, and the oracle confirms that he was 
the witch. [Anthropology and Anthropologists, p. 81] 
309 See Douglas, 'Thirty Years After Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic', xiv. 
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would seem to be little incentive for agnosticism in Western and Zande society 
alike.310 
The enduring legacy of Evans-Pritchard's analysis lay in the force of his 
argument that there was no fundamental difference between the ways in which the 
Azande-and by implication, 'primitive' people anywhere----and Westerners 
understand and experience the world. Such differences as may appear to be 
obvious often tend to resolve themselves into differences of idiom rather than 
substance;311 and where substantive differences are revealed, they are more 
properly explained as reflecting the determinative demands and limitations of the 
social context within which the subject processes of ratiocination are formed and 
function, than on the basis of any distinctively 'primitive' mentality. Socially 
driven and socio-culturally determined, the individual's need to believe readily 
overrides the need for consistency in the beliefs entertained, providing its own 
rationalisations for contradiction. As Geertz suggests, people everywhere plug the 
dikes of their most needed beliefs with whatever mud they can find. 312 
B. Anthropological Analyses of Witchcraft and Sorcery in 
the Tradition of Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic 
Due, in part, to the interruption of the Second World War, the influence of 
Evans-Pritchard's theoretical orientation and approach on subsequent 
anthropological research into the witchcraft and sorcery-related beliefs of tribal 
peoples did not become apparent for something more than ten years after the 
310 SeeR. Horton, 'African Traditional Thought and Western Science', in Patterns of Thought 
in Africa and the West, p. 222. 
311 See Horton, 'African Traditional Thought and Western Science', p. 197. 
312 Local Knowledge, p. 80. 
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publication of Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic. 313 Post-war developments in 
Africa, and other areas of the world in which European colonial control was 
beginning to wane, deflected the attention of many anthropologists away from the 
socio-perceptual issues with which Evans-Pritchard had been concerned and 
towards a range of new problems posed by political transitions in what was to 
become the Third World. Nevertheless, his work and ideas came to dominate the 
writings of a small, albeit prolific, group of Africanist and Oceanist ethnographers 
in a remarkable way throughout the 1950s and well into the 1960s. 314 
The impress of Evans-Pritchard's work amongst the Azande on subsequent 
anthropological research into witchcraft, magic and sorcery in primitive societies 
is evident in three areas. First, long before the publication of Witchcraft, Oracles 
and Magic, Evans-Pritchard was adamant about the importance of assessing the 
313 Douglas suggests that Clyde Kluckhohn's Navajo Witchcraft (Boston: Beacon Press, 1944 }, 
'was clearly written independently'. 'Thirty Years After Witchcraft Oracles and Magic', xiii. 
314 Ibid., xiii-xiv. Reflecting on this influence, Evans-Pritchard lamented that, in many cases, 
his ideas were being applied in ways he, himself, could not countenance, and he unequivocally 
denounced the 'crude functionalism' to which he considered a number of subsequent studies of 
witchcraft had contributed. See E.E. Evans-Pritchard, Theories of Primitive Religion (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1965), p. 114. 
In a more fundamental sense, the ideas set out in Evans-Pritchard's study of Azande witchcraft 
and magic laid the foundation for a philosophical debate, which only began in earnest in the early 
1970s, around issues concerned with the sociology of knowledge, and which continues to draw 
fodder for arguments (and counter-arguments) from Evans-Pritchard's basic contention that a 
fuller understanding of the social context in which people formulate their ideas about magic, 
witchcraft and sorcery erodes the utility of characterising such beliefs as irrational. It was this 
contention which established the two poles in that debate: the rationalist (or intellectualist) 
position, which explains magic as based upon essentially mistaken beliefs, and the relativist (or 
symbolist) position, which explains magic away by showing how it actually has to do with belief, 
as such, in any case. See generally, Overing, Reason and Morality, pp. 1-28; Wilson, Rationality, 
vii-xviii. The debate has also been cast as involving a confrontation between Enlightenment 
theory and the Romantic rebellion. See R.A. Shweder and R.A. Levine, eds., Culture Theory 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). 
For present purposes it is worth noting that Evans-Pritchard's analysis of Azande beliefs 
advanced propositions capable of giving credence to both positions; and one suspects that in this 
context too, Evans-Pritchard would have regarded himself as having more in common with some 
of his latter-day critics than with those who invoked his arguments in support of their views 
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meaning and import of the beliefs and behaviours in terms commensurate with the 
attitudes, orientations, understandings and experience of the people under study, 
as opposed the implicitly evaluative (and almost invariably devaluing) comparison 
of the empirical products of indigenous modes of thought and action with their 
apparent counterparts in earlier, or less-sophisticated contemporary, Western 
societies.315 
The implications (indeed, the very possibility) of an anthropologist adopting 
such a perspective were, and to some extent continue to be, controversial.316 
However, without implying that he had fully comprehended all of the subtleties 
and nuances of Azande culture, or that his understanding was so complete that he 
might accurately and faithfully articulate their nature and dynamics in the idiom of 
Western academic scholarship, Evans-Pritchard did bring a measure of sympathy 
to the objects and subjects of his research, which he recognised could only have 
been achieved by a thoroughgoing immersion in Zande life and society. 317 In this 
respect, the need for the kind of protracted, close and intensive fieldwork in the 
315 See Evans-Pritchard, 'Sorcery and Native Opinion', pp. 23-25. 
316 Framed more in the terms of a methodological problem than one of epistemological 
proportions, the same issue developed into an extended debate amongst legal anthropologists 
about whether, and if so to what extent, concepts of law amongst non-Western peoples can be 
identified and considered meaningfully from a Western analytical (in this case, jurisprudential) 
perspective. The opposing views in this debate were instantiated in the approaches of Paul 
Bohannan [Justice and Judgement Among the Tiv (London: Oxford University Press, 1957)] and 
Max Gluckman [The Judicial Process among the Barotse of Northern Rhodesia (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1967)]. The substance of the debate is discussed in S. Roberts, 
Order and Dispute: An Introduction to Legal Anthropology (New York: StMartin's Press, 1979), 
p. 199; L. Pospisil, Anthropology of Law: A Comparative Theory (New York: Harper and Row, 
1971), pp. 15-16; L. Nader, 'Introduction: The Anthropological Study of Law' (1965) 67(6) 
American Anthropologist 4 at 11; Law in Culture and Society (Chicago: Aldine Publishers, 1969), 
p. 5; S.F. Moore, Law as Process: An Anthropological Approach (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1978), pp. 139-146. 
317 See Evans-Pritchard, Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic, pp. 44-45. 
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study of native witchcraft and sorcery beliefs, an approach by which Evans-
Pritchard's research was characterised, came to be regarded as essential.318 
Secondly, Evans-Pritchard observed that the hostilities expressed by witchcraft 
and sorcery-related beliefs were patterned, and that the structure of these patterns 
were based on the relationship between the victims and targets or witchcraft and 
sorcery, suspected and alleged witches and sorcerers and most importantly 
perhaps, those levelling accusations of witchcraft or sorcery. 
Accusations clustered in areas of ambiguous social relations. 
Where roles were buffered by unequal power, wealth, or other 
forms of social distance, witchcraft accusations were not 
made; they appeared where tensions between neighbouring 
rivals could not otherwise be resolved.319 
To be sure, particular interpersonal enmities played a role in the dynamics of such 
accusations, but social distance appeared to be equally determinative of who 
would, and who would not, be likely suspects, victims and accusers.320 
Thirdly, following on from Evans-Pritchard's suggestion that, amongst the 
Azande, witchcraft served as part of a homeostatic system of social control that 
had a discernibly normative effect on behaviour, Max Marwick's study of 
witchcraft and sorcery beliefs amongst the Cewa people of what was then 
Rhodesia in central Africa321 provided the ethnographic foundation for a 
functionalist elaboration on that notion, and gave rise to his theory of witchcraft 
318 See Marwick, 'The Study of Witchcraft', p. 231. 
319 Douglas, 'Thirty Years after Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic', xvii. 
320 Evans-Pritchard, Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic, pp. 46-48. 
321 
'The Social Context of Cewa Witch Beliefs' (1952) 22(2) Africa 120-135; 22(3) Africa 
215-233; Sorcery in its Social Setting: A Study of the Northern Rhodesian Cewa (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1965). 
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and sorcery as a 'social strain-gauge'. 322 Underscoring the utility of Evans-
Pritchard's distinction between witchcraft and sorcery, especially where the 
patterns of belief and action in African and Oceanic societies were being 
compared, and canvassing the differences between the two regions (as evidenced 
in the ethnographic materials) in the sources and direction of accusations, 
Marwick found that, in both areas, 
the relationship between alleged witch or sorcerer and 
believed victim is not only close but strained; and this fact 
gives us the means of detecting the tension-points of a social 
structure by the frequency with which attacks of witchcraft 
and sorcery are believed to occur between persons standing in 
various relationships. 323 
Consistent with results rendered by Marwick's functionalist approach, the data 
yielded by Clyde Mitchell's research in Nyasaland324 similarly emphasised the 
morality-sustaining, normative and explanatory roles of witchcraft in a Yao 
community. However, where Evans-Pritchard had offered a fairly simple model 
of witchcraft beliefs as an interpersonal social and moral regulator in an otherwise 
stable social environment, Marwick and Mitchell added a new level of 
sophistication to Evans-Pritchard's theory, of witchcraft beliefs as a social and 
moral regulator in an otherwise stable social environment. For whereas the 
witchcraft beliefs in Zande society might be characterised as quiescently 
omnipresent, quickly activated by incidental interpersonal frictions, the power of 
witchcraft beliefs in Yao and Cewa communities seemed to be mobilised in a 
322 
'Witchcraft as a Social Strain-Gauge' (1964) 26 Australian Journal of Science, reproduced 
in Marwick, Witchcraft and Sorcery, pp. 280-295. 
323 Ibid., p. 280. 
324 J.C. Mitchell, The Yao Village: A Study in the Social Structure of a Nyasaland Tribe 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1952); 'The Meaning of Misfortune for Urban 
Africans' in African Systems of Thought, ed. M. Fortes and G. Dieterlen (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1965), pp. 192-202. 
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more generalised and regular response to the cyclical changes periodically 
experienced by the social system as a whole.325 Thus, 
[ w ]hen a small village reached, by natural population increase, 
a certain critical size (beyond the numbers its frail authority 
structure could encompass), mutual witchcraft accusations 
began to be flung about by rivals for dominance within it. 
When accusations and counter-accusations had thoroughly 
poisoned the atmosphere, a point of fission would be reached: 
a part of the village would hive off some distance away, under 
the leadership of one of the rival claimants; and the remainder, 
once again reduced to manageable size, would settle down 
again in a climate lightened (for the time being) of 
suspicion.326 
For a good three decades after Witches, Oracles and Magic was published, 
Africanist ethnographers 'continued to dot the i's and cross the t's,' confirming the 
usefulness, and elaborating substantially on the basis, of Evans-Pritchard's general 
approach.327 It was only in the early 1960s that anthropologists began seriously to 
question, not so much the validity of the theoretical propositions and conclusions 
Evans-Pritchard had offered in respect of the Azande, but the extent to which so 
much of the subsequent data might have been forced into an analytical mould 
Evans-Pritchard himself would not appear to have intended for universal (or even 
325 Douglas, 'Thirty Years After Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic', xviii. 
326 Gillies, 'Introduction' in Evans-Pritchard, Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic, xxiv. 
327 Douglas, 'Thirty Years After Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic', xviii. See for example J.D. 
Kriege, 'The Social Function of Witchcraft' ( 194 7), reproduced in Marwick, Witchcraft and 
Sorcery, p. 263-275; M.H. Wilson, 'Witch Beliefs and Social Structure' (1951) 56(4) American 
Journal of Sociology 307- 313; I. Schapera, 'Sorcery and Witchcraft in Bechuanaland' (1952) 51 
African Affairs 41-52; S.F. Nadel, 'Witchcraft in Four African Societies: An Essay in Comparison' 
(1952) 54(1) American Anthropologist 18-29; P. Mayer, 'Witches', Inaugural Lecture, Rhodes 
University (1954), in Marwick, Witchcraft and Sorcery, pp. 70; D. Forde, 'Spirits, Witches and 
Sorcerers in the Supernatural Economy of the Yako' (1958) 88(2) Journal of the Royal 
Anthropological Institute 165-178; M. Douglas, 'Witch Beliefs in Central Africa' (1967) 37(1) 
Africa 72-80; R.W. Wylie, 'Introspective Witchcraft among the Effutu' (1973) 8(1) Man (N.S.) 74-
79; H. F. and J.C. Mitchell, 'Social Factors in the Perception of the Cause of Disease' (1980), 
reproduced in Marwick, Witchcraft and Sorcery, pp. 401-421. See also the several essays 
collected in Middleton and Winter, Witchcraft and Sorcery in East Africa. 
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pan-African) application.328 But even today, as suggested above, his influence is 
apparent, explicitly or implicitly, in most anthropological accounts of witchcraft 
and sorcery. 329 
C. Implications for the Anthropology of 
Melanesian Sorcery and Witchcraft 
As long ago as 1970, Mary Douglas acknowledged the sportiness of the 
ethnographic work, and the latent tautological quality of much of the 
ethnographically grounded anthropological studies of witchcraft and sorcery-
related beliefs, the vast majority of which were based on African field studies 
carried out within, or corollary to, the tradition to which Evans-Pritchard's 
monograph gave rise: 
Here witch accusations were used to challenge abuse of 
authority, there to strengthen it. Wherever a belief in 
witchcraft was found to flourish, the hypothesis that 
accusations tend to cluster in niches where social relations 
were ill defined and competitive could not fail to work, 
because competitiveness and ambiguity were identified by 
means of witch accusations.330 
Inevitably, she lamented, 'the subject began to lose interest as the lack of 
predictive power in the irrefutable governing hypothesis was revealed.331 
Unsurprisingly, Marwick disagreed with Douglas's suggestion that the 
apparent decline in a distinctively anthropological contribution to the sociology of 
328 See V.W. Turner, 'Witchcraft and Sorcery: Taxonomy versus Dynamics' (1964) 34(4) 
Africa 314-324. 
329 SeeM. Rowlands, 'Sorcery, Power and the Modem State in Cameroon' (1988) 23(!) Man 
(NS) 118-132. 
330 
'Thirty Years After Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic', xviii. 
331 Ibid. 
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witchcraft was attributable either to the weakness of its model or the staleness of 
its paradigm.332 Rather, he argued: 
The virtual retirement of anthropologists from a field once 
indisputably their preserve has resulted, not from their 
clinging to an outworn paradigm, but rather from their failure 
to distinguish between the dogma derived from informants' 
statements and the social characteristics of accusers, witches, 
and victims aggregated from samples of case histories large 
enough to yield statistically significant results."' 
Whatever the origins or nature of the deficiencies in the African data may be, 
and to whatever degree a perceived intellectual ennui may be attributed to those 
perceived deficiencies, the implications of these circumstances bear an especial 
significance for anthropologists, and an anthropology, concerned with Melanesian 
witchcraft and sorcery-related beliefs. The problematic influence of other socio-
cultural paradigms grounded in African ethnography on Melanesian analyses may 
have been recognised and constructively addressed some time ago. In the process, 
Melanesianists not only developed a clearer and more refined awareness of their 
own theoretical assumptions, but even persuaded some Africanists to reappraise 
the ideas and approaches they had theretofore sought to impose on their 
Melanesianist colleagues. 334 
And yet, partly as a measure of the small interest Melanesianists have shown 
in the topic until recently, 'the influence of African theories on studies of sorcery 
and witchcraft has passed almost unnoticed.'335 Thus, where the micro-
sociological and political approaches developed by the Africanists in the 1950s 
332 
'Anthropologists' Declining Productivity in the Sociology of Witchcraft' (1972) 74(3) 
American Anthropologist378, 382. 
"'Ibid., p. 378. 
334 SeeM. Stephen, 'Introduction' in Sorcerer and Witch in lV!elanesia, p. l. 
335 Ibid., p. 2. 
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and 1960s concentrated almost exclusively on witchcraft accusations as indices of 
social conflict and tension, '[i]t has now become commonplace for Melanesianists 
also to treat sorcery primarily as an "idiom" for expressing human conflict ... , or 
at least to confine their investigation to this aspect alone.'336 
[I]t has long been recognized that the New Guinea data by no 
means comfortably fitted Africanists' theories about the social 
functioning of witchcraft. . . . [I]n Oceania accusations of 
sorcery or witchcraft appeared to take place not within the 
local group as in Africa, but between members of different 
commumtles. Sorcery rather than witchcraft seemed to 
predominate. Legitimate as well as illicit uses of sorcery were 
reported for Oceania, whereas Africanists reserved the terms 
'sorcery' and 'witchcraft' for socially condemned practices. 
Melanesianists have not been unmindful of these differences .. 
. . Nevertheless, ... discussion over the last several years has 
been limited-and continues to be limited-by assumptions, 
definitions and theoretical orientations largely borrowed from 
African studies. 337 
It is not intended to conclude this chapter with the suggestion that a received 
anthropological understanding of the nature and dynamics of witchcraft and 
sorcery is without value or utility, or that the acknowledged deficiencies in that 
body of data must necessarily be compounded here as an inevitable function of the 
uncritical importation of 'flawed' African into the Melanesian context. Of course, 
in turning to a consideration of ethnographically informed anthropological 
analyses of specifically Melanesian sorcery-related beliefs and behaviours, it 
behoves us to be aware of the qualifications that properly obtain where reliance is 
placed on these materials for any purpose. But in so far as the instant examination 
of sorcery-related beliefs and behaviour is subsidiary to an analysis of the 
implications of those beliefs and behaviours, as social facts-in which culturally 
significant meanings need to be discerned, so that appropriate, legally significant 
336 Ibid., p. 6. 
337 Ibid., p. 2. 
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meanings can be attributed to them-neither the absence of an aggregation of 
quantitative data capable of yielding statistically significant conclusions, nor the 
absence of a unified theoretical basis capable of supporting a comprehensive and 
exhaustive explanation of the subject phenomena, is particularly problematic. 
Mindful of the intellectual, ideological and epistemological barriers to a 
serviceable understanding of the nature and dynamics of Melanesian sorcery-
related beliefs, as discussed in this and the preceding chapter, we are at least better 
able to approach these issues with a keener sense of the barriers that must be 
surmounted or circumvented. 
Chapter Four 
THE DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS 
OF MELANESIAN SORCERY 
[A] perennial problem in the study of sorcery {is} the diversity of the data 
available, and the multiplicity of conclusions we may draw from 
those data. The current sorcery data base gives social anthropologists the 
capability to support almost any generalization, 
or any set of contradictory generalizations. We face the problem 
not only of understanding our sorcery information, but also of selecting an 
analytical perspective to best provide that understanding . 
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One alternative is to let the information speak for itself, to approach 
sorcery on a case-by~case basis as a unique phenomenon. But we work in a 
discipline that prides itself on its comparative approach, and we have been 
socialized within the comparative milieu. The ultimate goal of social 
anthropology is the formation of general statements regarding the human 
condition. We strive to understand human beliefs and behaviour not only in 
one society or situation, but in many. Social anthropology is built on 
ethnography, but the goal is ethnology. 1 
1. ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORIES OF 
WITCHCRAFT AND SORCERY 
The influence of the anthropological ideas to which Evans-Pritchard initially 
gave expression in his writings on Zande mystical beliefs-and which, in variant 
forms, found further expression in the spate of ethnographic studies dealing with 
aspects of witchcraft and sorcery in other African societies that followed on in the 
analytical tradition which may fairly be said to have begun with that ground-
breaking work-was powerful, widespread and enduring. But if Evans-Pritchard 
1 M. Zelenietz, 'Sorcery and Social Change: An Introduction' (1981) 8 Social Analysis 
[Special Issue: Sorcery and Social Change in Melanesia]4-5. 
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was the first and, for quite some time, the only, anthropologist to focus so acutely 
on the nature and dynamics of such beliefs and action, it would be wrong to say 
that the methodology he is credited with bringing so fruitfully to bear on the 
subject was peculiarly attributable to him; that the recognition of the necessity for 
developing an appreciation of native ideas within their social integument was 
uniquely his own; or that the field in which the protocols of the analytical 
approach with which Evans-Pritchard is invariably associated was uniquely or 
even originally African. 
By the early years of the twentieth century, the idea, if not the practice, of 
localised and protracted field work was being actively advanced by the founders 
of the still new, but already well-defined, modern school of British social 
anthropology? In 1913, W.H.R. Rivers, who produced a two-volume treatise 
based on his field work in the Torres Straits in the late 1890s, strongly advocated 
what he called 'intensive work', the essence of which involved a deliberate 
limitation in the socio-geographic field of study combined with a meticulous and 
comprehensive analysis over an extended period of time. A 'typical piece of 
intensive work', he wrote, is one in which:3 
the worker lives for a year or more among a community of 
perhaps four or five hundred people and studies every detail of 
their life and culture; in which he comes to know every 
2 See A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, 'Historical Note on British Social Anthropology' (1952) 54 
American Anthropologist 276. Arguably, the actual practice of such an approach to 
anthropological field work was presaged in North America, as exemplified in the extended 
anthropological field studies conducted by Franz Boas amongst the Eskimo and Kwakitutl Indians 
of Vancouver Island between 1883 and 1902. See L. Mair, An Introduction to Social 
Anthropology, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 28-29. 
3 
'Report on Anthropological Research Outside America', in The Present Condition and 
Future Needs of the Science of Anthropology, presented by W.H. Rivers, A.E. Jenks and S. G. 
Morely (Washington, 1913), quoted in A. Kuper, Anthropology and Anthropologists: The Modern 
British School (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), p. 7, who notes that Rivers's own work 
was itself, perhaps, distinguished more by its breadth than its depth of coverage. 
member of the community personally; in which he is not 
content with generalized information, but studies every feature 
of life and custom in concrete detail and by means of the 
vernacular language. . . . It is only by such work that it is 
possible to discover the incomplete and even misleading 
character of much of the vast mass of survey work which 
forms the existing material of anthropology' 
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It was Bronislaw Malinowski, who, under the auspices of the London School 
of Economics and with the patronage of C. G. Seligman, a colleague of Rivers, 
became the first professionally trained anthropologist to develop and apply (some 
would say, to invent) the modem methods of intensive ethnographic field work, 
not in Africa, but in the Trobriand Islands of New Guinea between 1915 and 
1918.5 More than a decade before the appearance of Witchcraft, Oracles and 
Magic, it was Malinowski who articulated the importance grasping the 'native's 
point of view, his relation to life ... [and) his vision of his world';6 and who gave 
expression to the argument that the thinking of primitive man was, if no more, 
than certainly no less rational or reasonable than modem Western man's. And 
before Evans-Pritchard, it was Malinowski who insisted that, in coming to terms 
with the primitive man in his full humanity, 'we are confronted with our own 
problems [and w]hat is essential in ourselves':' 
4 Ibid. 
The modem anthropological explorer ... is bound ... to 
arrive at some conclusions as to whether the primitive mind 
differs from our own or is essentially similar; whether the 
savage lives constantly in a world of supernatural powers and 
perils, or on the contrary, has lucid intervals as often as any 
one of us; whether clan-solidarity is such an overwhelming 
5 Kuper, Anthropology and Anthropologists, p. 13. 
6 B. Malinowski, Argonauts of the Western Pacific (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1922), 
p. 17. 
7 B. Malinowski, A Diary in the Strict Sense of the Term (1917), quoted in Kuper, 
Anthropology and Anthropologists, p. 35. 
and universal force, or whether the heathen can be as self-
seeking and self-interested as any Christian' 
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Whether or not Malinowski was singularly responsible-as he seemed to 
believe himself to be-for the founding of a distinctive methodological 'school' of 
social anthropology," his ideas about the social and psychological utility of 
otherwise seemingly irrational beliefs in sorcery, witchcraft and magic, clearly 
preceded subsequent and more eloquent elaborations of the proposition that the 
parameters of human rationality are fundamentally the products of determinative 
socio-culturally processes. 10 
For all that, Malinowski's theoretical formulations have been described as 
impoverished; especially so, perhaps, as these related to magic, witchcraft and 
sorcery, in respect of which phenomena his representation of the 'multi-layered 
character of ethnographic reality' is said to have amounted only 'almost' to a 
theory." Most of Malinowski's Melanesian writing fastened on a particular 
8 B. Malinowski, Crime and Custom in Savage Society (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1926), ix. 
9 In his preface to The Sexual Life of Savages in Northwestern Melanesia, 3rd ed. (1929; 
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1932), Malinowski wrote: 'The magnificent title of the 
Functional School of Anthropology has been bestowed by myself, in a way on myself .... ' (xxix); 
see also, B. Malinowski, 'Practical Anthropology' (1929) 2(1) Africa 22, 28. But cf. A. R. 
Radcliffe-Brown, Structure and Function in Primitive Society (London: Cohen and West, 1952), 
p. 188: 'This Functional School does not really exist; it is a myth invented by Professor 
Malinowski. .. .' (p. 188). See generally, J.L. Peacock, The Anthropological Lens: Harsh Light, 
Soft Focus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 79-81. 
10 See, B. Malinowski, 'Magic, Science and Religion' (1925) and 'Myth in Primitive 
Psychology' in Magic, Science and Religion and Other Essays (Boston: Beacon Press, 1954). 
11 Kuper, Anthropology and Anthropologists, pp. 1, 17. This characterisation is echoed in 
Sally Falk Moore's assessment of Malinowski's theoretical analysis of primitive society as 
consistent, cohesive and integrated systems. Law as Process: An Anthropological Approach 
(London: Routeledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), p. ll. Raymond Firth is critical of Kuper's 
assessment of Malinowski in this connection, suggesting that it have more to do with Kuper's own 
theoretical predilections than any particular weakness in Malinowski's. 'Degrees of Intelligibility' 
in Reason and Morality, ed. J. Overing (London: Tavistock Publications, 1985), p. 30 
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institutional theme of Trobriand life--economic exchange, agriculture, domestic 
relations and reproduction, myth and religion, normative social order. 12 In each 
case, however, although his ideas were finely developed around a specific 
institutional core, 'following the threads to show the ramifications of each 
activity,' he seemed unable to produce 'a single coherent statement of Trobriand 
"culture" as a whole.' Perhaps, as Kuper suggests, he was unable to do so; 'for 
despite his insistence upon interconnections he lacked the notion of a system.' 13 
In Malinowski's view, magical actions and their underlying systems of belief 
existed to fulfil particular purposes and, to that extent, he regarded their 
importance in social life as fundamentally, if not entirely, instrumental. This 
notion of belief and action as comprising a 'set of tools' was central to 
Malinowski's analysis of the Melanesian's understanding of magic-the sense of 
which could become apparent to the observer so soon as, but only if, its social 
utility were properly discerned: 
Thus, in his relation to nature and destiny, whether he tries to 
exploit the first or to dodge the second, primitive man 
recognises both the natural and supernatural forces and 
agencies, and he tries to use them both for his benefit 14 
Magical beliefs and actions were functional because they served to minimise 
anxieties about those elements of life that were otherwise beyond human control. 
12 See B. Mallinowski, 'Kula: The Circulating Exchange of Valuables in the Archipelagos of 
Eastern New Guinea' (1919) 20 Man 97-105; Argonauts of the Western Pacific (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1922); Coral Gardens and their Magic, 2 vols. (London: George Allen 
& Unwin, 1935); Sex and Repression in Savage Society (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1927); The Sexual Lives of Savages in Northwestern Melanesia (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1929); Magic, Science and Religion and Other Essays; Crime and Custom in Savage Society 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1926). 
13 Kuper, Anthropology and Anthropologists, p. 24. 
14 Malinowski, Magic, Science and Religion, p. 15. 
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Like religion, magtc was deployed in situations of emotional stress, in which 
circumstances its purpose was 'to ritualize man's optimism, to enhance his faith in 
the victory of hope over fear.' 15 Belief in magic was rational in the same way that 
'belief in the efficacious of any other technical procedure could be seen to be 
rational. Thus, from the perspective of a Trobriand Islander, magic was a 
perfectly sensible attempt 
to shape the future, to cope with the unforeseeable accidents 
which may ruin the most carefully-tended garden, to set at rest 
the anxiety of the man who has done all he can in the usual 
way to ensure success in an enterprise, but still knows very 
well that success is uncertain. 16 
Evans-Pritchard similarly endeavoured to demonstrate the logical consistency 
of Zande notions of magic and witchcraft and, as one of Malinowski's three 
graduate students at the London School of Economics in 1925, it is not surprising 
to see in his work evidence of Malinowski's influence in this respect. Thus, where 
Kuper suggests that the problem of rationality Evans-Pritchard confronted in his 
Zande monograph was very much the problem of Tylor, Frazer and Levy-Bruhl, 
in his analysis of that problem his institutional focus was 'typically 
Malinowskian' .17 
It was in Evans-Pritchard's method of abstraction, however, that his approach 
represented a distinct departure from Malinowski's. For central to Evans-
Pritchard's Zande thesis was the category opposition between mystical and 
empirical beliefs and action; an opposition which, according to Kuper, Evans-
15 Ibid, p. 70. 
16 Kuper, Anthropology and Anthropologists, p. 77. 
17 Ibid .• p. 82. 
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Pritchard had effectively taken over from Frazer and, more directly, from 
Malinowski. It was, moreover, an opposition Evans-Pritchard retained in his 
analysis, despite his showing that the Azande believed mystical forces operated in 
much the same way as physical forces and did not, themselves, make such a 
contrast. 18 At the same time, however, Evans-Pritchard implicitly challenged the 
crudity of Malinowski's theoretical propositions-whereby magic was 
functionally linked to every activity with which it was associated--calling into 
question Malinowski's assertion that no single cultural institution (such as magic) 
could possibly be understood except as a functionally integral concomitant of the 
larger social system. 
Thus, whereas Malinowski emphasised the importance, indeed, the necessity, 
of construing the mystical aspects of systems of native belief and action more-or-
less exclusively on the basis of their functional implications for the total socio-
cultural system, 19 Evans-Pritchard resiled from that decidedly (though not 
exclusively) Malinowskian orthodoxy in his insistence that Zande mystical beliefs 
could, and should, be understood on their own terms. Disclaiming such analytical 
obligations to Malinowski as might otherwise have constrained his approach, in 
his introduction to Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande20 Evans-
Pritchard wrote: 
18 Ibid. 
If any one were to urge that in discussing magic I have made a 
partial abstraction of the activities with which it is associated, I 
would reply that I am dealing with only some of its relations. 
it would be grotesque to describe Zande economic life in a 
book on Zande magic, oracles, and witchcraft, since 
19 Ibid; and see also S. Wolfram, 'Facts and Theories: Saying and Believing' in Overing, 
Reason and Morality, pp. 71-84. [pp. 2-3] 
20 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1937). 
agriculture, hunting, and collecting are not functions of these 
beliefs and rites, but the beliefs and rites are functions of 
agriculture, hunting and collecting." 
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Malinowski's claim to being the founder of professional social anthropology in 
Britain is a strong one, and his reputation for establishing anthropology's 
distinctive apprenticeship in the form extended, intensive field work within a 
community of comprehensible size is equally well deserved.Z2 Beyond these 
accomplishments, his early and active appreciation for the practical implications 
of social anthropology in relation to the processes of social change in the rapidly 
diminishing quarters of an erstwhile 'primitive' world was, in some respects, 
prescient.23 With respect to the elaboration of a systematic anthropological 
understanding of sorcery-related beliefs and action, generally, and in relation to 
Melanesian societies more particularly, however, Malinowski's contributions 
proved to be rather less impressive, 
As said, Malinowski never developed a full theoretical account of the role 
and-more importantly from his perspective-the function of sorcery within the 
totality of the socio-cultural system of the Trobriand community on which his 
field work was based.Z4 Indeed, he appears to have made no attempt to place 
sorcery-related phenomena in their broader context, except, perhaps, in what 
Patterson has described as his 'tendentious account of the way in which sorcery 
21 Ibid., pp. 2-3. 
22 Kuper, Anthropology and Anthropologists, p. I. See also Mair, Social Anthropology, pp. 
29-30; D. Freeman, Margaret Mead and Samoa: The Making and Unmaking of an 
Anthropological Myth (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books), p.286. 
23 See B. Malinowski, 'Practical Anthropology' (!929) 2(1) Africa 22-38; 'A Five-Year Plan of 
Research [for the Institute of African Languages and Cultures]' (!932) 5(1) Africa 1-15; L. Mair, 
Anthropology and Social Change (London: Athlone Press, 1969), pp. 1-9. 
24 See S.F. Nadel, The Theory of Social Structure (London: Cohen & West, 1957), pp. 194-
195. 
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allegedly supports law and order as Whether this failing on Malinowski's part was 
a reflection of his complacent assumption that the theoretical explanations he had 
offered were sufficient, or whether it was indicative of a deficiency he himself 
recognised and had intended to address, is not entirely clear.26 In any case, what 
might otherwise have provided a seminal point of theoretical departure for 
subsequent anthropological analyses of specifically Melanesian patterns of 
sorcery-related belief and action-however far afield those departures may 
ultimately have led from their source-was inherently incapable of doing so. And 
even to the extent that Malinowski succeeded in articulating his ideas in a form 
that approximated to a tenable theory, his views in this connection have come 
increasingly to be regarded by scholars as lacking in both substance and 
cogency. 27 
As we shall see, aspects of Malinowski's analysis of law and sorcery in 
Trobriand society continue to inform both anthropological and socio-legal 
25 M. Patterson, 'Sorcery and Witchcraft in Melanesia' [Part II] (1975) 45(3) Oceania 212. 
26 In 1929, Malinowski wrote to his student, Raymond Firth, shortly after the latter had 
returned from the field: 
I wonder whether you will proceed at once to a full straight-
forward account of the Tikopean [sic] culture or whether you 
will do what I did-that is write it up piecemeal. I hope you 
will do the former, as I would do now, if I could go back ten 
years. [quoted in R. Firth, 'Introduction: Malinowski as 
Scientist and as Man' in Man and Culture, ed. R Firth 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957), p. 10] 
Later, in his introduction to Reo Fortune's monograph on Dobuan sorcery, he wrote: 'I have not 
yet published the full account of sorcery in the Trobriands, and am only now engaged in working 
it out.' R.F. Fortune, Sorcerers ofDobu: The Social Anthropology of the Dobu Islanders of the 
Western Pacific (1932; rpt New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1963), xxii. In his preface to this 
revised edition of the volume, Fortune is pointedly critical and, in some cases, frankly dismissive 
of a number of Malinowski's underdeveloped theoretical propositions. Ibid., xi-xv. 
27 M. Stephen, 'Introduction' in Sorcerer and Witch in Melanesia, ed. M. Stephen (Carlton, 
VIC: Melbourne University Press, 1987), p. 9. 
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considerations of the dynamic relationship between the two phenomena. In the 
absence of a serviceable theoretical basis developed with a particular view to the 
nuances of Melanesian culture and society, however, anthropological theories of 
sorcery and witchcraft grounded in Africanist research and data have, until quite 
recently, provided by default the analytical parameters in accordance with which 
virtually all of the Melanesianist studies have been pursued. 
A. Psychologically and Sociologically Orientated 
Theories Generally Considered 
In contradistinction to the earlier, more speculative representations of sorcery, 
witchcraft and magic discussed in the preceding chapter, modem, which is to say 
ethnographically informed, anthropological theories of sorcery, witchcraft and 
magic in so-called primitive societies may be grouped into two broad categories, 
reflecting their principal orientations and analytical grounding in the established 
premises of psychology and sociology, respectively. As the idea of a clear and 
determinate division between the fields of the social sciences is itself somewhat 
arbitrary, it would be misleading to suggest that these two categories are in any 
sense mutually exclusive. Indeed, such differences in approach as may be 
discerned between psychologically and sociologically orientated anthropological 
analyses often tend to reveal differences in focus, emphasis and style, rather than 
substance. Important elements of each approach frequently appear in the other. 
(1) Psychological Theories of Sorcery and Witchcraft 
The contemporaneous emergence of modern social anthropology and the 
elaboration of psychological theories (principally, though not exclusively, 
Freudian) of personality and human development during the first two decades of 
the twentieth century foreordained both a convergence of, and confrontation 
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between, the ideas propounded by scholars and practitioners m both fields. 28 
Given their common grounding in general principles of empiricism, and their 
common interest in the nature and dynamics of human thought and action, it is not 
surprising that a vigorous, if not always sympathetic, dialogue should have 
developed between psychoanalysts and social anthropologists across a range of 
issues. 29 And given their common concern with the indicia and determinants of 
normality, aberrance and deviance, it is equally unsurprising that psychodynamic 
and cognitive theories should have played an influential role in the construction of 
anthropological explanations of the sorcery and witchcraft beliefs of primitive 
peoples.30 
Psychological theories have tended to emphasise the relation of sorcery-related 
beliefs and action to Freudian notions of the displacement of affect and derivative 
hypotheses involving the projection of infantile urges and other psychodynamic 
conflicts into culturally standardised fantasies. In the main, such theories are 
concerned with identifying and describing the intra-psychic origins of such 
phenomena, focusing on beliefs with a decidedly causal orientation.31 Thus, for 
example, in his analysis of mystical beliefs amongst the Navajo Indians of the 
28 See M. Marwick, 'The Study of Witchcraft' in The Craft of Social Anthropology, ed. A.L. 
Epstein (London: Tavistock Publications, 1967), p. 238; C. Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: 
Selected Essays (New York: Basis Books, 1973), pp. 207-208. On the general influence of Freud 
on twentieth century Western thought, see B. Susser, The Grammar of Modern Ideology (London: 
Routledge, 1988), pp. 92,286-287, 387ff. 
29 See R.M. Keesing, Cultural Anthropology: A Contemporary Perspective, 2nd ed. (New 
York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1981), pp. 101-104; J. Kirkpatrick and G.M. White, 'Exploring 
Ethnopsychologies' in Person. Self and Experience: Exploring Pacific Ethnopsychologies, ed. 
G.M. White and J. Kirkpatrick (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 3-32. 
30 See M Torgovnick, Gone Primitive: Savage Intellects. Modern Lives (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 194-209. 
31 M. Patterson, 'Sorcery and Witchcraft in Melanesia' [Part One] (1974) 45(2) Oceania 133 
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American Southwest, Kluckhohn considered witchcraft 'as an expression m 
fantasy for the culturally disallowed, but unconsciously wanted.m And in his 
study of ritual practices amongst the Iatmul of New Guinea, Bateson developed 
the concepts of ethos, as 'the expression of a culturally standardised system of 
organisation of the instincts and emotions' of individual members of that culture;33 
and eidios, which he defined as 'a standardisation of the cognitive aspects of the 
personality of the individuals.'34 
Freudian influences are manifestly apparent in Malinowski's general work on 
magic,35 and in other aspects of his Melanesian research in which he set out 
expressly to test the application of elements of psychoanalytic theory against his 
Trobriand data.36 Mead addressed similar psychological themes in her 
examination of the nuances of the mystical beliefs of children and adolescents on 
the island of Manus in the early 1930s;37 and more recently, Riebe returned to an 
explicitly Freudian analysis in her explanation of the basis of witchcraft 
accusations amongst the Kalarn of northeastern New Guinea: 
The early expressions of grief and anger at the death of a 
loved one soon turned to searchings for a culprit. Freud states 
that the task of mourning is to withdraw all libido from its 
32 C. Kluckhohn, Navajo Witchcraft (1944; rpt Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), pp. 67-68. 
33 G. Bateson, Naven: A Survey of the Problems Suggested by a Composite Picture of the 
Culture of a New Guinea Tribe Drawn from Three Points of View (1936; rpt Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1958), p. 118. 
"Ibid., p. 220. 
35 See B. Malinowski, Magic, Science and Religion and Other Essays, ed. R. Redfield (New 
York: Free Press, 1948), pp. 59-60,63,70-72. 
36 See e.g., Sex and Repression in Savage Society (London: International Library of 
Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method, 1927). 
37 M. Mead, Growing Up in New Guinea: A Study of Adolescence and Sex in Primitive 
Societies (1930; rpt Harrnondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd, 1942), pp. 79-92,211-219. 
attachment to the loved object. This process, he states, is very 
painful and the task is carried through 'bit by bit, at great 
expense of time and cathetic energy.' In the long run the work 
of mourning is completed and, with the libido returned to it, 
'the ego becomes free and uninhibited again.' Among Kalam, 
the private resolution from grief to recovery was paralleled 
publicly by the wake which merged into a sifting of 
information and a moblilizing of support, and thence to a 
killing. Compulsive concern with the death was channelled 
into the process of selecting the revenge victim, and a 
successful revenge killing was referred to as 'the avenged 
returning to the homestead'. This marked the return to 
wholeness and an end to grief. 38 
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In a paper entitled 'Sorcery, Sin and the Superego', Whiting sought to explain 
witchcraft beliefs amongst the North American Paiute Indians as evidence of a 
delusional paranoia with its origins in early childhood experiences.39 Though 
critical of such simplistic applications of Freudian analysis to the sorcery and 
witchcraft beliefs of non-western peoples, Nadel developed a causal account for 
their appearance in African societies in similarly Psychodynamic terms, linking 
the belief in witchcraft to frustrations, anxieties and other mental stresses which he 
characterised as 'psychopathological symptoms ... related to mental disturbances 
of this nature.'40 In a re-introduction of the idea of a distinctive 'primitive 
mentality' of the kind with which Levy-Bruhl and Durkheim had been pre-
occupied, Hall pike derived the premises of his analysis of paranormal experiences 
and primitive notions of causality from Piaget's theory of the psychological 
development of the child.41 
38 I. Riebe, 'Kalam Witchcraft: A Historical Perspective' in Stephen, Sorcerer and Witch in 
Melanesia, pp. 211,224-225 (citations omitted). 
39 Discussed in Patterson, 'Sorcery and Witchcraft in Melanesia [Part One]', pp. 134-135. 
40 S.F. Nadel, 'Witchcraft in Four African Societies: An Essay in Comparison' (1952) 54(1) 
American Anthropologist 18. 
41 C.R. Hallpike, The Foundations of Primitive Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), pp. 
5-40, 424-479. For a critical review of Hallpike's thesis, see J. Lave, 'How They Think' (1979) 
26(10) Contemporary Psychology 788-789. 
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Although such models have been predominant in the past, not all 
psychological theories of witchcraft and sorcery-related beliefs have been cast in 
purely Freudian or nee-Freudian moulds. In recent years, psychoanalytic and 
related approaches have come increasingly to be supplanted by a range of 
alternative psychological models focusing on the conceptual play in the interstices 
between the individual and society, and utilising novel considerations of 
personality, emotion, cognition and social learning theory.42 Winkelman, for 
example, has employed a complex ethnopsychological model (amongst other 
socio-politically based explanatory propositions) in developing a sophisticated 
cross-cultural analysis of the practice of sorcery and witchcraft, from which he has 
concluded that, in a statistically significant proportion of the cases examined, 
sorcerers and witches constitute a derivative species of shamans and healers, 
whose actions can be linked to psychologically, as well as hallucinogenically, 
induced states of altered consciousness.43 
42 See generally R.A. Schweder and R.A. LeVine, eds., Culture Theory: Essays on Mind Self 
and Emotion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); J. Dougherty, ed., Directions in 
Cognitive Anthropology (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1985); P. Heelas and A. Lock, 
eds., The Anthropology o[Se/f(London: Academic Press, 1981); F.L.K. Hsu, ed., Psychological 
Anthropology: Approaches to Culture and Personality (Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press, 1961); U. 
Neisser, Cognitive Psychology (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1967); G.D. Spindler, ed., 
The Making of Psychological Anthropology (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978). 
43 M.J. Winkelman, 'Shamans and Other "Magico-Religious" Healers: A Cross-Cultural Study 
of Their Origins, Nature and Social Transformations' (1990) 18(3) Ethos 308, 347-349, assesses 
data related to a remarkable 47 societies drawn from all the major regions of the world and 
covering an equally remarkable time span ranging from 1750 BC to the present (ibid., p. 31 0). On 
a similar theme, but in a very different vein, Kalweit argues that the trance-induced state of 
expanded consciousness experienced by shamans represents a psychic realm in which a host of 
magical phenomena can, in fact, be brought into existence, and that it is only the parochialism of 
Western intellectual and academic rationalism that prevents anthropologists, amongst others, from 
recognising that reality. H. Kalwei~ Shamans, Healers and Medicine Men, trans. M.H. Kohn 
(Boston: Shambala Publications, 1992). 
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(2) Sociological Theories of Sorcery and Witchcraft 
Modern sociological theories of sorcery and witchcraft concentrate on the 
social and interpersonal, as opposed to the individual intra-psychic, nature and 
origins those beliefs and actions. On such analyses, belief may well precede, 
guide, direct and determine actions; but the beliefs themselves are generally 
regarded as essentially social constructions.44 Sociological theories tend to 
associate various forms of sorcery and witchcraft beliefs with particular aspects of 
the social structure of the society in which they occur. In relation to that society, 
they then draw out the latent and patent connexions between the uses and 
consequences of those beliefs and behaviours for other aspects of the larger social 
organisation. In this sense, it is fair to describe many, perhaps most, modern 
sociological theories of sorcery and witchcraft as functionally and institutionally 
orientated. 45 Thus, for example, in his analysis of sorcery in Trobriand society, 
Malinowski depicted the relevant interpersonal dynamics as servicing a 
powerfully conservative force in social relations and community structure by 
furnishing 'the main source of the wholesome fear of punishment and retribution 
indispensable in any orderly society':46 
When a real injustice or a thoroughly unlawful act is to be 
punished ... , the sorcerer feels the weight of public opinion 
with hi and he is ready to champion a good cause. . . . In such 
cases also the victim, on learning that a sorcerer is at work 
against him, may quail and make amends or come to an 
equitable arrangement. Thus ordinarily, black magic acts as a 
genuine legal force, for it is used in carrying out the rules of 
44 See J. Middleton and E.H. Winter, eds., Witchcraft and Sorcery in East Africa (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), p. l. 
45 See Patterson. 'Sorcery and Witchcraft in Melanesia [Part One]', p. 133. 
46 Malinowski, Crime and Custom in Savage Society, p. 93. 
tribal law, it prevents the use of violence and restores 
equilibrium.". 
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As suggested in the concluding portion of the preceding chapter, however, it 
was Evans-Pritchard's identification of the homeostatic forces of witchcraft in 
Zande society that provided the analytical basis on which a host of functionalist 
ethnographic research was subsequently pursued. Elaborated in the field-based 
studies of Wilson,'8 Nade!,'9 Krige,'0 Gluckman,51 Tnrner'2 and Marwick,'3 
amongst others, functional theories of witchcraft and sorcery have been 
characterised as postulating that: 
the function (use, effect) of sorcery and witchcraft beliefs and 
practices is to reinforce the basic structural principles by 
which the society is organised by providing a means for (a) the 
projection of the hostility that exists in some crucial social 
relationships on to individuals who serve as scapegoats; (b) the 
rupture of obsolete social relationships thereby enabling the 
formation of new ones; (c) the stressing of values and norms 
which regulate the behaviour of individuals and groups in the 
society. In addition there is the basic and universally validated 
proposition that sorcery and witchcraft beliefs are a theory of 
47 Malinowski, Crime and Custom in Savage Society, p. 86. 
48 See M.H. Wilson, 'Witch Beliefs and Social Structure' (1951) 56(4) American Journal of 
Sociology 307. 
49 See Nadel, 'Witchcraft in Four African Societies'. 
50 See J.D. Kriege, 'The Social Function of Witchcraft' (1947) in Marwick, Witchcraft and 
Sorcery, pp. 237-251. 
51 See M. Gluckman, 'The Logic of African Science and Witchcraft' (1944) in Marwick, 
Witchcraft and Sorcery, pp. 321-331. 
52 See V.W. Turner, 'Witchcraft and Sorcery: Taxonomy versus Dynamics' (1964) 34(4) 
Africa 314; Schism and Continuity in an African Society (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1957). 
53 See M. Marwick, Sorcery in its Social Setting: A Study of the Northern Rhodesia Cewa 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1965); 'Witchcraft as a Social Strain Gauge' ( 1964) in 
Marwick, Witchcraft and Sorcery, pp. 280-295 
causality which functions to explain the why of misfortune, 
disease and death. 54 
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Once again, it was Evans-Pritchard's Zande analysis that provided the impetus 
for the theoretical elevation of a perceived causal relationship between sorcery and 
witchcraft beliefs, on the one hand, and the experience of misfortune, on the other, 
to the status of a basic and universally validated proposition. In applying this 
proposition to his own data, however, Marwick introduced an important shift in 
emphasis from beliefs to action, which has had significant ramifications for the 
emergence of a distinctively Melanesianist counter-position. 
Assessing his Cewa research in the light cast upon his data by Evans-
Pritchard's association of mystical beliefs with misfortune, Marwick arrived upon 
the hypothesis of witchcraft and sorcery-related phenomena as a 'social strain-
gauge'. In accordance with this theory, a study of the social contexts in which 
sorcery and witchcraft beliefs are given operative (i.e., behavioural) expression-a 
study which necessarily entails a close consideration of the relationship between 
accuser, victim and accused-should reveal the critical tension points in the 
group, community or society under scrutiny. 55 For Marwick, the crucial dynamic 
in the triadic relationship between accuser, victim and accused was the process of 
accusation. 
The sociological importance of [an accusation of witchcraft or 
sorcery ]lies in the fact that it provides direct evidence of tense 
relationships in the society being studied. Accusations of 
sorcery and witchcraft may be taken as indices of social 
tension in the relationships in which they occur, i.e. as social 
strain-gauges.56 
54 Patterson, 'Sorcery and Witchcraft in Melanesia [Part One]', pp. 136-137. 
55 Marwick, 'Witchcraft as a Social Strain-Gauge', pp. 280-281. 
56 Marwick, 'The Study of Witchcraft', p. 235. 
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There is some poignancy in the fact that Marwick's first reflective restatement 
of his strain-gauge theory took the form of a paper addressed, not to his Africanist 
colleagues, but to an antipodean gathering of mainly of Oceanist and, more 
specifically, Melanesianist anthropologists.57 In the opening remarks of his 
Presidential Address to the Congress of the Australian and New Zealand 
Association for the Advancement of Science (Section F), convened in Canberra in 
January of 1964, he said: 
I have decided to examine some aspects of the sociology of 
witchcraft and sorcery that appear to me to be in need of 
clearing up and pruning if we are to make further progress in 
this field. I am encouraged to attempt this task because I now 
find myself better situated geographically for the exploration 
of a problem tbat has interested me for some time, and among 
colleagues better fitted to advise me on it. 58 
The problem to which Marwick was referring was that, in Oceania, one of the 
'well-founded propositions of the sociology of witchcraft and sorcery' did not 
seem to apply. That is, whereas in Africa both acts and accusations of sorcery and 
witchcraft were seen to occur 'only between persons already linked by close social 
bonds', in Oceania, the ethnographic evidence suggested that 'the sorcerer, who 
seems to be commoner here than the witch, is believed to direct his destructive 
magic outside his own group.'59 Thus, the principal object of Marwick's paper was 
to examine the difficulties ensuent on the attempted application of his 'strain-
gauge' theory under social circumstances in which the operative social tensions 
57 
'Witchcraft as a Social Strain-Gauge', (1964) 26(9) Australian Journal of Science 263-268, 
reproduced in Marwick, Witchcraft and Sorcery, pp. 280-295. to which all subsequent references 
are made. 
58 Marwick, 'Witchcraft as a Social Strain-Gauge', p. 280. 
59 !bid. 
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arose on an inter-communal basis, rather than intra-communally, as they tended to 
do in Africa. 
In pursumg this examination, it would appear that Marwick was less 
concerned with the possibility of any fundamental deficiency in the theory itself, 
than he was to locate potential causes for the difficulties in discrepant definitions, 
the inadequacy of the relevant ethnographic data and certain deficiencies in the 
field methods of Melanesianist ethnographers: 
With a few notable exceptions, Oceanists usually equate the 
term 'sorcery' with destructive magic in general and do not 
apply it exclusively, as Africanists do, to destructive magic 
applied anti-socially or illegitimately ... 60 
l have [also] found that most anthropologists in this region 
have not made a practice of systematically collecting specific 
instances of either believed attacks of sorcery or witchcraft or 
of observed or observable accusations of these. . . . A 
common failing in the case reports l have encountered in the 
Oceanian literature is an omission to specif'y the social 
relationships between the main characters concerned." 
In the end, Marwick was satisfied to suggest that, with refined field techniques 
and a keener ethnographic attention to the analytically relevant details-the 
prescriptions for which he readily provided62-there was no reason why the 
social-strain gauge theory, which had theretofore been applied so successfully to 
detect intra-communal tensions within particular African societies, could not 
eventually be employed with a similar measure of success in the identification of 
critical tensions in the inter-communal relationships between Oceanian societies.63 
60 Ibid., p. 282. 
61 Ibid., p. 289. 
62 Ibid., pp. 292-294. 
63 Ibid., p. 291. 
B. Recalcitrance of the Melanesian Data and the 
Rejection of Africanist Models 
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Ten more years of ethnographic effort failed to render the proliferating mass of 
Melanesian data on sorcery-related beliefs and practices any more amenable to a 
strain-gauge theory, or any other African-based model for that matter. Nor did it 
produce a distinctively Melanesianist theory capable of providing a 
comprehensive analytical framework within which what was, by then, a quite 
considerable body of descriptive literature might organised, and on the basis of 
which consistent causal explanations might be generated. In the absence of a 
theoretical alternative for which anything even approaching a claim to 'universal 
validity' might be made, however, the experience did create a distinctively 
Melanesianist perspective from which, amongst other things, the analytical 
deficiencies in Marwick's model itself could be challenged. 
In 1974-75, in the introductory segment of what was the first attempt to 
account comprehensively for the phenomena of sorcery and witchcraft in 
Melanesia, on the basis of a the Melanesian ethnographic data exclusively, and in 
heuristic terms specifically developed for purpose of a Melanesianist analysis, 
Mary Patterson criticised (and frankly rejected the applicability of) Marwick's 
strain-gauge theory.64 There were, she suggested, three principal points on which 
Marwick's own data, and much of the rest of the African-based ethnographic 
materials that appeared to support his hypothesis, could be questioned. Firstly, 
Patterson drew attention to an observation Marwick made, almost in passing, in 
the context of a discussion of his Cewa research, in which he noted that in 30 per 
cent of the cases he recorded, no quarrel or other discernible interpersonal 
64 
'Sorcery and Witchcraft in Melanesia [Part One]', pp. 137-141. 
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disruption had preceded a believed attack or accusation of witchcraft."5 In those 
instances, Marwick said, blame for misfortune was 'laid at the door of someone 
who was not necessarily in a tense relationship with the victim or the accuser'; 
although such persons did tend to be regarded as 'eccentric' by the affected 
community.66 In the face of this observation, and the hardly insignificant 
incidence of its occurrence, Patterson queried the existence of so many 
accusations of witchcraft and sorcery appearing in Marwick's, amongst other 
Africanist ethnographies, which could fairly be classified as a kind of 
scapegoating, but which were not otherwise indicative of the existence of tensions 
in particular relationships between the individuals involved."' 
Secondly, referring specifically, but only by way of example, to Krige's and 
Gluckman's African materials, Patterson remarked that, whereas virtually all 
anthropological accounts of societies in which sorcery and witchcraft beliefs were 
entertained recognised the existence of numerous interpersonal relationships 
characterised by hostility, tension or Marwickian 'strain', a comparatively small 
proportion of such relationships were similarly characterised by the occurrence of 
sorcery accusations. In the event, it was difficult for her to accept the view that 
the occurrence of sorcery-related accusations necessarily provided an accurate, or 
even a valid, measure of social strain.68 Thirdly, Patterson noted that Marwick 
himself was unable to offer a solution to what he regarded as the problem posed 
by the fact that "'a high absolute frequency of accusations in a particular category . 
65 Ibid., p. 137. Kluckhohn, Marwick observed, had made a similar observation in relation to 
the Navajo. Marwick, Sorcery in its Social Setting, pp. 290-291. 
66 Marwick, Sorcery in its Social Setting, p. 291. 
67 Patterson, 'Sorcery and Witchcraft in Melanesia', p. 138. 
68 Ibid. 
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.. is an index, not only of the degree of tension characteristic of the relationship, 
but also of the sheer frequency of interaction in it" .'69 
On the basis of these observations, Patterson concluded: 
[E]ither, as Marwick suggests, 'one of the conditions for the 
resolution of tension in terms of sorcery is that alternative 
ways of expressing it are not available' or that the sociology of 
conflict, of which sorcery and witchcraft studies are part, is 
not advanced by the application of this theory. As I am 
forced, on the basis of the Melanesian data, to reject the 
former suggestion as well as the premise contained in it-that 
tension is necessarily resolved in terms of sorcery-! am 
inclined to accept the latter proposal.70 
Cognisant of the fact that Marwick's theoretical propositions represented what 
was generally regarded, at the time, as the epitome of anthropological thinking in 
relation to the nature and dynamics of witchcraft and sorcery-related beliefs, 
Patterson set out to specify the terms of a substantive departure from the 
conventional anthropological protocols, in accordance with which witchcraft and 
sorcery-related phenomena in both African and Oceanian societies had been 
analysed for nearly fifty years, and to encourage the development of new 
theoretical approaches, distinctively apposite to the beliefs and practices 
prevailing in Melanesian societies. 71 
69 Ibid., quoting Marwick (citation omitted). 
70 Ibid. (citations omitted). 
71 In what may well have been a symbolic gesture, Patterson transposed the conventional 
rubric of 'witchcraft and sorcery' to the ethnographically more apposite 'sorcery and witchcraft', 
and proclaimed the Melanesianists' independence from their Africanist forebears thus: 
The fact that a considerable proportion of accusations elude 
the strain gauge (as is the case in Melanesia) leads to the 
conclusion that a broader theoretical framework is required to 
account for scapegoating and intergroup as well as 
interpersonal conflicts as they are expressed in the idiom of 
sorcery and witchcraft. [Ibid.] 
2. MELANESIAN CONFIGURATIONS OF 
SORCERY AND WITCHCRAFT 
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It is not intended here to provide an encyclopaedic discussion of specific 
patterns of Melanesian sorcery and witchcraft, as these beliefs and associated 
practices have been identified, described and analysed by social anthropologists. 
To be sure, there is an immense body of ethnographic literature in which these 
issues are recognised and addressed as a nearly ubiquitous feature of indigenous 
cultural life in Papua New Guinea, and a considerable number of ethnographic 
accounts in which they are specifically examined in depth and detail. The sheer 
number and diversity of Melanesian and Papuan societies, groups and 
communities within which distinctive forms of sorcery-related ideas, beliefs and 
behaviours are known, or might reasonably be expected to be found, however, 
would make even the effort to identify them logistically impracticable. Such an 
undertaking would extend well beyond the scope and objectives of the instant 
inquiry in any case. In the following discussion, selected examples and 
illustrative cases are drawn from the extant ethnographic materials where they 
serve to demonstrate a particular point. For present purposes, however, there is 
neither the need for, nor the pretence to, anything approaching an exhaustive 
coverage or consideration. 
No contemporary social anthropologist with Melanesian proclivities, of whose 
work I am aware, has shown the temerity to suggest that their ethnographic 
findings are replete, or their analysis is determinative of the many complex issues 
that invariably arise even in the most circumscribed studies of sorcery-related 
beliefs and behaviours. None of the theoretical models canvassed here purports to 
provide either a calculus or a Rosetta stone capable of giving certain or absolute 
answers to the simplest, to say nothing of the more perplexing, questions with 
which Melanesian sorcery and witchcraft are hedged about. 
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There is no tenable grand unifying anthropological theory of sorcery and 
witchcraft, Melanesian or otherwise, nor is one likely to emerge from the available 
data; for even if the construction of such a theory were something towards which a 
competent anthropologist might realistically aspire-or for which the rest of us 
might hope-the 'ethnographic picture', on which the composition of such a 
theory would necessarily be based, remains 'far from complete, or even 
adequate . .n Nevertheless, the very questions raised by searching ethnographic 
enquiries into the dynamics of sorcery-related beliefs and practices, and the 
cautiously tentative answers placed on offer in responsive, albeit preliminary, 
anthropological analyses of those phenomena, provide the only-and thus, a 
necessarily sufficient-foundation of social facts, on the basis of which the 
particular issues germane to a consideration of sorcery and witchcraft as problems 
of law in Papua New Guinea today may properly proceed, and to which a 
specifically jurisprudential enquiry should properly be limited. 
The pressing, if as yet unanswered, question for Evans-Pritchard, and for his 
successors in epistemological interest, may remain one of why otherwise rational 
people believe in what, on empirical grounds, appear so clearly to be imaginary, 
supernatural powers and the capacity of certain individuals to direct those powers 
to particular, purposeful and often malevolent ends. But for anthropologists 
interested in the determinative dynamics of demonstrable social facts-and for 
judges and lawyers in Papua New Guinea today, who are obliged to concern 
themselves with the jurally determinative implications of those facts-that people 
do believe in such things is itself a sufficient and necessary reason to consider 
them. 
72 Stephen, 'Introduction' in Sorcerer and Witch in Melanesia, p. l2. 
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More than thirty years ago, Ronald Berndt said of the social fact of witchcraft 
and sorcery beliefs: 
We are not, as anthropologists, concerned primarily with the 
empirical 'reality' of the situation, with whether or not it 
actually takes place; local belief in it gives that degree of 
reality which is required for our purposes." 
If, by this remark, he meant that the anthropological study of witchcraft and 
sorcery-related beliefs is justified because, in Papua New Guinea, such beliefs 
have 'real social concomitants', 74 then that justification must be equally compelling 
in the case of socio-legal scholars; and more compelling still for judges and 
lawyers, whose interests and actions involve the attribution of jurally 
determinative significance to those beliefs. 
A. Sorcery, Witchcraft and the Sociology of Conflict 
Two preliminary analytical points are generally, though by no means 
universally, accepted by modem anthropologists concerned with the nature and 
dynamics of witchcraft and sorcery-related beliefs of indigenous African and 
Melanesian peoples alike. First, there appears to be something of a consensual 
recognition that the relevant field of study is properly delimited to a range of ideas 
and phenomena involving the belief, and the practices associated with the belief, 
that certain human beings are capable of causing harm, injury, death and 
destruction to other persons and property by magical, metaphysical or otherwise 
73 R.M. Berndt, Excess and Restraint: Social Control Among a New Guinea Mountain People 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 224. See also T. Luhrmann, Persuasions of the 
Witch's Craft: Ritual Magic in Contemporary England (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1989), p. 
16. 
74 Marwick, 'Witchcraft as a Social Strain-Gauge', p. 285. 
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supernatural means. 75 Although such a limitation formally precludes from the 
consideration of sorcery and witchcraft those beliefs and practices involved in a 
host of similarly mystical and equally potent forces deployed for constructive or 
beneficial purposes (e.g., curing illnesses, healing injuries, ensuring fertility, 
securing success in agriculture, hunting and other socio-economic pursuits )/6 it 
retains the virtue of moral neutrality, in that the effects of an act of sorcery or 
witchcraft (and the motives behind such actions) will be regarded as either good or 
bad on the basis of the perspective from which those effects are observed and 
experienced by the people themselves.77 
Second, notwithstanding the somewhat arbitrary origins, and sometimes 
polemical ramifications, of the terminological distinction between witchcraft and 
sorcery, having become so much a part of modem anthropological discourse, its 
retention may well be justified on the grounds of convenience alone, if less so, 
perhaps, in many cases, on account its heuristic utility 78 Thus, with particular 
respect to Papua New Guinea, Glick observed: 
Sorcery and witchcraft have to do with the malevolent use of 
superhuman powers. Although the two are closely linked and 
75 Patterson, 'Sorcery and Witchcraft in Melanesia [Part One]', p. 132. 
76 In fact, Patterson does touch on these kinds of magical phenomena, albeit briefly, in her 
consideration of what she describes as prophylactic beliefs and actions: that is, the measures taken 
for purposes of protecting against and preventing the harmful consequences of sorcerous acts. 
Ibid., pp. 147-148. 
77 Although Patterson rejected the distinction between 'sorcery' and 'vengeance magic', as 
these expressions were used by Evans-Pritchard, Marwick and other Africanists to distinguish 
between characterisation of an act on the basis of one's positional perspective ('what is sorcery to 
one person or group will be simultaneously vengeance magic to another'), she adopted the use of 
'sorcery' and 'tabu' to differentiate between the specific motive of the practitioner in particular 
cases-to cause hann in the first instance, and to prevent or protect against hann, in the second. 
lbid.,p.l41. 
78 Ibid., p. !40. See also, V. W. Turner, 'Witchcraft and Sorcery: Taxonomy versus Dynamics' 
( 1964) 34(4) Africa 314-324. 
in many cultures inseparable, anthropologists sometimes 
distinguish between sorcery as the use of powerful rites or 
poisonous objects and witchcraft as the projection of hannful 
personal power. A sorcerer's capacity to hann, in other words, 
depends on his ability to control extrinsic powers; whereas a 
witch, who can inflict sickness or death on others simply by 
staring at them or willing evil on them, possesses powers-
inherited or acquired-as an intrinsic part of his or her person. 
Beliefs in witchcraft are not uncommon in Melanesian 
cultures, but among most peoples of Papua New Guinea 
sorcery beliefs are predominant; moreover, where witchcraft is 
encountered it is likely to appear as part of a complex of ideas 
centring on sorcery. 79 
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Acknowledging that, in a general sense, these characterisations are shared in 
common by African and Melanesian societies, Patterson prefaces her presentation 
of a broader, peculiarly Melanesian theoretical framework by drawing a 
fundamental distinction between the social circumstances under which accusations 
of sorcery and witchcraft tend to arise in Africa and Melanesia, respectively. 
Relying on the African ethnographies, she notes that accusations of witchcraft or 
sorcery attendant upon illness or death appear almost always to be made against a 
79 L.B. Glick, 'Sorcery and Witchcraft' in Anthropology in Papua New Guinea: Readings from 
the Encyclopaedia of Papua and New Guinea, ed. I. Hogbin (Carlton, VIC: Melbourne University 
Press, 1973), p. 182. Cf. M. Reay, 'The Politics of a Witch-Killing' (1976) 47(1) Oceania 1, who 
argues that sorcery and witchcraft are sharply distinguished from each other amongst the Kuma 
(Western Highlands Province): 
Sorcery is a manly martial art practised by a select few and 
directed solely against the clan's enemies. It is known as 'war 
magic', and expression which uses the tenn for all benevolent 
magic . . . . Only the sorcery of the clan's enemies, directed 
against one1S own group or some eminent individual within it, 
is considered bad-bad, that is, in its alleged effects, since its 
intention is understandable. Witchcraft is the reverse of war 
sorcery in nearly every way. Witches ... are not men of 
standing, as sorcerers are, but are ... men of little account. 
Whereas a sorcerer subjects himself to a stem discipline of 
taboos and fasting, and manages to carry out his duties without 
neglecting his work as a farmer, warrior, an marriage broker, a 
witch is lazy and inefficient and lacks both the energy and 
interest to be a creditable citizen. Further, a witch acts solely 
against members of his own community .... [pp. 1-2] 
2.f6 
person known to the accuser, and that apart from the anomalous cases of 
scapegoating, an accused African sorcerer or witch is almost invariably in a 'close 
and strained relationship with the victim and/or the accuser.'80 In this respect, 
Patterson finds that the Melanesianist literature reveals a very different situation: 
To begin with, it is necessary to distinguish between 
accusations that follow illness and accusations that follow 
death. In the event of death, with rare exceptions, the 
incidence of scapegoating accounts for almost all those 
accusations levelled at co-members of the community, while 
accusations levelled at members of another group, specified or 
anonymous are the norm. It is only accusations made during 
illness that conform to the African paradigm and then not 
invariably." 
Patterson agrees that the locus of the study of Melanesian sorcery and 
witchcraft, like the study of their counterparts in other parts of the world, is 
properly within the ambit of a sociology of conflict. At the same time, however, 
she insists upon the need to qualify key elements of Marwickian tension-based 
theories of such conflict, broadening the analytical aperture in order to take 
account of inter- and intra-group accusations alike. In her view, acts and 
accusations of sorcery and witchcraft reflect the social conflicts that can arise 
when people harbour objectives, desires, ambitions, or expectations which, by 
their nature are incompatible or mutually exclusive. Sorcery and witchcraft 
constitute a particular strategy for dealing with those conflicts; but it is only one 
strategy and, as with any other social form in which such conflict may be 
expressed, sorcery and witchcraft should not be regarded as synonymous with the 
underlying conflict itself.82 Thus, in much the same way as the conflicts that exist 
80 Patterson, 'Sorcery and Witchcraft in Melanesia [Part One]', p. 138. 
81 /bid., pp. 138-139. 
82 Patterson, 'Sorcery and Witchcraft in Melanesia [Part One]', p. 139. 
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within and between groups may have both functional and dysfunctional aspects, 
the expression of such conflict in the idiom of sorcery and witchcraft may be seen 
to have both fi.mctional and dysfunctional implications-for the individuals 
involved and for the social relationships that obtain in both instances.83 
On these premises, Patterson pursued her analysis of Melanesian sorcery and 
witchcraft beliefs, not to determine their origins, but rather to explain the 
consequences of those beliefs and their associated practices for the affected social 
relationships (intra- and intergroup), and to ascertain 'the reasons for the 
differential stress placed on certain aspects of the phenomena in different 
Melanesian societies. 84 In doing so, however, it was necessary first to describe the 
general features of Melanesian sorcery and witchcraft, the principal elements of 
which, according to the patterns Patterson identified, are summarised below. 
(1) Typological Configuration of Melanesian 
Sorcery and Witchcraft 
Relying on the extant literature of Melanesianist ethnography, Patterson 
identified several general types or techniques of sorcery, one or more variations of 
which are found amongst different groups. First, there is what she describes as 
personal leavings and food remains sorcery, which utilises some substance or 
item with which the intended victim has had some intimate contact, such as nail 
parings, hair clippings, excreta, semen and so forth. 
83 Ibid. 
Having secured the essential ingredients, [the sorcerer] ... 
places the remains in some sort of container ... , or wraps 
them in a bundle of bespelled leaves and then almost 
invariably destroys them by slow burning. Other potent 
84 Ibid., p. 140. 
'medicines' are often added to the remains. If the sorcerer 
wishes to cause illness only he partly bums or merely heats the 
remains but does not destroy them. The victim's symptoms 
may be enacted by the sorcerer during this procedure. To kill 
the victim the remains must be completely burnt. . . . The 
recitation of spells usually accompanies the procedure in this 
technique and they may be vital to the efficacy of the sorcery. 
To restore the victim to health, the remains may have to be 
returned to the victim, neutralised or merely removed from the 
fire by the sorcerer'' 
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Disease sorcery is a less sophisticated technique which, because it is not 
usually intended to be fatal, tends more often to be directed towards members of 
the sorcerer's own group. Here too, the recitation of a spell may accompany the 
practice, and may often be all that is necessary in order to bring about the desired 
result. Consistent with the objects and social dynamics of disease sorcery, each 
disease-causing spell tends to have a corollary, counter-active spell, which the 
sorcerer may be entreated to invoke at the request of, or on payment of a fee by, 
the victims or their kinsmen. 86 
A third form of sorcery is identified by Patterson as vada or vele which, 
variously denominated, would appear to be widely practised throughout 
Melanesia.87 Vada sorcery is distinguished by the fact that it commonly involves 
several sorcerers acting in concert. It is most notable, however, in virtue of the 
fact that it involves a direct physical assault on the victim. 88 Glick refers to this as 
85 Ibid., pp. 141-142. 
86 Ibid., p. 142. 
87 Variants of this technique are described by Fortune, Sorcerers of Dobu, p. 163; S.W. Reed, 
The Making of Modern New Guinea, with Special Reference to the Culture Contact in the 
Mandated Territory (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1943), pp. 69-70; P. 
Lawrence, 'De Rerum Natura: The Garia View of Sorcery' in Stephen, Sorcerer and Witch in 
Melanesia, pp. 17, 28-29; Bowden, 'Sorcery, Illness and Social Control in Kwoma Society' in 




a form of assault sorcery, using the Neo-Melanesian Pidgin (Tok Pisin) name, 
sangguma, which he described as follows: 
The assailants spring on their victim from ambush, brutally 
overpower him, jab poisons directly into his body, sometimes 
twist or rip out organs, and perpetrate similar crimes against 
his person. They are not satisfied until he is thoroughly 
befuddled, unable to remember who or what has afflicted him. 
A characteristically sadistic touch is to ask simple questions or 
set simple tasks to test the victim's mental state ... and resume 
the attack if he responds sensibly .... The victim is permitted 
to stagger home but only as a shell, a mocking sign to kinsmen 
and neighbours that in this man's person they have all in a 
sense been assaulted and are now helpless to resist. Finally .. 
. , it is immediately evident to everyone except the victim that 
the illness is hopeless. 89 
Despite the brutality of the physical assault to which the victim of sangguma 
is believed to have been subject, it is to the overwhelming potency of the sorcery, 
as opposed to any supposed physical injuries, that the victim is believed ultimately 
to succumb. In a similar vein, Patterson identifies a range of miscellaneous 
sorcery practices involving the introjection of various objects (e.g., stones, 
miniature arrows) into, or the application of certain substances on, or in the way 
of, the physical person of the sorcerer's victim. Unless counteracted, these will 
also cause illness or death by a kind of 'poisoning'. Here too, however, it is the 
magical quality of the process and/or the instrumentalities used in a sorcerous 
attack, rather than any physical injury or inherent toxicity, that is seen to cause the 
harm. This interpretation is corroborated by the fact that, in many reported cases, 
the kinds of injuries inflicted and substances utilised by sorcerers are not 
medically recognised as capable of inducing the results experienced, observed or 
described by the people themselves.90 
89 Glick, 'Sorcery and Witchcraft', pp. 183-184. 
9() Patterson, 'Sorcery and Witchcraft in Melanesia [Part One]', p. 146. 
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In terms of the definition of witchcraft she was prepared to accept for the 
purposes of her analysis-a definition generally consistent with Evans-Pritchard's 
characterisation of witchcraft-Patterson observed that witchcraft beliefs, as such, 
are much less common in Melanesia than in African societies. Referring to the 
relevant Melanesianist ethnographies, she noted that, in certain societies, there is 
an apparent propensity to associate witchcraft with women more so than with-
and in some cases, to the exclusion of-men, and that this configuration may bear 
some relationship with specific patterns of gender relations.91 This is not always 
the case, however.92 
With respect of those Melanesian societies in which ethnographers have 
identified specific patterns of witchcraft beliefs, Patterson discerned two general 
features which seem to be reported commonly in the literature: first, the idea that 
witches have certain extraordinary powers of a personal nature, including the 
ability to transform themselves into various creatures, to fly through the air and to 
render themselves invisible to their intended victims; and second, the belief that 
witches tend to be necrophagous. Especial social significance is attached to the 
latter of these features, since a witch's homicidal cravings for human flesh have 
the potential to put many people in harm's way.93 Brown's description of the 
witchcraft beliefs of the Mintima people (Simbu Province) is illustrative of both 
features, and serves to underscore key differences between Melanesian witchcraft 
and the conventional Africanist paradigm: 
91 Ibid., pp. 144-145. 
92 Amongst the Kuma of the Western Highlands, for example, 'the power of witchcraft is 
attributed to men, women, and even children, and all may be accused.' Ibid., p. 145. 
93 Ibid., pp. 145-146. See also L. Steadman, 'The Cannibal Witches in the Hewa' (1975) 56(2) 
Oceania 114, 117-18. 
The witch, involuntarily, has a small creature (most often a 
bat, but possibly a bird, lizard, rat, snake) which is the kuma 
[witchcraft] inside his or her chest or head. It can change into 
another animal, leave the witch's body, usually at night, and 
return. . . . The creature goes out to take the flesh from a 
victim and bring it back for the witch to eat. Then the victim 
dies. Men, women and children are believed potential kuma. 
Sometimes both a man and his wife are thought to be kuma. 
Kuma are expected to be in a family with other kumo, and 
suspects are questioned about their close relatives, but no 
training or techniques are inherited or taught." 
(2) Patterns of Action: The Social Contexts of 
Melanesian Sorcery and Witchcraft 
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To the extent that Patterson regards sorcery and witchcraft accusations as 
significant indicia of underlying intra- and intergroup conflicts, the socio-
relational circumstances under which such accusations arise are critical variables 
in her theoretical model. Examining these key variables in the context of the 
Melanesian societies depicted in the extant ethnographic literature with a view to 
identifying such patterns as might be apparent, Patterson introduced an important 
refinement of one of the central dictums implicit in the Africanist studies of 
sorcery and witchcraft: the assumptions that all instances of illness, injury, death 
or misfortune are invariably linked to sorcery or witchcraft. 
On the evidence educed, Patterson found that, in the vast majority of societies, 
a range of minor illnesses and injuries were regarded as quite 'natural', in the sense 
that they will inevitably be experienced by many people in the absence of the 
involvement of sorcery or witchcraft. To be sure, in a considerable number of the 
94 P. Brown, 'Kumo Witchcraft at Mintima, Chimbu Province, Papua New Guinea' (1977) 
58(1) Oceania 26, 27. See also T.M. Maracek, 'The Death of Koliam: A Witchcraft Killing in a 
Changing Environment' (1979) 59(3) Oceania 221; Reay, 'The Politics of a Witch-Killing'; 'The 
Magico-Religious Foundations of New Guinea Highlands Warfare' in Stephen, Sorcerer and 
Witch in Melanesia, pp. 83, 92-115. 
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cases m which sorcery-related elements were absent, some other form of 
metaphysical intervention (e.g., where misfortune was regarded as retribution 
visited upon a person by a ghost or spirit because he or she had transgressed 
against an important religious tenet). Usually, however, she found that there were 
alternative agencies to which illness might be attributed, and it often happened 
that sorcery would be diagnosed only after all other possibilities had been 
exhausted. 95 
(a) Accusations of Sorcery 
Acknowledging that in most Melanesian societies at least some and often 
many illnesses, diseases and deaths are recognised as having been caused by 
sorcery, Patterson found a significant difference between the nature of the social 
relationships involved when sorcery accusations related to illness, and the kinds of 
relationships involved when accusations followed on in the wake of a death. In 
relation to accusations arising in the first instance, it appeared that, where such 
allegations were made at all, they were just as likely to be levelled against a 
member of the alleged victim's local group (who may or may not be a kinsman) or 
against a member or members of another, often unspecified group.96 With 
particular respect to intra-group accusations, however, Patterson noted that: 
[t]he characteristic feature of ... [an] accusation ... is 
recognition of conflict which should be resolved in 
conciliation by the payment of compensation on the part of the 
95 Patterson, 'Sorcery and Witchcraft in Melanesia [Part One]', p. 148. See Lawrence, 'De 
Rerum Natura', p. 25, noting the distinction made by the Garia between illnesses, and even deaths, 
regarded as naturally attendant upon human mortality, those that result from some offence to a 
ghost or a deity, and those that are caused by the deliberate malevolence of human agents (i.e., 
sorcerers). 
96 Patterson, 'Sorcery and Witchcraft in Melanesia[ Part One]', p. 148. 
sorcerer or by a reciprocal exchange between alleged sorcerer 
and victim. 97 
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In relation to accusations attendant upon a death, however, Patterson found 
that such accusations were made almost exclusively against a person or persons 
classified, from the point of view of the accuser, as a member or members of an 
'out-group'. Even if the identity of the suspected culprit might not be known, the 
critical point in such a situation was that, 'while it is possible to conceive that an 
individual may bring about the misfortune of a fellow group member, it is not 
conceivable that he should wish to cause his death.'98 
(b) Retaliation and Response to Acts of Sorcery and Witchcraft 
As suggested above, irrespective of whether the suspected perpetrator is within 
or outside the social group to which the victim belongs, the common response to a 
perceived act of sorcery resulting only in illness will normally result in a demand 
for compensation; or, in some cases, which Patterson considers to be 'exceptional', 
a proportional act of counter-sorcery. In the face of a death believed to have been 
brought about by sorcery, however (culpability for which is almost invariably 
attributed to a person or persons outside the group to which the victim belongs), 
the likelihood of some more severe form of retaliation is much greater. In the 
latter cases, such retaliation may involve a physical attack by the kinsmen of the 
victim on the group with which the supposed sorcerer is known or believed to be 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid., p. 149. 
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affiliated, although it may also take the form of similarly targeted vengeance 
sorcery. 99 
In determining the nature and extent of such retaliation as may be considered 
appropriate in any particular instance, Patterson identified several factors that will 
be taken into account by the aggrieved kinsmen of the victim. These include the 
social status and character of the victim; the nature of the relationship between the 
accuser and the alleged sorcerer (assuming the latter's identity is known); the 
circumstances of the relations between the groups to which the accuser and the 
supposed sorcerer belong; the status of the suspected sorcerer himself (again, 
assuming his or her identity is known); and a circumspect consideration of the 
tactical and strategic implications-political, economic and military-<Jf the 
contemplated retaliatory action. 100 
(c) Personality, Character and the Socio-Political 
Position of the Melanesian Sorcerer 
In addition to the quality of the misfortune suffered by the victim and the 
affiliational status of a suspected sorcerer with the victim's own or another group, 
Patterson identified certain features relating to the personal characteristics of 
persons believed to be responsible for an act of sorcery or witchcraft, which she 
considered to be significant in the patterned dynamics of accusations. As might 
be expected, co-resident in-group members accused of lethal sorcery or witchcraft 
were almost invariably classed as scapegoats, that is: 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid. 
(p ]ersons who have either alienated kin and neighbours 
through frequent anti-social behaviour or neglect of 
obligations, or . . . persons peripheral to the group with 
conditional status as members (e.g. immigrants or the spouses 
of group members). 101 
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In a few cases, however, she found that in-group accusations attendant upon the 
death of the victim of some social status might be directed at a political rival of 
the deceased. 101 
The status of a sorcerer within his own group is often reciprocally related to 
his political position, in that the achievement of political importance can be a 
function of one's abilities as a sorcerer, and such abilities themselves can serve to 
enhance one's political position. In this connection, Patterson found that in those 
societies in which political power was held by a limited number of men, those 
individuals also tended either to monopolise, or to have an effectively 
monopolistic access to, important sorcery techniques. Specialist sorcerers serving 
the political elite might enjoy the benefits of their proximity to power; but such a 
position can be a precarious one, since it is dependent upon the protection of 
persons whose own status is subject to the vicissitudes of politics. 103 
Ultimately, as Patterson suggests, 'a person with a reputation for sorcery or 
witchcraft is tolerated only so long as he is either powerful, supported by those 
with power, or not in conflict with his fellows.' Thus, where the protection 
afforded to a sorcerer in virtue of his political patronage erodes on account of a 
sorcerer's waning acceptance or popularity amongst his patron's constituency, or 
where his patron faces a reversal of his own political fortunes, the sorcerer may 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid. 
'"'Ibid., pp. 149-150. 
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quickly become the object of enmity and a potential scapegoat in the eyes of those 
who previously regarded him with awe, respect and admiration. 104 
(3) Group Structure and Conflict: The Social Parameters 
of Melanesian Sorcery and Witchcraft 
The descriptive generalisations that Patterson constructed on the basis of her 
extensive examination of the Melanesianist ethnographies provided the raw data 
in which she grounded her explanatory propositions about the social origins of 
sorcery and witchcraft accusations. Having laid that foundation, Patterson set out 
to articulate, in a preliminary way, a theory of Melanesian sorcery and witchcraft 
as a form of regulated social conflict. On the premises thus established, she 
formed the view that a probing scrutiny of the structure of individual Melanesian 
societies should reveal the ways in which conflict is regulated, and the frequency 
with which the 'contingent institutions' of sorcery and witchcraft are activated in 
those regulatory processes.105 
Analysing the features she regarded as salient for the purposes of identifying 
distinct social groups, Patterson developed a comprehensive scheme whereby the 
Melanesian societies represented in the ethnographic literature she examined 
could be classified in terms of prevailing socio-cultural rules and norms of 
descent, affiliation, inheritance and domicile, and then broadly differentiated on 
the basis of the types of society characterised by those features. The details of 
Patterson's classificatory method and the specific configuration of the various 
104 Ibid., p. 150. 
105 Ibid., p. 151. 
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groups evaluated need not be elaborated here106 Essentially, however, her model 
yielded three archetypal social groups organised around the rules and norms 
described above. These she denominated Type A societies, characterised by 'an 
effective male membership that is continually fluctuating'; Type B societies, with 
'a relatively stable and constant male membership'; and Type C societies, 
comprising a variant of the second type to the extent that effective male 
membership is closed and fairly constant. 107 Evaluating individual Melanesian 
societies in terms of their stability and solidarity, Patterson placed each of the 
three categorical types into which those societies could be classified on a 
continuum, locating 'Type A at the negative extreme, Type C at the positive and 
Type B in an intermediary position.' Assessing the relevant socio-structural 
factors against the nature, type and frequency of sorcery and witchcraft allegations 
106 Of doubtless interest and importance to anthropologists, these details are of a sophisticated 
technical nature and do not bear on the issues with which we are particularly concerned. Briefly 
stated, the social formations identified by Patterson were those constituted as parishes: local 
groups comprised of persons associated with a certain tract of land, bearing a distinctive name and 
organised as a discrete political unit. Ibid. 
107 Ibid. Again, the ethnographic details of the basis of which a particular society qualified as 
consistent with Type A, B or C need not concern us here. For those to whom such matters are of 
interest, however, Patterson descriptions are summarised below. 
Type A societies included monocarpellary parishes characterised by matrilineal descent 
and inheritance with either avunculo-virilocal domiciliary or hi-local residential features, 
and non-carpellary parishes characterised by non-unilineal descent and inheritance with 
optative residential features. 
Type B societies embraced parishes consisting of members of a number of exogamous 
unilineal kinship groups that are either phyle wide or common to a particular parish only. 
The characteristic descent and inheritence system could be either matrilineal or 
patrilineal, with residential arrangements being avunculo-virilocal in the first instance and 
patri-virilocal in the second. 
Type C societies involved parishes with patrilineal descent and inheritance combined with 
patri-varilocal domicile and mono-carpellary characteristics. Ibid., pp. 152-155. 
Particular individual Papua New Guinea societies identified by Patterson as falling within one or 
another of these three classificatory types are discussed in the second part of her essay, 'Sorcery 
and Witchcraft in Melanesia [Part Two]' (1975) 45(3) Oceania 212-230. 
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found to occur within and between the Melanesian societies classified in 
accordance with her tri-partite scheme, Patterson advanced three empirically based 
hypotheses: 
• in those societies where effective male membership is variable and the in-
group is dispersed, almost all disease, death and misfortune will be 
attributed to the malevolent supernatural capabilities of human beings; 
• in those societies where effective male membership is segmental and 
relatively constant, and the in-group is largely co-terminous with the 
parish, almost all death and intractable illness will be attributed to the 
malevolent supernatural capabilities human beings, but non-human 
agencies will be blamed for some illness and death; and 
• in those societies where effective male membership is relatively constant 
and the in-group is co-terminous with the parish, almost all disease, death 
and misfortune will be attributed to non-human agencies, and sorcery and 
witchcraft will be minor concerns. 108 
Patterson's theory--or more accurately, perhaps, her typology--of sorcery and 
witchcraft as an expression of various forms of social conflict does not provide a 
simple set of correlations neatly linking high, middle-range and low measures of 
group stability and solidarity with commensurate incidences of intra- and 
intergroup conflict, and invariably corresponding nexuses to internally and 
externally directed sorcery accusations. Nor are the patterns she identifies with 
respect to the differential emphases on sorcery and witchcraft as explanations for 
disease and death simply related to differences in the constancy of what she 
108 Patterson, 'Sorcery and Witchcraft in Melanesia [Part One]', p. 157. 
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describes as effective male membership in particular parish groups. What she 
does clearly elucidate, however, is that there are demonstrable relationships 
between the kinds of social conflict associated with particular types of group 
structure, on the one hand, and the frequency with which resort may be had to 
particular kinds of sorcery-related beliefs, actions and explanations by members of 
those groups. 109 
Her conclusions are important in several respects. First, she does not concern 
herself overly much with the origins of sorcery and witchcraft beliefs as 
intrinsically rational or irrational, but focuses exclusively on the facts and 
circumstances governing the expression of those beliefs as social facts, the reality 
of which is beyond question. This kind of approach enables constructive 
theorisation to proceed without the unnecessary ethnocentric complications 
engendered by express or tacit assumptions that there is something 'wrong' with 
the beliefs themselves. 
Second, in her meticulous consideration of the distinctively Melanesian 
characteristics of the sorcery-related phenomena with which her theory is 
concerned, Patterson demonstrates that there are valid and compelling reasons for 
deviating form the African-based models on which much of the anthropological 
analysis of Melanesian sorcery and witchcraft has been based. Superficial 
similarities notwithstanding, the differences between the relevant Melanesian 
social configurations and their African counterparts are, on closer consideration, 
basic and obvious. As Read observed in relation to the New Guinea Highlands: 
'[t]he area of effective social life is small ... [and] we find a 
highly fragmented social . Members of the cultural-linguistic 
group seldom have any conception of common identity; each 
109 Ibid., p. 160. 
such group, furthermore, comprises a multiplicity of socially 
distinct, autonomous communities which are characterised by 
strong internal solidarity and by an external opposition with all 
other like communities.' 110 
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Moreover, as Patterson demonstrates, the maintenance of political identity m 
Melanesian society is largely a function of the limitation and expression of 
conflict both within and between local groups. Properly apprehended as an 
integral element of Melanesian polities, accusations of sorcery 'are no longer the 
anomalies that the African data made them appear.'lll 
Finally, without denying that the various specific techniques of Melanesian 
sorcery and witchcraft are in many ways similar to those used by African and 
other traditional indigenous societies, Patterson does not permit these genuinely 
isomorphic features to override the importance of understanding the 
manifestations of sorcery and witchcraft as merely one dynamic expression of 
otherwise distinctively Melanesian intra- and inter-group relations. 112 
B. Sorcery as a 'Cultural Form' 
Patterson's typology of sorcery and witchcraft accusations was the first attempt 
by an anthropologist to construct a theoretical model designed to take 
comprehensive account of sorcery-related phenomena on a modem 
110 Patterson, 'Sorcery and Witchcraft in Melanesia [Part Two]', p. 231, quoting .Kenneth 
Read, 'Cultures of the Central Highlands, New Guinea' (1954). 
Ill Ibid. 
112 Thus: 
the expression and suppression of conflict in Melanesian 
societies is related to the structure of the groupings within 
them and ... sorcery and witchcraft (as forms of socially 
regulated conflict) will, therefore, vary in importance as 
explanations of disease and death in concomitance with 
variations in these structures. [Ibid., p. 230] 
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ethnographically informed basis. For the reasons outlined above, her achievement 
represents a significant step forward, both as an act of intellectual liberation from 
the distorting constraints of Africanist preconceptions, and as a continuation of the 
movement away from the erstwhile tendentious analyses of sorcery and witchcraft 
as cultural delusions and towards their ethnographically informed consideration as 
demonstrably real social facts. Limited though it was to the Melanesian social 
field, like all comparatist endeavours, its theoretical utility was weakened by 
unavoidable over-generalisations-a consequence of which Patterson herself was 
not unaware. 113 
This, perhaps inevitable, outcome left Patterson's model open to an equally 
inevitable challenge by other anthropologists and ethnographers invoking a 
critique based on what Mary Douglas referred to as 'Bongo-Bongoism': 
Hitherto when a generalization is tentatively advanced, it is 
rejected out of court by any field-workers who can say: 'This 
is all very well, but it doesn't apply to the Bongo-Bongo'. 114 
Predictably enough, the indignant 'Bongo-Bongoist' might be expected to 
demonstrate the inapplicability of Patterson's theory to the Melanesian society 
constituting the particular objects of his or her ethnographic scrutiny. Bruce 
K.nauft went further, however; complementing his critique with an alternative 
model ofhis own. 115 
113 See Patterson, 'Sorcery and Witchcraft in Melanesia [Part One]', p. 160. 
114 M. Douglas, Natural Symbols: Explorations in Cosmology (Hannondsworth: Penguin 
Books Ltd., 1970), p. 16. 
1
" B. Knauf!, Good Company and Violence: Sorcery and Social Action in a Lowland New 
Guinea Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). 
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Knauft's ethnography focused on sorcery beliefs and attributions amongst the 
Gebusi, a small society of some 450 persons inhabiting an area on the Stirckland 
Plain in the Western Highlands Province of Papua New Guinea. Departing from 
the pattern by which many Melanesian societies are characterised, the Gebusi 
recognise no formalised roles of secular authority or socio-political leadership. 
There are no 'big-men' or other singularly identifiable head men, and no 
gerontocratic group of elders. Unlike other highland societies, the Gebusi do not 
engage in competitive exchanges. Status rivalry is noticeably absent, as is any 
distinctively aggressive aspect to typical male demeanour. Conflicts and disputes 
are assiduously avoided, and arguments and fights within the group are rare. 
Knauft's own field experience corroborated the observations noted in early patrol 
reports, in which life amongst the Gebusi was described as generally peaceful, co-
operative and friendly. 'In many respects,' Knauft remarks, their communal and 
non-competitive spirit of amity is indeed idyllic.' 116 
Paradoxically, however, Knauft suggests that the Gebusi have one of the 
highest homicide rates for any human society, with approximately 33 per cent of 
all adult deaths (calculated for the period from 1940 to 1982) being violent 
homicides committed, not by outsiders, but primarily by co-residents and kinsmen 
living near to one another and within the same community. 117 What is more, the 
vast majority of Gebusi homicides were seen 'to follow directly upon attributions 
of sorcery-that is to say, they consist of the killing of the primary sorcery 
suspect.' us It was this opposition between amity and homicide--' good company 
'"Ibid., pp. 1-2. 
117 According to Knauft's interpolations, the rate of homicide amongst the Gebusi for the 
period was amounted to a notional 568 per 100,000 persons per year-approximately 50 times 
greater than the then current rate of all reported homicides in the United States. Ibid., p. 3. 
118 Ibid. 
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and violence'-which Knauft regarded as fundamental in the shaping of Gebusi 
culture; and as such, a compelling reason to reject as an explanatory theory the 
sociology of conflict approach to sorcery and witchcraft accusations that Patterson 
imported, mutatis mutandis, into the Melanesian anthropological field. 
Gebusi show little if any evidence of ongoing social or 
political tension in relationships that are sorcery-prone in a 
statistical sense. And to assume the existence of strain by 
virtue of the sorcery attribution itself is to adopt the 
functionalist tautology. In fact, there is a striking absence of 
Gebusi competition or political machination in sorcery-prone 
relations-and an absence of private backbiting or gossip as 
well. Gehusi sorcery attributions result not so much from 
conflict as from the pervasive denial of conflict in certain 
relations. 1 19 
The apparent inadequacy of even a modified social strain-gauge approach to 
the explanation of sorcery-related behaviour amongst the Gebusi drove Knauft to 
examine the phenomena at deeper level of cultural life--at the level of belief 
itself. This recognition drew him to the conclusion that it was the articulation of 
'strain' at both levels that needed to be examined from a symbolic and 
psychological, as well as a sociological, perspective. In this connection he noted 
that, although '[a] comprehensive and systematic articulation of these perspectives 
has been routinely called for ... by many of the major figures in the study of 
sorcery and witchcraft', none had ever actually been carried out; and it was 
towards just such an analysis that Knauft's efforts were directed. 120 
With particular respect to the Gebusi, the details of Knauft's ethnographic 
study and conclusions need not concern us here. What is more important for 
present purposes is the larger comparative typology that he developed as an 
119 Ibid. 
120 Ibid., p. 330. 
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alternative to Patterson's model. Drawing on his own research, and evaluating the 
now-expanded body of Melanesianist ethnographic literature on which Patterson 
relied in the construction of her hypotheses, Knauft postulated six types of pre-
colonial Melanesian society on the basis of the socio-symbolic qualities of the 
sorcery beliefs and practices associated with each group. 121 
In many Melanesian societies, Knauft observes, sorcery was a monopoly of 
hereditary leaders or of specialists working primarily in the service of such a 
leader. Here, the monopoly over sorcery was regarded as a legitimate means of 
social control, and served to increase the status of the recognised leader or leaders 
within a group. Amongst commoners, fear of this kind of 'chiefly or priestly 
121 In constructing this model, Knauft was significantly influenced by Burridge's ideal-type 
description of the Melanesian manager. See K.O.L. Burridge, 'The Melanesian Manager' in 
Studies in Social Anthropology: Essays in Memory of E. E. Evans-Pritchard, ed. J.H. Beattie and 
R.G. Lienhard! (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975). On Burridge's analysis, according to 
Knauft, indigenous Melanesian leaders must struggle with a moral and cultural dilemma: 
They should satisfy egalitarian ideals and remain equivalent 
with other men, but their attempt to become first among equals 
leads them to become self-willed, manipulative, and 
powerful-in short, to adopt the victimizing characteristics of 
the leader-as-sorcerer. These demands and ideals are in 
tension not only for the aspiring individual but also for the 
society as a whole, since the need for equivalence and yet the 
importance of leadership and authority under some conditions 
are recognized by all. . . . Hence, the prestige and will-to-
power of the leader are admired but are also resented and 
ultimately constrained by his followers. [Knauft, Good 
Company and Violence, p. 340] 
Here, Knauft argues, Burridge noted and refined an important dynamic that Patterson only 
touched upon obliquely: 'the indigenous moral and ethical system is closely related to sorcery 
beliefs and to the type and degree of Melanesian leadership.' What Burridge failed to account for, 
however-and what Knauft attempted to assess more fully-were the significant differences in 
outcome to which this kind of tension gives rise in different Melanesian societies. Ibid. 
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sorcery' also served to control political rivalries, dissent and other potentially 
destabilising disputes. '22 
In other societies, de-facto control of sorcery techniques remained in the hands 
of a gerontocratic elite or other specialists. This circumscribed control resulted in 
a 'channelled limitation of sorcery accusations' thereby reducing (and in some 
cases precluding) divisive intra-group disputes based on sorcery-related 
accusations. In some instances, Knauft notes, inter-group 'warfare' might 
effectively be carried out almost exclusively through the sorcery and counter-
sorcery within the control of these leaders and/or specialists, without any necessity 
to resort to conventional violence. At the intra-group level, sorcery could be used 
by the same select group either as a means of general social control, or sometimes 
for more self-serving purposes. 123 
Amongst a third group of Melanesian societies, sorcery was more closely 
associated with 'war magic', and was utilised in connection with the competitive 
struggles for leadership amongst and between established and aspiring leaders. In 
these cases, Knauft suggests, sorcery was essentially an adjunct to a man's 
individual abilities as a fighter and an aspect of any number of hegemonic 
strategies. 124 
In the larger and politically more centralised societies of the New Guinea 
Highlands, and also on the island of Manus, Knauft identifies a fourth 
122 Ibid., pp. 340-341. 
"'Ibid., p. 341. 
124 Ibid. 
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characteristic pattern of sorcery belief and behaviour. In these societies, he 
suggests: 
there was a relative absence of sorcery beliefs in pre-colonial 
times. Leadership and kin/political affiliation were relatively 
unconstrained by sorcery fears. Correspondingly, political 
integration on the basis of competitive bigman status hierarchy 
was highly developed.'" 
Although such societies might be more or less continually involved in cycles of 
inter-group warfare and violence, these events appear to have been 'neither caused 
nor tempered by fears of sorcery.' 126 
In stark contrast to the kinds of societies described immediately above, K.nauft 
depicts a fifth group as those societies in which a reputation for sorcery was of 
considerable significance in the dynamics of leadership competition. To the 
extent that leaders within such societies actively exploit their reputations as 
powerful sorcerers, with a view to political ascendancy and the maintenance of 
control over their constituencies, sorcery suspicions 'and a concomitant lack of 
intragroup trust' tended to limit the development of stable political constituencies 
and institutionalised leadership hierarchies. 127 
K.nauft's sixth category embraces those Melanesian societies in which the 
political ascendance of individual leaders was actively restrained, if not entirely 
precluded, by beliefs and fears of sorcery. 
In these cases, the leader was extremely wary of appearing too 
dominant over other men-for fear of either being suspected 
of sorcery or of being a vulnerable target of sorcery sent 
125 Ibid., p. 342. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Ibid. 
against him. In these cases, leaders were careful not to appear 
domineering or ostentatious; the need to be seen as consensual 
and equivalent to other men was particularly pronounced. 128 
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Accounting for the shifting patterns of political leadership evident m many 
contemporary Papua New Guinea societies, and relating that circumstance to the 
kinds of constraints on sorcery-related beliefs and behaviour described above, 
Knauft associates the appearance of these features today to the prevalence of wage 
labour and increased migration. Under such conditions, he suggests, 'sorcery fears 
may intensifY as a reaction against the increasing potential for socioeconomic 
stratification.'129 
Acknowledging that no pre-colonial Melanesian society could be said to fall 
neatly into one or another of the categories described above, Knauft condensed his 
six-part typology into four, constructed on the basis of specified complexes of 
factors which, on the ethnographic evidence, appear to co-occur: 
(1) Societies in which sorcery practices and attributions were effectively, and 
fairly exclusively controlled by stable leadership. In these societies, 
sorcery fears tended to suppress intra-group divisiveness and to promote 
overall political integration. 
(2) Societies in which sorcery was relatively absent or used primarily by 
leaders in active inter-group conflict. This pattern may be associated with 
strong competitive leadership relatively unconstrained by sorcery fears, 
but with greater potential for endemic warfare. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Ibid., p. 343. 
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(3) Societies in which the control of sorcery was a significant element of 
competitive leadership even within the group. Leaders competitively 
exploited their reputations as sorcerers as a means of gaining and 
maintaining political power. In such societies, distrust and fear of sorcery 
militated against group solidarity, and sorcery feuds could easily become 
politically divisive. 
( 4) Societies in which the actions of leaders have themselves been 
substantially restrained by fears of sorcery attack or retribution. In these 
cases, '[t]he somewhat ambivalent relationship between sorcery and 
prestige shifts . . . to a more definitely negative and retributive 
character.' 130 
Having set out what amounts, in my view, to a more fully developed and 
rather more sophisticated variant on Patterson's typology, it is curious that Knauft 
should level the criticism he does against her methodology: 
A taxonomy of categories that are defined in absolute rather 
than in continuous terms become increasingly unwieldy as one 
tries to apply them systematically to a wide range of societies. 
Qualifications are invariably needed to account for ambiguous 
cases, and these easily lead to convoluted reasoning or 
cumbersome methodology .... 
While Patterson's ideas are extremely interesting, in the 
service of typology they give rise to complexly defmed and 
occasionally dubious generalizations . . . . My point in 
critiquing Patterson's article is not that her basic ideas are 
wrong, but that her method and typology are too strict in 
reducing these ideas to a uni-causal explanation on the basis of 
kinship and social structure. 131 
uo Ibid., pp. 343-344. Knauft locates the Gebusi within the fourth of these condensed 
categories. 
131 Ibid., pp. 346-347. Citing specific ethnographically documented examples, Knauft 
suggests that, in fact, the vast majority of Melanesian societies 'fall near the fine line between' two 
of Patterson's three 'types' of local groups. Ibid. p. 347. 
269 
Still, he does offer a model which, informed by a more recent trend in 
anthropological analysis, examines subtle variations in Melanesian symbolic 
structures, cultural orientations and ethical systems that Patterson failed to explore 
in depth. 132 Thus, whereas Knauft, like Patterson, develops a continuum along 
which the sorcery-related beliefs and practices of various Melanesian societies are 
located in corresponding conjunction with discernible patterns of leadership and 
socio-political tensions, unlike Patterson, he is more sensitive to-or at least 
demonstrably more interested to understand-the interaction of those conflict 
generating/conflict suppressing tensions and a range of other equally important 
considerations: 
It would be wrong to suggest tbat ethics or sorcery beliefs are 
the singular cause of prime mover of variations in status 
differentiation and political integration in Melanesia; sorcery 
beliefs interact with social structural, economic, and ecological 
factors. 133 
At the same time, however, Knauft does ascribe especial significance to the 
role of sorcery-related beliefs and practices in these complex sequences of 
interaction. 
[E]thical orientations and sorcery beliefs can have an 
important independent influence in the feedback processes that 
Patterson's ethnographic categorizations are hence particularly 
prone to problems of data control. Even in terms of the data 
available, there are numerous Melanesian societies tbat appear 
to contravene Patterson's predictions or categorizations. [Ibid., 
pp. 347,421-422, nn. 10-12] 
"' See e.g. B. Douglas, 'Rank, Power, Authority: A Reassessment of Traditional Leadership in 
South Pacific Societies' 14 Journal of Pacific Studies 2-27; N. Modjeska, 'Production and 
Inequality: Perspectives from Central New Guinea' in Inequality in New Guinea Highlands 
Societies, ed. A.J. Strathem (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). For a similar 
example in a Polynesian context, see N. Thomas, 'Marginal Powers: Shamanism and tbe 
Disintegration of Hierarchy' (1988) 8(3) Critique of Anthropology 53-74. 
133 Knauft, Good Company and Violence, p. 344. 
engender sociopolitical development. These cultural and 
symbolic factors cannot themselves be reduced to or 
'explained' as a simple function of social structural, economic, 
or economic determinants. !34 
C. Sorcery as an Expression of Socio-Political Power 
270 
In his introduction to a collection of essays dealing with the dynamics of 
sorcery-related beliefs and practices in the then (and still) rapidly changing 
context of modem Melanesian societies, Zelenietz acknowledged, at once, that 
such a focused consideration of the phenomena had theretofore received 'only 
scattered and incidental treatment' in the ethnographic and anthropological 
literature, and that anything in the nature of a comprehensive or definitive 
assessment would be premature at best. 135 For reasons which will be obvious at 
this point, he noted the difficulties inherent in approaching the subject matter, 
illustrating the fact by reference to the issue of legitimacy in respect of sorcery-
related practices. 
Thus, according to Evans-Pritchard, Zelenietz suggests that sorcery was 
generally regarded as illegitimate: 'an unacceptable means for handling social 
conflict'. Amongst the Azande, sorcerers were 'socially marginal people', and the 
existence of the practice was indicative of 'a lack or inadequacy of legitimate 
social controls', particularly where malevolent magic was direct against members 
of a sorcerer's (or his principal's) own group.136 Marwick advanced this view, 
arguing that 'sorcery ... is best understood when regarded as ... the illegitimate 
134 Ibid. 
135 M. Zelenietz, 'Sorcery and Social Change: An Introduction', Special Issue: Sorcery and 
Social Change in Melanesia ( 1981) 9 Social Analysis I. All but one of the substantive essays 




sub-division of the destructive branch of magic"37-a perspective shared, in the 
main (though by no means universally) by the Africanists, but one with which 
Melanesianist ethnographers, beginning with Malinowski, were inclined to 
disagree. 138 
This particular debate has waxed and waned over the years. Today, however, 
certainly amongst Melanesianists, it is clear that the legitimacy of sorcery, as an 
instrument of self-redress or a weapon of war, and irrespective of whether it is 
directed against a member of one's own social group or against another, tends to 
be function of the particular social context in which it is employed, rather than 'a 
hard and fast defining criterion for separating sorcery from some other 
phenomenon.' 139 In other areas, too, as we have seen, the indeterminacy of the 
data, and the variety of approaches available by which means those data may be 
evaluated, seem to preclude even some of the basic generalisations. 
And yet, Zelenietz observes, whilst universally valid and generalising 
hypotheses remain elusive, an examination of the Melanesianist literature does 
reveal the presence of certain general themes. One such theme is that of power: 
Sorcery and witchcraft are inescapably enmeshed in the 
exercise of power. If we see power as a broad phenomenon, 
137 M. Marwick, 'The Study of Witchcraft' in The Craft of Social Anthropology, ed. A.L. 
Epstein (London: Tavistock Publications, 1967), p. 232 
138 See B. Malinowski, Crime and Custom in Savage Society (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1926), pp. 85-99. See also A. Chowning and W. Goodenough, 'Lakalai Political 
Organization' in Politics in New Guinea: Traditional and in the Context of Change: Some 
Anthropological Perspectives, ed. R.M. Berndt and P. Lawrence (Nedlands, WA: University of 
Western Australia Press, 1971), pp. 113-174; Reay, 'The Politics of a Witch Killing'; A. Forge, 
'Prestige, Influence and Sorcery: A New Guinea Example' in Witchcraft Confessions and 
Accusations, ed. M. Douglas (London: Tavistock Publications, !970), pp. 257-275. Cf. E. Goody, 
'Legitimate and Illegitimate Aggression in a West African State' in Douglas, Witchcraft 
Confessions and Accusations, pp. 297-244. 
139 Zelenietz, 'Sorcery and Social Change', p. 4. 
as the ability to control or influence the actions of one's self 
and others, then the use of sorcery and witchcraft become 
expressions of this ability to control, or attempt to control, 
both one's own fate and the destiny of other individuals and 
groups. 140 
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Common to the models developed by Patterson and Knauf! is the variable 
availability and utilisation of the power of sorcery in Melanesian societies. In 
some cases it is the exclusive preserve of the political elite, tactically and 
strategically deployed to enhance or to undo social solidarity at different levels, 
within and outside of a particular group or community. In other cases, it may be 
the means by which the most marginalised members of society endeavour, or are 
perceived as endeavouring, to threaten established patterns of social structure and 
relations. As a corollary to the idea that the practice of sorcery itself constitutes 
an important exercise of power, sorcery accusations and other actions taken in 
response both to perceived acts of sorcery and to accusations, may likewise be 
understood as expressions of power-or manifestations of powerlessness. 
Played out in the 'traditional' socio-political context, these complex interactive 
processes are all at least potentially indicative, generative and reflective of salient 
aspects of indigenous social, political and economic life. The reciprocal 
implications of those processes create the tangled web of human relations into (or 
out of) which even the most intrepid ethnographers have had difficulty reading 
meaning. The introduction into such 'traditional' environments of any novel and 
significant elements must invariably compound that difficulty; and in Melanesia, 
the novel and significant introduction of colonialism and the development of the 
post-colonial state have demonstrably had this effect. For if sorcery is properly 
analysed as an expression of power, then the alteration of traditional social, 
140 Ibid., p. 5. 
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political and economic relations is bound to be radical where these fundamental 
institutions have been, and continue to be, the focal points of those erstwhile 
exogenous influences. 
When brought into contact with the power of European 
colonialists, indigenous societies the world over faced the 
'unpredictable and uncontrollable'. Transfonnation and 
change were the orders of the day as encapsulation altered 
balances and perceptions of power. One way in which people 
reacted to changes imposed on their social order was through 
the use of witchcraft and sorcery1 " 
It is in this context that Zelenietz argues the relevant ethnographic research 
should be organised and interpreted. And in examining the various changes and 
problems that confronted, and continue to confront, indigenous Melanesians as a 
consequence of their exposure to agents and agencies of the West-and 
increasingly nowadays, the 'Westernised' agents and agencies of the contemporary 
post-colonial state-one particular issue is thrown into sharp relief: 'a basic 
indigenous concern with the redistribution and redefinition of power.' 142 
141 Ibid., p. 6. 
142 Ibid. 
143 Ibid. 
The imposition of a colonial authority structure, partial 
integration into a different economic order, the coming of new 
religious creeds and doctrines, the appearance of new diseases, 
all modify notions of power, stability and control within and 
between groups. Sorcery is a way for people to exert power 
over their own destiny in an environment wherein the 
traditional bases of power have been changed .... Sorcery, in 
these Melanesian societies, is one means by which people 
redefine their relationships to themselves, to others, and to the 
world in general. Sorcery, then, provides a means of power 
not only to react to imposed changes, but it also gives people a 
context in which they can attempt to control change, to rewrite 
the rules and relationships of power. 143 
27.f 
Assessing the collected ethnographic materials, Lindenbaum draws a number 
of conclusions about the implications of the social changes precipitated by, or at 
any rate, associated with, the political and economic changes experienced by 
Papua New Guineans during the colonial and post-colonial period. First, she 
suggests, the evidence indicates there has been a recent and dramatic increase in 
sorcery and witchcraft beliefs. 144 This is a curious proposition, as it is difficult to 
comprehend precisely what is meant by an 'increase' in belief. Presumably, 
however, Lindenbaum is referring to an increasing frequency with which, and a 
proliferation of instances in which, expression of one kind or another is seen to be 
given to sorcery-related beliefs, enhanced and re-iterated in modes reflecting the 
influences of inter-cultural articulation.145 
More significantly, Lindenbaum noted a shift in the practice of particular 
kinds of sorcery from what she refers to as exo-sorcery to what she calls endo-
sorcery: 
Sorcery attacks fonnerly directed against 'outsiders' are now 
said to occur within the phratry ... , or the village ... , within 
larger villages ... , or between fonner allies and 'brothers' ... 
. Participation in wage labour, a decline in indigenous trade, 
the cash cropping of coffee and copra, cattle raising and new 
evaluations concerning the ownership of land, along with the 
absence of warfare which lessens the need of for local 
alliances, are all factors that have strengthened relations 
between the village and the government or the village and the 
market, at the expense of local ties. Signs of increased 
marriage endogamy appear ... as labourers attempt to keep 
144 S. Lindenbaum, 'Images of the Sorcerer in Papua New Guinea' (1981) 8 Social Analysis 
119. 
145 Such an interpretation would be borne out by Barker's observations about the effects of 
Christian missionisation on traditional patterns and expressions of sorcery-related beliefs. See J. 
Barker, 'Encounters with Evil: Christianity and the Response to Sorcery among the Maisin of 
Papua New Guinea' (1990) 61(2) Oceania 139-155. See also R. Robin, 'Revival Movements in 
the Southern Highlands Province of Papua New Guinea' (1982) 52(4) Oceania 320-343 
their wages to themselves ... , and accusations of sorcery 
come closer to home as the 'zones of safety' contract. 146 
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The paraphernalia of sorcerers has also changed, including now an updated 
technology of knives, razor blades, bicycle spokes and battery acid; while the 
commoditisation of sorcery as a product and/or a service has increased with 
increasing mobility, introducing new and different forms of sorcery from one area 
of the country into another where it had not hitherto been known (and against 
which local counter-sorcery techniques may not be effective on that account). 147 
Perhaps the most telling revelations in the assessment of Melanesian sorcery 
and social change involve the recognition that the social dynamics of sorcery 
itself, as an instrument and an expression of power, are changing responsively and 
adaptively to the changing environments in which such beliefs and practices have 
always existed. As Lindenbaum observes: 'The sorcery syndromes of Papua New 
Guinea are the complex ideologies of particular kinds of moral economy, neither 
completely old nor entirely new', leading to the conclusion that: 148 
there is no such thing as traditional sorcery. Sorcery is the 
ideology of a transitional moment, rather than an old 
'tradition'. The irony is that it is as much 'ours' as 'theirs', a 
precipitate of our mutual encounter. 149 
146 Lindenbaum, 'Images of the Sorcerer', p. 119. 
147 Ibid., pp. 122, 125. 
148 Ibid., p. 127. 
149 Ibid. 
D. 'Contrasting Images of Power': A Synoptical Analysis of 
Melanesian Sorcery and Witchcraft 
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As will be evident from the preceding discussion, where the issues have been 
addressed at all, anthropological interest in sorcery and witchcraft has been keen 
enough to generate debate and discussion amongst a small number of researchers 
and theoreticians for more than fifty years. In the main, however, such 
considerations have been tangential to the larger concerns of social 
anthropologists, and incidental to the focused ethnographic analyses of particular 
societies. Beyond that, it is only recently that Melanesianists have begun to show 
any particular interest in the topic. Valuable data were provided by a handful of 
ethnographers in the earlier decades of this century. 150 But from the end of the 
Second World War, anthropological preoccupations with Papua New Guinea 
societies tended to focus on group structure, exchange systems and political 
adjustment. Indeed, except to the extent that discussions of sorcery and witchcraft 
formed an obligatory, if sometimes passing, consideration in specific ethnographic 
research centring on a particular group, community or region, the first modem 
theoretical approaches to the dynamics of the Melanesian phenomena in general 
were Patterson's typological survey of Melanesian witchcraft and sorcery, which 
appeared in 1974-75, Zelenietz and Lindenbaum's collection of essays dealing 
with sorcery and social change, which was published in 1981,151 and Knauft's 
150 Most notably, Bronislaw Malinowski's Trobriand studies; Reo Fortune's examination of 
Dobuan sorcery practices; Francis Williams's ethnographic work as a Government Anthropologist 
in the Lake Kutubu area and in what is today the Gulf District of Papua New Guinea; and Gregory 
Bateson's study of latrnul. 
151 Most of the papers themselves were initially developed in connection with the symposium 
on 'Sorcery and Social Change' held at the annual meetings of the Association for Social 
Anthropology in Oceania in 1979 and 1980. See Zelenietz, 'Sorcery and Social Change', p. 14, n. 
I. Lindenbaum's own earlier and continuing ethnographic fieldwork concentrated on sorcery 
issues. SeeS. Lindenbaum, 'Sorcery and Structure in Fore Society' (1971) 41(4) Oceania 277-
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extended discussion m the concluding chapters of his Gebusi ethnography m 
1985. 
A conference on 'Sorcery, Healing and Magic in Melanesia', held by the 
Research Centre for South-West Pacific Studies at LaTrobe University in 1982, 
gave rise to the third of what remains only three discrete scholarly undertakings 
devoted exclusively to a comparative overview of Melanesian sorcery and 
witchcraft, and takes the form of a concluding chapter in Stephen's edited volume 
of selected papers from the LaTrobe conference, which was published in 1987. 152 
Before considering Stephen's synoptic model, however, it will be instructive to 
reiterate her observations, that the 'single most important result' of the La Trobe 
conference was to demonstrate the extent to which current anthropological 
understandings of Melanesian sorcery and witchcraft remain clouded by 
definitions and theoretical models that simply do not fit the complexity of the 
available data: 153 
The task of rethinking our way through the conceptual 
categories and explanatory models that have been applied to 
Melanesian sorcery and witchcraft has only begun. . . . The 
ethnographic picture is still far from complete, or even 
adequate', and much more data is required before the questions 
that have been raised by the extant research can begin to be 
answered satisfactorily.'" 
Examining the existing ethnographic evidence and anthropological arguments 
in light of the foregoing caveat, Stephen offers an overview of the diverse 
287; 'Sorcery and Danger' (1975) 46(1) Oceania 68-75; Kuru Sorcery: Disease and Danger in the 
New Guinea Highlands (Palo Alto, CA: Mayfield Publishing Co., 1979). 
152 
'Contrasting Images of Power' in Sorcerer and Witch in Melanesia, ed. M. Stephen 
(Carlton, VIC: Melbourne University Press, 1987), pp. 249-304. 
153 
'Introduction' in Sorcerer and Witch in Melanesia, pp. 2-3 
154 Ibid., pp. 11, 12. 
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phenomena of Melanesian sorcery and witchcraft with a particular view to 
problems categorisation and interpretation. Her limited objective is not to impose 
an explanatory theory on the data presented, but rather to allow a pattern to 
emerge from those data. Thus, she begins 'not by asking "What are sorcery and 
witchcraft?" but rather by asking "What have scholars described as sorcery and 
witchcraft?"', addressing that question in four sections. In the first of these she 
identifies two contrasting roles represented by the sorcerer and the witch 
respectively. In the second section she examines the nature of that polarity in 
greater detail. The third section concentrates on the effects of social change and 
the blurring of the two roles over time and under exogenous pressures. In the final 
section she traces the psychological underpinnings of the opposed images of 
sorcerer and witch. 155 
[M]oving through these several layers of analysis, the 
discussion attempts to resolve the contradictions of the 
Melanesian material into two contrasting concepts of cosmic 
power. 156 
(1) The Diversity of Melanesian Sorcery and Witchcraft 
Much of the modem Melanesianist anthropology of sorcery and witchcraft 
reflects the sociological emphasis on accusations that has dominated the general 
theoretical literature on those phenomena. Such an approach, Stephen notes, 
effectively reverses indigenous perceptions of sorcery and witchcraft as means of 
mystical attack on innocent or defenceless victims, and advancing the idea that the 
'real victim' is the accused sorcerer or witch. On analyses of this kind, which are, 
'"Ibid., p. 250. 
156 Ibid. 
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by and large, consistent with the frame of reference developed by the Africanists, 
sorcery and witchcraft are dealt with as 'culturally standardized fantasies about the 
capacity of some people to injure others by occult powers.' 157 
Assuming (a) that such practices ate socially condemned and 
(b) that in fact no such powers exist and no one actually 
engages in such nefarious activities, this approach reasons that 
accusations of plying the black arts can best be understood as 
indirect attacks on the person accused, who is thereby branded 
as a despicable, anti-social being. Accusations thus reflect the 
tensions and conflicts existing between individuals and 
groups; and it is this context of social action that is the real 
concern of the social anthropologis~ not the 'academic' 
differences in beliefs. . . . It further follows that there is little 
point in attempting to distinguish between sorcery and 
witchcraft; once their ideological frills ate removed they are 
essentially the same social phenomenon."' 
The distinction drawn between sorcerers and witches in the Melanesian 
context also tends to follow the lines developed by Evans-Pritchard. But the 
Melanesian data, and the anthropological analyses of those data, deviate from the 
African model in that, witchcraft, as such, is rarer in Melanesia than sorcery; and 
whereas accusations in African societies tend to be directed at members of the 
accuser's own group or community, Melanesian accusations are more frequently 
directed against outsiders. 159 
In Stephen's v1ew, however, even after qualifYing the Africanist 
generalisations with the Melanesian variation described immediately above, these 
widely accepted assumptions fail to do justice to the great diversity of phenomena 
depicted in the Melanesian ethnographies. They are also inadequate to deal with 
157 Ibid. 
158 Ibid., pp. 250-251. 
159 Ibid., p. 251. 
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the evidence of contradictory patterns of sorcery and witchcraft accusations, and 
the associated patterns of fear accompanying the apprehension of sorcerers and 
witches in different Melanesian societies. Organising the available data, Stephen 
develops a far more sophisticated framework to take account the multiplex 
variations in these Melanesian expressions and experiences. In so doing, she 
identifies no fewer than nine categories by which the nature, source and direction 
of Melanesian (principally Papua New Guinean) sorcery and witchcraft fears and 
accusations might be more appropriately classified, illustrating each with 
examples from the ethnographic literature. 160 
The variations Stephen observes demonstrate the inaccuracies contained in 
many of the generalisations that have tended to be applied in relation to 
Melanesian societies. Fears about sorcery and witchcraft within and outside the 
community are complex phenomena, spanning the gamut of possible 
configurations. Witchcraft, as distinguished from sorcery on the conventional 
analytical basis, appears to be rather more common than is generally recognised; 
and the phenomenon of 'sorcery and witchcraft' ought not, perhaps, to be regarded 
as analytically unitary161 At the same time, however, Stephen does note a 
significant, and significantly consistent, pattern whereby the social roles of 
Melanesian sorcerers (who consciously utilise particular techniques for the 
deliberate and purposeful infliction of harm, injury, damage or death), on the one 
hand, and witches (whose similar actions are the unintended expressions of an 
160 The categories denominated and discussed include: (1) sorcery from within; (2) sorcery 
from without but also from within; (3) sickness from within, sorcery deaths from without; (4) 
sorcery from outside but within the horizon of social interaction; (5) sorcery from without, 
witchcraft from within; (6) witchcraft from within and from without; (7) witchcraft from within; 
(8) witchcraft from without; and (9) sorcery or witch beliefs not acted upon. Ibid., pp. 252-262. 
161 Ibid., pp. 262-263. 
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unconscious power), on the other, can be distinguished. Thus, sorcery can be seen 
as: 
the attribute of powerful men, or its attribution brings power 
and social rewards; its use is socially approved in particular 
contexts; revenge for sorcery deaths is usually carried out by 
counter-magic rather than open violence . . . . When physical 
violence is involved, the local group and the kin of the 
sorcerer are implicated in his attack and serve as appropriate 
targets for revenge. 162 
Whereas witchcraft tends to be: 
imputed to the vulnerable or the weak, or its imputation brings 
social ruin; it is abhorred not only as an immoral abut as an 
inhuman act; witchcraft deaths are usually acted upon publicly 
with physical violence. The insider witch is ostracized or 
killed; foreign witches are hunted down by raiding parties 
aiming to kill the offending witch alone, and kin are 
implicated only if they defend the culprit. 163 
(2) Sorcerer and Witch 
Proceeding on the basis of the polarity she identified between the positions of 
sorcerers and witches in many Melanesian societies, Stephen then assesses the 
implications of those positions for the individuals involved and the communities 
in which they live. Sorcerers enjoy a particular kind of status in society, 
depending upon the nature and circumstances in which they employ their personal 
and cosmic powers. As an intermediary between human beings, and between 
humans and the realm of spirits and ghosts, the sorcerer occupies a critical, if 
often precarious, socio-political position, which entails a range of special 
162 Ibid., p. 264. 
163 Ibid. 
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responsibilities both to his fellows, and to other supra-human beings. 164 In the 
event, there is a need on the part of the community in which a sorcerer resides to 
ensure that he continues to use his powers for the common good, and some of the 
variations in observed sorcery practices appear to reflect this imperative in 
particular. 165 
Similar features of differentiation are noted in respect of witches; although 
consistent with the position generally occupied by witches in Melanesian 
societies, these tend to reflect inversions of the qualities and social dynamics 
associated with sorcerers. 166 
(3) Social Change, Sorcery and Witchcraft 
Developing many of the same thematic issues addressed by Zelenietz and 
Lindenbaum in their edited collection of ethnographic essays dealing with sorcery 
and social change, Stephen focuses on ways in which sorcery and witchcraft 
represent 'flexible ideologies and roles responding to external pressures and 
change, as well as to internal needs.' 167 
Illustratively, Stephen looks at Lindenbaum's study of Fore sorcery/68 in 
which the latter examined the processes by which an epidemic outbreak of kuru, a 
164 Ibid., pp. 265-272. 
165 Ibid., pp. 272-274. 
166 Ibid., pp. 275-277. 
167 
'Contrasting Images of Power', p. 277. 
168 Kuru Sorcery: Disease and Danger in the New Guinea Highlands (Palo Alto, CA: 
Mayfield Publishing Co., 1979). 
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degenerative and ultimately fatal neurological disease,169 amongst the Fore of 
Papua New Guinea's Eastern Highlands, brought about a radical change m 
traditional attitudes towards sorcery and co-resident sorcerers. Kuru was endemic 
in Fore society, affecting about one percent of the population (mostly women), 
and was recognised as an arrow in the quiver of Fore, amongst other, sorcerers. 
When the mortality rate rapidly rose to affect about 15 percent of the population in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s, and the frantic search for an effective cure proved 
fruitless, suspicions fell increasingly upon sorcerers amongst the Fore themselves. 
Acknowledging that Lindenbaum's account of this situation provided 'an 
impressive analysis of the processes whereby a community exposed to a severe 
epidemic becomes consumed by fears of internal mystical aggression', Stephen 
was critical of Lindenbaum's underestimation of the implications of the epidemic 
for the role of the Fore sorcerer, which she depicts as an instance of 'the 
emergence of the witch-like sorcerer--one who is seen to lose control of his 
dangerous powers, unleashing them indiscriminately on his own community."70 
Fore sorcery was a complex art ... and used against the 
enemy it was entirely legitimate. In the past, when deaths 
from it were few, Fore sorcerers had claimed responsibility for 
kuru; when deaths began to increase at an alarming rate, 
responsibility turned to blame. The sorcerers who had 
formerly been regarded as the defenders of their communities 
against enemy groups, now emerged as the destroyers of their 
own people. 171 
169 Kuru is caused by a virus that attacks the central nervous system after an incubation period 
of up to 15 years. The virus, which concentrates in the brain tissues of the victim, was transmitted 
by a special Fore custom: Fore women and children ritually ate the bodies of their own dead 
relatives, including their brains. Only by eating the brain of a victim can a person become a future 
victim. SeeR. Keesing, Cultural Anthropology: A Contemporary Perspective, 2nd ed (New York: 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981), p. 164. 
170 
'Contrasting Images of Power', p. 277. 
171 Ibid. 
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In Stephen's view, this development is indicative of the process and effects of, 
m this instance, endogenously derived social change, in the course of which 
traditional sorcery beliefs are marshalled for explanatory purposes, but the role of 
the sorcerer is necessarily recast in the face of novel, ambiguous and otherwise 
ideologically challenging events. She goes on to examine a host of examples in 
the ethnographic literature depicting a range circumstances and situations in 
which, both as cause and effect, the role, position and status of sorcerers and 
witches are implicated in the processes of social change. 172 
( 4) Psychological Processes and Experiential Reality 
To the extent that powerful psychological processes can be seen to add 
emotional force to the 'logic of investing certain human individuals with cosmic 
responsibility and blame', Stephen canvasses the Melanesian ethnographies to 
identify these features as they have been developed by other anthropologists, in 
order to explain the psychodynamic foundations underpinning the intellectual 
justification of a magico-religious world viewm 
Here Stephen examines explanations for witch beliefs as projections of 
repressed fears or feelings of inferiority on to others. What is being projected, she 
suggests, is blame for misfortune and death, for which those accusing the witch 
are seen as attempting to avoid the fear that they, themselves, are somehow 
responsible. 174 Noting the common, though not universal, association of disaster, 
misfortune, illness and death with punishment and guilt, Stephen identifies in the 
172 Ibid., pp. 278-288. 
173 Ibid., p. 288. 
174 Ibid., p. 289. 
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ethnopsychological literature of Melanesian sorcery and witchcraft beliefs the 
varied contexts in which suffering elicits the rhetorical question: 'What have I 
done to deserve this? In this connection she suggests: 
[T]he psychological significaoce of witchcraft as ao 
explaoation for death is that it provides a meaos of dissipating 
. . . guilt feelings-particularly in circumstances where the 
usual explanations for death as punishment become inadequate 
or intolerable. 175 
In much the same way that the Melanesian witch represents the person on to 
whom feelings of guilt may be projected, the sorcerer represents the person on to 
whom power-and more specifically, the power of punitive authority-is 
projected. 176 From a psychological perspective, the sorcerer is the symbolic 
embodiment of controlled, male power; he is 'the father figure writ large', whose 
image is conjured 'by conscious guilt and the fear of punishment."77 
The community's willingness to accept the claims of certain 
individuals for responsibility over life aod death can ... be at 
least partly explained in terms of the belief in the effectiveness 
of magic; but this belief finds psychological support in 
feelings of dependency triggered off by conscious guilt and 
the aura cast by the parental image, the father who takes 
responsibility. 178 
Further to this kind of analysis, Stephen argues that, just as sorcery is equated 
particularly with male power and the associated paternal imagery, in those 
societies recognising sorceresses a corresponding psychological projection is 
involved, with parental authority being represented in these instances by maternal 
175 Ibid. 




Images and the powers appropriately associated therewith. Because the 
associative links with social authority and responsibility are generally within the 
domain of men (and sorcerers), however, linkages in the latter instances tend to be 
weaker. 179 
Concluding her discussion of the psychological processes involved in 
Melanesian sorcery and witchcraft-though the matter is probably as much a 
feature of the sociological aspect of the phenomena-Stephen emphasises that real 
people are either forced into, or themselves elect, the roles of sorcerer and witch. 
That is to say, notwithstanding the implicit assumption in most anthropological 
analysis that sorcerers and witches are, in fact, imaginary figures, belief in their 
existence may be real enough, to accusers and the accused alike. 
The individual's image of himself is in large part created by 
others' perceptions of and in response to him. People who are 
treated like witches may well end up convinced that they are. 
Sorcerers who are acclaimed for their cures ... may come to 
believe in them, despite themselves. 180 
From a psychological perspective, Stephen suggests, such convictions may 
provide a standardised cultural form through which the neuroses of the 
emotionally disturbed might be expressed. Also, since 'normal individuals' are 
prone to entertain repressed feelings of guilt and inferiority, it is not unreasonable 
that, under the stress of accusation, they may come to identify consciously with 
collective projections of those feelings. 181 More convincingly, however, Stephen 
points out that in many Melanesian societies, mystical phenomena are closely 
179 Ibid., p. 29!. 
180 Ibid., p. 293. 
181 Ibid., p. 294. 
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associated with dreams and other trance-like states, and that in such states of 
altered consciousness, what is experienced is recognised to be as real as the 
qualitatively different experience of a waking, mundane reality. 182 
Knauft, who had occasion to read Stephen's essay prior to its publication, 
found her analysis particularly compelling in its inter-linking of the political and 
cosmological aspects of Melanesian sorcery and witchcraft. At least to the extent 
that his Gebusi data did not seem to mesh smoothly with her 'binary 
categorization' of the processes of sorcery and witchcraft, however, he found her 
model problematic. 183 Yet Stephen's concluding comments indicate she is well 
aware of the limitations inherent in any attempt to classify the elusive elements of 
Melanesian mystical belief and action. 
Sorcery and witchcraft are not a single, or even two, 
institutions, but numerous cultural variations on two [pace, Dr 
K.nauft] themes, variations which are moulded by external 
pressures as well as internal structures, which vary over time, 
and which may serve many different social and cultural 
ends. 184 
182 Ibid., p. 295. Without referring specifically to Melanesian culture, Holger Kalweit makes a 
forceful argument to this effect, extending the proposition to advance the suggestion that such 
altered states actually involve a heightened sense of reality, to which cynical non-believers deny 
themselves access. Shamans, Healers and Medicine Men, trans. M.H. Kohn (Boston: Shambhala 
Publications, 1992), pp. 188-192. See also M.J. Winkelman, 'Shamans and Other "Magico-
Religious" Healers: A Cross-Cultural Study of Their Origins, Nature and Social Transformations' 
(1990) 18(3) Ethos 308. 
163 Knauft, Good Company and Violence, p. 344. 
184 
'Contrasting Images of Power', p. 296. 
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3. IMPLICATIONS OF ANTHROPOLOGICAL ANALYSES FOR THE 
JURISPRUDENTIAL CONSIDERATION OF MELANESIAN 
SORCERY AND WITCHCRAFT 
Anticipating consideration of the issues to be dealt with in the sequel,' 85 it will 
be useful to conclude this chapter with some comment on the implications of the 
kinds of ethnographic descriptions and anthropological analyses discussed above 
for the ways in which sorcery-related beliefs and practices are apprehended from a 
jurisprudential perspective, and in the ultimately determinative context of law and 
the courts in Papua New Guinea today. 
In a sense, the ethnographic endeavour to identify and describe relevant social 
facts is similar to the practical exercise of ascertaining the relevant legal facts in a 
jural context. Initially, the field of observation is potentially as wide in both 
instances, capturing the totality of human behaviour; and in both cases, the focus 
is quickly narrowed to embrace particular actions over a specified period of time 
within a delimited set of social and spatial circumstances. The criteria of 
selection, grounded in both cases in theoretical or hypothetical propositions, in 
accordance with which the ethnographer and the lawyer or judge separates 
relevant from irrelevant considerations, may differ, as will their respective 
methods of observation and assessment. Essentially, however, the processes and 
the objectives their scrutiny are much the same. So too, as each seeks to derive 
(or import) meaning and significance from or into the facts he or she has 
accumulated, the nature and purposes of the respective enterprises shift 
qualitatively. Ethnography becomes anthropology when questions about when, 
where and how particular persons do or say particular things are overtaken by the 
fundamental question of why such things were said or done. Legal investigation 
185 See Chapters Six and Seven below. 
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becomes legal analysis when those same preliminary questions are overtaken by 
questions of knowledge, belief, intention and motive. 
The analogy should not be overdrawn. But it 1s at this point that the 
similarities between the two undertakings begin to wane in any case, and certain 
salient differences begin to become apparent. Of particular significance here, is 
the profound difference between the need for theoretical consistency; for as we 
have seen, it takes only the slightest indication of variation from a model designed 
to explain the nature and contours of sorcery-related beliefs for an anthropologist 
to point out the inapplicability of that model to the society with which he or she is 
concerned (and in so doing, call into question the tenability of that model as a 
generalising explanatory construct). To the extent that the law advances a 'model' 
of expected belief and behaviour, however, it requires only that certain specified 
criteria be satisfied-sometimes beyond a reasonable doubt, but more often only 
on a balance of the probabilities-and the 'case' is drawn fully into the framework 
of the grand theory. Indeed, even where the 'model' is shown to be demonstrably 
inapposite, it may still serve not only to characterise and classify the facts in 
question, but to do so determinatively; and although arguments may be 
successfully mounted to show that the model is manifestly inappropriate in a 
particular instance, consideration of its appropriateness to such matters in general 
are not normally entertained. 
Finally, perhaps the most significant difference between the anthropological 
and legal evaluation of particular kinds of belief and behaviour lies in the human 
consequences of the respective processes. Error in the first instance is by no 
means unimportant, since defective or deficient scholarship retards the 
advancement of knowledge and fosters intellectual misunderstandings the effects 
of which, in some cases, may be quite serious indeed. Error in the second 
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instance, however, will almost invariably result in an injustice, the immediate 
ramifications of which can, and often do, involve the imposition of tremendous 
personal hardship and suffering-the dispossession of one's property, the 
deprivation of one's freedom and occasionally, the loss of one's life. 
With particular respect to the matters of sorcery-related beliefs and practices in 
contemporary Papua New Guinea societies, the nexus between law and 
anthropology is more than an intellectual intersection at which point interesting, 
controversial and sometimes polemical issues might be eloquently debated 
amongst and between scholars. For where ethnographically informed 
anthropological explanations of Melanesian sorcery beliefs are brought to bear on 
the legal and jurisprudential processes of interpreting, characterising and 
responding to the conduct that often follow on from the expression of those 
beliefs, the integrity of the data and tenability of theoretical classifications can 
have an impact that goes far beyond a critical footnote. And yet it is very rare 
today to find an anthropological exposition that actively engages the fundamental 
theoretical issues of sorcery-related beliefs as 'socio-legal facts' with a view with 
to their consideration (to say nothing of their application) in the context of a 
jurisprudential analysis. Rarer still, I hasten to add, are jurisprudential analyses 
that resolutely take on these particular issues with much cognisance of the 
ethnographic and anthropologicalliterature. 186 
One exception relating specifically, though not exclusively, to the 
jurisprudential implications of Melanesian sorcery-beliefs is Goldman's recent 
study of the notions of causation and accident amongst the Huli of the Southern 
186 One of the very few examples of an ethnographically informed jurisprudential analyses of 
kind to which I refer here is B.Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Law in Micronesia: An Interpretive 
Approach to Transplanted Law (Leiden: EJ Brill, 1993). 
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Highlands Province. 187 Goldman is cautious not to label his ethnographic analysis 
as necessarily or exclusively 'jurisprudential' in nature, since its parameters are 
broader than that. What he sets out, in part, to accomplish, however, is: 
to bridge the chasms between law and custom, and between 
jurisprudential theory and practice-that is, to demonstrate 
how the operative dynamics of accident is similar in Western 
and Melanesian jural traditions as a basis for an effective inter-
fusion of ideologies."' 
In the process, he is manifestly successful in the corollary effort to 'form the 
groundwork of an anthropologically informed jurisprudence.' 189 
As we have seen, much of the anthropological literature on sorcery and 
witchcraft develops explanatory models based on an assumption that attributes 
causation (and hence, fault and responsibility) for misfortune to mystical entities, 
because rational alternative explanations, grounded in a more sophisticated 
understanding of the workings of natural phenomena are unavailable; and/or 
because of the unwillingness or inability of primitive peoples to account for 
otherwise unforeseen (and usually undesirable) events in terms of chance, 
probability or genuine accident. The assumption, however, as Goldman argues, 
may well be unfounded. Referring to Evans-Pritchard's observation that, amongst 
the Azande, witchcraft was invoked as an explanation for all misfortunes, 
Goldman describes how this conclusion has come effectively to settle a fate of 
exclusion for the concept of 'accident' in subsequent anthropological and 
ethnographic studies: 
'
87 The Culture of Coincidence: Accident and Absolute Liability in Huli (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1993). 
188 Ibid., p. 13. 
189 Ibid. 
Misfortune was to be handled within the framework of religio-
cosmological beliefs. Witchcraft was at the same time a vision 
of natural causes, the idiom in which 'coincidences' were given 
meaning, and the language of misfortune. This causal model 
was supported by examples of what anthropologists called 
'accidents', for nowhere in the classic literature on the Azande 
does any native gloss on this term emerge. Accident was 
swallowed whole by the conventional wisdom that witchcraft 
beliefs provided explanations of the why of misfortune, 
disease, and death. 190 
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As we have seen, the rejection of Africanist models notwithstanding, 
explanations for most, if not all, deaths amongst Melanesian societies are likewise 
reported in the ethnographic literature as attributable to sorcery or witchcraft. But 
in this connection, too, as Goldman notes, there is often a telling lack of statistical 
data to support such claims. Thus, he suggests: 
[i]t may be that situational particulars have here been teased 
into statements of typicality. Notwithstanding this, we are 
asked to accept that any indigenous notion of accidental death 
is absent, even though a 'fortuitous death' ... is not per se non~ 
causal, though it may be non-agentive.' 91 
Beyond these apparent discrepancies in the received anthropological 
orthodoxy on sorcery and witchcraft beliefs, Goldman draws our attention to the 
fact that, in a number of ethnographic accounts, causal explanations based on 
witchcraft or sorcery are more particularly invoked m extraordinary 
circumstances. In more ordinary circumstances, 'everything but accident is 
permissible'; although, he continues, it is rare to find any suggestion to the effect 
that 'insignificant/non-serious accidents occur but not significant/serious ones.' 192 
In Goldman's view, such glib assertions are inadequate: 
190 Ibid., pp. 68-69. 
191 Ibid., p. 71 (citation omitted). 
192 Ibid., p. 72. 
If the preferred fonn of wisdom is that 'accident' descriptions 
are possible, given a major/minor, rare/common, or 
serious/non-serious dichotomy, then surely this throws back 
on to the analyst the onus to explain and justify such a 
coding. 193 
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It probably bears mentioning here that Goldman's own research amongst the 
Huli has revolved around a close linguistic analysis of verbal exchanges 
associated with various problematic and otherwise socially significant 
interpersonal confrontations. 194 As a linguist, he is especially sensitive to the 
nuances and subtleties of the language of his indigenous informants, and to the 
ever-present dangers of inaccurate renderings of the expressions on which 
ethnographic descriptions and anthropological explanations necessarily rely. 
Thus, to the extent that much of the revealing light Goldman is able to shed on 
Huli society and culture is a reflection of his fastidious approach to transcription 
and translation, and in light of the curious discrepancies he highlights in the 
ethnographic and anthropological literature on sorcery and witchcraft beliefs in 
Melanesia and elsewhere, we should do well to retain a critical perspective of the 
kind discussed above in Chapter Two, in the consideration of ethnographically 
informed anthropological analyses of issues of sorcery and law alike. 
193 Ibid. 
194 See L. Goldman, Talk Never Dies: The Language of Huli Disputes (London: Tavistock 
Publications, 1983); 'The Presentational Style of Women in Huli Disputes' (1986) 24 Pacific 
Linguistics 213-218; 'Anatomical Tenns in Huli: Names and Games' (1986) 16(3) Mankind 190-
208. 
Chapter Five 
THE LEGAL DISPOSITION OF SORCERY-
RELATED BELIEFS AND PRACTICES 
The British system of colonial administration, which we in Papua are seeking 
to follow, aims at the preservation of the native races, even of those 'weaker 
peoples' who are 'not yet able to stand by themselves.' The 'well-being and 
development' of these peoples is declared by the League of Nations to 'form a 
sacred trust of civilization,' and this declaration is entirely in accord with all 
the best traditions of British administration. I 
294 
The truth is that law has been used throughout the ages as an instrument 
of domination and oppression by the ruling classes. . . In this country, the 
law was an instrument of colonialism and a means whereby the economic 
dominance of the white man was established over us. . We do not have to 
resort to any high flown academic theory to expose the true nature of the law. 
Certainly Papua New Guineans do not have to do so. We have been at the 
receiving end of the stick since the white man reached this island. 2 
1. SORCERY AND LAW 
IN ETHNO-HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
In many essential respects, the ideas, forms and systems of law introduced by 
the British into Papua New Guinea in the latter decades of the nineteenth century, 
and which first came to bear on the sorcery-related beliefs and practices of Papua 
New Guineans at the time, are replicated in the laws and the legal institutions of 
Papua New Guinea today.3 This original situation, and its implications for the 
1 Sir Hubert Murray, Papua of To-Day: or an Australian Colony in the Making (London: PS 
King & Son Ltd., 1925), viii. 
2 John Kaputin, 'The Law: A Colonial Fraud?' (1975) 10(1) New Guinea and Australia, The 
Pacific and South-East Asia 4-15 at 4. 
3 See generally D.R.C. Chalmers and A. H. Paliwala, An Introduction to the Law in Papua 
New Guinea, 2nd ed. (North Ryde: Law Book Company, 1984), pp. 47-104; D.R.C. Chalmers, 
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nature and direction of subsequent legal development in Papua New Guinea, have 
been the objects of a sustained critique and the focal point of an ongoing debate 
since, and before, the country achieved political independence in 1975." 
'A History of the Role of Traditional Dispute Settlement Procedures in the Courts of Papua New 
Guinea' in Law and Social Chnnge in Papua New Guinea, ed. D. Weisbrot, A. Paliwala and A. 
Sawyerr (Sydney: Butterworths, 1982), pp. 169-189; R.S. O'Regan, The Common Law in Papua 
and New Guinea (Sydney: Law Book Company, 1971); 'Western Criminal Law In New Guinea' 
(1974) 7(1) Australia & New Zealand Journal of Criminology 5-16; 'The Common Law and 
English Statutes in the Territory of Papua and New Guinea' (1971) 45 Australian Law Journal 
297-305; 'The Reception of the Common Law and the Authority of Common Law Precedents in 
the Territory of Papua New Guinea' (1970) 19(2) International & Comparative Law Quarterly 
217-228; 'Codes and Common Law in Papua and New Guinea' (1970) 1 Melanesian Law 
Journal 5-10; J.R. Mattes, 'Sources of Law in Papua and New Guinea' (1963) 37 Australian 
Law Journal 148-153; M. Groves, 'The Criminal Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Papua-
New Guinea' [Pts. I & II] (1952) 25 Australian Law Journal 582-588, 636-641. On the 
introduced law relating to sorcery in particular, see D.R.C. Chalmers, D. Weisbrot and W.J. 
Andrew, Criminal Law and Practice of Papua New Guinea, 2nd ed. (North Ryde: Law Book 
Company, 1985), pp. 720-724; D. Weisbrot, 'Integration of Laws in Papua New Guinea: 
Custom and the Criminal Law in Conflict' in Weisbrot, Paliwala and Sawyerr, Law and Social 
Chnnge in Papua New Guinea, pp. 59, 65; R.S. O'Regan, 'Sorcery and Homicide in Papua New 
Guinea' (1974) 48 Australian Law Journal76-82; D.M. Selby, 'Sorcery in New Guinea' (1945) 
18 Australian Law Journal306-307. 
4 See J. Aleck, 'Introduction: Custom Is Law in Papua New Guinea' in Custom at the 
Crossroads: The Future of Customary Law in Papua New Guinea, ed. J. Aleck and J. Rannells 
(Port Moresby: Faculty of Law, University of Papua New Guinea, 1995), pp. 1-6; J. Nonggorr, 
'An "Indigenous Jurisprudence" in Papua New Guinea: The Past Record and Future Prospects' 
in Aleck and Rannells, Custom at the Crossroads, pp. 68-83; B.L. Ottley, 'Custom and 
Introduced Criminal Justice' in Legal Issues in a Developing Society, ed. R.W. James and I. 
Fraser (Port Moresby: Faculty of Law, University of Papua New Guinea, 1992); P. Sack, 
'"Law" and "Custom" in Papua New Guinea' (1990) 51(1) Transactions of the Jean Bodin 
Society 249-274; B. Narokobi, Lo Bilong Yumi Yet: Law and Custom in Melanesia (Suva: 
University of the South Pacific, 1989); D. Weisbrot, 'Papua New Guinea's Indigenous 
Jurisprudence and the Legacy of Colonialism' (1988) 10(1) University of Hawaii Law Review 1-
45; P. Sack, '"Law" and "Custom" in Papua New Guinea: Separation, Unification or Co-
Operation?' (1987) 20(3) Veifassung und Recht in Ubersee 329-342; D.R.C. Chalmers and A. H. 
Paliwala, An Introduction to the Law in Papua New Guinea, 2nd ed. (North Ryde, NSW: Law 
Book Company, 1984); J. Aleck, 'Customary Law and the Modern Legal System in Papua New 
Guinea: Problems of Integration' Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Pacific 
Northwest Political Science Association, Portland, Oregon (1983); D. Weisbrot, 'Integration of 
Laws in Papua New Guinea', pp. 59-103; B. Narokobi, 'History and Movement in Law Reform 
in Papua New Guinea' in Weisbrot, Paliwala and Sawyerr, Law and Social Change in Papua 
New Guinea, pp. 13-24; P. Fitzpatrick, Law and State in Papua New Guinea (London: 
Academic Press, 1980); R. Mortimer, 'The Evolution of the Post-Colonial State' in Development 
and Dependency: The Political Economy of Papua New Guinea (Melbourne: Oxford University 
Press, 1979), pp. 205-244; A. Paliwala, J. Zorn and P. Bayne, 'Economic Development and the 
Changing Legal System of Papua New Guinea' (1978) 16 African Law Studies 3-79; S.D. Ross, 
'A Review of the Judiciary in Papua New Guinea' (1977) 5(1) Melanesian Law Journal 5-25; 
Law Reform Commission of Papua New Guinea, The Role of Customary Law in the Legal 
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That these issues have been, and continue to be, problematic and controversial, 
however, does little to alter the demonstrable reality of the situation as it was then 
and as it is today. The facts of the matter are indisputable: the statute and 
common law in Papua New Guinea are largely, if not entirely, of English and 
Australian derivation; the underlying rules and principles of law and equity are 
essentially English; and the constitutionally established judicial system is 
organised and operates on bases that are virtually indistinguishable from those 
which underpin the Anglo-Australian models in whose likeness it has been 
deliberately fashioned.5 
As suggested in Chapter One, a comprehensive assessment of law and 
colonialism in Papua New Guinea would extend beyond the narrower parameters 
of the present inquiry. However, to the extent that these issues are inextricably 
bound up with the particular questions raised by the matters with which we are 
immediately concerned, some of them must be addressed if the pertinent questions 
are not to be begged. 
System, Report No. 7 (November 1977); N. O'Neill, 'The Judges and the Constitution-The 
First Year' (1976) 4(2) Melanesian Law Journal 242-258; K. Los, 'The Suitability of the Legal 
System and Legal Method in Papua-New Guinea' (1971) I Melanesian Law Journal 73-75; J. 
Goldting, 'Just Law for a Primitive Society' (1971) 6(3) Sydney Law Review 371-381. 
5 This is not to say that the system of law initially introduced by the British into in Papua 
New Guinea was the common law of England. Rather, it was a distinctive 'colonial version of 
that law', which retained few of the checks and balances that restrained the excesses of English 
justice and few of the statutory protections which tended to mitigate some of its hardships. A. 
Paliwala, J. Zorn and P. Bayne, 'Economic Development and the Changing Legal System of 
Papua New Guinea' (1978) 16 African Law Studies 3 at 12. Whilst this system was potentially 
applicable 'to relations between the colonisers, between the colonisers and the colonised, and 
between the colonised' themselves, in practice it was 'only rarely applied in the latter two 
categories'. P. Bayne, 'Legal Development in Papua New Guinea: The Place of the Common 
Law' (1975) 3(1) Melanesian Law Journal9 at II. 
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All history is polemic;• and more so, perhaps, than any other species of that 
particular scholarly genre today, colonial history is fraught with contention.7 In 
this regard, the history--or, at any rate, the historiography--of colonialism in the 
Pacific Islands generally, and in Papua New Guinea more particularly, is no 
exception. 8 That the light thrown up by the past can and does illuminate our 
6 See I. Wallerstein, 'Some Reflections on History, the Social Sciences and Politics' in The 
Capitalist World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), vii-xii. See 
generally J.H. Hexter, 'Historiography: The Rhetoric of History' in International Encyclopedia 
of the Social Sciences, ed. D.L. Sills (New York: Crowell, Collier Macmillan, 1968); A. 
Megill and D.N. McCloskey, 'The Rhetoric of History' in The Rhetoric of the Human Sciences, 
ed. J.S. Nelson, A. Megill and D.N. McCloskey (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1987); A.C. Danto, Narration and Knowledge (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985); 
F.R. Ankersmit, Narrative Logic: A Semantic Analysis of the Historian's Language (The Hagne: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1983); H.V. White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth 
Century Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973); E.H. Carr, What is 
History? (London: Macmillan, 1961). 
7 SeeP. Darby, The Three Faces of Imperialism (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1987); F. Cooper and A.L. Stoler, 'Introduction: Tensions of Empire: Colonial Control and 
Visions of RuJe' (1989) 16 American Ethnologist 609; E. Wolf, Europe and the People Without 
History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982); A.D. Smith, National Identity 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1991); G.H. Nadel and P. Curtis, eds., Imperialism and 
Colonialism (New York: Macmillan Company, 1964). 
8 In relation to the problems inherent in the historiography of colonialism in the Pacific 
Islands generally, see G. Denning, 'History "In" the Pacific' (1989) 1 (1&2) The Contemporary 
Pacific 134-139; J.W. Davidson, 'Problems of Pacific History' (1966) 1 Journal of Pacific 
History 5-21; 'Understanding Pacific History: The Participant as Historian' in The History of 
Melanesia, ed. K.S. Inglis (Canberra and Port Moresby: Research School of Pacific Studies, 
Australian National University, 1969), pp. 1-15; 'The Decolonization of Oceania' (1971) 6 
Journal of Pacific History 133-150; D. Routledge, 'Pacific History As Seen from the Pacific 
Islands' (1985) 8(2) Pacific Studies 81-99. See also R. Keesing, 'Creating the Past: Custom and 
Identity in the Contemporary Pacific' (1989) 1 (1&2) The Contemporary Pacific 19-42; D. 
Merwick, ed., Dangerous Liaisons: Essays in Honour of Greg Denning (Parkville, VIC: History 
Department, University of Melbourne, 1994). With respect to Papua New Guinea's colonial 
historiography, see E.P. Wo1fers, 'For the First "Generation ... with No Personal Recollection 
of Australian Rule": Reflections on the Impact of Colonial Rule in Papua New Guinea' in Papua 
New Guinea: A Century of Colonial Impact, 1884-1984, ed. S. Latukefu (Port Moresby: The 
National Research Institute and the University of Papua New Guinea, 1989), pp. 417, 426-430; 
J. Waiko, 'European-Melanesian Contact in Melanesian Tradition and Literature' in Priorities in 
Melanesian Development (Canberra and Port Moresby: Research School of Pacific Studies, 
Australian National University and the University of Papua New Guinea, 1973), pp. 417-428; 
P.G. Sack and D. Clark, eds. and trans., Albert Hahl: Governor in New Guinea (Canberra: 
Australian National University Press, 1980), ix; P. Hempenstall, Pacific Islanders Under 
German Rule: A Study in the Meaning of Colonial Resistance (Canberra: Australian National 
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understanding of the present, and may even inform our expectations of the future, 
there can be no doubt. What is revealed, however, invariably appears in the crude 
glow of an imperfect incandescence, potentially blinding in its intensity when 
shed upon events at first hand, but often insufficient to provide clarity or 
resolution at its periphery; and refracted in both instances by a multiplicity of 
tendentiously fashioned lenses. All too frequently, our understanding of history 
subsists in reflections of ideas and phenomena whose meanings are distorted in 
the mirrors of time and space, and the most telling features of which are liable to 
be obscured in the penumbral shadows of passion, prejudice, ignorance and 
hubris.9 
The bearing of 'whence' on 'whither' in the realm of human affairs may well be 
inexorable; 10 for all that, however, it is invariably hedged about with a daunting 
and equally ineluctable uncertainty. And yet, even the most resolute critics of the 
University Press, 1978), vii-x; O.H.K. Spate, 'Britannia, Anglia, Melanesia' in Inglis, The 
History of Melanesia, pp. 661-671. 
9 In a particularly harsh condemnation of conventional Western historical analysis, Michael 
Oakeshott maintained: 
History is nothing other than 'the historian's experience. It is 
"made" by nobody save the historian; to write history is the 
only way of making it.' History is historiography. Hence, 
there are no lessons to be derived from history, because in 
reading history we only read ourselves. If history possesses a 
verdict it is only because we have already sat in judgment. 
Those who 'learn' from the past are, in a manner of 
speaking, intellectual ventriloquists who specialize in 
throwing their own frail voices into the mouth of sagacious 
and authoritative 'history'. In so doing, history becomes 
'retrospective politics,' where the naked present is paraded in 
the cloak of the past. [B. Susser, The Grammar of Modem 
Ideology (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 176] 
10 A.J. Toynbee, Change and Habit: The Challenge of Our Time (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1966), p. 8. See also, Carr, What Is History?, p. 55. 
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historiography of colonialism in Papua New Guinea 11 agree that 'it is only through 
an awareness of the nature and impact of colonial rule that certain aspects of 
contemporary Papua New Guinean society can be understood.' 12 
Indeed, the dynamic processes of social, political and economic, cultural and 
legal change, experienced collectively and individually by the people of Papua 
New Guinea from the time of their initial contacts with the ideas and expressions 
of European civilisation to the present, do appear to reflect certain salient features 
of those early and ongoing encounters, even if the quality and magnitude of those 
influences often elude ready identification and precise measurement. So too, the 
enduring influences and imprints of these myriad instances of exogenous 
introduction and intercultural articulation are revealed, if not always (or always 
obviously) in the nature and dynamics of sorcery beliefs and practices themselves, 
then most assuredly in the ways in which these beliefs and practices, and the 
responsive conduct they induce, are determinatively characterised by and through 
contemporary ideas and institutions of the law. 
If law was the 'cutting edge' of nineteenth-century European colonialism, 13 and 
if the modem implications of nineteenth-century European colonial law are 
11 See e.g. E.P. Wolfers, Race Relations and Colonial Rule in Papua New Guinea (Sydney: 
Australia and New Zealand Book Company, 1975); A. Amarshi, K. Good and R. Mortimer, 
Development and Dependency: The Political Economy of Papua New Guinea (Melbourne: 
Oxford University Press, (1979); P. Fitzpatrick, Law and State in Papua New Guinea (London: 
Academic Press, 1980); 'Law and Labour in Colonial Papua New Guinea' in The Political 
Economy of Law: A Third World Reader (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987) 130-135; P.G. 
Sack, 'Law in New Guinea and the Risks of Academic Pioneers: Some Comments on DRC 
Chalmers, "The Colonial Legal System in German New Guinea: 1884-1914"' (1983) 82 
Zeitschrift for Vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft 231-241. 
12 Wolfers, 'For the First Generation .. .', p. 427. See also U. Samana, Papua New 
Guinea: Which Way? (North Carlton, VIC: Arena Publications, 1988), pp. 63-65. See Carr, 
What is History?, pp. 87-108, 109-132. 
13 S.E. Merry, 'Law and Colonialism' (1991) 25(4) Law & Society Review 889, 890. 
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rendered intelligible only through a retrospective understanding of their 
underlying continuities, it is important to recognise at the outset that the forms and 
institutions of European colonial law, like the larger enterprise for which that 
species of law was pressed into service in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the 
Pacific, were as diverse and distinctive as the European nations whence they 
emanated, the cultures and societies in which they found expression and the 
individuals through whom the law was given expression in situ. 14 
More to the point, if law was the 'cutting edge' of colonialism in Papua New 
Guinea-intended to serve, and demonstrably serving, the hegemonic interests of 
empire as a signal 'instrument of power' and an integral 'part of the process of 
coercion' 15-a more refined understanding of the implications of that process 
depends as much upon knowledge of the ideological basis upon which that 
weapon was wielded, the particular individuals by and against whom it was used, 
to what specific ends it was so employed and with what apparent consequences, as 
it does upon a working knowledge of the substance and procedural forms of 
colonial law itself. 
Over fifty years ago, in what is still regarded as one of the most insightful 
treatments of intercultural contact in Papua New Guinea, 16 the sociologist, 
Stephen Winsor Reed, thoughtfully observed: 
14 See M Cooper, 'On the Beginnings of Colonialism in Melanesia' in The Pacification of 
Melanesia, ASAO Monograph No. 7, ed. M. Rodman and M. Cooper (1979; rpt Boston: 
University Press of America, 1983), pp. 26-27. 
15 M Channock, Law, Custom an4 Social Order: The Colonial Experience in Malawi an4 
Zambia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 4. 
16 See J. Griffin, H. Nelson and S. Firth, Papua New Guinea: A Political History 
(Melbourne: Heinemann Educational Australia Pty Ltd, 1979), p. 45. 
A proper evaluation of the changes which have taken place in 
New Guinea's native cultures as a result of white contact 
demands background study of the whole history of European 
penetration and settlement in this region. . . . We must 
recognise at the start that the phrase 'European contact' covers 
an indefinite number of concrete social situations in which 
Europeans and natives meet. . . . In other words, it is no less 
important to know the culture of the immigrant whites, and 
especially their reasons for coming to this inhospitable land, 
than it is to understand the cultures of New Guinea natives. It 
is from the inter-action of these two traditional bodies of 
behavior and belief that the modem society of New Guinea 
has been created with all of its problems yet to be solved. 17 
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More recently, and in much the same spirit, Edward Schieffelin and Deborah 
Gewertz have argued that ethnographically informed approaches to colonial 
history in Papua New Guinea must also attempt to give meaningful expression to 
the distinctively Papua New Guinean experiences and understandings of 
intercultural encounters. 18 Criticising the absence of such a perspective in 
conventional treatments of these issues, Shieffelin and Gewertz note that most 
historical accounts of Papua New Guinea tend to reflect uniquely European 
experiences, described from a decidedly Western point of view, adumbrating 'the 
discovery, exploration and eventual political and economic consolidation of the 
peoples' of Papua New Guinea. 19 
The continuities these histories represent are those with 
European history. With very few exceptions they do not 
reflect the continuities of P[apua] N[ew] G[uinea] culture and 
experience. Indeed, like the majority of ethnographies at 
present, they hardly acknowledge the historicity of P[apua] 
N[ew] G[uinea cultures at all.20 
17 The Making of Modern New Guinea: with Special Reference to Culture Contact in the 
Mandated Territory (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1943), pp. 89-90. 
18 E. Schieffelin and D. Gewertz, eds., History and Ethnohistory in Papua New Guinea, 
Oceania Monograph No. 28 (Sydney: University of Sydney, 1985). 
19 Ibid., p. 2. 
20 Ibid., p. 2. 
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The circumspect introduction of ethnographically informed perspectives into 
analyses of the events and affairs of what cannot properly be regarded as other 
than a shared history poses a particular challenge to the fundamentally Western 
perspective which effectively dominates the discipline of history. 
It means a shift from universalistic western assumptions about 
the basis of human motivations and historical processes to a 
consideration of how these are shaped by particular cultural 
configurations. It means accepting the possibility that we 
cannot really understand the nature of events from an 
objective point of view, but can only grasp their significance 
when we understand how the people themselves experienced 
and understood them at the time, and in retrospect." 
Complementing Maitland's dictum-that anthropology must become history or be 
nothing22-the proposition that competent historical analysis similarly depends 
upon an infusion of relevant ethnographic perspectives is certainly no less 
compelling. 
Of course, the effort to achieve an ethnographically informed history is no less 
problematic, and no less polemical, than the effort involved in the attempt to 
construct a historically informed ethnography.'3 To recognise this, however, is 
21 Ibid. 
22 F.W. Maitland, Selected Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1936), p. 249. 
The deficiencies of legal ethnographies, and an anthropology of law, bereft of historical 
contextualisation are specifically addressed in J. Starr and J.F. Collier, 'introduction: Dialogues 
in Legal Anthropology' in History and Power in the Study of Law: New Directions in Legal 
Anthropology, ed. J. Starr and J.F. Collier (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 1-27. 
See also J. Starr and J.F. Collier, 'Historical Studies of Legal Change' (1987) 28(3) Current 
Anthropology 367-372. 
23 See Chapter Two above; and see also N. Thomas, Out of Time: History and Evolution in 
Anthropological Discourse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); J.L. Comaroff, 
'Dialectical Systems, History and Anthropology: Units of Study and Questions of Theory' (1982) 
8 Journal of Southern African Studies 143-172; B.S. Cohen, 'History and Anthropology: The 
State of Play' (1980) 22(2) Comparative Studies in Society and History 198-221; E.P. 
Thompson, 'Folklore, Anthropology and Social History' (1978) 3(2) Indian Historical Review 
247-266. 
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simply to acknowledge that there are ideological, as well as intellectual and 
methodological nettles, which must be grasped along the path towards a more 
meaningful, if inevitably imperfect, understanding of the issues of law, culture and 
history with which we are here concemed.Z4 
In the circumstances, then, beyond an earnest endeavour to bring the 
ethnographic and anthropological matters considered in the preceding chapter to 
bear in a meaningful way on the historical and legal issues to be addressed in the 
sequel, there is little more that can be done in the attempt to construct an analysis 
that strives represent a Melanesian perspective on the understanding and 
experiences of law and sorcery, inter tempore, and the ideological orientations 
which informed that understanding and those experiences. 
2. THE RECEPTION OF ANGLO-AUSTRALIAN LAW: 
FORM AND SUBSTANCE 
Underscoring the institutional dualism implicit in imposed regimes of colonial 
law,25 the characterisation of colonial law in Papua New Guinea as 'peculiarly' 
colonial draws attention to the historical fact that the systematised expressions of 
Anglo-Australian legal culture, in situ, were qualitatively and fundamentally 
different to their metropolitan counterparts in many important respects.26 As a 
24 See P. Just, 'History, Power, Ideology and Culture: Current Directions in the 
Anthropology of Law' (1992) 26(2) Law & Society Review 373, 376-387. The cogency of, and 
the difficulties inherent in, ethno-historically informed studies of law and legal change are by no 
means peculiar to considerations of the historical experiences of 'other' societies and cultures. 
See H.J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Fonnation of the Western Legal Tradition 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), pp. 13-18, 77-83. 
25 See Merry, 'Law and Colonialism·, pp. 890-891. 
26 In other words: 'The law exported from England ... was not the common law of England 
but a colonial version of that law.' A. Paliwala, J. Zorn and P. Bayne, 'Economic Development 
and the Changing Legal System of Papua New Guinea' (1978) 16 African Law Studies, 3 at 12. 
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technical matter, this was necessarily so for two reasons. The first of these is of 
largely historical interest and need not detain us here. The second, however, has 
some considerable bearing on the very matters with which we are particularly 
concerned, and is thus more immediately deserving of appropriate enlargement. 
A. The Limitation of Circumstantial Applicability 
Firstly, then, at least passing cognisance must be taken of the fact that the 
formal reception of both English statutes and, more importantly,27 the rules and 
principles of English common law and equity, in Papua New Guinea was made 
subject from the outset to 'the qualification of circumstantial applicability . .zs This 
limitation, which frequently appeared in colonial legislation dealing with the 
reception of English law beyond the seas, provided, in effect, that English laws 
were received only to the extent that they were deemed to be appropriate to local 
circumstances. Embodying a common law rule of 'respectable antiquity ,'29 the 
logic of this qualification was explained by Blackstone as follows: 
27 The integumentary nature of the common law tradition, within which the meaning and 
application of statutes are ultimately determined, is the principal focus of this analysis. Cf. P. 
Finn, 'Statutes and the Common Law' (1992) 22 Western Australian Law Review 7- 30. 
28 R. v Ebulya [1964] P.&N.G.L.R. 200 at 221, per Ollerenshaw, J. For a contemporary 
discussion of the formal reception of English law in colonial territories, see H.H. Marchall, 'The 
Future of "Received" English Law in the Countries of the Commonwealth' (1982) 15 
Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 81-91. 
29 R.S. O'Regan, The Common Law in Papua and New Guinea (Sydney: The Law Book 
Company Limited, 1971), p. 12. 
It hath been held that if an uninhabited country be discovered 
and planted by English subjects, all the English laws then in 
being . . are immediately in force. But this must be 
understood with very many and very great restrictions. Such 
colonists carry with them only so much of the English law as 
is applicable to their new situation in the conditions of the 
infant colony .... [A] multitude of other provisions are neither 
necessary nor convenient and therefore not in force. 30 
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Towards the end of the nineteenth century the situation and conditions in New 
Guinea were, to say the least, considerably different to those prevailing in 
contemporary England. Thus, in accordance with the provisions of the British 
Settlements Act 1887,31 subject to the terms contained in Royal Instructions issued 
the following year12 and reflecting certain peculiarities in the administrative 
30 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. I (1765-1769; rpt. 
Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 107. See also A.C. Castles, An 
Australian Legal History (Sydney: Law Book Company, 1982), pp. 11-19. Consonant with the 
doctrines of international law recognised at the time as dispositive of questions concerning the 
validity of colonial law in 'backward territories': see M.F. Lindley, The Acquisition and 
Government of Backward Territory in International Law-Being a Treatise on the Law and 
Practice Relating to Colonial Expansion (London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1926); H. 
Jenkyns, British Rule and Jurisdiction Beyond the Seas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902). See 
also I. Browniie, Principles of Public International Law, 4th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1990), pp. 107-112, 122-123, 127-150, 176-179, the qualification of circumstantial applicability 
was readily interpreted as extending to inhabited but 'barbarous' countries, as well as those 
which were, in fact, uninhabited. K. Roberts-Wray, Commonwealth and Colonial Law (London: 
Stevens & Sons, 1966), p. 540. 
31 50 & 51 Viet., c 54. Section 2 of the Act provided: 
It shall be lawful for Her Majesty the Queen in Council from 
time to time to establish all such laws and institutions, and 
constitute such courts and officers, and make such provisions 
and regulations for the proceedings of the said courts and for 
the administration of justice, as may appear to Her Majesty in 
Council to be necessary for the peace, order and good 
government of Her Majesty's subjects and others within any 
British settlement. 
Cf. Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890, 53 & 54 Viet. c. 37. 
32 
'Instructions Passed under the Royal Sign Manual and Signet, to the Administrator of 
British New Guinea' [hereafter, Royal Instructions] (8 June 1888) British New Guinea 
Government Gazette, vol. I, no. 4 (4 September 1888). 
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relationship between England and the Australian colonies obtaining at the time, 33 
the Courts and Laws Adopting Ordinance (Amended) 1889 provided, in pertinent 
part, that in British New Guinea (and later Papua): 
The principles and rules of common law and equity that for 
the time being shall be in force and prevail in England shall so 
far as the same shall be applicable to the circumstances of the 
Possession be likewise the principles and rules of common law 
and equity that shall for the time being be in force and prevail 
in British New Guinea. 34 
The reception of enacted law was a somewhat more complicated affair. In this 
respect too, however, the relevant section of the adopting Ordinance made 
substantially equivalent provision and, to the extent that such legislation was 
'applicable to the circumstances of the Possession ... ,' [t]hose portions of the 
Acts Statutes and Laws of England that were in force in the Colony of Queensland 
on the 17th day of September 1888 ... 'were likewise brought into effect.35 
33 These peculiarities, which need not concern us here, resulted, amongst other things, in the 
two-step reception of English statute law (via Queensland) and, ultimately, the single-step 
reception of the rules and principles of common law and equity directly from England. For 
amplification of this arrangement, see J.R. Mattes, 'Sources of Law in Papua and New Guinea' 
(1963) 37 Australian Law Journal 148-153; R.S. O'Regan, 'The Reception of the Common Law 
and the Authority of Common Law Precedents in the Territory of Papua and New Guinea' 
(1970) 19(2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 217-228; P. Bayne, 'Legal 
Development in Papua New Guinea: The Place of the Common Law' (1975) 3(1) Melanesian 
Law Journal 9-39. See also P.D. Finn, Law and Government in Colonial Australia (Melbourne: 
Oxford University Press, 1987), p l-6; Castles, An Australian Legal History, pp. 400-444, 493-
514. 
34 Section 4 (emphasis supplied). As originally enacted, the Courts and Laws Adopting 
Ordinance 1888 provided for the adoption of the laws of Queensland as the laws of British New 
Guinea, with a number of statutes being expressly excepted therefrom. That arrangement, 
however, led to a number of administrative difficulties which, in MacGregor's words, made it 
' ... difficult-sometimes impossible-to determine whether a given law was in force in the 
Possession or not.' Annual Report on British New Guinea, 1889 to 1890, p. 5. In due course, the 
1888 Ordinance was repealed, and the amended Ordinance of 1889 substituted English law for 
Queensland law as the basic law of the Possession. See R.S. O'Regan, The Common Law in 
Papua and New Guinea (Sydney: The Law Book Company Ltd, 1971), pp. 1-2. 
35 Courts and Laws Adopting Ordinance (Amended) 1889, sec. 3. 
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Thirty years later, when the mandated Territory of New Guinea carne under 
Australian administration, the Laws Repeal and Adopting Ordinance 1921 36 
provided in virtually identical terms for the adoption of the rules and principles of 
common law and equity that were in force in England at the commencement of 
that Ordinance on 9 May 1921,37 as well as 'those portions of the Acts, Statutes 
and laws of England' which were in force in what, by that time, had become the 
State of Queensland. 38 
The technical processes by which the formal reception of Anglo-Australian 
law in Papua New Guinea was determined involved a variety of complex and 
sometimes dauntingly convoluted considerations. 39 As said, these are matters of 
36 As amended to 1923. 
37 Section 16. 
38 Section 14. 
39 The doctrine of circumstantial application was, of itself, problematical enough. As Lord 
Cranworth observed in Whicker v. Hume (1858) 7 H.L.C. 124 at 161 (11 E.R. 50 at 65): 
Nothing is more difficult than to know which of our laws is 
to be regarded as imported into our colonies .... Who is to 
decide whether they are adopted or not? This is a very 
difficult question. 
See also R. v. Dabat [1963] P.&N.G.L.R. 113 It 114; Booth v. Booth (1935) C.L.R. !; 
O'Regan, The Common Law in Papua and New Guinea, pp. 40-58. 
In Papua New Guinea, this difficulty was further exacerbated by the mediated adoption of 
English statute law (via Queensland), and the lapse of three decades between the adoption of 
Anglo-Australian law in British New Guinea (Papua) and the former German territory. 
Moreover, the Courts and Laws Adopting Ordinance (Amended) 1889 also provided that English 
statute law was received in British New Guinea only in so far as it was neither repugnant to, nor 
inconsistent with 'the provisions of any of the instruments laws or enactments specified [in a 
designated Schedule to the Ordinance] (sec. 3), whilst the Laws Repeal and Adopting Ordinance 
1921 (as amended to 1923) similarly provided that such enacted law was received in the 
mandated Territory only in so far it was: 
not repugnant to or inconsistent with the provisions of any 
Act, Ordinance, law, regulation, rule, order or proclamation 
having the force of law that has been or may hereafter be 
308 
largely (though not entirely) historical significance today40 and they will not, on 
that account, be laboured here!' For present purposes, it is rather more important 
to understand that, whilst the formally adopted rules and principles of Anglo-
Australian law-and the integumentary tradition of the common law within which 
those rules and principles are embraced-;;ould potentially have applied, mutatis 
mutandis, to order relations 'between the colonisers, between the colonisers and 
the colonised, and between the colonised', the actual application of those rules and 
principles to the latter two categories was a rare and, at best, highly attenuated, 
occurrence!2 
B. The Legal Regulation of Native Affairs 
Subject as it was to the formal qualification of circumstantial applicability, so 
much of the common law that could be adopted in New Guinea was effectively 
expressed to extend to or applied to or made or promulgated 
in the Territory [sec. 14]. 
40 See e.g. The Ship 'Federal Huron' v. OK Tedi Mining Ltd [1986] PNGLR 5; M. 
MacCormick, 'The Ship 'Federal Huron' v. OK Tedi Mining Ltd etc' (1987) 15 Melanesian Law 
Journal 181; R. W. James, 'A Comparative View of the Underlying Law' in Legal Issues in a 
Developing Society, ed. R.W. James and I. Fraser (Port Moresby: Faculty of Law, University of 
Papua New Guinea, 1992), pp. 146, 149-150. 
41 For further consideration and discussion of these matters see O'Regan, 'The Reception of 
the Common Law and the Authority of Common Law Precedents in the Territory of Papua and 
New Guinea'; O'Regan, 'The Common Law and English Statutes in the Territory of Papua and 
New Guinea' (1971) 45(6) Australian Law Journal 297; O'Regan, The Common Law in Papua 
and New Guinea; Mattes, 'Sources of Law in Papua and New Guinea'; Bayne, 'Legal 
Development in Papua New Guinea: The Place of the Common Law'; M.B. Hooker, Legal 
Pluralism: An Introduction to Colonial and Neo-Colonial Laws (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 
pp. 338-340; K. Roberts-Wray, Commonwealth and Colonial Law (London: Stevens & Sons, 
1966), pp. 132-133, 886-887. 
42 Bayne, 'The Place of the Common Law', p. 11; B.L. Ottely and J.G. Zorn, 'Criminal 
Law in Papua New Guinea: Code, Custom and the Courts in Conflict' (1983) 31(2) American 
Journal of Comparative Law 251 at 258-259. 
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received for the benefit of the colonisers exclusively.43 So far as the conduct of 
Papua New Guineans was concerned, in terms of their relations inter se and with 
non-Melanesians alike (and to the extent that such conduct was practically 
amenable to colonial law in any meaningful sense), the only body of adopted 
Anlgo-Australian law occasionally applied was the common law of crimes (and 
later, the Queensland Criminal Code).44 Beyond that, however, virtually every 
aspect of native life was subject to a distinct and extensive set of legal regulations, 
made and administered, more or less ad hoc, by a handful of colonial officials and 
their delegates on the spot. 
43 See Bayne, 'Legal Development in Papua New Guinea: The Place of the Common Law,' 
p. 20; Ottley and Zorn, 'Criminal Law in Papua New Guinea: Code, Custom and the Courts in 
Conflict,' p. 259. Even then, its application of English law in practice was further qualified by 
the political exigencies and vicissitudes of life in a remote colony, where so much was new, so 
much had been left behind and so much was wanting. Finn, Law and Government in Colonial 
Australia, p. 2 [footnotes omitted]. Thus, for example, as Fitzpatrick notes, it was unusual for 
any white expatriate to be charged with a petty criminal offence (particularly those involving 
breaches of public order). Even more serious crimes often went unprosecuted, when committed 
by colonial officials. Occasionally, colonists suspected of criminal conduct were accorded the 
expedient option of leaving the colony. Law and State in Papua New Guinea, p. 66 [footnotes 
omitted]. 
44 The Queensland Criminal Code Act 1889 (63 Vic. c. 9) was adopted in British New 
Guinea in 1902 by the Criminal Code Ordinance 1902 (No. 7), and in the mandated Territory in 
1921, pursuant to sec. 16 and Sch. 2 of the Laws Repeal and Adopting Ordinance 1921 (No. 1); 
the latter having been re-adopted, with minor amendments, by the Laws Repeal and Adopting 
Ordinance 1924 (No. 1). In both instances, the Criminal Code was technically applicable to 
natives and non-natives alike. Significantly, the adoption of the Code in British New Guinea did 
not contain express qualifications as to circumstantial applicability or repugnancy to existing 
laws; although in retrospect, the Supreme Court noted that parts of the Code were manifestly 
inapplicable and unenforceable at the time of its adoption. R. v. Ebulya [1964] P.N.G.L.R. 200 
at 221-222. Unlike its British New Guinea (and later, Papua) counterpart, the adoption of the 
Criminal Code in the mandated Territory was subject to circumstantial applicability, 'although in 
practice this distinction made little or no difference as no substantive portion of the Code was 
ever ruled inapplicable.' Chalmers, Weisbrot and Andrew, Criminal Law and Practice of Papua 
New Guinea, pp. 236-237. 
Also known as the 'Griffith Code', after its draftsman, Sir Samuel Griffith, the Queensland 
Criminal Code 'was intended as a progressive codification of the common law of crimes .... ' 
Incorporating a number of related scattered statutes, it was also exported for use in Nigeria. 
Weisbrot, 'Integration of Laws in Papua New Guinea: Custom and the Criminal Law in 
Conflict,' p. 6!. 
310 
In British New Guinea, the system of native regulation derived its authority 
from the British Settlements Act, which provided for the delegation of all or any of 
the powers conferred by the Act on the Queen in Council 'to any three or more 
persons within the settlement.'45 Subject to such conditions, provisions and 
limitations as may be specified m the instrument defining the scope of the 
authority attaching to their offices, the persons to whom those powers were 
delegated were permitted: 
to establish all such laws and institutions, and constitute such 
courts and officers, and make such provisions and regulations 
for the proceedings in the said courts and for the 
administration of justice, as may appear ... to be necessary for 
the peace, order, and good government of Her Majesty's 
subjects and others within [the Possession]." 
Royal Instructions issued pursuant to the Act accordingly provided for the 
establishment of a Legislative Council consisting of an Administrator and at least 
two, but not more than five, appointed Members.47 The Legislative Council, 
acting collectively by majority vote, was in turn responsible for the enactment of 
the laws (styled 'Ordinances') of the Possession.48 
On 15 November 1889, William MacGregor, Administrator of British New 
Guinea, acting with the advice and consent of the Legislative Council, duly 
enacted an Ordinance for the Better Regulation of Native Affairs.<9 More 
commonly known by its short title, the Native Board Ordinance50 provided, inter 
45 50 & 51 Viet., c. 54, s. 3. 
46 50 & 51 Viet., c. 54, s. 2. 
47 Royal Instructions, cl. XIII. 
48 Royal Instructions, cl. XIX and para. XXII( I). 
49 No. IX of 1889. 
50 Native Board Ordinance, cl. XVI. 
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alia, for the establishment of a 'Native Regulation Board', consisting of the 
Administrator and at least two members of the Legislative Council. 51 Amongst its 
principal responsibilities, the Native Regulation Board was required: 
to consider such questions relating to the good government 
and well being of the native population ... and to give the 
Administrator honest and well advised Counsel thereupon and 
to submit to the Administrator any recommendations or 
proposals that they may deem to be for the benefit of the 
Native population-" 
Further to these obligations, the Board was empowered to make such regulations 
affecting the affairs of the natives, as to it seemed necessary and proper, in regard 
to: marriage and divorce, the succession to property in the case of intestacy and 
the testamentary disposition of property; the disposal of the dead; the jurisdiction, 
powers and procedures of specialised native courts and native magistrates; the 
rights to real and personal property; the cultivation of the soil; the observance of 
native customs; and any other matters 'bearing upon or affecting the good 
government and well-being of the Natives'.53 
" Native Board Ordinance, cl. II. 
52 CL VII. 
53 CL VIII. Although not especially pertinent to the matters with which we are concerned 
here, it is interesting nevertheless to note that the defmition of a 'Native' in the Native Board 
Ordinance (cL I) included not only 'any aboriginal native of New Guinea or any island adjacent 
thereto or any part of the Possession of British New Guinea,' but also: 
every aboriginal native of any island in the Pacific Ocean or 
any of the East Indian Islands or of Malaysia that shall whilst 
he is in the Possession of British New Guinea live after the 
manner that aboriginal natives of New Guinea or the islands 
adjacent thereto live and also every person that is wholly or 
partly descended from any aboriginal natives or native 
aforesaid and that shall whilst he is in the Possession ... live 
after the manner that ahoriginal natives of New Guinea or the 
islands adjacent thereto live. 
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In remarkably short order, the lives and affairs of Papua New Guineans came 
increasingly to be governed by the divers regulatory pronouncements of the 
Native Regulation Board, the provisions of which invariably attempted to 
transform indigenous patterns of conduct and social relations m a marmer 
calculated to suit, at once, the immediate political and economic needs of the 
colonial administration, and the projected aspirations and cultural pretensions of 
the white, Christian, Eurocentric society it represented. 54 Indeed, most, if not all, 
of the regulations enacted in British New Guinea under the Native Board 
Ordinance of 1889, those subsequently re-enacted or made anew in Papua under 
the supplanting Native Regulation Ordinance of 190ff5 and those promulgated 
under the Native Administration Ordinance 1921 56 in the Australian-administered, 
formerly German, Territory of New Guinea, involved patent impositions on 
traditional Papua New Guinean life and society of an arbitrary, coercive, culturally 
repressive and sometimes seemingly absurd quality. 
In their myriad expressions, the Native Board Regulations m British New 
Guinea, the Native Regulations in Australian Papua,57 and the cognate Native 
54 See Bayne, 'Legal Development in Papua New Guinea: The Place of the Common Law,' 
pp. 20-21; Paliwala, Zorn and Bayne, 'Economic Development and the Changing Legal System 
of Papua New Guinea,' pp. 28-29; Ottley and Zorn, 'Criminal Law in Papua New Guinea: 
Code, Customs and the Courts in Conflict,' p. 259, n. 32; Weisbrot, 'Integration of Laws in 
Papua New Guinea: Custom and the Criminal Law in Conflict,' p. 66; A. Amarshi, K. Good 
and R. Mortimer, Development and Dependency: The Political Economy of Papua New Guinea 
(Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 181. 
55 No. XXV of 1909. 
56 No. 21 of 1921. 
57 Pursuant to s. 5 of the Papua Act 1905 (No.9) (Cwth), British New Guinea was accepted 
as a Territory under the authority of the Commonwealth of Australia (thenceforth to be known a 
the Territory of Papua). Under the authority of that Act, the Native Regulation Ordinance of 
1908 (No. XXV of 1909) repealed the Native Board Ordinance of 1889 (cl. 7 of the former), 
and vested authority in the 'Lieutenant-Governor in Council to make Regulations affecting the 
affairs of the natives' on the same terms as those provided in the 1889 Ordinance (cl. 5 of the 
1908 Ordinance). 
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Administration Regulations in the mandated Territory of New Guinea,58 all 
expressly conveyed or implicitly betokened the predominant ethos of colonial rule 
Differences between the regimes of native regulation administered by the Britisb and the 
Australians are canvassed in some detail in A.M. Healey, 'Native Administration and Local 
Goverrunent in Papua, 1880-1960' (unpublished PhD Thesis, Australian National University, 
1962), and more recently in K.J. Vizjak, 'The Native Regulations of Papua-A Form of Social 
Control' (unpublished Honours Sub-Thesis, Australian National University, 1988). Although the 
administrative styles and colonial philosophies of MacGregor (and his immediate successors), on 
the one hand, and those of J.H.P. Murray, the first Australian Lieutenant-Governor of Papua 
(and his successors), on the other, can be distinguished on a number of substantive bases, it may 
fairly be said that the similarities between the two regimes-English and Australian-out-number 
and out-weigh any significant differences. For present purposes, it will suffice to refer to E.P. 
Wolters's general observation: 'The Native Regulation Board Ordinance of 1889 [sic] was no 
more than the legal seed from which MacGregor's Australian successors developed an 
increasingly bifurcated legal system.' Race Relations and Colonial Rule in Papua New Guinea, 
p. 18. 
58 Control of the German Territory of New Guinea (Kaiserwilhelmsland) and the islands of 
Bismarck Archipellago was surrendered to Australian Naval and Military forces on 17 
September 1914. In accordance with the applicable rules and principles of international and 
military law, however, the existing German laws remained in force and effectively unchanged 
pending an appropriate constitutional disposition. In 1920, anticipating the grant of a Class C 
Mandate by the League of Nations to the Commonwealth of Australia, the New Guinea Act 1920 
(No. 25) (Cwth) declared the 'Territories and Islands formerly constituting German New Guinea 
... to be a Territory under the authority of the Commonwealth, by the name of the Territory of 
New Guinea' (s. 4), upon a date to be proclaimed. In due course, the Mandate was issued and 
accepted, bringing the provisions of the New Guinea Act into effect on 9 May 1921. In 
pursuance of the powers conferred by the New Guinea Act, the Governor-General of the 
Commonwealth of Australia ordained the Native Administration Ordinance 1921 (No 21), under 
cl. 4(1) of which the Administrator of the Territory was empowered to make regulations 
affecting the affairs of the natives on precisely the same terms as those specified in the Native 
Regulation Ordinance of 1908 (Papua). 
The nature of the Australian legal administration in the Territory of New Guinea is 
comprehensively addressed in C. D. Rowley, The Australians in German New Guinea, 1914-1921 
(Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1958). A cursory and decidedly uncritical treatment 
can be found in G.W.L. Townsend, 'The Administration of the Mandated Territory of New 
Guinea' (1933) 82(5) Geographical Journal 424-434. See also D.R.C. Chalmers, 'New Guinea 
under the Military Occupation, 1914-1921' (1980) 79 Zeitschrift fUr Vergleichende 
Rechtswissenschaft 225-234; idem, 'A History of the Role of Traditional Dispute Settlement 
Procedures in the Courts of Papua New Guinea' in Law and Social Change in Papua New 
Guinea, ed. D. Weisbrot, A. Paliwala and A. Sawyerr (Sydney: Butterworths, 1982), pp. 
169,175-176; H.N. Nelson, 'The Swinging Index: Capital Punishment and British and Australian 
Administrations in Papua New Guinea, 1888-1945' (1978) 13(3) Journal of Pacific History 130, 
144-146. Here, too, whilst the existence of demonstrable differences between the native 
regulatory schemes erected in Papua and New Guinea are duly acknowledged, those differences, 
for present purposes, need not be regarded as so substantial as to preclude a meaningful 
consideration of the two systems together. Thus, as Wolfers observes: 
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'that natives should do as they were told.' 59 Spanning the gamut of what, from the 
distinctive perspective of the colonisers, constituted dangerous, threatening, 
insulting, indecent, rude, immodest, unhygienic, economically disruptive, morally 
repugnant, heretical, inconvenient, undesirable or merely <esthetically displeasing 
behaviour, the system of Native Regulations dictated, amongst other things: 
dress codes (no shirts on men in town areas); language (no 
English spoken to Europeans ... ); health (required submission 
to VD examinations, building of latrines, burial of rubbish, 
burning of diseased clothing, bedding, drops and animals); 
village life (linear placement of houses, clean swept village 
squares, planting of trees outside the village whilst uprooting 
them within); agriculture (the promotion of cash cropping, 
particularly coffee, tea, cocoa and copra); and even sexual 
relations (adultery, recognized as a precipitator of trouble, was 
prohibited) .... 60 
In addition to such comparatively unremarkable prohibitions as those against 
theft, assault and other 'conventional' offences which were not otherwise 
punishable as crimes or misdemeanours,61 it was also an offence under the 
In General, New Guinea's Native Administration Regulations 
imposed harsher penalties than their Papuan counterparts-
and from 1923, all prison sentences for offences against the 
Native Administration Regulations, were deemed to 'be with 
hard labour unless it ... [was] expressly enacted' that the 
reverse was to be the case. They were geared to the 
requirements of a plantation society, and only secondly to the 
protection of the village. In New Guinea, the indigenes were 
always at least potential employees; in Papua, villagers, to be 
protected from the effects of uncontrolled social change, and 
economic exploitation. Many of the Native Administration 
Regulations were, however, directly derived from the 
MacGregor-Murray tradition of asserting the administration's 
right of unilateral intervention in the village. . . . [Race 
Relations and Colonial Rule in Papua New Guinea, p. 92] 
59 L. Mair, Australia in New Guinea, 2nd ed. (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1970), 
p. 66. 
60 Weisbrot, 'Integration of Laws in Papua New Guinea: Custom and the Criminal Law in 
Conflict' , p. 66. 
61 See regulations 78 and 71, Native Regulations, 1939 (Papua); regulations 95 and 93, 
Native Administration Regulations, 1924 (New Guinea). 
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Regulations for a native to be abroad between the hours of nine o'clock in the 
evening and daylight in any town other than one in which he or she was 
authorised to reside. Whilst within the boundaries of a town where they 
permissibly resided, natives were nonetheless obliged to confine themselves to 
prescribed premises during those hours.62 Any native who was unable to justify 
his presence in a particular place at a particular time, or 'to give a good account of 
his means of support,' could summarily and, if necessary, forcibly be returned to 
his or her village."3 The drinking of intoxicating liquor, gambling and 
prostitution-common enough vices amongst members of the expatriate 
community-were all made forbidden acts under the Regulations.64 In New 
Guinea, it was even an offence for a native to ride a bicycle 'upon any street' in the 
town ofRabaul, 'unless he [was] authorized in writing by an officer, and ha[d] the 
authorization in his possession.'65 
Directly and indirectly, a good many of the Regulations were designed to 
provide punitive sanctions for actual or perceived violations by natives of 
employment contracts and indenturing arrangements into which they had entered 
with expatriate businessmen and plantation operators on theoretically private, 
voluntary bases.66 To be sure, the legal regulation of native labour also 'made 
62 Regulations 73 and 74, Native Regulations, 1939 (Papua); reg. 80 Native Administration 
Regulations 1924 (New Guinea) 
63 Regulation 75, Native Regulations, 1939 (Papua). 
64 Regulations 83, 84 and 88, Native Regulations, 1939 (Papua); regs 84, 103 and 104, 
Native Administration Regulations 1924 (New Guinea). 
65 Native Administration Regulations 1924 (New Guinea), reg. 80D(2). 
66 D. R. C. Chalmers and A. Paliwala, An Introduction to the Law in Papua New Guinea, 
2nd ed (Sydney: Law Book Company, 1984), p. 146. On the nature and implications of the 
contractual and statutory systems of native labour in Papua New Guinea, see Fitzpatrick, Law 
and State in Papua New Guinea, pp. 57-62, 170-172; Paliwala, Zorn and Bayne, 'Economic 
Development and the Changing Legal System of Papua New Guinea'; Wolfers, Race Relations 
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provision for such things as maximum hours of work and minimum wages and for 
health, dietary and accommodation standards,' as well as offering some measure of 
protection for workers against 'fraud and cruelty on the part of employers and 
labour recruiters.'67 For its part, however, the Administration itself could, and 
often did, compel natives to work on a variety of its own infrastructural projects 
under conditions no less onerous than those imposed by many suspect, private 
labour contracts, and readily punished natives who either refused to do so, or 
failed to do so in accordance with instructions. 68 
Where they were not prohibited outright, many traditional cultural activities of 
deep spiritual and religious significance to Papua New Guineans were likewise 
constrained by the Regulations. Thus, for example, the organised celebration of 
customary practices associated with traditional spiritual or religious beliefs were 
declared to be 'illegal cults' .69 The encouragement or facilitation such practices 
and the mere possession of any 'charm or object' used or intended for use in 
connection with those activities, were all punishable offences under the Native 
and Colonial Rule in Papua New Guinea, pp. 9, 36-40, passim; Amarshi, Good and Mortimer, 
Development and Dependency: The Political Economy of Papua New Guinea, pp. 9-77, 163-
186;. C. Newbury, 'Land, Labour, Capital and Colonial Government in Papua New Guinea,' in 
Papua New Guinea: A Century of Colonial Impact, 1884-1984, ed. S. Latukefu, pp. 37-48; 
H.N. Nelson, 'European Attitudes in Papua, 1906-1914,' in The History of Melanesia, Second 
Waigani Seminar, ed. K.S. Inglis (Port Moresby: University of Papua and New Guinea, 1969), 
pp. 593-613. Cf. S. Firth, 'Labour in German New Guinea,' in Papua New Guinea: A Century 
ofColonial1mpact, 1884-1984, ed. S. Latukefu, pp. 179-202. 
67 Fitzpatrick, Law and State in Papua New Guinea, p. 57. 
68 For example, sub-regulation 118(1) of the Native Regulations, 1939 (Papua) provided: 'It 
is good for the people that roads should be made and kept clean and the Magistrate will tell the 
people of each village what roads they are to make and keep clear of weeds.' Failure to comply 
with administrative directions in this connection could result in imprisonment for a term of up to 
fourteen days (sub-reg. 118(2)). Similar orders could issue under provisions of the Native 
Administration Regulations 1924 (New Guinea). There, however, disobedience carried a penalty 
of up to six months' imprisonment (reg. 118). 
69 Regulation 81. Native Regulations, 1939 (Papua). 
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Regulations.70 A wide range of traditional mortuary and funerary rites were 
similarly curtailed or forbidden absolutely .71 Indeed, no ceremony involving 
'noise, shouting, beating of drums, singing and dancing,' all of which activities 
figure centrally in many Melanesian rituals and constitute an essential feature in 
the general pattern of traditional social relations, could lawfully proceed after nine 
o'clock in the evening.72 
In broad, largely discretionary provtswns, the Native Regulations gave 
colonial officials effectively replete control over the lives and affairs of all Papua 
New Guineans. The principal instrument through which that discretion was 
exercised was the patrol officer, or kiap: 
70 Ibid. 
Though the kiaps were at the bottom of a hierarchy that wound 
upwards through sub-district and district officials to the 
Lieutenant Governor or Administrator, they had almost 
unlimited power-and unlimited duties-within their own 
domains. Each patrol officer, assisted by Papua New Guinean 
police constables, was in charge of all the villages in an area 
that might be as large as a hundred square miles. From his 
patrol post he kept the peace, made occasional forays into new 
areas to bring more villages under Australian control, 
protected missionaries and other expatriates under his 
jurisdiction, heard court cases, settled disputes, collected taxes, 
rounded up men to build roads and airstrips, took the census, 
71 Regulation 100, Native Regulations, 1939 (Papua); reg. 102, Native Administration 
Regulations 1924 (New Guinea). For an enlightening anthropological analysis of the significance 
of death in traditional Melanesian culture, the importance of the rituals associated therewith, and 
some of the implications of the administration's regulatory interference with these processes, see 
G. Bateson, Naven: A Survey of the Problems suggested by a Composite Picture of the Culture of 
a New Guinea Tribe drawn from Three Points of View, 2nd ed. (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1958), pp. 152-159 (originally published in 1936). See also, R.F. Salisbury, Vunamami: 
Economic Transformation in a Traditional Society (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1970), 
pp. 279-280, 292-295. 
72 In New Guinea, the prohibition on such activities was limited to those occurring within a 
town. See sub-regulation 80(4) and reg. 80c of the Native Administration Regulations 1924. In 
Papua, the restriction extended to towns and villages alike, although a Magistrate might grant 
permission 'to dance after that hour'. See sub-regulation 73(2) of the Native Regulations, 1939. 
and generally enforced the manifold rules created by the 
administration. 
The kiap single-handedly embraced all the functions of the 
legal system. As an administrator, he relayed government 
policy to his charges. As a policeman, he arrested them when a 
rule was broken. As prosecutor, he charged them, and as 
magistrate, he meted out their sentences." 
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Ultimately, the Regulations were administered by a separate system of 
specialised Native Courts-the Native Magistrates Courts, as they were called in 
British New Guinea74 (later styled Courts for Native Matters in Papua75), and the 
Courts for Native Affairs, as they came to be called in the mandated Territory of 
New Guinea.76 In both their structure and operations, the Native Courts were, ipso 
facto, quite different to conventional English or Australian courts of law. The 
13 Paliwala, Zorn and Bayne, 'Economic Development and the Changing Legal System of 
Papua New Guinea,' p. 27. 
In all cases, except where a Regulation expressly provided otherwise, sentences of 
imprisonment could be imposed with or without hard labour, at the discretion of the magistrate. 
Regulation 65, Native Regulations, 1939 (Papua); reg. 48, Native Administrative Regulations 
1924 (New Guinea). In Papua, although children under the age of fourteen years might not be 
imprisoned for an offence against the Regulations of which they had been convicted, the court 
could order that they be publicly whipped as a punishment. See reg. 61, Native Regulations, 
1939 (Papua), providing further that '[t]he whipping may vary according to the age of the 
offender, but shall not be severe.' 
74 Native Board Ordinance of 1889, ci. X. 
75 Native Regulation Ordinance of 1908, ci. 3. 
76 Native Administration Regulations 1923, Part II (cf. Native Administration Ordinance 
1921, cl. 2, providing for the establishment of, but without formally denominating, 'such courts 
for native matters as the Administrator constitutes in pursuance of this Ordinance.' 
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presiding magistracy77 also played a role significantly different to, and rather more 
expansive than, that of a conventional Anglo-Australian judicial officer:78 
He was . . . the sole personification of the government: 
policeman, explorer, road-builder, health inspector, social 
worker and prison warder: even in court, where he deal[t] with 
most of the 'lesser offences' against the law ... , he act[ed] as 
prosecutor, defence counsel, judge andjury.79 
That such an arrangement should have resulted, from time to time, in 'judicial' 
excess and abuse was inevitable. The very existence of a separate system of 
courts, bifurcated on explicitly racial grounds, was so inherently discriminatory 
that any semblance of impartiality-in the dispensation of justice as between 
expatriate Europeans and indigenous Melanesians, on the one hand, or as between 
the Administration and those Papua New Guineans whose affairs became matters 
for judicial disposition, on the other-may fairly be regarded as largely, if not 
entirely, fortuitous. 80 In fairness, it must be said that many of those responsible 
for the administration of justice in colonial Papua New Guinea sincerely, if 
naively, endeavoured to do so in fidelity at least to the spirit of justice, if not 
always to the strict rule of law. The intrinsic nature of the system, however, 
tended to militate against this. 
77 In British New Guinea, the Native Board Ordinance of 1889 expressly provided that 'any 
person whether a Native or not' might be appointed as a Magistrate for Native Matters (cl. X, 
emphasis supplied). In practice, however, no indigenous magistrates were so appointed. No 
equivalent provision was carried over in the Native Regulation Ordinance of 1908 (Papua), and 
certainly none appeared in the Native Administration Ordinance or the Native Administration 
Regulations (New Guinea). 
78 Wolfers, Race Relations and Colonial Rule in Papua New Guinea, p. 19. 
79 Ibid. 
80 See Fitzpatrick, Law and State in Papua New Guinea, p. 66; A. Inglis, Not a Mzite 
Woman Safe: Sexual Anxiety and Politics in Port Moresby, 1920-1934 (Canberra: Australian 
National University Press, 1974), p. 79. 
The Courts for Native Affairs (or Matters) were wholly staffed 
by ... administration officers. Many of these officers regarded 
their judicial work as ancillary to their executive functions, 
and performed their judicial work with an executive mind. 
Although there were instances of arbitrary and illegal actions, 
the rationale for the system was compelling. On the whole, 'the 
individual integrity, devotion and goodwill of the officers 
concerned and the tradition of a service dedicated to the 
welfare of the native population' tempered the inequities of the 
system.81 
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In that same spirit, many of the Native Regulations earnestly, if somewhat 
clumsily, sought to introduce beneficial practices in the areas of health and 
hygiene,82 to encourage industry and productive husbandry, and to provide a 
modicum of protection for indigenous Papua New Guineans against the more 
ruthless forms of exploitation at the hands of the most unscrupulous Europeans. 83 
Characterised as generously as an informed historical circumspection permits, 
81 Bayne, 'Legal Development in Papua New Guinea: The Place of the Common Law,' pp. 
14-15. Bayne has quoted here from the Report on the System for the Administration of Justice in 
the Territory of Papua New Guinea, prepared in 1960 by Professor David Derham (and 
commonly referred to as the Derham Report) at the request of the then Minister for Territories, 
Paul Hasluck. Professor Derham had been directed to 'enquire into the existing system of the 
administration of justice in the Territory ... ,' and to make suggestions for its improvement having 
regard to both the present and future requirements of the Territory': Derham Report, para 2, p. 
I (quoting from the terms of reference). In Chapter Two of his Report, Professor Derham 
addressed 'Defects in the Functioning of Courts for Native Affairs,' in which context he 
observed, at para. 18, p. 20: 
One of the defects in the past ... was that many powers [of 
the kiaps] were exercised indiscriminately and without formal 
check . . . . This produced in isolated areas the exercise of 
what has been called 'the divine right of k:iaps', and the rights 
and interests of native subjects were at the mercy of personal 
rule uncontrolled by any effective law. 
The 'potential dangers' of that situation was, according to Derham, 'kept in check in all but 
isolated cases by the individual integrity, devotion, and goodwill of the officers concerned .... ' 
Ibid. Yet even in his essentially commendatory assessment, Derham was obliged to 
acknowledge: 'It would be naive to . . . to suppose that all the arbitrary characteristics of 
personal rule by the kiap [were] in the past.' Ibid., para. 19, p. 21. 
82 MacGregror, as it happened, was a physician by training, and prior to his appointment as 
Administrator of British New Guinea he had served as Chief Medical Officer in Fiji. 
83 See Wolfers, Race Relations and Colonial Rule in Papua New Guinea, pp. 17-18. 
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however, the means adopted to achieve those ends were, at best, paternalistically 
aimed at the 'correction and improvement' of a people generally regarded as 
wretchedly primitive, and whose benighted condition was beyond question even 
in the most sympathetic assessments. Regulations designed to facilitate the 
development of village economies were, in the main, wholly undisguised efforts 
'to provide a potential source of tax-revenue, and to assist in the indigenes entry 
into a [colonially controlled] cash economy.'84 Such real protections as were 
offered to natives under the labour regulations operated principally to the 
advantage 'of the literate and those who knew the law.'85 
In their every iteration, the Native Regulations purported to foster 'the good 
government and well being of the native population.' Yet the realisation of those 
intentions was invariably conceived in terms entirely consistent with a colonial 
Weltanschauung from which the native point of view was effectively excluded as 
an irrelevant, if not impertinent, consideration. In its every application to, or in 
relation to, the natives, colonial law in Papua New Guinea was not, and was not 
84 Ibid., p. 18. From the outset, the administration of British New Guinea operated under 
severe financial constraints and the need to generate internal revenue was constant. The curious 
arrangement under which the protectorate was erected into a crown colony provided that a 
number of Australian colonies, rather than England, would finance the administration for a 
period of ten years. In that time, MacGregor operated on 'an annual pittance of £15,000 .... ' 
H.J. Gibbney, 'The Interregnum in the Government of Papua, 1901-1906' (1966) 12(3) 
Australian Journal of Politics & History 341 at 342. 
85 
'Most Papuans had to wait until they found, or were noticed by, a European who 
recognized their plight, before they could assert their rights'. Wolfers, Race Relations and 
Colonial Rule in Papua New Guinea, p. 39. Whilst it may be difficult today to ascertain with 
certainty whether, in any particular instance, 'the law was even-handedly administered and 
whether administration officials were conscientious in protecting labourers from abuses . . . , ' 
contemporary analysts tend to agree that, as a rule, 'Australians and other white expatriates were 
treated more leniently than were indigenous workers.' A. Paliwala, J. Zorn and P. Bayne, 
'Economic Development and the Changing Legal System of Papua New Guinea' (1978) 16 
African Law Studies 3 at 23-24 (citing C.D. Rowley, The New Guinea Villager: A Retrospect 
from 1964 (Melbourne: Cheshire, 1972); P. Fitzpatrick, 'Labouring in Legal Mystification' 
(1976) 4 Melanesian Law Journal 133; H. Nelson, Black, White and Gold: Goldmining in Papua 
New Guinea, 1878-1930 (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1976). 
322 
intended to be, anything like a faithful reflection or representative expression of 
the common law tradition. In the circumstances, it could not reasonably be 
expected to have been so. Thus, to the extent that it was meant to serve as a 
'specific instrument for achieving the objectives of the colonial state' (however 
one may be inclined to characterise those objectives or their underlying motives), 
the law exported from England and Australia to Papua New Guinea was not the 
common law.86 Indeed, it is not too much to say that, in many respects, colonial 
law, as a juridical system and as a jurisprudential tradition, represented the very 
antithesis of the common law.87 
86 Paliwala, Zorn and Bayne, 'Economic Development and the Changing Legal System of 
Papua New Guinea,' p. 12. 
87 See Bayne, 'Legal Development in Papua New Guinea: The Place of the Common Law,' 
pp. 14-15. Reflecting on the fundamental differences between the common law and the system of 
colonial law in Papua New Guinea, in respect of the latter, Weisbrot catalogues the absence of: 
the right to trial by a jury of one's peers (available for a time 
to European defendants, but never to nationals); the 
separation of powers (the colonial administration both 
promulgated and executed the laws; kiaps served as 
magistrates-and often as the de facto prosecutors as well; 
superior court judges often played an inquisitorial role at 
trials due to the absence of counsel and jurors; and in Papua 
the Lieutenant Governor from 1908 until 1940 was also Chief 
Judicial Officer); the writ of habeas corpus, although 
theoretically available, was in practice unavailable due to the 
absence of defence counsel and the centralization of the bench 
in Port Moresby; prohibitions against unreasonable searches 
and seizures meant little to kiaps in the field . . . ; the 
separation of criminal and civil matters . . . ; the 
presumption of innocence. . . ; and equal protection of the 
law .... 
'Integration of Laws in Papua New Guinea: Custom and the Criminal Law in Conflict,' p. 66 
(footnotes omitted). 
3. THE DISPOSITION OF SORCERY-RELATED 
MATTERS UNDER COLONIAL LAW 
A. Preliminary Considerations 
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The epistemological, sociological and ideological problems posed by the 
sorcery-related beliefs and practices of the indigenous population for Papua New 
Guinea's colonial administrators were apprehended and approached by the latter in 
practical, political and legal terms. Although it is the last of these terms with 
which we are principally concerned here, it is difficult to account for any issue of 
law in society without some circumspect consideration of its practical implications 
and political premises. 
The problematic practical and political ramifications of the sorcery-related 
beliefs and practices for the colonial administration of Papua New Guinea have 
already been touched upon, and will be considered again in the sequel. 88 In its 
distinctively legal aspect, the problem of sorcery typically arose in three contexts. 
First, there was the issue of dealing with the practice (or the purported practice) of 
sorcery per se, the occurrence of which would normally come to the attention of 
colonial authorities through information related or by way of accusation. In such 
cases, irrespective of the consequences of a reported act of sorcery, where the 
alleged sorcerer could be identified and located, the elements essential to any 
problem of law-an alleged act, a suspected human actor and usually (though not 
necessarily) a consequence--could be said to be present. 
The second context in which sorcery posed problems of law involved 
situations in which the occurrence of conventional conduct or otherwise 
88 See discussion in Chapters One and Six. 
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unremarkable events, themselves well recognised by the law as providing a 
potential basis for civil or criminal action of some kind, were complicated by the 
implication of sorcery-related issues. Thus, for example, where the destruction of 
a person's garden by another's pig might easily lend itself to legal disposition, such 
an apparently simple matter could become rather more complicated if the owner 
of the pig should insist that the pig's actions were not brought about by his or her 
negligent attendance, but were compelled by an act of sorcery on the part of some 
third party. 
Finally, and far more commonly, sorcery-related issues problematised 
otherwise unproblematic matters of law when an action having clear legal 
implications was said or seen to have been taken in response to, or retaliation for, 
a prior or anticipated act of sorcery. Thus, a conventional case of assault or 
homicide-even one in which the accused might freely admit to the commission 
of the offence-raised complicating issues where the perpetrator claims that his or 
her actions were provoked, justified, excused or even compelled by an articulable 
belief that the victim had perpetrated, or was intending to perpetrate, an act of 
sorcery against the individual offender, or some other person or persons in whose 
interests the offender was expected or required to act. 
In each of these instances, were the variable of sorcery to be treated in the 
same way some other fact or circumstance (denominated "X" for present 
purposes) cognisable by the law, the problems posed by such a consideration 
would not be difficult to address. Thus, in the first case, an act of "X" is either 
lawful or unlawful. If lawful, it is no matter for the law to consider; and if it is 
unlawful, the law will have specified the appropriate remedies or penalties. In the 
second case, consideration "X" might or might not be regarded as an independent 
intervening action, capable of cutting off or mitigating the responsibility or 
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culpability of the accused. So, if a mischievous third person was found to have let 
the pig loose from its enclosure, and even perhaps have led the pig into the 
victim's garden with the expectation that it would do damage there, the 
responsibility of the owner of the pig (which might otherwise have been absolute), 
could be said to be overridden by the wrongful intervening actions of the third 
person. In the third case, the law readily contemplates such explanations for 
otherwise unlawful actions in terms of reasonable provocation, duress, 
compulsion, self-defence and the defence of others, all of which claims may 
operate to reduce, or cut off entirely, the responsibility or culpability of the 
accused.89 
Although different procedural and substantive rules of law govern the 
introduction and disposition of each of the three kinds of explanation described 
above, the fundamental legal conceptions underlying their rationale are essentially 
the same in all cases. As a matter of legal ratiocination, actions and defences to 
actions are either 'reasonable' or 'unreasonable', and intervening factors are 
recognised as either causal or insufficiently related in causal terms for the 
purposes of explaining actions and responses to actions alike. Therefore, except 
to the extent that the particular legal context in which one or another of these 
issues is brought to bear, it is unnecessary, for the purposes of this discussion, to 
differentiate between the consideration of sorcery-related beliefs and practices in 
relation to the three circumstances in which those considerations have arisen in a 
legal context. 
89 In this context, the law also recognises that, even in the absence of a 'reasonable' 
explanation for unlawful conduct, the state of mind of an accused may operate to minimise or 
preclude liability or culpability for the consequences of such conduct. Hence, the defences 
insanity, diminished mental capacity and (in some instances) mistake of fact may be similarly 
invoked, even where the explanation provided is inherently 'unreasonable'. 
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B. Sorcery as an Offence under the Native Regulations 
As we have seen, the sorcery-related beliefs and practices of the indigenous 
Melanesian population of colonial Papua New Guinea were matters of real and 
serious concern to government officials for eminently practical reasons. They 
were a disruptive influence on the effective and efficient administration of the 
colony, an impediment to the extension of colonial political and economic control, 
and an effrontery to the ideological premises on which civilising mission of the 
colonial enterprise understood to be predicated. Beyond this, however, kiaps and 
Resident Magistrates regularly reported that, in the eyes of the indigenous people 
themselves, sorcery and witchcraft were 'the curse of native life.'90 
Superstition and witchcraft are the two great causes of all 
native disturbances, and are the most difficult to combat .... 
Endeavours have been made to grapple with witchcraft 
through the chiefs or head men of villages but these do not 
seem to have much power in that direction. The wizard or 
witch is the person most feared." 
To legislate against sorcery, however, presented its own problems for an 
administration committed to inculcating the indigenous population with, if not a 
complete understanding of, then at least a healthy respect for the authority and the 
legitimacy of colonial rule. As Zelenietz explained: 
Colonial administrators ... thought that laws against sorcery 
would be progressive tools of social change. However, the 
issue of sorcery presented inherent dilemmas that 
administrators never successfully resolved. On the one hand, 
they recognized the importance of sorcery and witchcraft as 
systems of beliefs and actions in indigenous cultures. On the 
other hand, their own upbringing in cultures which stressed 
scientific empiricism did not allow the administrators to accept 
the validity of native beliefs. Thus they faced the challenge of 
saying that sorcery and witchcraft did not exist, and yet 
90 Annual Report on British New Guinea, 1902-03, p. 25. 
91 Annual Report on British New Guinea, 1892-93, p. 46. 
writing laws that would make these non-existent phenomena 
illegal. 92 
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The problem here probably had less to do with the colonial legislator's 
experience of cognitive dissonance, than with the ambivalent message such 
legislation would send to those who were expected to be bound by it. As the 
cutting edge of colonialism, the indigenous Melanesians surely recognised that the 
law was regarded as a singularly significant institution by members of the society 
that represented itself to be masterfully in command of the natural world. Thus, 
for Europeans to enact and attempt to enforce laws against Melanesian beliefs and 
behaviour which the Europeans themselves rejected as irreal, would tend to reveal 
either a troublesome instance of contradictory action or, more seriously, a 
profound disingenueousness masking an unexpressed belief, on the part of the 
Europeans, in the reality of sorcery. 
In the end, the administration did enact prescriptive legislation, the very 
glibness of which suggests that the epistemological conflicts ascribed to their 
ambivalence on the matter was not nearly so troublesome or disconcerting as 
scholarly reflections today seem to imply. Thus, in December of 1893, the Native 
Regulation Board promulgated Regulation No. II of that year in the following 
terms: 
SORCERY FORBIDDEN 
1. White men know that sorcery is only deceit, but the lies of 
the sorcerer frighten many people. The deceit of the sorcerer 
should be stopped. 
2. It is a forbidden act for any person to practice or to pretend 
to practice sorcery. 
3. It is a forbidden act for any person to threaten any other 
person with sorcery whether practised by himself or by any 
one else. 
92 M. Zelenietz, 'Sorcery and Social Change: An Introduction' (1981) 8 Social Analysis, p. 
12. 
4. Any person who practises sorcery or who procures another 
person to do so or who threatens anyone with sorcery may be 
tried by a Magistrate. 
PUNISHMENT 
5. If the person tried is found guilty he may be sentenced by a 
European Magistrate to imprisonment not exceeding tbree 
months, or by a Native Magistrate to imprisonment not 
exceeding three days. 
6. If the person is sent to prison he will be made to work 
without payment. 
328 
Explaining the necessity for the introduction of the Ordinance, the 
Administration adverted to the sorcerer as 'a weed of universal distribution in the 
Possession', who used sorcery as a means 'of extorting blackmail or revenge' .93 
On a somewhat doubtful basis, this explanation concluded by asserting that: 'the 
majority of natives approve warmly the suppression of sorcery and it is already 
manifest that the regulation will be productive of considerable good.'94 These 
optimistic sentiments notwithstanding, however, the Administration had great 
difficulty, as a practical matter, implementing the Ordinance. To begin with, it 
would certainly appear that neither the premises nor the object of the ordnance 
were nearly so well received by the indigenous population as the govermnent 
seemed to suggest. Thus, two years after the introduction of the Ordinance, the 
Resident Magistrate for the Western Division was compelled to report: 
Witchcraft ('Puri-Puri') still causes a deal of trouble and yet it 
is difficult to get a case against any practitioner of the black art 
. . . . The superstition may die out to some extent with the 
present adult population, but no law or native regulation will 
do much towards stamping it out." 
93 Annual Report on British New Guinea, 1893-94, p. vi 
94 Ibid., p. vii. 
95 Annual Report on British New Guinea, 1895-96, p. 66. 
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Other Resident Magistrates described problems associated with obtaining reliable 
evidence or proof,% and consistently complained of the futility of the law's 
operation in practice: 
[T]here is nearly always difficulty in sheeting home a charge . 
. . owing to the extreme reluctance of many natives to give 
evidence or information against the most powerful of his class. 
. . . The native way of looking at this matter ... is that if he 
denounces a sorcerer and the sorcerer is sent to gaol when he 
returns home he will, in revenge, bewitch tbe informant and 
cause him his due .... "' 
Some twenty years later, in a revealing reflection on the rationale behind the 
Sorcery Ordinance and aspects of its implementation, J .H.P. Murray, then 
Lieutenant-Governor of Papua, wrote: 
Sorcery is another offence which comes very frequently 
before tbe native magistrate's courts, for it is, under tbe 
regulations, punishable with six months imprisonment. . . . 
The penalty imposed is perhaps sufficient to act, to a certain 
extent, as a deterren~ but it is quite insufficient as a substitute 
for private vengeance. . . . The difference is that the Papuan 
looks upon sorcery as reality, whereas the European (as a rule) 
does not; to the former no punishment would be sufficient 
short of death, or at any rate a long term of imprisonment, 
either of which seems to us to be out of the question in the 
case of what is after all, according to our view, only an 
imaginary offence'' 
In Papua, the sorcery ordinance was re-enacted in 1911 as a Native 
Regulation, under the Native Regulation Ordinance 1908,99 with a modified 
preamble100 and expanded substantive provisions. Maintaining the prohibition on 
96 Annual Report on Papua, 1906-07, p. 54. 
"'Annual Report on British New Guinea, p. 25. 
98 Papua or British New Guinea (London: P.S. King & Son, 1912), pp. 202-203. 
99 (No. 25 of 1909). 
100 Subregulation 80(1) provided: 
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practising or pretending to practise, threatening to practise, procurmg or 
attempting to procure another to practise (or pretend to practise), sorcery, 
Regulation 80 now penalised '[a]ny native who-
is found in possession of implements or 'charms' used in 
sorcery; or accepts payment or presents in the shape of food or 
otherwise when the obvious intention of making such 
payments or presents is to propitiate a Sorcerer. 101 
In 1924, substantially the same provisions were adopted as regulation 97 of 
the Native Administration Regulations in the Territory of New Guinea (absent 
however, was any preambulatory statement whatsoever). The New Guinea 
regulation also included a provision penalising '[a]ny native who administers or is 
in possession of a drug assumedly used for unlawful purposes,' 102 and allowed for 
the imposition of both a fine and imprisonment upon conviction. 103 
Sorcery is only deceit, but the lies of the Sorcerer frighten 
many people and cause great trouble, therefore the Sorcerer 
must be punished. 
101 Native Regulations (Papua), para 80(2)(d). The penalty remained a period of 
imprisomnent of up to six months, although this was in default of payment of a fme in the 
amount of three pounds [sub-reg 80(2)]. Omitted were references to sentencing by a Native 
Magistrate, and the obligation to work without payment. 
102 Native Administration Regulations (New Guinea), para 97(1). 
103 Queensland's Criminal Code Act 1899 (63 Vic No. 9), popularly known as the Griffith 
Code, was adopted in British New Guinea in 1902 pursuant to section 1 of the Criminal Code 
Ordinance (No. 7 of 1902), and in New Guinea, pursuant to section 16 and Schedule 2 of the 
Laws Repeal and Adopting Ordinance (No. I) in 1921. Reflecting the provisions of the English 
Witchcraft Act, 1735 (9 Geo II, c. 5)-which remained in force until it was repealed in 1951-
section 432 of the Code, as adopted, made it an offence to pretend 'to exercise or use any kind 
of witchcraft, sorcery, enchantment or conjuration', to 'tell fortunes' or to use some other form 
of 'occult science' as a method of discovering lost or stolen property. Conviction under that 
provision could result in a term of imprisomnent of up to one year. Although it was 
theoretically possible for a native Papuan or New Guinean to be prosecuted under section 432, 
no such charges would appear to have been laid, at least up to the early 1970s. See Territory of 
Papua and New Guinea, House of Assembly Debates, Second House, lOth mtg, 1st sess., val. II, 
no. 13, p. 4138 (19 March 1971); and in so far as I am aware, no charges against an indigenous 
Papua New Guinean have been brought under that provision (now s. 409 of the Criminal Code 
Act, Revised Laws of Papua New Guinea, ch. 262) since that time. 
Chapter Six 
RE-CONCEPTUALISING SORCERY FROM 
A JURISPRUDENTIAL PERSPECTIVE 
Even though this Act may speak as if the powers of sorcery really exist .. 
nevertheless nothing in this Act recognizes the existence or effectiveness of 
powers of sorcery in any factual sense except only for the purpose ot and of 
proceedings under or by virtue of, this Act, or denies the existence or 
effectiveness of such powers.' 
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One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly 
causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such 
emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such 
bodily harm .. 2 
1. Preliminary Considerations 
Of all the antinomic features by which Western representations of the 
relationship between tradition and modernity in contemporary Melanesia tend to 
be characterised, the dichotomy between law and custom stands out as one of the 
more persistent, problematic and misdirected.3 Perhaps the frequency with which 
such dichotomous representations recur is indicative of nothing more deliberate 
than the irrepressible exhibition of an acquired trait of intellectual character, a 
kind Lamarckian hereditament which has left its continuing impress on the 
1 Sorcery Act (No. 22 of 1971), Revised Laws of Papua New Guinea, c. 274, s. 9. 
2 American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Torts (Second), s. 46. 
3 For a critical consideration of the conceptual dichotomisation of traditional and modern law 
see K. Kulcsar, Modernisation and Law: Theses and Thoughts (Budapest: Institute of Sociology, 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 1987) 
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development of fundamentally linear-evolutionist theories of social change and 
cultural variation.' Or perhaps, as Roger Keesing suggested, the dichotomous 
characterisation of law and custom may reflect something more deeply embedded 
in the epistemological sub-structures of Western thought; something invariably, if 
unconsciously, displayed by Western scholars in their fidelity to constructs of 
statant, dualistic polarity and expressive of a craving for 'radical alterity' that is 
equally chronic and inevitable.5 
Whatever the origins of these dichotomous conceptualisations may be, it is 
eminently clear that they have enjoyed a predominant, and arguably unwarranted, 
currency in the interpretative grammars of comparatism. Their presence is 
particularly troublesome in comparative analyses of nominally Western and 
Melanesian jural processes and institutions in which the paradigmatic status of the 
dichotomy between law and custom conduces all too readily to an uncritical 
magnification of the significance of inter-cultural difference. As a consequence of 
this overstatement of difference, situations of conflict and contradiction-at the 
practical, theoretical and ideological levels of analysis-are apt to be exaggerated 
4 See generally R.A. Nisbet, Social Change and History (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1969); H.T. Wilson, Tradition and Innovation: The Idea of Civilization as Culture and its 
Significance (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984); J.R. Gusfield, 'Tradition and 
Modernity: Misplaced Polarities in the Study of Social Change,' American Journal of Sociology, 
vol. 72, no. 4 (January 1967), pp. 351-362; S.N. Eisenstadt, Tradition. Change, and Modernity 
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973); R. Bendix, 'Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered,' 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 9 (April 1967), pp. 292-346. See also R.H. 
Chilcote, Theories of Comparative Politics: The Search for a Paradigm (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1981), pp.271-346; S.L. Seaton and H.J.M. Claessen, eds. Political Anthropology: The 
State of the Art (The Hague: Mouton Publishers, 1979), pp. 1-28; G. Balandier, Political 
Anthropology, trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon Publications, 1970), pp. 186-
196. 
5 R. Keesing. 'Theories of Culture Revisited,' paper presented at the Symposium Assessing 
Developments in Anthropology, annual meeting of the American Anthropological Association, 
Washington, D.C. (November 1989). 
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where they may well and truly exist, and invented where, in fact, they may not 
exist at all. 6 
Less problematic than the dichotomous portrayal of the relationship between 
law and custom, but all the more striking nonetheless, is the equally persistent 
conceptual misrepresentation of modem and traditional institutions of sorcery, 
witchcraft and magic, particularly as these ideas and phenomena are considered in 
comparatist discourses on law and society in Papua New Guinea. In the 
contemplation of this 'most bizarre and exotic aspect of native life,'7 the heuristic 
precedence of difference over similarity radically counterposes Western and 
Melanesian attitudes, beliefs and fundamental assumptions about the nature of the 
real world at the deepest levels of epistemological orientation. Essentialist 
distinctions between the ostensible rationality of a distinctively Western 
modernity on the one hand, and the presumed irrationality of an equally 
distinctive Melanesian tradition on the other, are powerfully and seemingly 
unalterably instantiated. The differentiae of scientific ontologies and pre-scientific 
approaches to the organisation of ideas, events and human affairs, are thus marked 
off as principal determinants amongst the features which are said to set Us apart 
from Them on sharply contrastive and ultimately irreconcilable bases. Here, too, 
6 Margrit Eichler provides a compelling critique of related applications of this distorting 
superordination of difference over similarity, with particular respect to gender, in The Double 
Standard: A Feminist Critique of Feminist Social Science (London: Croom Helm, 1980), pp. 13-
14. See also F. Olsen, 'Feminism and Critical Legal Theory: An American Perspective,' 
International Journal of the Sociology of Law, vol. 18, no. 2 (May 1990), pp. 199-215. I would 
like to express my gratitude to Dr Ngaire Naffine, Faculty of Law, University of Adelaide 
(Visiting Scholar, Department of Law, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian 
National University, 1989-1990), for providing me with these references, and also for pointing 
out to me, in a more general way, the relevant bearing that feminist scholarship in law and the 
social sciences clearly has on many of the issues and problems with which I am especially 
concerned. 
7 M. Marwick, ed., Witchcraft and Sorcery (2d ed. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1982), 
p. 15. 
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however, it seems to me that both the nature and extent of these supposedly 
incompatible differences between two worlds of experience and understanding are 
wont to be overdrawn. 8 
To raise these issues is to engage questions central to an enduring debate over 
the proprieties of rationality and the vicissitudes of relativism in the interpretation 
of cultural variation.9 The far-reaching importance of this debate should not be 
underestimated, for it is one in which some of the major presuppositions of a 
rationalist, empirically based, scientific view of the world-which is to say, of 
course, a pre-eminently Western view-are seriously challenged.10 At the same 
time, it is a debate which bears crucial implications for the practical disposition of 
a growing number of very real problems of law confronting societies in which 
conflicts of cultural diversity are fast becoming inevitable facts of political and 
economic life. 11 Undoubtedly, these are all matters which fairly invite a close and 
8 See Keesing, 'Theories of Culture,· pp. 5-6. 
9 See M. E. Spiro, 'Cultural Relativism and the Future of Anthropology,' Cultural 
Anthropology, val. I, no. 3 (August 1986), pp. 259-286; P. Hirst, 'Is It Rational to Reject 
Relativism?' in Reason and Morality, ed. J. Overing (London: Tavistock Publications, 1985), 
pp. 85-103; M. Hollis and S. Lukes, 'Introduction,' in Rationality and Relativism (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1982), pp. 1-20; D. Sperber, 'Apparently Irrational Beliefs,' in Rationality and 
Relativism, ed. M. Hollis and S. Lukes (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982), pp. 149-180; P. Hirst 
and P. Woolley, Social Relations and Human Attributes (London: Tavistock Publications, 1982); 
R.M. Unger, Law in Modem Society: Toward a Criticism of Social Theory (New York: The 
Free Press, 1976), pp. 11-12. 
10 See P.G. Sack, 'Normativity and Probability: Pure Law and the Social Sciences,' 
Rechtstheorie, vol. 18, no. I (1987), pp. 97-104. See generally P. Rabinow and W.M. Sullivan, 
eds., Interpretive Social Science: A Second Look, ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1987). 
11 See S. Poulter, 'Separate Cultures in One Land: Legal Recognition of Cultural 
Pluralism-an English Perspective,' in Conference Papers, 9th Commonwealth Law Conference 
(Auckland: Commerce Clearing House Ltd, 1990), pp. 121-128; D.F.G. Sheppard, 'Provision 
for Maori Culture in New Zealand Planning Law,' in Conference Papers, 9th Commonwealth 
Law Conference (Auckland: Commerce Clearing House Ltd, 1990), pp. 149-157; A.D. Renteln, 
'Relativism and the Search for Human Rights,' American Anthropologist, vol. 90, no. I (March 
1985), pp. 56-72; K. Brennan, 'The Influence of Cultural Relativism on International Human 
Rights Law: Female Circumcision as a Case Study,' Law and Inequality, vol. 7, no. 3 (July 
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critically circumspect scrutiny. The immediate concerns of this chapter, however, 
are rather more narrowly focused. Thus, although some of these larger issues will 
be touched upon, they cannot be addressed here with the depth and sophistication 
of analysis they deserve. Instead, my primary objectives are, firstly, to 
demonstrate how they are implicated specifically in considerations of the 
relationship between law and sorcery in Papua New Guinea today; and secondly, 
to trace out the contours of an alternative perspective from which that relationship 
might be apprehended more constructively. 
2. The Over-Valuation of Difference 
in the Consideration of Law and Sorcery 
For most of this century, the task of describing, interpreting and representing 
the nature of culture and the purposeful dynamics of social life amongst peoples 
who have been variously labelled native, tribal, traditional, pre-industrial, pre-
scientific, or primitive, has fallen almost exclusively within the province of social 
anthropology .12 Identification and explanation of the legal in the understandings 
and experiences of reality shared amongst the members of such societies, and 
illumination of perceived relationships between the distinctively legal and other 
categories of beliefs, attitudes, values and behaviour, have been and remain 
primary elements of what is still a predominantly anthropological enterprise. 13 
1989), pp. 367-398; J. G. Starke, 'Congress on Multiculturalism, Canberra, 30 November - 3 
December 1988' [Current Topics], Australian Law Journal, vol. 63, no. 2 (February 1989), pp. 
67-69. 
12 See generally J .J. Honigmann, The Development of Anthropological Ideas (Homewood, 
IL: Dorsey Press, 1976); M. Fried, The StudY of Anthropology (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell 
Company, 1972); S. Tax, ed., Horizons of Anthropology (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 
1964); L. Mair, An Introduction to Social Anthropology (London: Oxford University Press, 
1965); R.H. Lowie, Primitive Society (1920; reprint, New York: Liveright Publishing 
Corporation, 1947). 
13 As we have seen, the pioneering work in Melanesian legal ethnography of Bronislaw 
Malinowski represents one of the earliest anthropological steps towards the recognition that there 
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Empirical studies and explanatory analyses of the beliefs and behaviours 
associated with sorcery, witchcraft and other expressions of the occult in the 
context of contemporary tribal societies have likewise been, and effectively 
remain, the prerogatives of social anthropology. 14 
was, in fact, something distinctively legal in the organisational arrangements of so-called 
primitive societies. See B. Malinowski, Crime and Custom in Savage Society (London: Kegan 
Paul, Trench, Trubner and Company, Ltd., 1926), p. 55. In taking that step, Malinowski 
expressly challenged what was then the prevailing scientific view on the matter, which held that 
the 'primitive mind' could be characterised as 
draw[ing] no line between law and morality, religion, medicine or art. All of these are 
part of the social and mental fabric, and the traditions by which they are governed are the 
same. [E.S. Hartland, Primitive Law (London: Methuen & Company Ltd, 1924), p. 138]. 
For more general discussions, see P. Bohannan, ed., Law and Warfare: Studies in the 
Anthropology of Conflict (Garden City, NY: The Natural History Press, 1967); I. Hamnett, ed., 
Social Anthropology and Law, ASA Monograph No. 14 (London: Academic Press, 1977); R.R. 
Gadacz, 'Folk Law and Legal Pluralism: Issues and Directions in the Anthropology of 
Modernizing Societies,' Legal Studies Journal, vol. 11, no. 2 (1987), pp. 125-144; E.A. 
Hoebel, The Law of Primitive Man: A Study in Comparative Legal Dynamics (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1954); H.l. Hogbin, ed., Law and Order in Polynesia: A Study of 
Primitive Legal Institutions (1934; reprint, New York: Cooper Square Publisher, 1972); M. 
Krygier, 'Anthropological Approaches,' in Law and Social Control, ed. E. Kamenka and A.E.-
S. Tay (London: Edward Arnold, 1980), pp. 27-39; S.F. Moore, Law as Process: An 
Anthropological Approach (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), pp. 1-31, 214-256; L. 
Nader, 'The Anthropological Study of Law,' American Anthropologist, vol. 67, no. 6, pt. 2 
(December 1965), pp. 3-32; L. Pospisil, Anthropology of Law: A Comparative Approach (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 127-191; S. Roberts, Order and Dispute: An Introduction to 
Legal Anthropology (New York: StMartin's Press, 1979); F.G. Snyder, 'Anthropology, Dispute 
Processes and Law: A Critical Introduction,' British Journal of Law & Society, vol. 8, no. 2 
(Winter 1981), pp. 141-180; M.B. Hooker, Legal Pluralism: An Introduction to Colonial and 
Neo-Colonial Laws (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), pp. 6-54; S.E. Merry, 'Legal Pluralism,' 
Law & Society Review, vol. 22, no. 5 (1988), pp. 868-896. 
14 See generally J. Middleton and E.H. Winter, eds. Witchcraft and Sorcery in East Africa 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963); E.E. Evans-Pritchard, Witchcraft, Oracles and 
Magic Among the Azande (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1937); R.F. Fortune, Sorcerers of Dobu: 
The Social Anthropology of the Dobu Islanders of the Western Pacific (1932; reprint, New York: 
E.P. Dutton & Company, 1963); M. Douglas, ed., Witchcraft Confessions and Accusations 
(London: Tavistock Publications, 1970); M.G. Marwick, 'The Study of Witchcraft,' in The 
Craft of Social Anthropology, ed. A.L. Epstein (London: Tavistock Publications, 1967), pp. 231-
244; M.G. Marwick, 'Anthropologists' Declining Productivity in the Sociology of Witchcraft,' 
American Anthropologist, vol. 74, no. 3 (June 1972), pp. 378-385; M.G. Marwick, 
'Introduction,' in Witchcraft and Sorcery (2d ed. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1982), pp. 
11-19; M. Zelenietz, 'Sorcery and Social Change: An Introduction,' Social Analysis, no. 8 
(November 1981), pp. 3-14; M. Stephen, 'Introduction,' in Sorcerer and Witch in Melanesia 
(Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1987), pp. 1-14; M. Patterson, 'Sorcery and Witchcraft 
in Melanesia,' Oceania, vol. 75, no. 2 (December 1974), pp. 132-138. 
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There is today a rich and prolific ethnographic literature that deals with a 
broad range of issues and problems having to do with changing patterns of 
traditional indigenous beliefs and behaviour amongst the cultures and societies of 
Melanesia generally, and Papua New Guinea more particularly. Much of that 
literature is explicitly concerned with these developments as they relate directly to 
the phenomena of law15 and sorcery/6 respectively. Within the discrete 
ethnography of Melanesian societies, and as a dominant theme in the analytical 
literature of social anthropology as a whole, customary beliefs and practices 
associated with sorcery and witchcraft are commonly regarded as traditional 
features of 'social control' and hence, as subjects of study properly, but by no 
means exclusively, addressed within the sub-field of legal anthropology. 11 
15 See the bibliographic entries appearing in C. O'Sullivan, ed., Tradition and Law in Papua 
New Guinea: An Annotated and Selected Bibliography (Canberra: Department of Law, Research 
School of Social Sciences. The Australian National University, 1986); A.L. Epstein, ed., 
Comention and Dispute: Aspects of Law and Social Control in Melanesia (Canberra: Australian 
National University Press, 1974), pp. 345-351. 
16 See the bibliographic entries appearing in M. Stephen, ed. Sorcerer and Witch in 
Melanesia (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1987), pp. 13-14, 299-304; M. Zelenietz and 
S. Lindenbaum, eds., 'Sorcery and Social Change in Melanesia,' Social Analysis, no. 8 
(November 1981), pp. 129-136; M. Patterson, ' Sorcery and Witchcraft in Melanesia,' Oceania, 
vol. 75, no. 3 (March 1975), pp. 231-234; B.M. Knauf!, Good Company and Violence: Sorcery 
and Social Action in a Lowland New Guinea Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1985), pp. 425-456. 
17 See Malinowski, Crime and Custom in Savage Society, pp. 85-99; A. Chowning, 'Sorcery 
and the Social Order in Kove,' in Sorcerer and Witch in Melanesia, ed. M. Stephen (Carlton: 
Melbourne University Press), pp. 149-182; R. Bowden, 'Sorcery, Illness and Social Control in 
Kwoma Society,' in Sorcerer and Witch in Melanesia, ed. M. Stephen (Carlton: Melbourne 
University Press, 1987), pp. 183-208; P.G. Sack, 'Crime or Punishment: The Role of the 
Sorcerer in Traditional Tolai Law (New Britain),' Anthropos, no. 69 (1974), pp. 401-408; M. 
Reay, 'The Politics of a Witch-Killing,' Oceania, vol. 47, no. 1 (September 1976), pp. 1-20; 
P.G. Sack, "'It Ain't Necessarily So": Variations on Magic, Law, Science and a Komkom,' 
unpublished paper (Canberra 1982);. J. Crawford, 'Aboriginal Custom in Australia,' in P. Sack 
and E. Minchin, eds. Legal Pluralism (Law Department, Research School of Social Sciences, 
Australian National University, 1986), pp. 253-280; G. Powles, 'Legal Systems and Political 
Cultures: Competition for Dominance in Western Samoa,' in Sack and Minchin, eds. Legal 
Pluralism, pp. 191-214. 
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However anthropological and anthropologically informed studies of law and 
sorcery might be parcelled out amongst interested scholars, conventional 
ethnographic research will continue to provide the foundation upon which such 
studies are based." And yet, anthropologists themselves readily concede that '[t]he 
ethnographic picture is still far from complete, or even adequate.' 19 Of course, 
there is always a need for more data and further analytical refinement where the 
products of basic field research are marshalled for practical application?0 To my 
mind, however, what is far more troubling than the doubts which may from time 
to time be expressed about the competence or sufficiency of Melanesian 
ethnography, is the largely unquestioned confidence which scholars who rely on it 
are prepared to repose in the fundamental analytical perspectives from which the 
very best ethnographic research is pursued. 
The underlying objective of social anthropology has always been the 
achievement of synoptic, ethnological explanations; and hence, the 'ultimate goal' 
18 SeeM. Zelenietz, 'Sorcery and Social Change: An Introduction,' Social Analysis, no. 8 
(November 1981), p. 5. See also A.L. Epstein, 'Introduction,' in Contention and Dispute: 
Aspects of Law and Social Control in Melanesia (Canberra: Australian National University 
Press, 1974), pp. 1-39. 
" M. Stephen, 'Introduction,' in Sorcerer and Witch in Melanesia (Carlton: Melbourne 
University Press, 1987), p. 12. 
20 See, e.g., Paul Sillitoe's remarks in 'Some More on War: A Wola Perspective,' in 
Homicide Compensation in Papua New Guinea: Problems and Prospects, Law Reform 
Commission Monograph No. 1, ed. R. Scaglion (Port Moresby: Office of Information, 1981), p. 
78: 
It often annoys Papua New Guinean administrators that 
academics offer qualified advice and suggestions only, and 
rarely come up with concrete answers. But given the 
complexity of any society and the countless behavioural 
responses possible in any sirnation, we are not often in a 
position to give hard and fast answers. We can only advise 
those in authority of the simation as we understand it, and 
leave them to make the policy decisions for which they are 
elected and appointed. 
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of anthropological explanations of the dynamics of Melanesian sorcery is said to 
be 'the formation of general statements regarding the human condition' :21 
We strive to understand human beliefs and behaviour not only 
in one society or situation, but in many. An exercise which is 
purely ethnographic is unsatisfactory because, at some point or 
another, comparisons must be made. If no~ we are little more 
than recorders of (supposedly) unique peoples and events." 
As an expression of the programmatic ethos of social science, this is an 
objective with which I have no particular quarrel. It would seem, however, that the 
conventional ethnographic study of Melanesian law and sorcery, and the 
measured generation of qualified anthropological explanations accounting for 
those phenomena, proceed less on the basis of a demonstrable commitment to the 
science (or is it an art?) of comparatism, than to the search for 'the significance of 
cultural difference.m Indicatively, most of the comparisons which from time to 
time 'must be made' almost invariably identify, not simply noteworthy difftrences 
between the Western and Melanesian conceptions constituting the subjects of 
comparison, but radically divergent, diametric oppositions.24 With these kinds of 
analytical premises I most definitely do quarrel, and I argue here largely in 
support of an alternative to the dichotomous formulations they implicitly 
presuppose. 
In the pursuit of a decidedly comparative examination of the relationship 
between Western and Melanesian conceptions of sorcery, as a particular category 
21 Ze1enietz, 'Sorcery and Social Change: An Introduction,' p. 5. 
22 Ibid. 
23 C.J. Greenhouse, 'Just in Time: Temporality and tbe Cultural Legitimation of Law,' Yale 
Law Journal, vol. 98, no. 8 (June 1989), p. 1631. See also Keesing, 'Theories of Culture,' p. I. 
24 See Peter Lawrence, 'The State Versus Stateless Societies in New Guinea,' in Fashion of 
Law in New Guinea, ed. B. Brown (Sydney: Butterwortbs, 1969), p. 15. 
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of 'supernatural' or 'metaphysical' beliefs, and the legally significant conduct with 
which such beliefs are frequently associated, I conscientiously reject preclusively 
overdrawn, a priori emphases on the supposedly overriding significance of inter-
cultural difference. In their stead, I favour an approach that is more readily 
inclined to entertain the significance of cross-cultural continuities and 
similarities. 25 This preferred perspective is informed by the conviction that an 
exploration of features common to Western and Melanesian thought need not 
supplant, but must nevertheless precede, the 'enumeration of differences,' since it 
is only by taking matters in that order that 'we shall be less likely to mistake 
differences of idiom for differences of substance .. .' .26 With our comparatist 
priorities thus arranged, we are also 'more likely to end up by identifying those 
features which really do distinguish one kind of thought from another. m 
To adopt such a perspective is not to insist that the comparative pendulum 
ought to be swung completely in the opposite direction. Rather, it is an attempt to 
achieve a kind of balance that appears to be lacking in many scholarly attempts to 
account analytically for the inter-cultural relationship between certain 
fundamental conceptual principles. Vague and uncertain as these principles may 
be, it is important for several reasons that they be recognised as integrally related: 
firstly, because they function connectively in the interface between law and 
sorcery in Papua New Guinea today; secondly, because their circumspect 
consideration elucidates the amorphous boundaries which are commonly assumed 
25 See J. Starr and J.F. Collier, 'Introduction: Dialogues in Legal Anthropology,' in History 
and Power in the Study of Law: New Directions in Legal Anthropology (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 11-13. 
26 R. Horton, 'African Traditional Thought and Western Science', Africa, vol. 37, no. I 
(January 1967), p. 50. 
27 Ibid. 
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to distinguish rational from irrational beliefs along much sharper lines; and 
thirdly, because a number of these principles are operatively active in the jural 
orientations of Melanesian and Western societies alike, indicating that, in certain 
respects, these supposedly different, socio-culturally defined orientations may 
themselves be far more similar to one another, than their conventionally 
dichotomous representations suggest or even allow. 
Let me stress the fact that it is not my intention to argue that Melanesian and 
Western worlds of experience and understanding are merely 'minor variants of one 
another'-there is, to be sure, a great deal more to it than that.28 But in a balanced 
search for the significance of similarities and differences, it is nonetheless 
essential to maintain a sensitive appreciation for the genuinely crucial difference 
between distinctions which ought to be drawn at the level of idiom, and those 
which might properly be given a more substantive significance. 'Just how different 
the thought and experience of non-Western peoples are from our own,' as Keesing 
observed, 'is a moot point about which we could all argue ad nauseam';29 and I am 
certainly no more inclined to erect (or resurrect) redundant arguments in support 
of an asserted sameness than I should be to reiterate propositions favouring the 
supremacy of cross-cultural difference. Like Keesing, however, I also see no 
compelling reason to assume, as a premise, that the pragmatic manner in which 
Melanesians find their ways through their worlds of law and sorcery are 
qualitatively different to the manner in which we find our ways through our own; 
or that their 'culturally constructed senses of individuation and agency (or 
18 Keesing, 'Theories of Culture,' p. 6. 
29 Ibid. 
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personhood or causality or whatever)' are necessarily so strikingly different to 
ours. 30 
3. An Operative Contextualisation of Law and Sorcery 
in Contemporary Papua New Guinea 
In an effort to describe the relevant dimensions of the relationship between 
law and sorcery in Papua New Guinea today, let me begin by offering a series of 
broad averments about their respective positions in a contemporary context. Few 
of these propositions are incontrovertible. None, certainly, is uncontroversial and 
all of them, I own, are manifest generalisations. Nevertheless, they can provide a 
concise and reasonably accurate exposition of what would seem to be the more 
pertinent aspects of the current state of affairs. For present purposes, I might 
circumvent some of the more highly charged polemics with which the now 
familiar law-versus-custom debate has come to be so closely associated.31 I do so, 
30 Keesing, 'Theories of Culture,' p. 6. 
31 Aspects of the law-versus-custom debate are considered S. Dinnen, 'Crime, Law and 
Order in Papua New Guinea,' Melanesian Law Journal, vol. 17 (1989), pp. 10-25; B. Narokobi, 
Lo Bilong Yumi Yet: Law and Custom in Papua New Guinea (Suva: University of the South 
Pacific, 1989); S. Dinoen, 'Sentencing, Custom and the Rule of Law in Papua New Guinea, 
Journal of Legal Pluralism, no. 27 (1988), pp. 19-54; P.G. Sack, "'Law" and "Custom" in 
Papua New Guinea: Separation, Unification or Co-operation?' Veifassung und Recht in Obersee, 
vol. 20, no. 3 (1987), pp. 329-342; G.D. Westermark, 'Court is an Arrow: Legal Pluralism in 
Papua New Guinea,' Ethnology, vol. 25, no. 2 (April 1986), pp. 131-149; P.G. Sack, "'Law" 
and "Custom" in Papua New Guinea,' proceedings of a conference of the Jean Bodin Society 
(Bruxel!es 1984); R.J. Gordon and M.J. Meggitt, Law and Order in the New Guinea Highlands: 
Encounters with Enga (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1985), pp. 190-209; R. 
Scaglion, ed., Customary Law in Papua New Guinea: A Melanesian View, Law Reform 
Commission Monograph No. 3 (Port Moresby: Law Reform Commission of Papua New Guinea, 
1983); B. Ottley and J. Zorn, 'Criminal Law in Papua New Guinea: Code, Custom and the 
Courts in Conflict,' American Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 31, no. 2 (Spring 1983), pp. 
251-300; B. Brunton and D. Roebuck, 'Customary Law and Statue Law in the Pacific: A Policy 
Framework,' Melanesian Law Review, vol 10, nos 1 & 2 (December 1982), pp. 6-13; D. 
Weisbrot, 'Integration of Laws in Papua New Guinea: Custom and the Criminal Law in 
Conflict,' in Law and Social Change in Papua New Guinea, ed. D. Weisbrot, A. Paliwala and 
A. Sawyerr (Sydney: Butterworths, 1982), pp. 59-103; P. Fitzpatrick, Law and State in Papua 
New Guinea (London: Academic Press, 1980), pp. 50-90, 198-246; T.E. Barnett, 'Law and 
however, with the clear understanding that it is squarely in the context of that 
debate that any consideration of the contemporary relationship between law and 
sorcery in Papua New Guinea must ultimately be situated. 
A. State Law as the Relevant Socio-Political Datum 
Howsoever one may assess the circumstances which brought it about (and 
regardless of the particular significance one may be inclined to attach to the fact), 
Papua New Guinea is an independent, politically sovereign state. It is so 
recognised by every other country in the world; and to a growing number of Papua 
New Guineans as well, this particular status can hardly be a matter of complete 
indifference. The State of Papua New Guinea is organised along the lines of a 
modified Westminster model of government.32 It operates through constitutionally 
created political structures, embracing the institutions of legislative, executive and 
judicial authority ordinarily associated with what may conveniently (if less than 
perfectly accurately) be referred to as the Western democratic form or system of 
government. 
The laws of the State of Papua New Guinea, by which I mean those forms of 
law recognised by the state as legitimate authoritative and subject to enforcement 
by the state as such, are enumerated specifically and exclusively in the 
Constitution. They include the Constitution itself, the Organic Laws, Acts of the 
Justice Melanesian Style,' in Alternative Strategies for Papua New Guinea , ed. A. Clunies Ross 
and J. Langmore (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 59-85. 
32 See C.J. Lynch, 'Form and Style in South Pacific Constitutions,' Pacific Perspectives, 
vol. 13, no. 1 (1988), pp. 32-54; idem, 'The Westminster Model in the Pacific,' The 
Parliamentarian, vol. 63, no. 2 (July 1982), pp. 138-150; idem, 'Achievement of Independence 
in Papua New Guinea: The Legal Aspect,' Journal of Pacific History, vol. 15 (July 1980), pp. 
175-193; Y. Ghai, 'Constitution Making and Decolonisation,' in Law, Government and Politics 
in the Pacific Island States, ed. Y. Ghai (Suva: Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the 
South Pacific, 1988), pp. 1-53. 
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Parliament, Emergency Regulations, such other laws as may be made under or 
adopted by the Constitution, the underlying law and none other.33 
Despite the technical supremacy of the political state in Papua New Guinea, 
the effective extension of state law throughout much of the country is quite 
limited. Even in the in the cities and larger towns, where the problems of 
accessibility and communication are not nearly so great as they are in the remote 
and far more numerous villages where the vast majority of the people live, the 
popular acceptance of the legitimacy of state law is often tenuous, at best. Regard, 
to say nothing of respect, for the government officials charged with the 
administration of state law is frequently lacking. 
33 Constitution of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea, s. 9 [hereinafter referred to 
as PNG Constitution]. Until such time as the Parliament shall declare and provide for the 
development of the 'underlying law,' the Constitution of Papua New Guinea provides that: 
'custom is adopted, and shall be applied and enforced, as part of the underlying law' [PNG 
Constitution, s. 20(2); Sch. 2.1(1)] except: in respect of any custom that is, and to the extent that 
it is, inconsistent with a Constitutional Law or a statute, or repugnant to the general principles of 
humanity [PNG Constitution, Sch. 2.1(2)]. 
Further adopted by the Constitution of Papua New Guinea as part of the underlying law are: 
the principles and rules that formed ... the principles and rules 
of common law and equity in England ... except if, and to the 
extent that-(a)they are inconsistent with a Constitutional 
Law or statute; or (b) they are inapplicable or inappropriate 
to the circumstances of the country from time to time; or (c) 
in their application to any particular matter they are 
inconsistent with custom as adopted ... . [PNG Constitution, 
Sch. 2.2(1)]. 
The Constitution also places an affirmative duty on the National Judicial System, and on the 
Supreme and National Courts in particular, to formulate appropriate rules as part of the 
underlying law where neither custom nor the common law are applicable. [PNG Constitution, 
Sch. 2.3.]. 
345 
B. 'Traditional' Socio-Cnltural Orientations 
The pace and extent of 'social change' in Papua New Guinea has been 
remarkable and, in many respects, dramatic. At virtually every level, 'traditional' 
Melanesian culture--however that concept may be understood and described-is 
in ferment, and indeterminacy seems very much to be the order of the day. 
Nevertheless, it is fair to say that most Papua New Guineans continue to 
understand the nature of reality, to order their lives and to manage their affairs in 
accordance with attitudes, beliefs and values which appear to be quite different to 
those by which most non-Melanesian peoples (and Western European peoples in 
particular) understand, order and manage theirs. Along these same dimensions, 
there is a great diversity and a wide range of variation amongst and between 
different groups of Papua New Guineans themselves. Notwithstanding these 
extremes of socio-cultural diversity and variation, however, ethnographers have 
identified a number of features in the expressed belief systems and observable 
behaviours of Papua New Guineans, which suggest that they share more in 
common with one another than they do with other, non-Melanesian peoples. 
Moreover, it is the generally accepted and ethnographically informed view that 
many Papua New Guineans do, or would prefer to, attend to matters over which 
state law assumes (and attempts to extend its assertion of) exclusive control, in a 
fashion that differs substantially from both the manner in which state legal 
institutions operate in practice, and the ways in which those institutions are 
intended to operate in theory. The structural frameworks (cosmological, 
ontological, social, cognitive, and so forth) within which Papua New Guineans 
organise and employ their unique understandings and experiences of life are 
shaped, to a greater or lesser extent, by underlying customary systems of 
indigenous or 'traditional' values and beliefs. These systems are inextricably 
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bound up with the essential quality of 'being' Papua New Guinean-{)r more 
precisely, of 'being' a member of such group or groups with which an individual 
identifies him- or herself most intimately. The institutional structures of state law, 
on the other hand, are said to reflect fundamentally and essentially the systems of 
attitudes, values and beliefs of the people by whom (and presumably for whom) 
those institutions were initially devised. In other words, the norms and systems of 
state law in Papua New Guinea are the equally unique, culturally specific products 
of a particular Western society. 
C. The Persistence and Incorrigibility of Sorcery Beliefs 
Belief in the existence of witches and sorcerers, and in the potent efficacy of 
the powers they may exercise, is endemic in the cultures and societies of Papua 
New Guinea. In variable and changing forms, these beliefs are prevalent today 
amongst villagers and city-dwellers alike. Despite what, in many instances, has 
been a prolonged and seemingly thoroughgoing exposure to the countervailing 
influences of modern Western rationalism and the scientifically constructed 
materialist view of the world, such beliefs do not seem to have diminished 
appreciably. Indeed, by some accounts, these beliefs would appear in many ways 
to be held even more strongly now than they were in the recent colonial, and more 
distant, pre-colonial, past. 34 
Much of the conduct that belief in sorcery and witchcraft tends to induce and 
provoke amongst Papua New Guineans involves behaviours which, from a 
Melanesian perspective, demand and justify responsive and remedial actions 
34 See, e.g., G.D. Westermark, 'Sorcery and Economic Change in Agarabi,' Social 
Analysis, no. 8 (November 1981), p. 89, 99; P. Lawrence, 'De Rerum Natura: The Garia View 
of Sorcery,' in Sorcerer and Witch in Melanesia, ed. M. Stephen (Carlton: Melbourne 
University Press, 1987), p. 30. 
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which are deemed impermissible under the system of state law. By the same 
token, other kinds of conduct associated with the belief in sorcery and witchcraft, 
and which, again, from an indigenous Melanesian perspective, ought to be 
prevented or punished, are not recognised by state law as legally wrongful, and 
such conduct is not, therefore, subject to be enjoined or otherwise negatively 
sanctioned by the legal authorities of the state. 
4. Assumptions of Inter-Cultural Irreconcilability and 
Conflicting Beliefs in Law and Sorcery 
In light of the foregoing propositions, compelling arguments have been made 
to the effect that officials of the state legal system in Papua New Guinea lack the 
will to reform the law in ways that would make it more responsive to the jural 
values, beliefs and orientations of the vast majority of the people.35 Corollary and 
complementary arguments, however, have also been made to the effect that, 
notwithstanding such failures of political and judicial will, an accommodating 
reform of the law would be unavailing in any case, because the institutional 
structures and the underlying operational rationale of state law-indeed, of the 
state itself-are so fundamentally at odds with prevalent popular beliefs and 
values, any attempt to reform the law in the direction of popular accommodation 
would inevitably prove futile. 
As to the first category of arguments mentioned above, I am not particularly 
concerned here with the extent to which the administrators of the colonial and 
post -colonial state in Papua New Guinea may have demonstrated or failed to 
" See D. Roebuck, 'Custom, Common Law and Constructive Judicial Decision 
Lawmaking,' in Essays on the Constitution of Papua New Guinea, ed. R. De Vere, D. 
Colquhooun-Kerr and J. Kaburise (Port Moresby: Tenth Independence Anniversary Advisory 
Committee, 1985), pp. 127-145. 
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demonstrate sufficient will to reform the law. On that score, historical events and 
contemporary trends speak for themselves. As to the second category of 
arguments, however, whilst these may draw substantial support from the former, I 
disagree with the fundamental premises upon which they are based. I do not 
believe that there is anything inherent in the constituent nature of the adopted 
common law tradition which necessarily renders that tradition irreconcilably or 
irremediably inimical to a culturally appropriate and responsive accommodation 
of changing Melanesian jural attitudes, values and beliefs. 
The situation of sorcery and witchcraft beliefs in Papua New Guinea provides 
a powerful example of the supposedly intrinsic incompatibility and 
irreconcilability of Melanesian and Western jural values. It is, at once, an instance 
of the broader and fundamental incongruity of the epistemological premises 
underlying the institutions of law and custom in the respective cultures and 
societies, and an illustration of the irresolvable contradictions instantiated in the 
model of the 'state versus stateless societies'.36 
To be sure, state law in Papua New Guinea has always been essentially an 
alien transplant. Colonial or post-colonial, introduced or imposed, received or 
adopted, the law is said to bear within its essential character the immutable, 
ratiocinative parameters of a culture and society which rejects out of hand 
supernatural or metaphysical explanations of cause and effect. The rationalistic 
tenets of Western ontology and epistemology simply do not admit of experiences 
or phenomena for which material explanations are not either readily to hand or 
capable of being adduced on equally tenable (which is to say, wholly rational) 
bases. These are the terms of reference by which modern Western society is said 
36 Lawrence, 'The State Versus Stateless Societies,' p. 15. 
349 
to define the contours and delimit the content of cognisable reality. And it is in 
that reality that the state law of Papua New Guinea is seen to be firmly anchored. 
A. Legal and Anthropological Perspectives 
Semble, there are no real sorcerers or witches in Papua New Guinea (or 
anyplace else for that matter), and people who genuinely believe themselves or 
others to be so might properly be considered delusional, insane, ignorant or, 
somewhat more charitably, unreasonably mistaken.37 So it is that genuinely held 
beliefs that the exercise of sorcery, witchcraft or related supernatural powers is 
capable of bringing about particular experiential or phenomenological 
consequences (which themselves may be quite indisputably real) are treated either 
as the products of ignorance or of some mental defect_3' For legal scholars and 
37 See K.S. Chukka!, 'Supernatural Beliefs and Criminal Law in Nigeria,' Journal of the 
Indian Law Institute, vol. 25, no. 4 (October/December 1983), pp. 444-474; L.O. Aremu,' 
Criminal Responsibility for Homicide in Nigeria and Supernatural Beliefs,' International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, val. 29 (January 1980), pp. 112-131; G.L. Williams, 'Homicide 
and the Supernatural,' Law Quarterly Review, val. 65 (October 1949), pp. 491-503. 
38 See D. Sperber, 'Apparently Irrational Beliefs,' in Rationality and Relativism, ed. M. 
Hollis and S. Lukes (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982), p. 156; R. Perkins, Criminal Law (2d ed. 
Mineola, NY: Foundation Press, 1969), pp. 863-867; C. Howard, Criminal Law (4th ed. 
Sydney: The Law Book Company, 1982), pp. 41, 363-373. 
In People v. Strong (1975) 37 N.Y. 2d 568, 376 N.Y.S.2d 87, 338 N.E. 2d 602, the New 
York Court of Appeals was prepared only to contemplate a reduction in the offence for which 
the defendant was convicted from manslaughter to negligent homicide, where the defendant 
genuinely, albeit unreasonably, believed that his special 'powers' enabled him to thrust several 
knives and a hatchet into the body of a living person without doing the latter any harm. Here, the 
court held that 'objective indications of a defendant's state of mind' should 'corroborate, in a 
sense, the defendant's own subjective articulation' [per Jasen J, 37 N.Y.2d at 571-572, 376 
N.Y.S.2d at 90]. Gabrielli J (dissenting), on the other hand, concluded that there was no 
justification for the majority's holding that the 'defendant's ... claimed lack of perception, 
together with the belief of the victim and the defendant's followers ... ' supported even a verdict 
on the reduced charge. Endorsing the lower court's decision, Gabrielli J would have found: 
Defendant's belief in his superhuman powers, whether real or 
simulated, did not result in his failure to perceive the risk 
but, rather, led him consciously to disregard the risk of which 
he was aware [37 N.Y.2d at 572; 376 N.Y.S.2d at 90]. 
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social anthropologists, then, the important issues of Melanesian sorcery have to do 
only with the belief in its existence, and the implications of such beliefs for those 
aspects of the real world of human affairs with which the practices of law and 
anthropology are concerned. Hence, with a fitting scholarly detachment, 
ethnographers speak of the beliefs of the people they study in the existence of 
sorcery and witchcraft, and the consequences of those beliefs for the ways in 
which these people conduct their lives and order their societies;39 and conventional 
legal analyses have tended to proceed on similar bases.40 
In much the same way, the state law in Papua New Guinea concerns itself 
today with 'the widespread belief throughout the country that there is such a thing 
39 See, e.g., R. Bowden, 'Sorcery, Illness and Social Control in Kwoma Society,' in 
Sorcerer and Witch in Melanesia, ed. M. Stephen (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1987), 
p. 183: 
I wish to focus on the way in which sorcery beliefs in this 
society are related to concepts of illness and the curing of 
illness, and also the way in which they contribute to the 
resolution of social conflict. 
J. Hughes, 'Ancestors, Tricksters and Demons: An Examination of Chimbu Interaction with 
the Invisible World,' Oceania, vol. 59, no. 1 (September 1988), p. 59: 
The reality of a spirit world which co-exists with Chimbu 
human beings is not doubted by village people who are ever 
mindful of their obligations. 
G.D. Westermark, 'Sorcery and Economic Change in Agarabi,' Social Analysis, no. 8 
(November 1981), p. 99: 
Agarabi believe that the practice of sorcery has increased and 
that it has reached a particularly pernicious stage. They also 
feel that there is a greater threat of sorcery attack coming 
from within their own clans and phratries. 
40 See R.S. O'Regan, 'Sorcery and Homicide in Papua New Guinea,' Australian Law 
Journal, vol. 48, no. 2 (February 1974), pp. 76-82; The Honourable Mr Justice Smithers, 'Law 
and the Territory of Papua and New Guinea,' Melbourne University Law Review, vol 4 
(November 1963), pp. 212-237; D.M. Selby, 'Sorcery in New Guinea,' Australian Law Journal, 
vol. 18, no. 11 (March 1945), pp. 306-307. 
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as sorcery,'41 statutorily providing for the punishment of those found guilty of its 
maleficent practice, 'just as if sorcery and the powers of sorcerers were real.. . .'42 
There is an appreciable poignancy in this subjunctive formulation; a poignancy 
that is made even more apparent when the current statutory language is compared 
with the indicative certainty of the colonial legislation that preceded it, where it 
was summarily concluded that 'Sorcery is only deceit, but the lies of the Sorcerer 
frighten many people and cause great trouble, therefore the Sorcerer must be 
punished' .'3 More poignant still, in light of the foregoing, is the tortuous 
equivocation reflected in the hortatory language appearing in a substantive 
provision of Papua New Guinea's present Sorcery Act: 
Even though this Act may speak as if powers of sorcery really 
exist (which is necessary if the law is to deal adequately with 
all the legal problems of sorcery and the traditional belief in 
the powers of sorcerers), nevertheless nothing in this Act 
recognizes the existence or effectiveness of powers of sorcery 
in any factual sense except only for the purpose of, and of 
proceedings under or by virtue of, this Ac~ or denies the 
existence or effectiveness of such powers." 
In a pointed criticism of the particular provisions of the Sorcery Act quoted 
immediately above, then Acting Judge of the National Court, B.M. Narokobi, 
remarked in a 1981 decision: 'The real difficulty with the Sorcery Act is that it was 
enacted by Australians who are not aware of the real and factual effects of 
sorcery.'45 Only a few months before the judgement in which these observations 
41 Sorcery Act (No. 22 of 1971) [now Chapter 274, Revised Laws of Papua New Guinea], 
Preamble, s. 1(1), sch. 1.1. 
42 Sorcery Act (No. 22 of 1971), Preamble. 
43 Native Regulations Ordinance !939 (Papua), s. 80.-(1). Cf. Native Administration 
Regulations Ordinance 1924 (New Guinea), s. 97. 
44 Revised Laws of Papua New Guinea, c. 274, s.9 [Sorcery Act (No. 22 of 1971)], s. 9. 
45 The State v. Noah Magou [1981] P.N.G.L.R. I at 4. 
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appeared was delivered, however, the Supreme Court of Justice had overturned 
one of Narokobi's earlier trial decisions.46 In that case, four men had pleaded 
guilty to charges of wilfully murdering a woman whom they genuinely believed to 
have been a sorceress. Each of the accused had been sentenced to three months' 
imprisomnent with hard labour, and each was further ordered to pay five pigs in 
compensation to the deceased's son.<7 The State's appeals were based, inter alia, 
upon the manifest inadequacy of the sentences. In upholding the appeals on this 
ground, the observations of the then Chief Justice, himself a Papua New Guinean, 
are telling: 
[T]he learned trial judge properly took into account the 
background of the respondents. I have no quarrel on that 
score. For instance he found that the respondents came from a 
remote part of the country with minimal contact with the 
outside world; that they encountered 'modem life style' after 
they were taken into custody; that their area was sparsely 
populated and that what they did was out offear of sorcery. 
His Honour then, it seems to me, went into great lengths about 
the effect of sorcery or belief in it in the minds of believers. I 
agree, with respect, that in many communities in Papua New 
Guinea belief in sorcery and its powers is very strong and we 
cannot brush it aside. My own people believe it and great fear 
is caused by such belief. 
That the cultural setting of the respondents must be taken into 
account is not disputed .... However, it should not override the 
clear dictates of the Parliament that those who commit the 
crime of wilful murder attract to themselves the possible 
penalty of imprisonment with hard labour for life .... Whether 
[the victim] was guilty [of sorcery] or not she was entitled to 
the protection of the law. The belief in sorcery was rightly 
taken into account in sentence but it seems to have outweighed 
other considerations.48 
46 Acting Public Solicitor v. Uname Aumane [1980] P.N.G.L.R. 510. 
47 [1980] P.N.G.L.R. at 510. 
"[1980] P.N.G.L.R. at 513-514 (per Kidu CJ). 
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In 1980, Narokobi was convinced that the legislation which had been drafted 
for Papua New Guineans under the directive influence of Western thinking, failed 
to properly accommodate a truly Papua New Guinean perspective on the nature of 
the realities associated with traditional Melanesian beliefs in the existence of 
sorcery and witchcraft.'9 Yet the opinion expressed by the then Chief Justice 
suggests that it is, perhaps, as much a Westernised as a purely Western influence 
in state law, which may operate to that effect; and arguably with an even greater 
potency, since the former bears the imprimatur of indigenous judicial authority. 
B. The 'Westsernisation' of Melanesian 
Conceptions of Law and Sorcery 
In a distinctively jural context, the circumstances to hand are very like those 
which Keesing criticised in his consideration of the effects of certain kinds of 
Western and Westernised misrenderings of Pacific Islands culture and history.50 In 
this instance, however, there is a curious twist. 
Keesing argued that Western scholars are implicated in a process whereby 
their misrepresentative generalisations and stereotypes depicting aspects of 
Oceanic cultures, are seen to feed back into contemporary (mis)representations of 
those cultures, as these come to be understood and portrayed by Pacific Islanders 
themselves.51 Centrally featured amongst these misleading interpretations, 
49 Presumably, Narokobi maintains this view today. See B. Narokobi, Lo Bilong Yumi Yet: 
Low and Custom in Melanesia (Suva: University of the South Pacific, 1989); idem, 'In Search of 
a Melanesian Jurisprudence,' in Legal Pluralism, Proceedings of the Canberra Law Workshop 
VII, ed. P. Sack and E. Minchin (Canberra: Department of Law, Research School of Social 
Sciences, The Australian National University, 1986), pp. 215-228. 
50 See R.M. Keesing, 'Creating the Past: Custom and Identity in the Contemporary Pacific,' 
The Contemporary Pacific, vol. 1, nos. 1 and 2 (Spring and Fall 1989), pp. 19-42 
51 Ibid., p. 24. 
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Keesing identified certain dichotomous formulations, which he described as 
maintaining 'a continuing impress on Pacific thought.'52 In his analysis of this 
process of replicated distortion, Keesing was largely concerned with the ways in 
which Western and Westernised idea!isations of pre-colonial Island histories and 
understandings of traditional cultures 'incorporate Western conceptions of 
Otherness' respecting 'visions of primitivity, and critiques ofmodernity.'53 It is this 
kind of 'Western criticism of Westernization' which then works its way back into 
the Weltanschauungen of Pacific Islanders, reproducing and valorizing distorted 
conceptualisations of their own historical and contemporary realities. 54 
The situation with which I am concerned involves a different kind of 
misrepresentative message. It is, however, a message which may well be 
transmitted by processes quite similar to those which Keesing identified. The 
Western (and Westemised) vision of a modem Melanesian society, free from 
widespread belief in the real existence of sorcery and witchcraft and in which the 
believers in, and self-proclaimed or accused practitioners of, malevolent magic are 
generally recognised to be the deluded, insane or unfortunately ignorant souls they 
are considered to be in the scientifically advanced societies of the West, is a vision 
of a society which, like our own, shall have effectively purged its vital sense of 
tradition of any vestigial taint of primitiveness. This is a vision born of an 
eminently Western view of reality. At the same time, however, it is a vision that is 
increasingly sustained by a powerful assumption of 'Otherness' on the part of 
52 Ibid .. p. 23. 
53 Ibid., p. 29. 
54 A. Babadzan, 'Kastom and Nation Building in the South Pacific,' paper presented at 
Rothko Chapel Colloquium on Ethnicity and Nation, Houston, Texas, 1983 [quoted in Keesing, 
'Creating the Past,' p. 29]. 
355 
those who share the sort of views expressed by the (then) Chief Justice of Papua 
New Guinea's Supreme Court. In this case, therefore, unlike the situation of 
which Keesing is so critical, the more relevant 'Other' is the modern, rationalistic, 
secularised and scientifically enlightened societies of the West, and the 
mythologised vision of the 'legal culture65 to which that society will give rise is 
one that is conveyed by and through received (mis)understandings and 
(mis)renderings of the common law tradition. 
5. Metaphysical Misunderstandings 
and the Persuasive Illusions of Difference 
Commenting on the allure of radical difference in the study of sorcery and 
witchcraft amongst 'other' peoples, Max Marwick accounted for this evident 
fascination on the basis of what he assumed to be 'Western society's emancipation 
from it':56 
55 To establish a meaningful definition of the concept 'legal culture' is as problematic and 
potentially controversial as establishing a meaningful definition of the term 'culture' itself. See 
M. Chiba, 'The Identity Postulate of a Legal Culture,' inS. Panou, G. Bozonis, D. Georgas and 
P. Trappe, eds. Philosophy of Law in the History of Human Thought (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner 
Verlag, 1988), p. 86. For present purposes, however, it will be sufficient to adopt J.H. 
Merryman's definition of the expression 'legal tradition' as referring to: 
a set of deeply rooted, historically conditioned attitudes about 
the nature of law, about the role of law in the society and 
polity [and] about the proper organisation and operation of a 
legal system . . . . [The Civil Law Tradition (2d ed. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985), p. 2] 
See also H.W. Ehrmann, Comparative Legal Cultures (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 
Inc., 1976); L.M. Friedman, 'Legal Culture and Social Development,' Law & Society Review, 
vol. 4, no. I (August 1969), pp. 29-44; A. Watson, 'Legal Change: Sources of Law and Legal 
Culture,' University of Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 131, no. 5 (April 1983), pp. 1121-1157; 
B. Yngvesson, 'Inventing Law in Local Settings: Rethinking Popular Legal Culture,' Yale Law 
Journal, vol. 98, no. 8 (June 1989), pp. 1689-1709. 
56 M. Marwick, 'Introduction,' in Witchcraft and Sorcery, (2d ed. Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Books, 1982), p. 15. 
Western travellers, missionaries, administrators and even 
anthropologists have often selected this, the most bizarre and 
exotic aspect of native life, for a disproportionate share of 
attention. People's witch-beliefs are as often recorded for their 
sheer entertainment value as for their scientific interest. They 
seem to reward the romantic search by both writers and 
readers for fantasies that come true." 
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Marwick readily acknowledged the validity of legitimate 'scientific' interest in 
these systems of belief, even though 'from our point of view they represent the 
standardized delusions of the societies concerned ... .'58 Indeed, he continued, 
scientific studies of sorcery and witchcraft in 'native' societies are of especial 
importance 'because of the light they throw on human behaviour in general, 
including that of ourselves among whom they no longer command credence.'59 Or 
do they? 
Like the assumptions about modem Western legal culture that implicitly 
underlie the premises of Papua New Guinea's current sorcery legislation and the 
views of Papua New Guinea's then Chief Justice, Marwick's assumptions about 
the rationalistic virtues of modem Western culture generally may be far more 
contentious than their glib assertion seems to suggest. Moreover, the uncritical 
way in which such assumptions are so routinely accepted serves to create and 
perpetuate egregious misunderstandings and misrepresentations of Western law 
and Western culture alike. To the extent that such misrendered constructions of 
Western law and culture may function as a kind of touchstone for jural 
ratiocination in Papua New Guinea, even in the circumstances in which sorcery-
related beliefs are implicated (perhaps especially in such circumstances), these 
57 Ibid., 15. 
"Ibid., p. 16. 
59 Ibid., (emphasis supplied). 
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misunderstandings and misrepresentations undermine the legitimacy that the law 
must achieve if it is ever to be accepted as viably authoritative by the people it is 
meant to serve. 
A. Law, Metaphysics and the Reality oflntangible Harm 
In order to frame somewhat more narrowly the specific issues with which I am 
concerned, and thence to place them in an apposite context, let me offer here a 
brief ethnographic excursus: 
THE DEATH OF K. 
K. was a young man who was believed to have fallen victim to 
a powerful and malevolent form of sorcery, practised against 
him at the instigation of members of a clan with whom K.'s 
own had a long, hostile and at one time openly combative 
relationship. In response, K.'s people sought to invoke the 
forces of a remedial counter-magic. Toward that end, they 
enlisted the services of a sorcerer known to be sympathetic to 
their interests, and at odds with the sorcerer whom they held 
responsible for K.'s illness. 
The magic of K.'s enemies, however, proved to be the more 
efficacious. K.'s physical and mental condition deteriorated. 
He grew increasingly morose and paranoid. Unable to attend 
to his customary obligations in the village, he wifhdrew 
completely to an abandoned dwelling at its outskirts. There, in 
the depths of fhe despondency brought on by his magically 
induced delusions, K. committed suicide. 
The sorcerer, whom K.'s clan alleged had perpetrated the 
machinations resulting in the latter's death, denied all 
responsibility; denying further that he, personally, possessed 
the occult knowledge that would have been necessary to bring 
it about. Neifher he, nor the members of the clan at whose 
behest K.'s people maintained he had acted, however, would 
likely deny that such things can and do happen in fhe ordinary 
course of human affairs. Unpersuaded by these denials, K.'s 
clan sought compensation from those whom fhey were 
convinced were directly and indirectly responsible for the 
death of their kinsman. And although they were unsuccessful 
in their efforts to secure the redress to which they believed 
themselves justly entitled, the traditional institutions within 
which their society customarily processes inter-group disputes 
of this kind were fully prepared to acknowledge the intrinsic 
legitimacy of their grievance, and to entertain their claim as 
justiciable .... 
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Allowing for the variations and nuances of situation and circumstance so 
characteristic of ethnographic accounts dealing with alleged instances and 
accusations of sorcery in Papua New Guinea, the case related above is not 
atypical. As it happens, however, the story of K.'s death is not drawn from the 
literature of Melanesian ethnography. Rather, having taken a certain measure of 
literary licence-but very little licence with the actual facts of the case-the 
events I have described are drawn directly from a judgement of the California 
Court of Appeal in Nalley v. Grace Community Church of the Valley,60 which was 
delivered in 1987. 
"'(1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1057, 240 Cai.Rptr. 215. This decision was subsequently reversed 
by the California Supreme Court in Nalley v. Grace Community Chruch of the Valley (1988) 47 
Cal. 3d 278, 253 Cai.Rptr. 97, 763 P.2d 948, and an earlier opinion of the Court of Appeal in 
the same matter [Nalley v. Grace Community Church of the Valley (1984) -- Cal.App.3d --, 
204 Cal. Rptr. 303] had previously been withdrawn. For convenience, I shall refer to the first and 
second opinions of the Court of Appeal as Nalley I and Nalley II, respectively. The judgment of 
the Supreme Court will be referred to as Nalley III. 
It is important to note that, whilst citation of the Court of Appeal opinion in Nalley I would 
have been inappropriate, for precedential purposes, even prior to the Supreme Court's reversal 
of the Court of Appeal decision in Nalley II, on the Court of Appeal's second hearing of the 
matter it was deemed proper (and, indeed, necessary) for that court to consider factual findings 
and conclusions of law contained within the first opinion, for purposes related to application of 
the law of the case doctrine (see Cal Rules of Court, Rule 977; Nalley II, 240 Cai.Rptr. at 222, 
n. 2). In light of its reversal by the Supreme Court in Nalley III, reference to, or citation of, the 
opinion of the Court of Appeal in Nalley II (again, for precedential purposes) would likewise be 
inappropriate. 
In this discussion, however, I am not relying on the respective decisions of the Court of 
Appeal for the purposes of formulating a 'legal' argument, such as would be cognisable in a 
court of law. Rather, my aim is to demonstrate that a common law court in a modern, Western 
jurisdiction was prepared to take account of the issues raised, and that it did not fmd itself 
precluded by the constraints of the law from doing so. In this discussion, then, reference to the 
opinions of the Court of Appeal in both Nalley I and Nalley II is properly made for two reasons: 
firstly, because it is ouly in those opinions that relevant factual matters (contested and 
uncontested). which were placed before the Supreme Court, are mentioned and discussed in any 
detail; and secondly, because the grounds upon which the Supreme Court ultimately reversed the 
then standing decision of the Court of Appeal in Nalley II involved the consideration of legal 
issues that are not determinatively relevant to the purposes for which I have provided the 
example here. 
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K. (Kenneth Nalley) was 24 years old at the time he shot and killed himself in 
1979 in Los Angeles. There was no doubt about the fact that it was he who put the 
gun to his own head and fired the fatal shot, or that he was quite alone in the 
unoccupied flat of a friend when he did so. Nevertheless, Kenneth's parents sought 
to hold others responsible for their son's death-and it is upon that ground in 
particular that the crucial situational dynamics surrounding the entire incident may 
be seen to bear many of the hallmarks frequently associated with the 'bizarre' and 
'exotic' circumstances of Melanesian sorcery cases. 
Kenneth was a devout adherent to the beliefs of a fundamentalist religious 
sect, and was actively involved in his church's religious 'counselling programme'. 
This programme was operated in accordance with the view that answers and 
explanations for every question and problem ought to be sought, and would 
invariably be found, in selected biblical teachings, as interpreted and construed by 
church-trained spiritual counsellors. Upon these premises, the church's counsellors 
attempted to minister to the needs of a number of people suffering from a variety 
of emotional and psychological problems.61 Kenneth was amongst those receiving 
this kind.of spiritual guidance. 
Kenneth's parents were very much opposed to his involvement with the 
church. Although they were practising Catholics and had raised Kenneth within 
their understanding of the teachings of the Catholic Church, their principal 
objections to his affiliation with his chosen spiritual advisers reflected their 
general concerns with his increasingly aberrant behaviour and emotional state; the 
detrimental influence his association with fundamentalism was apparently having 
upon his mental health; and Kenneth's insistence on the superiority of the spiritual 
61 Nalley II, 240 Cal.Rptr. at 220. 
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attention he was receiving from his religious counsellors over the psychological 
attention his parents were equally insistent he required. 
As it happened, Kenneth's parents had actively tried to persuade their son to 
seek psychological treatment from professionally qualified, secular clinicians. The 
church's view on such intervention, however, militated against that possibility-
and Kenneth believed in the power of his church, as much as he did in its 
counsellors' mastery of that power. Summarising the nature of the church's 
position with respect to the efficacy and appropriateness of conventional, secular 
psychotherapy and psychiatry, the Court of Appeal referred to the views expressed 
at trial by one of Kenneth's counsellors: 
He believes the Bible gives the root answer to why emotional 
or psychiatric problems exist.... It is his conviction that to 
settle for an answer from secular psychiatry or psychology is 
to settle for less than God's goal.... [H]e would not refer 
someone to a psychiatrist, generally, unless he believed the 
psychiatrist had a 'world view' or was 'coming from the 
viewpoint consistent with the scripture1• 62 
During the period leading up to Kenneth's suicide, there were continuing 
disagreements and conflicts between Kenneth and his parents concerning the 
propriety (and, from his parents' perspective, the necessity) of Kenneth's seeking 
'professional' psychological assistance. Kenneth remained firm in his belief in the 
power of his spiritual counsellors to bring about the relief he presumably desired, 
whilst his parents remained equally convinced of the power of the clinical 
psychologists whose advice and assistance they sought, as much in an effort to 
address their son's emotional problems as in the hope that their preferred 'magic' 
would release him from the 'spell' under which Kenneth's religious mentors had 
seemingly placed him. 
62 Nalley II, 240 Cal.Rptr. at 220. 
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A crucial and contested piece of evidence in the trial involved a kind of 
instructional tape-recording made by the counsellors of Kenneth's church, and 
used by them in the training of other counsellors. Kenneth's parents sought to 
admit the recorded message to support an inference that the church counsellors 
'followed a policy of counseling suicidal persons that, if one was unable to 
overcome one's sins, suicide was an acceptable and even desirable alternative to 
living. '63 Excerpts from the tape recording were quoted in a prior opinion of the 
Court of Appeal:64 
'And the suicidal says, "I am under such tremendous pressure, 
now I've got to [sic] pleasure of release! Now!, I don't care 
about the future." ... And ... if he is a believer, he'll go to be 
with the Lord. Yes, there'll be a loss of reward, but because of 
the Lord and his grace, he'll go and be with the Lord. In fact, 
suicide is one of the ways that the Lord takes home a 
disobedient believer. We read that in the Bible. That death is 
one of the ways that the Lord deals with us .... That's right. And 
suicide for a believer is the Lord saying, "Okay, come on 
home. Can't use you anymore on earth. If you're not going to 
deal with those things in your life, come on home. ".'65 
As Kenneth's parents alleged in their complaint against the church counsellors, 
not only had they (the counsellors) "'taught or otherwise imbued [Kenneth] ... with 
the notion that if he accepted Jesus Christ as his personal savior, [he] would still 
be accepted into heaven if he committed suicide, "'66 but through their affirmative 
actions and omissions, which is to say, by their manipulation of what they knew to 
be Kenneth's- and presumably their own- genuine beliefs in the potency of a 
particular variety of supernatural powers (in this instance, divine powers), and 
63 Nalley II, 240 Cal.Rptr. at 223. 
64 Nalley I (1984) 204 Cal.Rptr. 303 (Cal App 2d Dist.). 
65 Nalley I, 204 Cal.Rptr. at 306. 
66 Quoted in the decision of the California Supreme Court, Nalley III, 47 Cal. 3d 278, 253 
Cal.Rptr. 97, 763 P.2d 948 at 952. 
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their peculiar knowledge of those powers, they were, arguably, responsible for 
Kenneth's suicide.67 
B. Questioning the 'Rational' Bases of Legally Cognisable Wrongdoing-
'Supernatural' Force and Intangible Harm 
That Kenneth's parents ultimately failed to obtain the judicially ordered 
compensation they sought for their son's death is of far less significance than the 
fact that a 'modem' Western, rationalistically orientated, scientifically conscious 
and secular court was prepared to entertain their claim on the terms in which it 
was presented. Thus, I have selected this particular case to use as an illustration 
here, not because it bears so clear or consistent a resemblance to Melanesian 
sorcery cases on its facts, but only because it seems to involve a number of 
features which, for comparative purposes, might be juxtaposed instructively, 
mutatis mutandis, to contemporary Melanesian examples. Concededly, Kenneth's 
case is extraordinary in certain respects. But it is by no means the only instance in 
which common law courts have been called upon to consider matters of this 
general type.68 
67 One of Kenneth's parents' allegations involved the claim that their son's spiritual advisors 
'"actively and affirmatively dissuaded and discouraged [Kenneth] from seeking further 
professional psychological and/or psychiatric care".' Another averred that they (again, the 
counsellors) had indoctrinated Kenneth with 'certain Protestant religious doctrines that conflicted 
with [Kenneth's] Catholic upbringing,' and that this served to exacerbate his '"pre-existing 
feelings of guilt, anxiety and depression",' [752 P.2d at 952]. 
68 See, e.g. Meroni v. Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity 
(1984) 125 Misc. 2d 1061, 480 N.Y.S.2d 706; People v. Strong (1975) 37 N.Y.2d 568, 376 
N.Y.S.2d 87, 338 N.E.2d 602. And see also D.H. Cook, 'Tort Liability for Cult 
Deprogramming: Peterson v. Sorlien,' Ohio State Law Journal, vol. 43, no. 2 (1982), pp. 465-
489; R. Delgado, 'Cults and Conversion: The Case for Informed Consent,' Georgia Law 
Review, vol. 16, no. 3 (Spring 1982), pp. 533-574; J. Feinberg, Offense to Others, The Moral 
Limits of Criminal Law, vol. 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); R.N. Shapiro, 'Of 
Robots, Persons, and the Protection of Religious Beliefs,' Southern California Law Review, vol. 
56, no. 5 (July 1983), pp. 1277-1318; L.W. Brooks, 'Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
by Spiritual Counselors: Can Outrageous Conduct be "Free Exercise"?' Michigan Law Review, 
vol. 84, no. 6 (May 1986), pp. 1296-1325. 
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More importantly, I have not relied on this particular example of a decidedly 
Western judicial disposition because it provides definitive answers (legal or 
otherwise) to the complex questions implicated in efforts to reconcile the 
seemingly contradictory 'beliefs' in the efficacies of law and sorcery in Papua New 
Guinea. Rather, in this context Kenneth's case is useful principally because it 
brings to the fore particular questions, in the consideration of which some of the 
problems central to this inquiry are illuminated. As a point of departure, therefore, 
Kenneth's case is both apposite and appropriate, because it unequivocally involves 
a legally cognisable consideration of issues and affairs in which the intentional 
infliction of 'metaphysical' harm was claimed to have injuriously affected, and 
ultimately brought about the death of, the alleged 'victim'; and because such a 
claim was regarded as cognisable and justiciable by a common law court-
something which, in principle, common law courts are assumed to have great 
difficulty doing, and something which at least some Melanesian judges appear to 
be loath to do.69 
Two questions which suggest themselves at this point may serve to focus this 
discussion even more sharply. They are, firstly, whether the underlying socio-
G.L. Williams discusses several cases arising within Commonwealth jurisdictions, but for 
which there are few formal references to the judicial reports thereof in 'Homicide and the 
Supernatural,' Law Quarterly Review, vol. 65 (October 1949), pp. 491-503. African examples 
can be found in K.S. Chukkol, 'Supernatural Beliefs and Criminal Law in Nigeria,' Journal of 
the Indian Law Institute, vol. 25, no. 4 (October/December 1983), pp. 444-474; L.O. Aremu, 
'Criminal Responsibility for Homicide in Nigeria and Supernatural Beliefs,' International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 29 (January 1980), pp. 112-131; P.R. Brietzke, 'Witchcraft 
and Law in Malawi,' East African Law Journal, vol. 8, no. I (1972), pp. 1-24. A relevant 
decision of the Supreme Court of Columbia is discussed in D.S. Clark, 'Witchcraft and Legal 
Pluralism: The Case of Celimo Miquirucama,' Tulsa Law Journal, vol. 15, no. 4 (1980), pp. 
679-698. 
69 See Acting Public Solicitor v. Uname Aumane [1980] P.N.G.L.R. I, (Opinions of Kidu 
CJ and Kapi J); The State v. Osborn Kwayawko and Five Others Unreported Judgment of the 
National Court, No. 679 (16 August 1988). 
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cultural circumstances surrounding and culminating in Kenneth's death might not 
logically be considered within a general theoretical framework of sorcery and 
witchcraft beliefs; and secondly, if so, whether those underlying factors might not 
profitably be considered in particular relation to issues of law and sorcery in a 
Melanesian context. 
6. The 'Rationality' of Law and the 
'Irrationality' of Sorcery Reconsidered 
Of course, there are any number of differences between the circumstances of 
Kenneth's death and Papua New Guinea cases (ethnographic and legal) in which 
sorcery beliefs and allegations (or accusations) are involved. 70 It is my contention, 
however, that many of these immediately apparent and distinguishing differences 
might more properly be seen as differences of idiom, rather than of conclusively 
determinative substance.71 
In the formulation of a preliminarily affirmative response to the questions 
posed above, consider the following remarks which appeared in a discussion of 
7° For example, amongst various Papua New Guinea societies, it is not uncommon that 
precise identity of the sorcerer suspected of a particular malevolent act of sorcery may not be 
immediately 'known', aud that certain divination techniques may be necessary to ascertain his or 
her identity. See P. Sillitoe, 'Sorcery Divination Among the Wola,' in Sorcerer and Witch in 
Melanesia, ed. M. Stephen (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1987, pp. 121-146. 
Frequently, it is assumed that the perpetrator of au act of malevolent sorcery is a member of a 
particular antagonistic clau or is otherwise regarded as au 'outsider'. See D.M. Hayauo, 
'Sorcery Death, Proximity, aud the Perception of Out-Groups: The Tauau Awa of New Guinea,' 
Ethnology, vol. 12, no. 2 (April 1973), pp. 179-191. George Westermark reports, however, 
that, amongst the Agarabi today, 'allies' are increasingly likely to be suspected of sorcerous 
attacks. See G.D. Westermark, 'Sorcery aud Economic Chauge in Agarabi,' Social Analysis, 
no. 8 (November 1981), pp. 89-100. Cf. B.M. Knauf!, Good Company and Violence: Sorcery 
and Social Action in a Lowland New Guinea Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1985). 
71 See Horton, 'Africau Traditional Thought aud Western Science,' p. 50. 
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the relationship between law and sorcery prepared by the Law Reform 
Commission of Papua New Guinea in 1977:n 
Major world religions claim the reality of forces or 
personalities greater than the human and animal powers. 
Whether these powers or personalities can be shown to exist is 
often quite irrelevant to the belief. Many rational beings hold 
to belief which cannot be supported by empirical evidence .... 
Many rational people believe in the Blessed Trinity, the 
Mystery of Incarnation and so on, even though they have no 
material evidence to prove these73 
From the conventionally orthodox perspective of the common law, even a 
preliminary response to either of the questions raised above would most likely be 
framed in the negative. Any serious suggestion to the effect that the kind of 
circumstances which, in a Melanesian context, may give rise to bona fide 
allegations or accusations of homicide as having been caused by sorcery or 
sorcery-like conduct (as a an expression of 'mental force' or otherwise), can or 
ought to be cognisable within the rational framework of the common law, are 
generally rejected out of hand.74 For in the absence of demonstrably material, 
72 Law Reform Commission of Papua New Guinea. Sorcery. Occasional Paper No. 4 
(October 1977). 
73 Law Reform Commission, Sorcery, p. 9. Consider, too, in this regard, the remarks of a 
contemporary American legal commentator, Professor R.M. Perkins, who observed that, whilst 
it is sometimes said that no one may be held legally responsible for killing 'by any influence on 
the mind alone,' where death actually results, 'there has always been more than an influence on 
the "mind alone".' Criminal Law (2d ed. Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1969), p. 736. 
74 See Colin Howard. Criminal Law (4th ed. Sydney: The Law Book Company, 1982), pp. 
31-33. C.E. Torcia, Whanon's Criminal Law, vol. 2 (14th ed. San Francisco: Bancroft Whitney 
Company, 1979), pp. 101-102. 
I am dealing here only with allegations or accusations of particular affirmative acts of 
sorcery (or the alleged use of metaphysical or 'supernatural' powers to cause harm), because 
implicit in such an allegation is the underlying assumption that such forces actually exist. This is 
not to suggest that, in a Melanesian context, there are or would likely be many instances in 
which such affirmative allegations will be the principal matters at issue before a court (with the 
exception, perhaps, of a Village Court, which entertains a prescribed 'criminal' jurisdiction in 
respect of affirmative acts of sorcery. See Village Couns Act 1973 (No. 12 of 1974), Village 
Couns (Amendment) Act 1977 (No. 17 of 1977) and the relevant regulations in Village Coun 
Regulations (Statutory Instrument No. 41 of 1974); and see generally P. Keris, 'Village Courts 
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causal connections between the alleged conduct of a defendant and the death of 
his or her supposed victim, authorship of the killing will be deemed impossible of 
proof. 75 Insofar as arguments about the means by which a person is said to have 
caused another's death are 'too much out of line with the prevailing views of the 
community,' there can be no evidence upon which a such attributions of homicide 
to the accused might reasonably be based.76 Similar expositions of the principles 
of culpability and liability will be found in the most current iterations of the 
modem common law.77 It would appear that Sir Matthew Hale's pronouncements 
on such questions may remain as decisive today as they were over two hundred 
years ago: 
If a man either upon working upon the fancy of another or 
possibly by harsh or unkind usage puts another into such 
passion of grief or fear, that the party either dies suddenly, or 
contracts some disease, whereof he dies, tho, as the 
circumstances of the case may be, this may be murder or 
manslaughter in the sight of God, yet in foro humano it cannot 
come under the judgment of felony, because no external act of 
in Papua New Guinea,' in Pacific Courts and Legal Systems, ed. G. Powles and M. Pulea (Suva: 
University of the South Pacific, 1988), pp. 88-95). In Papua New Guinea, legal questions 
concerning the validity of sorcery beliefs can be expected to arise far more often in connection 
with special affirmative defences to other crimes, and as claim in mitigation wherein a defendant 
alleges reasonable provocation. See, D.R.C. Chalmers, D. Weisbrot and W.J. Andrew, 
Criminal Law and Practice of Papua New Guinea (2d ed. Sydney: The Law Book Company Ltd, 
1985), pp. 721-724, 744-746. 
75 Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law , vol. 2, p. 101. 
76 Howard, Criminal Law, p. 29. See also C.S. Kenny. Outlines of Criminal Law (12th ed. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1926), p. 129. 
77 See, e.g., s. 228 of the Canadian Criminal Code, which provides, in pertinent part: 'No 
person commits culpable homicide where he causes the death of a human being (a) by any 
influence on the mind alone, (b) by any disorder or disease resulting from influence on the mind 
alone.' Martin's Annual Criminal Code (Aurora, ONT: Canada Law Book Co., 1990). See also 
J.G. Flemming, The Law of Torts (6th ed. Sydney: The Law Book Company, 1983), pp. 30-32; 
F.A. Trindade and P. Cane, The Law of Torts in Australia (Melbourne: Oxford University 
Press, 1985), pp. 67-70. 
violence was offered, whereof the common law can take 
notice, and secret things belong to God ... 78 
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To be sure, there are both civil and criminal offences within the common law 
from the commission of which no actually harmful consequences must necessarily 
flow in order for liability or culpability to attach.79 But where the legal 
wrongfulness of specified conduct is based, at least in part, upon the results or the 
effects of that conduct, some factual (and usually physical) connection between 
the alleged conduct of the defendant and the harm or injury suffered must be 
proven; for it is this material nexus which provides the necessarily rational 
relationship between cause and effect required by the law.80 
Bearing these conventional principles of causation in mind, it is interesting to 
note that the Criminal Code of Papua New Guinea (which expressly criminalises 
all unauthorised, unjustified or unexcused killings of one human being by 
another81 ) further provides, in pertinent part, that: 'any person who causes the 
death of another, directly or indirectly, by any means, shall be deemed to have 
killed the other person.'82 Seemingly, this statutory language suggests that legal 
78 Historia Placitorum Coronae (1736; reprint, London: Professional Books Ltd., 1971), p. 
429. 
79 See J. Hall, 'Interrelations of Criminal Law and Torts,' Columbia Law Review, vol. 43, 
no. 6 (September 1943), pp. 753, 760; G.P. Fletcher. Rethinking Criminal Law (Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1978), pp. 360-365; See generally J. Feinberg. Harmless Wrongdoing 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). 
80 Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law, vol. 1, pp. 122-123; W.L. Prosser and W.P. Keeton. 
The Law of Torts (5th ed. St Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1984), pp. 269-270. See also 
E.W. Cleary, gen.ed., McCormick on Evidence (3d ed. St Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 
1984), pp.540-541, discussing the question of the relevancy of evidence founded on metaphysical 
or supernatural assumptions. 
81 Criminal Code Act 1974 (No. 78 of 1974), Chap. 262, Criminal Code of Papua New 
Guinea [hereinafter referred to as PNG Criminal Code] s. 289. 
82 PNG Criminal Codes. 291 (emphasis supplied). 
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cognisance may be taken of extraordinarily indirect means of causation in the 
ascertainment and attribution of criminal responsibility for homicide. Eliminating 
the conventional evidentiary requirement of proof of direct (i.e., physical) 
causation, it might be supposed that this particular statutory formation has been 
deliberately chosen to reflect a conscious response to prevalent Melanesian 
understandings and experiences of the nature of cause and effect, and that the 
culturally alien, epistemological preconceptions of the Anglo-Australian common 
law have been rejected. 83 Judicial interpretations of these and related provisions of 
the Criminal Code, however, suggest that this is not the case. In the main, 
orthodox precepts of Anglo-Australian jurisprudence continue to govern the 
processes of legal ratiocination in the post-independence courts of Papua New 
Guinea. 84 As David Weisbrot commented: 
[I]t may still be said that in most material respects the legal 
system has changed very little with decolonization .... No 
coherent approach to law reform has yet been thought through 
or and adopted-whether it be integration of customary law 
and western law, or the development of a new strain of 
jurisprudence-nor is it at all clear that this is regarded as a 
failing .... Given an opportunity to review and substantially 
83 See B.M. Narokobi, 'Adaptation of Western Law in Papua New Guinea,' Melanesian 
Law Review, vol. 5, no. 1 (June 1977), pp. 52-69. 
84 See Chalmers, Weisbsrot and Andrew, Criminal Law and Practice of Papua New Guinea 
2d ed., pp. 443ff (and the cases discussed therein). See also D. Weisbrot, 'Papua New Guinea's 
Indigenous Jurisprudence and the Legacy of Colonialism,' University of Hawaii Law Revir:w, 
vol. 10, no. 1 (1988), pp. 1-45; idem, 'The Post-Independence Development of Papua New 
Guinea's Legal Institutions,' Melanesian Law Review, vol. 15 (1987), pp. 9-48; D.R.C. 
Chalmers, 'A History of the Role of Traditional Dispute Settlement Procedures in the Courts of 
Papua New Guinea.' In Law and Social Change in Papua New Guinea. Ed. D. Weisbrot, A. 
Paliwala and A. Sawyerr. (Sydney: Butterworths, 1982), pp. 169-189. P. Bayne, 'Legal 
Development in Papua New Guinea: The Place of the Common Law,' Melanesian Law Journal, 
vol. 3, no. 1 (1975), pp. 9-39; S.D. Ross, 'A Review of the Judiciary in Papua New Guinea, • 
Melanesian Law Journal, vol. 5, no. 1 (1977), pp. 5-25. 
revise and adapt the [Criminal] Code, the [Law Reform] 
Committee [of the Justice Department] did remarkably little'' 
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One area in which customary Melanesian jural values have manifestly failed to 
have much impact on the common law in Papua New Guinea involves the 
processes by which ultimate questions of causation (and hence, responsibility) are 
determined. 86 In this respect, the concerns that Weisbrot expressed about the 
potential entrenchment of wholly unreconstructed principles of Anglo-Australian 
legal culture in the emerging common law in Papua New Guinea would appear to 
have been realised to a very great extent. 87 
But howsoever one may be inclined to account for this particular turn of 
events in the development of law in Papua New Guinea, it is not, I reiterate, a 
necessary or inevitable reflection of any intrinsic incapacity of the common law 
tradition to allow for a socio-culturally responsive adaptation to the circumstances 
of Papua New Guinea today. 
7. Legal Norms and Socio-Cultural Values 
Whether it is ultimately the jural values of the people of Papua New Guinea or 
those reflected in the adopted emblems of Anglo-Australian legal culture which 
are to be reshaped, is a question to which, in my view, the only appropriate 
response should be eminently clear: it is the latter which ought to be altered to 
85 D. Weisbrot, 'Integration of Laws in Papua New Guinea: Custom and the Criminal Law 
in Conflict,' in Law and Social Clumge in Papua New Guinea, ed. D. Weisbrot, A. Paliwala and 
A. Sawyerr (Sydney: Butterworths, 1982), pp. 60, 62. 
86 Ibid., p. 76. 
87 Ibid., p. 96. 
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accommodate the former. 88 But as much as this may be to assert a normative 
proposition of legal and cultural sovereignty, it is, at the same time, to do no more 
than to recognise a truism grounded in the inchoate potential of the common law 
and the inevitable expressions of legal syncretism in Papua New Guinea. The 
suggested propriety of this particular course of jural development, therefore, is 
less a statement of preference in regard to the results of hegemonic, inter-systemic 
competition, than an acknowledgement of the necessary dimensions and direction 
of legal change. 
A. Rationalist Preoccupations as Impediments to Legal Integration-
The Reformation of Jural Perspectives 
In the present circumstances of Papua New Guinea's adopted legal system, the 
extent to which prevailing (and changing) Melanesian understandings and 
experiences of reality might more effectively be incorporated into the conceptual 
principles upon which that system operates will be determined by the perspective 
from which the interpretation, application and, indeed, the creation of an apposite 
common law is approached. The tools by which that perspective can be shaped 
and re-shaped are readily available in the operative mechanics of the common law 
tradition itself. What is required is a more actively innovative sense of the range 
of uses to which those tools can be put in the effort to fashion a perspective from 
which a responsive and responsible 'merger of concepts' may be facilitated. 89 
88 See Law Reform Commission of Papua New Guinea, The Role of Customary Law in the 
Legal System. Report No. 7 (November 1977), p. 60; idem, Criminal Responsibility: Taking 
Customs, Perceptions and Beliefs into Account. Working Paper No. 6 (February 1977); idem, 
Declaration and Development of Underlying Law. Working Paper No.4 (September 1976). 
89 See 0. Wijetillake, 'Integrating the Judicial System and Reviewing the Administration of 
Justice in Papua New Guinea,' Melanesian Law Journal, vol. 16 (1988), p. 37. 
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Purposively approached, the underlying dynamics of causation and 
responsibility, such as those upon which the judicial disposition of sorcery and 
sorcery-related related actions so often tum, are demonstrably amenable to a 
circumspect contemplation within the parameters of the common law. They are, 
at any rate, far more amenable than would appear to be allowed by the restrictive 
orthodoxies to which the courts of Papua New Guinea have heretofore 
unnecessarily bound themselves.90 It is this recognition which, I believe, is 
illustrated by Kenneth's case, and which constitutes the instructive contribution a 
reflective consideration of that case may provide to a sounder contemplation of 
law and sorcery in Papua New Guinea. 
As said, it is not intended to deal here with the technical processes of 
institutional law reform, as such. By the same token, the reformation of 
fundamental jurisprudential perspectives is arguably one of the surest means of 
achieving meaningful, beneficial and enduring change in the law of Papua New 
Guinea. To that extent, some consideration of this pre-conditioning reformation 
must necessarily be involved in the more mechanical processes of institutional 
change, and it is with that sort of fundamental to law reform that this discussion is 
specifically concerned. 
90 SeeP. Bayne, 'The Constitution in the Courts 1975-1980,' in Law and Social Change in 
Papua New Guinea, ed. Weisbrot, et al., pp. 222-228; idem, 'Judicial Review and Pacific 
Islands Constitutions,' in Law, Government and Politics in the Pacific Island States, ed. Yash 
Ghai (Suva: Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific, 1988), pp. 106-134. 
Hearteningly, there is some indication of a resurgence of advocacy for an adoption of this 
kind of purposive approach to legal reasoning in Papua New Guinea today. See Brian D. 
Brunton, Critique of the World Bank's Tropical Forestry Action Pan Review for Papua New 
Guinea, Working Paper No. 26, Law Reform Commission of Papua New Guinea (March 1990). 
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B. Sorcery in a Jural Context-Definitional Considerations 
Problems of law frequently revolve around questions of definition.91 Where 
problems of law are comparatively examined in contexts of considerable socio-
cultural diversity, questions of definition are multiplied and compounded.92 In the 
scholarly study of sorcery and witchcraft, terminological and definitional issues 
commonly give rise to similar difficulties in analysis and interpretation;93 and even 
within a field of inquiry as narrowly circumscribed as the social anthropology of 
Melanesian sorcery, problems of definition can be troublesome.94 
For their part, ethnographers interested in Melanesian sorcery and witchcraft 
beliefs have been able to avoid many of the difficulties of definition, since they 
91 See H.L.A. Hart. 'Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence.' Law Quanerly Review, vol. 
70 (January 1954), pp. 37-60; Hermann Kantorowicz. The Definition of Law (1958; reprint, 
New York: Octagon Books, 1980); P.G. Sack, 'Law and Custom: Reflections on the Relations 
between English Law and the English Language.' Rechtstheorie, vo!. 18, no. 4 (1987), pp. 421-
436. 
92 See B. W. Morse and G.R. Woodman, 'Introductory Essay: The State's Options,' in 
Indigenous Law and the State (Dordrecht: Foris Publications, 1988), pp. 5-24; P. Sack and E. 
Minchin, eds. Legal Pluralism. Proceedings of the Canberra Law Workshop VII. (Canberra: 
Law Department, RSSS, ANU, 1986); Sally Engle Merry, 'Legal Pluralism,' Law & Society 
Review, vol. 22, no 5 (1988), pp. 869-896; John Griffiths, 'What is Legal Pluralism?' Journal of 
Legal Pluralism, No. 24 (1986), pp. 24-55. 
93 See, e.g., R. Kieckhefer, European Witch Trials: Their Foundations in Popular and 
Learned Culture, 1300-!500 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976), pp. 1-9; E.W. Monter, 
Witchcraft in France and Switzerland: The Borderlands during the Reformation (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1976), pp. 17-41; T. 0. Beidelman, 'Towards More Open Theoretical 
Interpretations' in Witchcraft Confessions and Accusations, ed. M. Douglas (London: Tavistock 
Publications, 1970), pp. 351-356; K. Thomas, 'The Relevance of Social Anthropology to the 
Historical Study of English Witchcraft,' in Witchcraft Confessions and Accusations, ed. M. 
Douglas (London: Tavistock Publications, 1970), pp. 47-79; A. Macfarlane, Witchcraft in Tudor 
and Stuan England: A Regional and Comparative Study (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1970), pp. 211-253, 310-312; idem, 'Forward' in C. Lamer, Witchcraft and Religion: The 
Politics of Popular Belief(London: Basil Blackwell, 1984), vii-ix. 
94 See Stephen, Sorcerer and Witch in Melanesia (1987):3; Zelenietz, 'Sorcery and Social 
Change: An Introduction (1981), pp. 4-5. 
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tend to forgo generic definitions and rely instead upon their understandings of the 
descriptive meanings in current usage amongst the particular peoples with whom 
their researches are concerned. 95 Where anthropologists deal with the broader and 
more generally theoretical issues respecting Melanesian sorcery and witchcraft, 
and are therefore obliged to consider questions of definition explicitly, their 
efforts have largely been directed towards the development of culturally 
appropriate, circumstantially specific taxonomies. Thus, significant and useful 
distinctions have been drawn between prevailing Africanist taxonomical 
formulations (which were once quite commonly 'imported' without qualification 
into the Melanesian field) on the one hand, and descriptive terminologies 
formulated to suit situations peculiar to a particularly Melanesian context (where 
the scattered diversity of the ethnographic data require open and more flexible, 
albeit categorical, definitions) on the other. 
In what was the first attempt to formulate a comprehensive anthropological 
formulation of distinctively Melanesian sorcery and witchcraft beliefs, Mary 
Patterson96 offered the following broadly framed definition (really, more of a 
description) of the relevant phenomena: 
It is acknowledged that sorcery and witchcraft refer to the 
belief, and those practices associated with the belief, that one 
human being is capable of harming another by magical or 
supernatural means.97 
95 See, e. g., A. I. Mcintosh, 'Sorcery and its Social Effects Amongst the Elema of Papua 
New Guinea,' Oceania, vol. 53, no. 3 (March 1983), p. 225; T. Maracek, 'The Death of 
Koliarn: A Witchcraft Killing in a Changing Environment,' Oceania, vol. 49, no. 3 (1979), p. 
222; P. Brown, 'Kumo Witchcraft at Mintima, Chimbu Province, Papua New Guinea,' Oceania, 
vol. 48, no. I (1977), p. 27; S. Lindenbaum, 'Sorcery and Danger,' Oceania, vol. 46, no. I 
(1975), p. 70; M. Reay, 'The Politics of a Witch-Killing,' Oceania, vol. 47, no. I (1976), p. I. 
96 
'Sorcery and Witchcraft in Melanesia,' Oceania, vol. 45, no. 2 (December 1974): 132-
160, no. 3 (March 1975):212-234. 
'17 Patterson, 'Sorcery and Witchcraft in Melanesia' (1974), p. 132. 
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As we have seen, Patterson's theoretical model of Melanesian sorcery beliefs 
and practices has been subject to some criticism."8 However, her basically 
descriptive definition of Melanesian sorcery and witchcraft-like her 'basic 
ideas'-still seems to retain a general anthropological endorsement;99 and in light 
of that continuing approbation, it may be relied upon here, too, to the extent that it 
provides an adequate and acceptable 'anthropological' definition of the general 
phenomena. 
Despite the alien influences upon its drafting, the definition of 'sorcery' 
contained in Papua New Guinea's current Sorcery Act"JO comports fairly well with 
Patterson's open and flexible description. Indeed, if anything, the legislative 
formulation appears to be framed in even more broadly flexible and inclusive 
terms: 
'Sorcery' includes (without limiting the generality of that 
expression) what is known, in various languages and parts of 
the country, as witchcraft, magic, enchantment, puri puri, 
mura mura, dikana, vada, mea mea, sanguma or malira, 
whether or not connected with or related to the supematural. 101 
C. Sorcery as 'Outrageous Conduct' 
Bearing these definitions in mind, and with a particular view to the 
significance of the distinction between idiom and substance, let us consider yet 
one more descriptive formulation of a particular kind of conduct, within the terms 
98 See Knauft, Good Company and Violence, p. 346; Stephen, Sorcerer and Witch in 
Melanesia, p. 8. 
99 Ibid., p. 347. 
100 Sorcery Act (No. 22 of 1971), Revised Laws of Papua New Guinea, Chap. 274. 
101 Sorcery Act 1971, sec. 1 (emphasis of the parenthetical language has been supplied, 
otherwise emphasised terms are in the original). 
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of which both anthropological and legal representations of 'sorcery' in Papua New 
Guinea might be properly embraced: 
One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or 
recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is 
subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily 
harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm. 102 
It was on the basis of this formulation of the common law action for 
'outrageous conduct' that Kenneth's parents sought to hold their son's spiritual 
counsellors responsible for causing his death. 103 Notwithstanding its decidedly 
non-Melanesian pedigree, this particular description of legally actionable 
'outrageous conduct' clearly encompasses very much the same kinds of behaviour, 
concerns and affected interests as would tend to be at issue in either a modem 
judicial or a 'traditional' consideration of alleged acts of sorcery in Papua New 
Guinea today. Viewed in that light, some of the nominally 'Western' legal 
questions implicated in Kenneth's case merit further consideration here, as matters 
involving palpable indicia of comparative similarity to their Melanesian 
counterparts. 
Discussing the tenability of Kenneth's parents' claims alleging outrageous 
conduct on the part of the defendants in the Nalley case, the California Supreme 
Court summarised the elements necessary to make out that cause of action: 
The elements ... are (i) outrageous conduct by defendant, (ii) 
an intention by defendant to cause, or reckless disregard of the 
probability of causing, emotional distress, (iii) severe 
emotional distress, and (iv) an actual and proximate causal 
link between the tortious conduct and the emotional distress. 104 
102 American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Torts (Second), s. 46 [hereinafter 
referred to as Restatement (2d) Torts] 
103 Nalley lll, 47 Cal.3d 278, 253 Cal.Rptr.97, 763 P.2d 948 at 961 (1988). 
104 Nalley lll, 763 P.2d at 961. 
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Citing the applicable judicial authorities, the Court went on to state that if the 
conduct in question was properly to be regarded as 'outrageous', it must be shown 
to have been so extreme as to exceed 'all bounds of that usually tolerated in a 
civilized community.' 105 The more general statement of this principle (and the one 
from which the California rule is derived) is framed somewhat differently, 
however. 106 Commenting on that general principle, the eminent American legal 
scholar, William L. Prosser, observed: 107 
[T]he rule which seems to have emerged is that there is 
liability for conduct exceeding all bounds usually tolerated by 
decent society, of a nature which is especially calculated to 
cause, and does cause, mental distress of a very serious 
kind108 
The requisite outrageousness of particular conduct may further be said to arise 
'not so much from what is done as from abuse ... of some relation or position,' by 
virtue of which the wrongdoer is seen as entertaining 'actual or apparent power' to 
cause harm or injury.109 Outrageousness may also be found when it can be shown 
105 Ibid. (per Lucas, CJ), citing Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 Cal.3d 197, 185 
Cal.Rptr. 252, 649 P.2d 894 (1982). 
106 Restatement (2d) Torts, sec. 46, Comment d. 
107 Professor William L. Prosser (1898-1972) had a great deal to do with the development 
and refmement of the rule in the United States, and his commentaries on the matter were, in no 
small measure, responsible for its judicial adoption. Thus, his observations to the effect that the 
courts had 'created a new tort' [see W.L. Prosser, 'Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A 
New Tort,' Michigan Law Review, val. 37, no. 6 (April 1939), pp. 874-892] have been 
described as 'unnecessarily modest.' G.E. White, Tort Law in America: An Intellectual History 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 102. For some contemporary, critical 
commentaries on aspects of the tort, see W .H. Theis, 'The Intentional Infliction of Emotional 
Distress: A Need for Limits on Liability,' De Paul Law Review, vol. 27, no. 2 (Winter 1978), 
pp. 275-292; S. Ingber, 'Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy,' California Law 
Revi<M, vol. 73, no. 3 (May 1985), pp. 772-856. 
108 W.L. Prosser and W.P. Keeton. The Law of Torts (5th ed. St Paul, MN: West Publishing 
Co., 1984), p. 60. 
109 Ibid., p. 61 [emphasis supplied]. 
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that the actor knows, or has reason to know, 'that the plaintiff is especially 
sensitive, susceptible and vulnerable to mJury through mental distress at the 
particular conduct." 10 
In Papua New Guinea, historical and ethnographic data clearly indicate that 
the practice of sorcery was a common enough feature of traditional Melanesian 
life and that, even today, it is by no means an unusual event. 111 Indeed, as 
mentioned earlier, relatively recent data plainly suggest that the frequency with 
110 Prosser and Keeton, The Law of Torts, p. 62. The Restatement (2d) Tons, sec. 46, note f, 
expands upon this proposition as follows: 
The conduct may become heartless, flagrant, and outrageous 
when the actor proceeds in the face of such knowledge, 
where it would not be so if he did not know. 
An illustrative case provided in this connection [Illustration No. 10, pp. 75-76] is remarkably 
apt: 
A knows that B, a Pennsylvania Dutch farmer, is extremely 
superstitious, and believes in witchcraft. In order to force B 
to sell A his farm, A goes through the ritual of putting a 
'hex' on the farm, causing B to believe that it is bewitched so 
that crops will not grow on it. B suffers severe emotional 
distress and resulting illness. A is subject to liability to B for 
both. 
In Jennifer Totabu (now Popat), for example, reported that sorcery remains 'a common 
practice in Tolai [East New Britain Province] society ... ' 'Vunamami (Tolai) East New Britain 
Province,' in Customary Law in Papua New Guinea: A Melanesian Perspective, Law Reform 
Commission of Papua New Guinea, Monograph No. 2, ed. R. Scaglion (Port Moresby: 
Government Printer, 1983), p. 93. Similar reports have been made in respect of the Henganofi 
District, Eastern Highlands Province (see M.R. Atiyafa, in Customary Law in Papua New 
Guinea, p. 142), Vailala East Mareke, Gulf Province (see H. Hulape, in Customary Law in 
Papua New Guinea, pp. 157-159) and Kiriwina (Trobriand Islands) Milne Bay Province (see D. 
Mark, in Customary Law in Papua New Guinea, p. 174). Bruce Knauft reports that, amongst 
the Gebusi (Western Province), with whom he worked in the early 1980s: 
Sorcery inquests continue to be carried out publicly, and the 
accused is still liable to be killed, although subsequent 
cannibalism is practiced only occasioN alley and in secret .... 
The main impact of the Administration on sorcery attribution 
has been to reduce the frequency of killing and to make 
killings that do occur hidden rather than public acts [Good 
Company and Violence, p. 15]. 
378 
which such practices occur is on the rise. 112 Nevertheless, it is equally evident 
from these data that the practice of sorcery, in its 'evil' or 'forbidden' forms, is 
generally regarded as contrary to the welfare of 'decent' Melanesian society. 113 In 
terms of currently prevailing Melanesian social values, then, the practice of such 
malevolent sorcery must certainly be regarded as a highly undesirable feature of 
life in contemporary Papua New Guinea society. 
Beyond this, ethnographic data lend additional support to the contention that 
most members of a majority of Melanesian communities do consider themselves 
to be susceptible to the effects of sorcery; and that most people (sorcerers and 
non-sorcerers alike) fully recognise the general extent of that susceptibilityY4 In 
this sense, too, therefore, and from the perspective of the ordinary and reasonable 
Melanesian, it may properly be said that the practice of sorcery in Papua New 
Guinea today may constitute potentially 'outrageous conduct', as that expression 
was used and understood by the Court in Nalley. 115 
112 See S. Lindenbaum, 'Images of the Sorcerer in Papua New Guinea,' Social Analysis, No. 
8 (November 1981), p. 119. 
"'See, e.g., J. Totabu, 'Vunamami (Tolai). East New Britain,' in Customary Law in Papua 
New Guinea, p. 93. Hulape reports, in respect of Mareke villagers (Vailala East, Gulf 
Province): 
In villages nowadays, aoy person practicing or threatening 
other people with sorcery is seriously dealt with, because 
people believe this is a daoger to the community. Sorcerers 
may be threatened to be murdered in cold blood with ao axe 
or a knife by the people on whom they make sorcery [in 
Customary Law in Papua New Guinea, p. 158]. 
"' For example, George Westermark reports: 
Agarabi believe that the practice of sorcery has increased and that it has reached a 
particularly pernicious stage. They also feel that there is a greater threat of sorcery attack 
coming from within their own clans and phratries ['Sorcery and Economic Chaoge in 
Agarabi,' Social Analysis, No. 8 (November 1981), p. 99]. 
"'See Restatement (2d) Torts, sec. 46, Comment e. 
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D. Causation and Outrageous Conduct 
In Nalley, the Court placed especial emphasis on the question of causation, 
referring to the nature and sufficiency of the connection between the defendants' 
allegedly outrageous conduct on the one hand, and the actual harm (in this case, 
suicide) that was said to have been suffered by the victim as a consequence thereof 
on the other.ll6 In its consideration of this question the Court was able to find only 
one prior case in which a California appellate court was prepared to entertain an 
action for wrongful death based on the defendants' outrageous conduct, and 
wherein the death in question was the immediate result of the decedent's suicide. 
In that case, Tate v. Canonica, II? a decisive factor in the plaintiffs' successful 
action was their ability to demonstrate a necessary causal connection between the 
defendant's conduct and the decedent's suicide-a demonstration that was 
essential in order to counter the seemingly determinative precedents which held 
that: 
suicide is always an independent intervening cause, thus 
breaking the chain of legal causation in every case, and 
absolving the actors ... from responsibility118 
In Tate, the plaintiffs were the widow and surviving children of the decedent, 
the latter of whom allegedly became 'physically and mentally disturbed' and 
ultimately committed suicide as a direct result of the defendants' having 
intentionally made threats, accusations and other statements against the deceased, 
'for the purpose of harassing, embarrassing, and humiliating him in the presence of 
116 Nalley ll/, 763 P.2d at 961 (per Lucas, CJ). 
117 180 CaJ.App.2d 898, 5 Cal.Rptr.28 (1960) [discussed in Nalley ll/, 763 P.2d at 961]. 
118 Tate v. Canonica, 5 Cal.Rptr. at 31. 
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friends, relatives and business associates.' 119 Using the 'language of causation,' but 
construing the question of causation as really having more to do with the extent to 
which the law will operate to limit the liability of an actor, 120 the Court of Appeal 
(per Duniway J) quoted Prosser with approval: 
'Essentially it [causation] is a question of whether the 
defendant shall be relieved of responsibility for the result of 
his fault for the reason that another cause which has 
contributed to that result is regarded as playing a more 
important, significant and responsible part.... [T]he issue is 
merely one of the policy which imposes liability, and any 
attempt to deal with it in the language of the fact of causation 
can lead only to perplexity and bewilderment....The question 
[of causation} becomes one of whether the intervening cause 
is, in retrospect, so abnormal and irregular, so external, 
foreign and unrelated to the defendant's original conduct, that 
it should relieve him of liability'. 121 
In holding that the plaintiffs had presented a supportable claim, the Court of 
Appeal in Tate concluded that the causation question might be successfully met 
where it can be shown, firstly, that a defendant intended to cause serious mental 
distress and/or physical harm, and does so; and secondly, that such mental distress 
can be further shown to have been a 'substantial factor' in bringing about a 
decedent's suicide. 122 With particular respect to the issue of a defendants' intention 
in this regard, the currently developing trend in judicial decision making indicates 
that such intention may be supplanted by evidence of a 'substantial certainty', or 
even a 'high degree of probability', that physical harm or emotional distress will 
result from the conduct, and additional evidence tending to show that the 
119 5 Cal.Rptr. at 31. 
120 5 Cal.Rptr. at 35. 
121 5 Cal.Rptr. at 35-36 (emphasis supplied). 
122 5 Cal.Rptr. at 36. No showing is necessary to the effect that the act of suicide was 
committed in a state of insanity or in response to an irresistible impulse. 
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defendant proceeded with a conscious, wilful, wanton or reckless disregard of that 
risk. 123 
Insofar as the judicial disposition of Melanesian sorcery claims might be 
concerned, far and away the greatest epistemological difficulty for a Western (or 
Westernised) legal mind would seem to be posed by the obvious problems of 
proof in relation to the issue of causation. 124 For if the operative means (i.e., the 
"' practice of an efficacious and malevolent form of sorcery) by which an act is 
claimed to have brought about a particular harmful result (i.e., physical harm, 
injury or death, or severe emotional distress) cannot credibly be regarded as within 
the realm of possibility, then it is logically impossible for the conduct to have 
caused the consequences in question. 
As we have seen, however, the question of direct and tangible causation, even 
in the case of a suicide, may be circumvented, where some combination of the 
following and legally more determinative questions can be answered in the 
affirmative: Did the defendant entertain the requisite intent (or its functional 
equivalents) to bring about a harmful consequence? Was the nature of the conduct 
demonstrably outrageous? Was it substantially certain that the consequences of 
the conduct would involve a harmful, injurious or fatal result? Could the injured 
party be shown to have been peculiarly susceptible or vulnerable to the kind of 
harm for which the defendant's conduct is said to be responsible? And if the 
123 Prosser and Keeton, The Law of Torts, p. 64. See, e.g., Lucchesi v. Frederic N. Stimmel, 
M.D., Ltd. (1986) 149 Ariz. 76, 716 P.2d 1013. 
'
24 See Law Reform Commission of Papua New Guinea, Sorcery Among the East Sepiks, 
Occasional Paper No. 10 (October 1978), pp.14-16. 
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injured party was peculiarly susceptible or vulnerable, did the defendant actually 
know, or have reason to know, of that susceptibility or vulnerability?125 
E. Intangible Force and Metaphysical Harm-
Evolving Legal Perceptions 
Surveying the historical developments which have affected the nature and 
direction of growth in the law of torts in the United States, G. Edward White 
devotes some considerable attention to the ways in which judicial understandings 
of causation consistently operated as impediments to the common law's 
attribution of legal responsibility in cases of alleged mental distress and other 
kinds of 'intangible harm.' 126 The evolutionary course of American jurisprudence, 
which White describes as having led to a sophisticated refinement of causation 
analysis and the eventual abandonment of its more rigidly orthodox formulations, 
is shown to have been profoundly influenced by a growing recognition of 
circumstantially and situationally sensitive issues of socio-cultural policy .127 
Implicitly and inexorably, policy-orientated judgments of American courts have 
come to bear ever more determinatively on questions of legal responsibility for 
125 One of the grounds upon which the Supreme Court in Nalley felt obliged to reject the 
plaintiffs' claims, involved that court's difficulty in accepting the proposition that the defendants' 
conduct was both outrageous and a substantial factor in the decdent' s suicide. Nalley III, 763 
P.2d at 961. Cf. Kaufman, J (concurring), in respect of the latter consideration. 763 P.2d 964-
970. 
126 G.E. White, Ton Law in America: An Intellectual History (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1985), pp. 92-106. See also Prosser and Keeton, The Law of Tons, p. 55, referring to the 
earlier American and English decisions. See, e.g., Victorian Railway Commissioners v. Coultas 
(1888) 13 App.Cas. 222; Mitchell v. Rochester Railway Company (1896) 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 
354; Braun v. Craven (1898) 75 Ill. 401, 51 N.E. 657; Chittick v. Phi/odelphia Rapid Transit 
Company (1909) 224 Pa. 13, 73 A. 4. 
127 White, Tort Law in America, p. 112. See generally G. Calabresi, Ideals, Beliefs, 
Altitudes, and the Law (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1985); W. Twining, Karl 
Llewellyn and the Realist Movement (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1973). 
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injury and harm. 128 In this respect, the extension of tort law into the amorphous 
area of 'emotional distress' represents what White characterises as the presence of 
a 'new' and socio-culturally appropriate judicial perception about the boundaries of 
the common law. 129 
Previous justifications for limiting legal claims for harm and injury to those 
resting securely on 'discernible physical injuries,' White suggests, were based on 
the speculative qualities of mental or emotional distress. Subsumed in this 
characterisation he identifies two particular features of emotional discomfort: 'a 
sense that emotional illness was hard to diagnose and a sense that, given the 
diagnostic difficulties, emotional illness was comparatively easy to feign.' 130 In 
other words, the likelihood that this kind of harm or injury actually existed, in one 
case or another, was consistently subject to serious intellectual (and hence, 
judicial) doubt, because there was serious intellectual and judicial doubt about 
whether that kind of harm or injury 'actually existed' at all. 
By the early decades of the twentieth century, however, an expanding 
appreciation for the complexities and nuances of human behaviour and 'a growing 
interest in the explanatory powers of the behavioural sciences' combined to erode 
the preclusive characterisations of mental or emotional distress as too 
'speculative', illegitimate and, for the purposes of the law, effectively unreal. 131 
With this 'enhanced awareness of the psychological dimensions of human 
behaviour,' bona fide emotional discomfort (and, a fortiori, the discernible 
128 White, Tort Law in America, pp. 92-93. 
129 Ibid., p. 106. 
130 Ibid., p. 103. 
131 Ibid. 
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physical consequences associated therewith) came increasingly to be recognised 
'as a problem for which society bore some collective responsibility.' Hence, White 
argues: 'An altered awareness of the "seriousness" of emotional distress led to 
increased efforts in the courts to seek redress against its infliction.' 132 
Ultimately, a commensurately altered awareness of the 'reality' of the 
relationship between certain kinds of conduct on the one hand, and the equally 
'real' and emotionally distressful consequences of such conduct on the other, led to 
judicial recognition of the psychological and socio-cultural legitimacy of 
emotional distress; and from these socio-culturally mediated recognitions came 
further validations of the legal existence of emotional harm, along with an 
acceptance of the reality of the circumstances giving rise to its occurrence, for 
which legal redress has been made increasingly available. And, as the 
commentary accompanying the provisions dealing with 'outrageous conduct' in the 
American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law of Torts (Second) clearly 
indicate, the trend is continuing: 
132 Ibid. 
The law is still in a stage of development, and the ultimate 
limits of this tort are not yet determined. This Section states 
the extent of the liability thus far accepted generally by the 
courts. The caveat is intended to leave fully open the 
possibility of further development of the law, and the 
recognition that other situations in which liability may be 
imposed."' 
133 Restatement (2d) Torts, Sec. 46, Comment c. 
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F. Expanding the Boundaries of Legally Cognisable Wrongdoing 
Responding in this way to changing socio-cultural values in relation to the 
nature and extent of legitimate harm and injury, the common law reveals its 
inherent capacity to accommodate increasingly refined understandings of those 
values as the bases upon which legally cognisable claims might be founded. 134 In 
so doing, the law continuously adjusts itself to the changing circumstances under 
which the causes of these, amongst other, kinds of harm and injury will be 
recognised as reasonable and hence, legally sufficient. Thus, for example, where 
the law once severely restricted the range within which actions based on insult and 
verbal abuse might be maintained, 135 expanding socio-cultural perceptions of 
human dignity and personal integrity are leading to the creation of 'new' causes of 
action (or the expansion of existing ones), reflecting responsive jural 
considerations of relevant socio-cultural, ethnic, racial and religious standards of 
what constitutes 'serious' (and, in that sense, real) harm and the sort of conduct 
deemed capable of causing such harm. 136 Even more suggestive of the expansive 
134 See J. Feinberg. Offense to Others (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985). 
135 See Prosser and Keeton, The Law of Torts, pp.57-60; Fleming, The Law of Torts, p. 31. 
136 In the United States: 
The great weight of authority appears now to be that insulting 
and abusive language can be actionable if it is sufficiently 
outrageous to a person of ordinary sensibilities, both where 
the language is alleged to have caused purely emotional 
distress to the person to whom it is directed, and where the 
language is alleged to have caused emotional distress which 
in mrn produced some physical injury in the person to whom 
it was directed.[Annotation, 'Civil Liability for Insulting or 
Abusive Language-Modern Starns,' 20 A.L.R.4th 773, 
777]. 
This is particularly so in respect of cases involving racial, ethnic or religious abuse. See 
Annotation, 'Recovery of Damages for Emotional Distress Resulting from Racial, Ethnic or 
Religious Abuse or Discrimination,' 40 A.L.R.3d 1290. In Australia, at least one state (New 
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capacity of the common law to incorporate changing socio-cultural values and 
perceptions of reality, legal scholars and critical commentators today are earnestly 
contemplating the implications of culturally specific belief systems (and 
associated patterns of behaviour) for the ways in which some of the fundamental 
principles of the common law are interpreted and operatively applied. 137 
These are the intellectual matrices within which questions of legal causation 
are increasingly coming to be understood and within which, too, a growing 
number of common-law judicial decisions will likely be framed in the future. That 
South Wales) now statutorily penalises verbal abuse of this kind. See Anti-Discrimi!lfltion (Racial 
Vilification) Amendment Act (NSW) 1989. 
See also M. J. Matusda, 'Public Response to Racist Speech: Consideriog the Victim's 
Story,' Michigan Law Review, vol. 87, no. 8 (August 1989), pp. 2320-2381; R. Delgado, 
'Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calliog,' Harvard 
Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, vol. 17 (1982), pp. 133-181. 
131 A. Renteln, 'Culture and Culpability: A Study of Contrasts,' Newsletter of the 
Commission on Folk Law and Legal Pluralism, No. XVI (January 1989), pp. 32-42; M. 
Sheybani, 'Cultural Defense: One Person's Culture is Another's Crime,' Loyola of Los Angeles 
Internatio!lfll and Comparative Law Journal, vol. 9 (1987), pp. 751-783; Note, 'The Cultural 
Defense io Crimioal Law,' Harvard Law Review, vol. 99, no. 6 (Aprill986), pp. 1293-1311; R. 
Leikind, 'Regulatiog the Crimioal Conduct of Morally Innocent Persons: The Problem of the 
Indigenous Defendant,' Boston College Third World Law Jouf!lfll, vol. 6, no. 2 (Summer 1986), 
pp. 161-184; J. Sams, 'The Availability of the "Cultural Defense" as Excuse for Crimioal 
Behavior,' Georgia Jouf!lfll of Internatio!lfll and Comparative Law, val. 16 (1986):335-354; S. 
Poulter, 'African Customs io an English Settiog: Legal and Policy Aspects of Recognition,' 
Jouf!lfll of African Law, val. 31, nos. 1 & 2 (1988), pp. 207-225; S. Poulter, English Law and 
Ethnic Minority Customs (London: Butterwortbs, 1986); A. Samuels, 'Legal Recognition and 
Protection of Mioority Customs io a Plural Society io England,' Anglo-American Law Review, 
val. 10 (1981), pp. 241-256; S. Poulter, 'Foreign Customs and the English Crimioal Law,' 
Intef!lfltio!lfll & Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 24 (January 1975), pp. 136-140; J. Norgren 
and S. Nanda, American Cultural Pluralism and Law (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1988); S. 
Weber, 'Native-Americans Before the Bench: The Nature of Contrast and Conflict in Native-
American Law Ways and Western Legal Systems,' Social Science Journal, vol. 19, no. 3 (July 
1982), pp. 7-57; C. Wilkioson, American Indians, Time and the Law: Native Societies in a 
Modern Constitutional Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987). 
Similar considerations are attracting iocreasing attention io the area of international law and 
the international protection of human rights. See e.g. R. Mulgan, 'Should Indigenous Peoples 
Have Special Rights?' Orbis, val. 33, no. 3 (Summer 1989), pp. 75-388; R. Barsh, 'Indigenous 
Peoples: An Emerging Object of International Law,' American Jouf!lfll of Intef!lfltio!lfll Law, 
val. 80, no. 2 (April 1986), pp. 369-385. 
387 
the common law has shown itself amenable to what in many cases represents a 
radical shift in the fundamental criteria by which the ideas and phenomena of 
cause and effect are determined to be tenable, is evidence enough of the 
epistemological elasticity of the common law tradition, and of its intrinsic 
capacity to adjust and adapt to a wide variety of socio-cultural circumstances. 
Moreover, in doing so, the law is developing within, rather than exceeding the 
operative parameters of that tradition. 
8. The Socio-Cultural Bases of 'Rational' Beliefs 
and the Responsive Capacity of the Law 
In much the same way that the common law has shown itself capable of 
accepting and gradually (if not always readily) accommodating novel explanations 
of social and individual psychology into its ratiocinative processes, corollary 
recognitions and validations of other relevant socio-cultural considerations must 
eventually find their appropriate and equally rational loci in those processes as 
well. Of course, the psychological determinants of ordinary rational beliefs, and 
the behaviours to which those beliefs may give rise, are themselves continually 
being defined and redefined by particular, socio-culturally determined, normative 
values. 
The tendency of the common law of England or Australia or Canada or the 
United States, etc. to accept and adopt the characterisation of certain beliefs as 
either rational or irrational, to characterise the conduct seen to flow from those 
beliefs as either lawfol or unlawful and thence to dispose of the matters in which 
those characterisations are determinative, is itself no less a function of socio-
culturally normative evaluation. The rational beliefs of the reasonable person 
which the common law is prepared to entertain (and upon which its 
determinations will be justified) must ultimately be those of the rational or 
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reasonable Englishman, Australian, Canadian, American or, as the case may be, 
Papua New Guinean. 138 And this, I submit, is the singular strength of the 
common-law as a transplantable tradition. 
A. Legal Expressions and Cultural Values-
The Ostensible Novelty of Sorcery Beliefs 
It is interesting and instructive to compare the extent to which particular 
iterations of the common law tradition in different countries variably reflect the 
amenability of dominant socio-cultural institutions to the accommodation of the 
ideational and behavioural norms and values of the different 'minority' 
communities with whom the socially, culturally and, legally plural field is shared. 
What is more important for present purposes, however, is this: if the bases for 
such accommodations as may occur in countries where the common law 
represents the jural expressions of a dominant socio-cultural perspective can 
properly be found in respect of the more compelling interests of various 'minority' 
communities, then surely the prevailing socio-cultural perspectives of the 
dominant culture itself must be able to find expression in and through its own 
common law tradition. For even where the courts are favourably disposed 
towards the protection of genuinely held 'minority' beliefs, the larger interests of 
'the community as a whole' must always 'override the privileges otherwise 
attaching to freedom of conscience and belief.' 139 
138 See A. L. Epstein, 'The Reasonable Man Revisited: Some Problems in the Anthropology 
of Law,' Law & Society Review, vol. 7, no. 4 (Summer 1973), pp. 643-666. 
139 R v. Graham John [1974]2 AllER 561, 5641.per Roskill, U). Cf., the remarks of Erie J 
in R v. Barronet and Allain (1852) Dears CC 51, 60: 
To make a difference in the case of foreigners would be a 
most dangerous practice. It is of great importance that the 
administration of the law should be uniform. It must be 
administered without respect to persons, and it would be 
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The ostensible novelty of Melanesian sorcery beliefs and practices, when 
viewed from an Anglo-Australian perspective, need not and should not, therefore, 
constitute a bar to their effective recognition and cognisance under socio-
culturally appropriate interpretations and applications of the common law in 
Papua New Guinea. Nor is there any reason why their recognition by the law as 
rational beliefs, entertained and acted upon by ordinary, reasonable Melanesians, 
should necessarily be seen as operating to the derogation of any fundamental 
principle upon which the common law tradition is based. Whilst an unnecessarily 
orthodox adherence to circumstantially inapposite applications of a peculiarly 
Anglo-Australian approach to legal reasoning in connection, say, with the tenable 
connections of cause and effect involved in a Melanesian case in which harm or 
injury is alleged to have been brought about by the exercise of sorcery might 
suggest otherwise, 140 the better reasoned response to such a suggestion is that: 
the principle adhered to does not create any new rule of law 
although it may operate to extend existing principles over a 
wider area than that previously recognized; and that to deny 
the right to maintain an action because of the novelty thereof 
would prevent the growth of the law by judicial decision. 141 
Perhaps an even more appropriate response might be grounded in the 
Constitution of Papua New Guinea itself, which expressly directs the courts to 
dangerous and unjust to introduce into a general rule an 
exception in favour of foreigners.[Quoted in S. Poulter, 
English Law and Ethnic Minority Customs (London: 
Butterworths, 1986), p. 272]. 
140 See e.g. Lynch v. Knight (1861) 9 H.L.C. 577, 11 Eng.Rep. 854 (per Lord 
Wensleydale):'Mental pain or anxiety, the law cannot value, and does not pretend to redress, 
when the unlawful act causes that alone.' 
141 
'Fright, Shock and Mental Disturbance.' In American Jurisprudence 2d ed., val. 38, sec. 
22, pp. 25-26. 
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develop the common law in Papua New Guinea in a fashion that is 'appropriate to 
the circumstances of the country.' 142 
B. Intangible Force and Metaphysical Harm-
Changing Legal Perspectives 
Reflecting on the evolution of the action for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress as a jural expression of peculiarly, if by no means uniquely, American 
understandings and experiences of social reality-a culturally appropriate 
utterance, as it were, in one of the many vernaculars embraced within the 
'tradition' of the common law143-Prosser alluded to the reasons for the erstwhile 
reluctance of the American courts (and the continuing reluctance of the English 
courts) to redress claims of emotionally based harm. 144 Accounting for this 
reluctance largely in terms of the courts' difficulties in accepting such claims as 
real or rational, he observed that 'mental injuries' were commonly regarded by the 
courts as 'something metaphysical' and therefore 'too subtle and speculative to be 
capable of admeasurement by any standard known to the law.o145 Even as modem 
society came increasingly to recognise that the experience of emotional injury was 
quite real indeed, and that it was thus both rational and proper for the courts to 
take legal cognisance of claims based on such injury (when brought about through 
demonstrably wrongful conduct), the courts were initially slow to respond. The 
'
42 PNG Constitution, Sch. 2.3(1). See Iambakey Okuk v. Fallsheer [1980] P.N.G.L.R. 274, 
285-286; RePetition of M.T. Somare [1981] P.N.G.L.R. 265 (especially opinion of Kidu CJ, at 
272, 273). 
"
3 For an exposition on the understanding of law as tradition, see M. Krygier, 'Law as 
Tradition,' in Philosophy of Law in the History of Human Thought (1988), pp. 179-191. 
'




common law continued to view such injuries as 'too vague for legal redress,' 146 
because: 
mental consequences are so evanescent, intangible, and 
peculiar, and vary to such an extent with the individual 
concerned, that they cannot be anticipated, and so lie outside 
the boundaries of any reasonable 'proximate' connection with 
the act of the defendant. 147 
So long as physical injuries constituted the gravamen of a plaintiffs claim for 
damages, English and American courts alike had long been willing to recognise 
attendant mental anguish or 'nervous shock' .148 Thus, in cases where some variant 
of outrageous conduct was clearly involved, and where such conduct could 
plausibly be seen as giving rise to palpable physical harm or injury, those 
circumstances could provide a sufficient basis for judicial recognition of 
associated mental distress 'without too obvious pretense' .149 Hence, where some 
independent cause of action (e.g., assault, battery, false imprisonment, seduction) 
could be made out, that cause of action might then serve as the peg upon which a 
claim for 'mental damages' could be hung. 150 But for some time, the requirement 
of proof of physical manifestations of illness or injury remained a conditio sine 
qua non in American jurisprudence if an action for damages was to be entertained 
146 White, Ton Law in America, p. 102. 
147 Prosser and Keeton, The Law of Tons, p. 55. See also Victorian Railway Commissioners 
v. Coultas (1888) App.Cas. 222. 
148 Wilkinson v. Downton [1897] 2 Q.B.D. 57. See discussion in F.A. Trindade and P. 
Cane, The Law of Tons in Australia (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 61-67; J. 
G. Flemming, The Law of Torts 6th ed. (Sydney: The Law Book Company, 1983), pp. 30-30-
32. 
149 Prosser and Keeton, The Law of Tons, p. 60. 
150 Ibid., p. 57. See also Flemming, The Law of Tons, p. 32. 
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at law, and this is still a requirement of the law in England and Australia. 151 
(Although in Australia, at any rate, there would not appear to be any binding 
judicial authority 'which lays down that damages are not available for the 
intentional infliction of purely mental distress.' 152) 
One has not far to look in a search for the rational bases supporting earlier 
American (and the continuing Anglo-Australian) judicial tendencies to 
characterise mental pain and anguish as too vague and speculative for legal 
redress. Certainly, as mentioned above, part of the 'historic rationale for limiting 
tort claims to those resting on discernible physical injuries,' had to do with judicial 
concerns about the comparative ease with which 'emotional illness' could be 
feigned and the resultant potential for a multiplicity of perhaps spurious actions. 153 
A larger and more determinative part of that rationale, however, seems to have 
involved society's general 'lack of confidence' in its capacity to evaluate the 
implications of emotional distress, 'apart from its physical manifestations .. .' 154 For 
if something could not be identified as a tangible, which is to say as a physical or 
psycho-physiological phenomenon, neither could it properly be regarded as real; 
and to attribute to such an unreal phenomenon the legal status of either cause or 
effect would be unacceptably irrational. 
In the United States, judicial acceptance of 'parasitic' physical damages proved 
to be the entering wedge for the eventual recognition of outrageous conduct and 
151 So, too, in Canada and New Zealand. See Trindade and Cane, The Law of Tons in 
Australia, p. 68, n. 60. See also Fleming, The Law of Tons, p.32. 
152 Trindade and Cane, The Law of Tons in Australia, p. 69. 
153 White, Tort Law in America, p. 103. See also Prosser and Keeton, The Law of Tons, p. 
56. 
154 White, Tort Law in America, p. 103. 
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the intentional infliction of emotional distress as the basis for a discrete cause of 
action, even in the absence of physical harm or injury. 155 Responding to the 
changing expressions of a socio-culturally defined experiential reality, the courts 
ultimately came to acknowledge the real existence (and hence, the legal 
cognisability) of mental harm and the 'mental force' that might bring such harm 
about. In effect, the intentional infliction of emotional distress through outrageous 
conduct acquired its rational basis as an independent cause of action only when 
the courts finally conceded that 'there is no magic inherent in the name given to a 
tort, or in any arbitrary classification' in the law, 156 and in so doing, recognised 
their further obligation to fulfil a principal purpose of the law by providing a 
remedy for a wrong which society now deemed deserving of redress. 157 
Surely, then, one of the chief virtues of the common law tradition must be its 
capacity to respond to just such societal demands, and to do so on terms which 
accord with the relevant values and beliefs embraced by the society it serves. 
Indeed, as we shall see, it is arguably these very values and beliefs which 
effectively prescribe the applicable principles of justice upon which common-law 
decision making must ultimately be based. 158 As we have already seen, different 
155 Prosser and Keeton, The Law of Torts, p. 57. 
156 Ibid. 
157 Ibid., p. 56. 
158 Section 158(2) of the PNG Constitution provides: 'In interpreting the law the courts shall 
give paramount consideration to the dispensation of justice.' In 1978, John Goldring's prognosis, 
regarding the judicial interpretation of s. 158(2), was less than sanguine: 
Given the background of the present judges, and those of the 
foreseeable future, in positive law, it is difficult to predict 
whether they will interpret the expression 'justice' as 
meaning anything more than the rules of the existing body of 
law, or at least that body of law as modified slightly by such 
expressions as 'justice, equity and good conscience', which 
has, at least, been given some positive content by colonial 
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iterations of socio-culturally appropriate jural values are bound to co-exist within 
the larger integument of the common law tradition. Thus, from time to time and 
from place to place, different principles of justice will inevitably emerge as courts 
endeavour to fashion remedial responses to the circumstances of the cases before 
them and in light of the regnant values which give legal meanings to those 
variable circumstances. 
Naturally enough, the courts-which is to say, judges--demonstrate varying 
degrees of sensitivity, appreciation and understanding in respect of the socially 
determined bases upon which cognisable wrongdoing and appropriate remedial 
actions must rest. But that judges may be indeterminate, equivocal, ambivalent or 
even wrong-headed in this regard, reflects only the inevitable vagaries and frailties 
of human agency and the elusive complexities of changing socio-legal values. It 
says nothing about the nature or limitations of the common law tradition. 
courts in the common law tradition. [J. Goldring, The 
Constitution of Papua New Guinea: A Study in Legal 
Nationalism (Sydney: The Law Book Company, 1978), p. 
128]. 
Subsequent interpretative decisions of the courts in Papua New Guinea do seem to indicate 
that 'justice', according to s. 158(2) of the Constitution 'must mean the dispensation of justice 
according to the law ... and the law here is that as set out in a Constitutional Law.' B. Brunton 
and D. Colquhoun-Kerr, The Annotated Constitution of Papua New Guinea (University: 
University of Papua New Guinea Press, 1985), p. 362. See, Re Delba Biri v Ginbogl Ninkamal 
[1982] P.N.G.L.R. 342; Avia Aihi v The State [1981] P.N.G.L.R. 81. By the same token, 
compelling legal, as well as theoretical, arguments can be made in support of the proposition that 
the meaning of the term 'justice', in this constitutional context, was intended by the drafters to 
embrace an expression of distinctively Melanesian jural values, and that it ought therefore to be 
so interpreted. See, Re Petition of M.T. Somare [1981] P.N.G.L.R. 265; The State v Birch 
[1978] P.N.G.L.R. 79; B.M. Narokobi, La Bilong Yumi Yet: Law and Custom in Melanesia 
(Suva: Melanesian Institute for Pastoral and Socio-Economic Service and the University of the 
South Pacific, 1989), pp. 35, 107-108, 162-163; J. Goldring, The Constitution of Papua New 
Guinea, p. 127. 
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Chapter Seven 
A REAPPRAISAL OF THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN LAW AND CUSTOM IN 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
Concluding Considerations 
We need . .. to conceive of the common law as a system of customary law, and 
recognize that such systems may embrace complex theoretical notions which 
both serve to explain and justify past practice . .. and provide a guide to foture 
conduc/. 1• 
[Tjhe traditional legal values, attitudes, beliefS and practices of the vast 
majority of the people of Papua New Guinea consist in the myriad, diverse and 
changing customs of the indigenous population. There is no 'larger' legal 
tradition or culture by which the customs and traditions of some 'other' people 
needs legitimately to be accommodated. . Indeed, it is only the historical 
vestige of colonial fiat that places the dominant, albeit multi-faceted, legal 
culture of Papua New Guinea in the curious position of being 'outside' of, and 
persistently seeking entry into, its own legal home. 2 
1. 'NEW DIRECTIONS' IN LEGAL 
THEORY AND THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW 
The advent of legal pluralism is well and truly upon us? For some, perhaps, 
this may signify little more than a recognition that two or more legal orders can, 
and often do, co-exist. For others, however, it is both a revelation and a mandate 
1 A. W.B. Simpson, 'The Common Law and Legal Theory' in Legal Theory and Legal History: 
Essays on the Common Law (London: Hambledon Press, 1987). 
2 J. Aleck, 'Introduction: Custom Is Law in Papua New Guinea' in Custom at the Cross-roads, 
ed. J. Aleck and J. Rannells (Port Moresby: University of Papua New Guinea, 1995), p. 3. 
3 See generally J. Vanderlinden, 'Return to Legal Pluralism: Twenty Years Later,' Journal of 
Legal Pluralism no. 28 (1989), pp. 149-157; J. Griffiths, 'What is Legal Pluralism?' Journal of 
Legal Pluralism, no. 24 (1986), pp. 24-55; M.B. Hooker, Legal Pluralism: An Introduction to 
Colonial and Neo-Colonial Laws (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975). 
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warranting nothing short of a conswnmate reconceptualisation of the fundamental 
interrelations of law, culture and society.' At all events, amongst a growing 
number of legal scholars and social scientists, it is generally acknowledged today 
that co-existing legal orders interact and evolve together/ and in what has become 
very much a cross-disciplinary effort to identify coherent patterns of the 
distinctively legal in the complex interplay of human relations observable in all 
societies,6 the plurality, multiplicity and inherent multiplexity of law are coming 
to be regarded as empirical and theoretical facts of life.7 
4 S.E. Merry, 'Legal Pluralism,' Law & Society Review, val. 22, no. 5 (1988), p. 869. 
5 J. Starr and J.F. Collier, 'Introduction: Dialogues in Legal Anthropology,' in History and 
Power in the Study of Law: New Directions in Legal Anthropology (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 1989), p. 9. 
6 With few exceptions, it would seem that this effort has yet to evolve into a truly inter-
disciplinary enterprise. See, e.g., K. Llewellyn and E.A. Hoebel, The Cheyenne Way (Norman, 
OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1941); P. Sevareid, 'Sex and Witchcraft: An Interdisciplinary, 
Jointly-Taught Course in Comparative Dispute Settlement,' Third World Legal Studies ( 1986), pp. 
79-93. Some of the impediments to more profitable inter-disciplinary co-operation between legal 
scholars and social anthropologists have been identified by William Twining, who attributes these 
obstacles to 'differences in the intellectual traditions, the ethos, the biases and other attributes of 
their respective professions.' W. Twining, 'Law and Anthropology: A Case Study in Inter-
Disciplinary Collaboration,' Law & Society Review, val. 7, no. 4 (Summer 1973), p. 572. But even 
if it is only rarely achieved, the value of such collaboration has long been recognised by lawyers 
and anthropologists alike. See O.W. Holmes, 'Law in Science and Science in Law,' Harvard Law 
Review, val. 12, no. 7 (February 1899), pp. 443-463; R.H. Lowie, 'Anthropology and Law,' in The 
Social Sciences and Their Interrelations, ed. W.F. Ogburn and A. Goldenweiser (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1927), pp. 50-57; E.A. Hoebel, 'Law and Anthropology,' Virginia 
Law Review, val. 32, no. 4 (December 1946), pp. 835-854; Koch, K.-F., 'Law and Anthropology: 
Notes on Interdisciplinary Research,' Law & Society Review, val. 4, no. I (August 1969), pp. 11-
27; P. Lawrence, 'Law and Anthropology: The Need for Collaboration,' Melanesian Law Journal, 
val. I, no. I (December 1970), pp. 40-50; G. MacCormack, 'Anthropology and Legal Theoty,' The 
Juridical Review (1978), pp. 216-232. 
7 As Professor Tay observes, the expression 'legal pluralism' has become something of a 
'hurrah-word' to which reference is frequently confused and imprecise. Most broadly, she notes, 
'the phrase simply reminds us that there are many and different legal systems, legal arrangements, 
legal customs and legal "cultures" in the world, and that they may and do conflict with each other.' 
A.E.-S. Tay, 'China and Legal Pluralism,' in Legal Pluralism-Proceedings of the Canberra Law 
Workshop Vll, P.G. Sack and E. Minchin, eds. (Canberra: Law Department, Research School of 
Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1986), p. 29. Starr and Collier endorse what they 
see as a rejection of the term, because they believe it implies a sense of 'equality' in the 
arrangement of relations amongst different legal orders which belies the actual (and, in their view, 
invariably) hierarchical status of those relations. Legal pluralism, they argue: 'misrepresent[s] the 
397 
Accordingly, where the focus of theoretical concerns with the relationship 
between different forms of jural organisation and action once centred more or less 
exclusively upon the characteristic features that were seen to set those forms apart 
from one another, analytical interests are now shifting to concentrate more 
intensively upon the complex interconnections that link them together; and where 
the operations of discrete legal orders have been heuristically divorced from the 
contextual networks of socio-political relations in which they are inextricably 
embedded, those operations are coming to be understood more clearly as forming 
inseparable parts of the environments in which they occur. Contemporary 
representations of law in culture and society are thus beginning to provide a 
substantially expanded vision of an effectively integrated jural field; a vision in 
which the threads of demonstrable continuity, intricately weaving nominally legal 
phenomena into the fabric of a much broader array of integumentary social 
asymmetrical power relations that inhere in the coexistence of multiple legal orders. Various legal 
systems may coexis~ as occurs in many colonial and postcolonial states, but the legal orders are 
hardly equal.' Starr and Collier, 'Dialogues in Legal Anthropology,' p. 9. 
Professor Tay's broad and relatively uncontroversial defmition adequately captures the more 
generally accepted meaning of the term 'legal pluralism'. Therefore, unless the context indicates 
otherwise, my own use of the expression here is intended to convey this general meaning. By the 
same token, Peter Sack offers what I regard to be a 'better' defmition: 
Legal pluralism is more than the acceptance of a plurality of 
law; it sees this plurality as a positive force to be utilised-and 
controlled-rather than eliminated. Legal pluralism thus 
involves an ideological commitment. However, this 
commitment takes the form of an opposition to monism, 
dualism and any other form of dogmatism instead of 
prescribing a certain, positive course of action [P.G. Sack, 
'Legal Pluralism: Introductory Comments,' in Sack and 
Minchin, Legal Pluralism, p. 1]. 
To be sure, Sack's definition of 'legal pluralism' is narrower and, therefore, more precise than 
Tay's. More importantly, however, it embraces a distinct set of political sentiments that are quite 
different to those which Starr and Collier suggest the term necessarily imports-and to which I 
also happen to be quite sympathetic. 
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processes, have captured the keen attention of jurists, legal anthropologists and 
sociologists of law. 8 
In their earnest efforts to construct tenable models of socio-legal affairs, 
responsible scholars endeavour to portray a sense of the dynamic arrangement of 
integral relationships, the nature of which is revealed in forms far more indicative 
of the kinetic inner workings of a kaleidoscope than the static display of a mosaic. 
In tum, meaningful concepts of legal rules, principles and processes are beginning 
to assume a more flexible, multidimensional character that is capable of 
accommodating the vicissitudes of an implicit indeterminacy in jural realities.? 
Meaningful concepts of law are beginning to be understood and represented as 
continua 'rather than a discrete series of ideal types, models or paradigms.'9 Part 
and parcel of this seeming renaissance in the socio-legal sciences, however, 
provocative and disturbing questions are being raised from within the relevant 
disciplines which pointedly challenge the basic premises underlying virtually 
every aspect of their collective analytical pursuit. In a sustained self-scrutiny, 
reflexive critiques of conventional law and society research are laying bare the 
fibres of political value, moral purpose, ideological motive and the presumptive 
epistemological 'truths' which support the commitment to objectivity in 
contemporary scholarship. 
8 See, e.g., P. Fitzpatrick, 'Law and Societies,' Osgoode Hall Law Journal, vol. 22, no. I 
( 1984), pp. 115-138; Starr and Collier, 'Dialogues in Legal Anthropology,' p. II; R.L. Kidder, 
'Toward an Integrated Theory of Imposed Law,' in The Imposition of Law, ed. S.B. Burman and 
B. E. Harrell-Bond (New York: Academic Press, 1979), pp. 289-306. 
9 S. Henry, Private Justice: Towards Integrated Theorising in the Sociology of Law (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), p. 30. 
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Today, as we approach what has been described as a critical 'experimental 
moment' in the vast plenum of the entire Western intellectual enterprise, 10 the very 
authenticity of phenomenological reality becomes an object of poignant, searching 
doubt. The present, we are told, is a time for the wholesale reassessment of 
dominant ideas across the entire range of the human sciences, 'extending to law, 
art, architecture, philosophy, literature, and even the natural sciences.' 11 And it is 
not simply conventional 'ideas' that are being subjected to this relentless process 
of radical deconstruction; equally under threat are the paradigmatic styles in which 
those ideas have for so long been unquestioningly presented. Although the 
ramifications of such revision are certain to be more salient in some disciplines 
than in others, their effects are pervasive. 12 
Naturally enough, it is within '[t]hose fields most closely tied in their concerns 
to describing and explaining social phenomena' that some of the strongest internal 
challenges to reigning paradigms are being exhibited.13 Predictably, modem law 
and society scholarship is in full ferment, and for socio-legal theorists in particular 
these are heady, unsettling and, some would say, even 'dangerous' times. 14 So it 
10 G.E. Marcus and M.M.J. Fischer, Anthropology as Cultural Critique: An Experimental 
Moment in the Human Sciences (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986). 
ll Ibid., p. 7. 
12 Ibid., pp. 7, l52ff. 
13 Ibid., p. 15. 
14 For example, Susan Silbey and Austin Sarat 'worry' about the fact-
that too much recent social theory and criticism, theory and 
criticism to which [they] are quite sympathetic, goes too far in 
leading, against its better instincts, to a dangerous 
reductionism. ['Critical Traditions in Law and Society 
Research,' Law & Society Review, vol. 21, no. I (1987), p. 
167]. 
See also L. Nader, 'Post-Interpretive Anthropology,' Anthropological Quarterly, vol. 6!, no. 4 
(October 1988), pp. 149-159. 
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is, and so it must be, since it could hardly have been expected that this inexorable 
movement towards a pluralistically orientated reconstruction of fundamental 
socio-legal15 and legal-anthropological16 concepts could have proceeded so far as it 
has in the absence of controversy and dissent or, indeed, without its occasional 
excesses. Nor is it likely that such progress as it may yet make will not be 
similarly confounded. 
And yet, there are good reasons to be more sanguine about matters. For in 
much of what on the surface appears to be iconoclastic deconstruction-in 
jurisprudence, no less so than in the social sciences-there are, in fact, palpable 
indications of a vibrant reconstructive spirit. 17 All polemic may not be good 
scholarship, but all good scholarship is invariably polemic; 18 and to the extent that 
novel propositions may be regarded as the harbingers of inchoate sedition, 
innovation is bound to invite resistance. 19 If nothing else, however, a round 
15 See Silbey and Sara!, 'Critical Traditions in Law and Society Research,' pp., 165-174; L. 
Friedman, 'The Law and Society Movement,' Stanford Law Review, vol. 38 (February 1986), pp. 
763-780; R. Weisman, 'The Best of Times and the Worst of Times in the Sociology of Law,' Law 
& Society Review, vol. 21, no. 5 (1988), pp. 839-843; A. Hunt, 'The Ideology of Law: Advances 
and Problems in Recent Applications of the Concept of Ideology to the Analysis of Law,' Law & 
Society Review, vol. 19, no. I (1985), pp. 11-37; R.M. Unger, Social Theory: Its Structure and its 
Task (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); idem., The Critical Legal Studies 
Movement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983). 
16 See J. Starr and J.F. Collier, 'Historical Studies of Legal Change,' Current Anthropology, 
vol. 28, no. 3 (June 1987), pp. 367-372; D.H. Dwyer, 'Substance and Process: Reappraising the 
Premises of the Anthropology of Law,' Dialectical Anthropology, vol. 4 (1979), pp. 309-320; R.R. 
Gadacz, 'Folk Law and Legal Pluralism: Issues and Directions in the Anthropology of Law in 
Modernizing Societies,' Legal Studies Journal, vol. II, no. 2 (1987), pp. 125-144; C.J. 
Greenhouse, 'Looking at Culture, Looking for Rules,' Man (N.S.), vol. 17 (1982), pp. 58-73; S. 
Roberts, 'Where Two Worlds Meet: A Time for Reassessment in the Anthropology of Law,' 
Michigan Law Review, vol. 79 (March 1981), pp. 737-747. 
17 See, e.g., M.J. Matsuda, 'Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story,' 
Michigan Law Review, vol. 87, no. 8 (August 1989), pp. 2320-2381. 
18 I. Wallerstein, 'Some Reflections on History, the Social Sciences and Politics,' in The 
Capitalist World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. x. 
19 See Nader, 'Post-Interpretive Anthropology,' Anthropological Quarterly, vol. 61, no. 4 
(October 1988), pp. 149-159; O.M. Fiss, 'The Law Regained,' Cornell Law Review, vol. 74, no. 2 
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knowledge of the law teaches that a good many of today's novel propositions are 
likely to become tomorrow's conventions. 
Given the present volatility in the socio-legal sciences, it would be difficult to 
imagine a more propitious moment to embark upon a fundamental reappraisal of 
the manner in which the conceptual relationship between law and custom in 
societies like those of Papua New Guinea is understood and represented. And 
whilst that is precisely what I have set about to do here (at least in a preliminary 
way), it would be disingenuous if I were to suggest that mine is a project 
deserving of a 'post-modernist' imprimatur. What I have in mind is rather more 
modest and remarkably unsubversive. By the same token, because there has 
always been a critical edge to the meaningful study of law, culture and social 
change, today's responsibly conscientious and decidedly critical inquiries can, 
indeed, must be accommodated within that scholarly tradition, rather than being 
placed--Qr placing themselves--Qutside of it. Notwithstanding the tumultuous 
cut and thrust attending a veritable revolution in the human sciences, the present 
'critical' tum of events serves, I think, rather to confirm than to undermine the 
strength and vitality of a venerable tradition in socio-legal theory. 
The point deserves reiteration. Legal theory-and an eminently 'critical' 
strain of legal theory at that-has been around for a very long time. Arguably, 
many of its lasting contributions to our understanding of the place of law in 
culture and society have come less from discovery or invention than from its 
elucidation of the familiar and its clarifying reinterpretations of what is already 
(January 1989), pp. 245-255; L.B. Schwartz, 'With Gun and Camera Through Darkest CLS-Land,' 
Stanford Law Review, vol. 36 (1983-1984), pp. 413-464; D.F. Greenberg, 'Resistance to 
conventionality in the Sociology of Law: A Rejoinder to Horwitz,' Law & Society Review, vol. 17, 
no. 2 (1983), pp. 385-390; A.V. Horwitz, 'Resistance to Innovation in the Sociology of Law: A 
Response to Greenberg,' Law & Society Review, vol. 17, no. 2 (1983), pp. 369-384. 
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known (albeit less well understood).20 But these are no mean achievements even , 
if the important insights they offer are significantly 'new' only by virtue of their 
being newly recognised as significant. It was, in fact, a very wide set of concerns 
that occupied the precursors of contemporary socio-legal theory, and it is an even 
wider set of concerns that provides the foundation for such theoretical inquiry 
today.21 In that sense, 'modern' (or, if you will, 'post-modern') legal scholars and 
anthropologists of law share a common patrimony. And it is upon that basis, too, 
that the pursuit of a pluralistic approach to socio-legal inquiry is wholly in 
keeping with a continuing and genuinely critical tradition." For those who seek to 
preserve the critical edge in that tradition, the task today is 'to reconstitute and re-
imagine the subject of socio-legal research. '23 
Legal scholars and anthropologists concerned with the relationship between 
law and custom in Papua New Guinea realise that legal institutions, processes and 
phenomena simply 'cannot be understood without seeing the entire social 
environment.'24 But that is only to take the first step towards the critical 
reconstitution and re-imagination of the subject-matter. Further inquiry must be 
20 See, M. Krygier, 'Law as Tradition,' in S. Panou, G. Bozonis, D. Georgas and P. Trappe, 
eds., Philosophy of Law in the History of Human Thought (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, GmbH, 
1988), pp. 179-180. 
21 See P. Stein, Legal Evolution: The Story of an Idea (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1980); Marcus and Fischer, Anthropology as Cultural Critique, p. 4. Cf. W.T. Murphy and 
S. Roberts, 'Introduction: Legal Scholarship in the Common Law World,' Modern Law Review, 
vol. 50, no. 6 (October 1987), p. 682. 
22 See C. Geertz, 'Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective, ' in Local 
Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology (New York: Basic Books, 1983), pp. 
167-234. 
23 S. Silbey, 'Plenary Session Address,' before the annual meeting of the Law and Society 
Association, Chicago (30 May 1986), revised and reprinted in Silbey and Sarat, 'Critical 
Traditions in Law and Society Research,' p. 166. 
24 Silbey and Sarat, 'Critical Traditions in Law and Society Research,' p. 165. 
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directed towards the development and refinement of understandings concerning 
the relationship between legal institutions, processes and phenomena, on the one 
hand, and the environments in which they are observed to exist and operate, on the 
other. And beyond that, there must also be an attempt to explicate the dynamics 
of the interrelationships between various legal institutions, processes and 
phenomena as these may be seen to occur even within a single social environment. 
Both sorts of inquiry are important. In the latter pursuit, however, it seems to me 
that legal scholars have borne an especial responsibility which, perhaps, ought to 
be shared more equitably amongst all of those participating in the pluralistically 
orientated investigation of the relationship between law and custom. 
William Twining observed that it has been the peculiar task of the legal 
scholar to venture forth from the law in order to 'gamer what one or more 
neighbouring disciplines have to offer respecting questions of a general nature that 
have been thrown up in legal contexts.a5 It is the 'academic lawyer' who is 
expected 'to bring back the ideas, techniques, and insights of that other discipline 
and to integrate or assimilate them into the intellectual milieu of the law.'26 That 
this is a duty which legal scholars may not always have discharged well or often 
enough is a point well taken. But that such a responsibility exists, and that it 
should logically fall upon the lawyers' shoulders to act pro bono publico, as it 
were, in the pursuit and application of legal scholarship, carmot be denied. 
Moreover, to the extent that this tacit obligation to apply legal knowledge in 
pragmatic, 'problem solving' exercises is a characteristic feature of what has come 
25 W. Twining, 'Some Jobs for Jurisprudence,' British Journal of Law and Society, vol. I, no. 
I (1974), p. 157. 
26 Twining, 'Some Jobs for Jurisprudence,' p. 157. 
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to be known (somewhat disparagingly in certain circles) as 'law and development' 
scholarship, I think it is rather an honourable charge than a professional vice.27 
Now, insofar as the development of a sound jurisprudential perspective on the 
relationship between law and custom in Papua New Guinea is concerned, that 
'other discipline' has long been and will doubtless remain social anthropology (and 
more specifically, perhaps, the sub-discipline of legal ethnography). To be sure, 
what legal scholars return with from their forays into that domain has not always 
fitted neatly or comfortably into existing theoretical perspectives.28 Nevertheless, 
when it does occur, the assimilation of anthropologically informed pluralist 
principles into the conventional frameworks and institutionalised methodologies 
of legal theory-and, just as importantly, those of modem legal practice-is a 
singularly salutary event; not only because aspects of an anthropologically 
informed pluralist thesis may forthrightly challenge the complacency into which 
certain strains of theoretical ideation in the law may periodically descend, but 
because many of the substantive contributions such insights make possible are 
already beginning to prove their value as instructive complements to both the 
theoretical and the practical tasks of the law?9 
27 See D.M. Trubek and M. Galanter, 'Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the 
Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States,' Wisconsin Law Review, no. 4 (1974), 
pp. 1097-1098; cf. F. von Benda-Beckmann, 'Scape-Goat and Magic Charm: Law in Development 
Theory and Practice,' Journal of Legal Pluralism, no. 28 (1989), pp. 129-148. 
28 See, T.E. Barnett, 'Law and Justice Melanesian Style,' in Alternative Strategies for Papua 
New Guinea, ed. A. Clunies Ross and J. Langmore (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1973), 
pp. 59-85. 
29 See P. Fitzpatrick, 'The Abstracts and Brief Chronicles of the Time: Supplementing 
Jurisprudence,' in Dangerous Supplements: Resistance and Renewal in Jurisprudence, ed. P. 
Fitzpatrick (London: Pluto Press, forthcoming); B. Yngvesson, 'Inventing Law in Local Settings: 
Rethinking Popular Legal Culture,' Yale Law Journal, vol. 98, no. 8 (June 1989), pp. 1689-1709; 
M.J. Matsuda, 'Native Custom and Official Law in Hawaii,' Law and Anthropology 
[Internationales Jahrbuchfor Rechtsanthropologie], vol. 3 (1988), pp. 135-146; J. Norgren and S. 
Nanda, American Cultural Pluralism and Law (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1988); M.-M. 
Sheybani, 'Cultural Defense: One Person's Culture is Another's Crime,' Loyola of Los Angeles 
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In its theoretical and practical expressions alike, contemporary jurisprudence 
has measurably benefited from the 'new directions' in which it has been guided by 
social anthropology-and in an age during which 'multi-culturalism' is becoming 
less the politician's catch-phrase and more of a socio-demographic reality, it is 
certain to continue to do so?0 What I am urging here is that the corollary 
development of a more cogent legal ethnography and anthropology of law, 
particularly in regard to considerations of the relationship between law and custom 
in Papua New Guinea, also stands to profit by looking (again) to jurisprudence 
and legal theory for its own conceptual supplementation. As it happens, we have 
come a long way from Austin, Maine and even Hart.31 
International and Comparative Law Journal, vol. 9 (1987), pp. 751-783; R. Leikind, 'Regulating 
the Criminal Conduct of Morally Innocent Persons: The Problem of the Indigenous Defendant,' 
Boston College Third World Law Journal, vol. 6, no. 2 (Summer 1986), pp. 161-184; S. Poulter, 
'African Customs in an English Setting: Legal and Policy Aspects of Recognition,' Journal of 
African Law, vol. 31, nos. 1 & 2 (1988), pp. 207-225; idem, English Law and Ethnic Minority 
Customs (London: Butterworths, 1986); R.L. Barsh, 'Indigenous Peoples: An Emerging Object of 
International Law,' American Journal of International Law, vol. 80, no. 2 (April 1986), pp. 369-
385; R. Mulgan, 'Should Indigenous Peoples Have Special Rights?' Orbis, vol. 33, no. 3 (Summer 
1989), pp. 375-388; A. Samuels, 'Legal Recognition and Protection of Minority Customs in a 
Plural Society in England,' Anglo-American Law Review, vol. 10 (1981), pp. 241-256. 
30 See the several papers dealing with this consideration in Conference Papers, 9th 
Commonwealth Law Conference (Auckland: Commerce Clearing House New Zealand Ltd, 1990): 
S. Poulter, 'Separate Cultures in One Land: Legal Recognition of Cultural Pluralism-An English 
Perspective,' pp. 121-128; A. Ademola, 'Recognising Separate Cultures in One Land: Marriage 
Laws and Inheritance Problems in Nigeria,' pp. 135-143; F.M. Chomba, 'Recognising Separate 
Cultures in One Land: The Zambian Experience,' pp. 145-148; F.G. Sheppard, 'Provision for 
Maori Culture in New Zealand Planning Law,' pp. 149-157; C. G. Powles, 'Traditional Authority in 
the Contemporary Pacific: Conflict and Compromise in Legal and Political Systems,' pp. 571-579; 
A.S. Epati, 'Traditional Authority in the Contemporary Pacific,' pp. 581-588; D. Tupou, 'A Review 
of How the Legislative and Judicial Westminster Model Has Functioned Alongside Traditional 
Indigenous Systems-The Tongan Experience,' pp. 589-594. 
31 See J.G. Hund, 'Jurisprudence and Legal Anthropology: The Roles of Theory and Method 
Revisited,' Comparative and International Law Journal of South Africa, vol. 12 (!979), pp. 188-
198. Cf. S.F. Moore, Law as Process: An Anthropological Approach (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1978), pp. 13, 214-256; S. Roberts, Order and Dispute: An Introduction to Legal 
Anthropology (New York: StMartin's Press, 1979), pp. 24-26, 184-206. 
406 
2. LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA: 
THEMATIC CONSTANTS IN ETHNOJURISPRUDENCE 
In a logical extension of the movement towards an enhanced appreciation of 
the 'integral plurality' of socio-legal forms/2 the distinctive valences of law and 
custom in so-called primitive or traditional societies are coming to be seen in a 
new and different light. What were previously characterised as the unique 
features and especial domains of law and custom, respectively, are thus coming to 
be understood today as implicitly interfused and constantly shifting, both in 
relation to one another and in remarkably varied patterns of response to an 
enormous range of perpetually changing contextual circumstances.33 In part, the 
emergence of a pluralist perspective on the interaction of law and custom may be 
seen as reflecting a more generalised reassessment of the embracing conceptual 
relationship between 'tradition' and 'modernity', and the processes of syncretic 
socio-cultural change that have been identified as crucial in the evolution of that 
relationship.34 Current discussions about the authenticity of 'invented traditions' 
have had serious implications for the ways in which historians, anthropologists 
and social theorists generally interpret, and thereby give meaning to, a whole host 
32 Fitzpatrick, 'Law and Societies,' p. 115. 
33 See D. Feldman, 'The Nature of Legal Scholarship,' Modern Law Review, val. 52, no. 4 
(July 1989), pp. 500, 501. For an especially apt Melanesian example, see J.G. Zorn, 'Customary 
Law in the Papua New Guinea Village Courts,' The Contemporary Pacific, val. 2, no. 2 (Fall 
1990), pp. 279-311. 
34 See, R. Bendix, 'Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered,' Comparative Studies in Society 
and History, val. 9 (April 1967), pp. 292-346; S.N. Eisenstadt, Tradition, Change and Modernity 
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973); J.R. Gusfield, 'Tradition and Modernity: Misplaced 
Polarities in the Study of Social Change,' American Journal of Sociology (January 1967), pp. 351-
362; E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983); E. Shils, Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981); H.T. 
Wilson, Tradition and Innovation: The Idea of Civilization as Culture and its Significance 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984). 
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of changing attitudes, values and beliefs in a variety of cultures and societies.35 
Not surprisingly, these same debates have had a pronounced influence on the ways 
in which a growing number of socio-legal scholars have come to characterise and 
construe the processes of cultural change, both in relation to the peculiarly jural 
understandings and experiences shared amongst the members of particular 
societies, and in relation also to the ways in which those understandings and 
experiences are interpreted by outsiders. 36 
In large part, however, the impetus behind contemporary efforts to 
reformulate a jurisprudential understanding of the relationship between law and 
custom in cultures and societies like those of Papua New Guinea has come rather 
more directly from the products of conventional social anthropology. Legal 
ethnographers, whose first-hand perspectives put them in particularly close touch 
with the experiential realities of changing socio-legal relations, are regularly 
monitoring and logging a rapid erosion of the boundaries by which the 'semi-
35 See, e.g., M. Jolly, 'Custom and the way of the Land: The Politics of Tradition in Vanuatu 
and Fiji,' paper presented at the annual conference of the Association for Social Anthropology in 
Oceania, Kauai, Hawaii (March 1990); L. Lindstrom, 'Pasin Tambuna: Cultural Traditions and 
National Identity in Papua New Guinea,' paper presented at the annual conference of the 
Association for Social Anthropology in Oceania, Kauai, Hawaii (March 1990); J. Linnekin, 'The 
Politics of Culture in the Pacific,' in Cultural Identity and Ethnicity in the Pacific, ed. J. Linnekin 
and L. Poyer (Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1990), pp. 149-174; R. Keesing 'Creating the 
Past: Custom and Identity in the Contemporary Pacific,' The Contemporary Pacific, vol. I, nos. 1 
& 2 (Spring & Fall 1989), pp. 19-42; idem, 'Kastom in Melanesia: An Overview,' Mankind, vol. 
13, no. 4 (August 1982), pp. 297-301; A. Babadzan, 'Kastom and National Building in the South 
Pacific,' in R. Guideri, F. Pellizzi and S. Tambiah, eds., Ethnicities and Nations: Processes of 
Interethnic Relations in Latin America, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific (Houston: University of 
Texas Press, 1988), pp. 199-228. 
36 SeeP. Sack, 'Paradigm Lost: Modem Versus Traditional Legal Systems,' paper presented at 
the 9th World Congress of Sociology [Research Committee on Sociology of Law] (n.d.); M. 
Krygier, 'Law as Tradition,' in Philosophy of Law in the History of Human Thought (Stuttgart: 
Franz Steiner Verlag, GmbH, 1988), pp. 179-191; K. Kulcsar, Modernization and Law: Theses 
and Thoughts (Budapest: Institute of Sociology, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 1987); M. 
Chiba, Legal Pluralism: Toward a General Theory Through Japanese Legal Culture (Tokyo: 
Tokai University Press, !989); F. von Benda-Beckmann, 'Law out of Context: A Comment on the 
Creation of Traditional Law Discussion,' Journal of African Law, vol. 28, nos. I & 2 (I 984), pp. 
28-33. 
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autonomous' fields37 of law and custom were once described with an air of 
relatively confident sufficiency.38 What their current research unequivocally 
demonstrates is that the analytical lines which have heretofore divided both 
popular and scholarly conceptions of modem Western law and the jural 
parameters of traditional Melanesian custom may be seen today as decisively 
fixed only insofar as they are described exclusively by reference to the most 
formalistic criteria of difference. In virtually all other respects, these boundaries, 
which even as initially posited were recognised as flexible and permeable, are now 
beginning to blur almost beyond recognition. 
In Papua New Guinea, as in other countries throughout the post-colonial 
world, syncretic interactions involving a blending of 'indigenous' and 'introduced' 
social forms are rendering inadequate many of the conventional criteria by which 
the concepts and phenomena of law and custom were once clearly distinguished. 
Today, the sheer pace and pervasive extent of change in socio-legal relations in 
Melanesian cultures and societies effectively nullify much of the contrastive 
utility previously ascribed to the convenient and simple dichotomisation of 
'traditional' custom and 'modem' law.39 
Undeniably, social anthropologists were amongst the first to recognise that in 
Papua New Guinea, as elsewhere, there is arguably 'no such thing as modem or 
traditional law,' but rather that 'there are many and not only two forms of law, and 
37 S.F. Moore, 'Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an 
Appropriate Subject of Study,' Law & Society Review, vol. 7, no. 4 (Summer 1973), pp. 719-746. 
38 See, R. Scaglion, 'Legal Adaptation in a New Guinea Village Court,' Ethnology, vol. 29, no. 
l (January 1990), pp. 17-33; G. Westermark, 'The Agarabi Moot,' Journal of Anthropology, vol. 6, 
no. 1 (!987), pp. 77-94; W.L. Rodman, 'A Law Unto Themselves: Legal Innovation in Ambae, 
Vanuatu,' American Ethnologist, vol. 12, no. 4 (November 1985), pp. 603-624. 
39 See Linnekin, 'The Politics of Culture in the Pacific'; Chiba, Legal Pluralism, pp. 13-26; 
Kulcsar, Modernization and Law, pp. 34-58. 
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that they do not only differ from society to society and from culture to culture, but 
that different forms exist in each of them.'40 And it is still primarily the work-
product of legal ethnography which provides the mainstay of empirical support for 
the proposition that the sharp, facile distinction between modem law and 
traditional custom-like that between modem and traditional society-is a 
construct of diminishing theoretical value which can no longer be regarded as 
apposite to the pluralistic complexities of changing socio-political relations. 
Foil owing on from this ethnographically heightened sensitivity to the nuances 
and vicissitudes of change, a growing sense of urgency has been brought to bear 
upon the development of other analytical considerations concerned with these 
same transformational processes, but which focus upon a rather more narrowly 
defined range of their particular implications. 41 With particular respect to Papua 
New Guinea, this sense of urgency is reflected in the ongoing debates about 
political development and progressive socio-legal change; debates in which a 
40 Sack, 'Modem versus Traditional Legal Systems,' p. 1. 
" See, e.g., C. McLachlan, 'The Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Law,' International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 37, pt. 2 (April 1988), pp. 368-386; A. Armstrong, 
'Zimbabwe: Away from the Customary Law,' Journal of Family Law, vol. 27, no. 1 (1988-89), pp. 
339-350; F. Snyder, 'Rethinking African Customary Law,' Modern Law Review, vol. 51 (March 
1988), pp. 252-258; S.R. Weber, 'Native-Americans Before the Bench: The Nature of Contrast and 
Conflict in Native-American Law Ways and Western Legal Systems,' Social Science Journal, vol. 
19, no. 3 (July 1982), pp. 47-57; B.Z. Tamanaha, 'A Proposal for the Development of a System of 
Indigenous Jurisprudence in the Federated States of Micronesia,' Hastings International and 
Comparative Law Review, vol. 13, no. 1 (Fall\989), pp. 71-114; M. Matsuda, 'Native Custom and 
Official Law in Hawaii,' Law & Anthropology [Internationales Jahrbuch fur 
Rechtsanthropologie], vol. 3 (1988), pp. 135-146; S. Poulter, 'African Customs in an English 
Setting: Legal and Policy Aspects of Recognition,' Journal of African Law, vol. 31, nos. 1 & 2 
( 1988), pp. 207-225; A. Samuels, 'Legal Recognition and Protection of Minority Customs in a 
Plural Sociery in England,' Anglo-American Law Review, vol. 10 (1981), pp. 241-256; K. Brown, 
'Criminal Law and Custom in Solomon Islands,' Queensland Institute of Technology Law Journal, 
vol. 2 (1986), pp. 133-139; S. W. Tiffany, 'Customary Land Disputes, Courts and African Models 
in the Solomon Islands,' Oceania, vol. 53, no. 3 (March 1983), pp. 277-290; D. Weisbrot, 'Law 
and Native Custom in Vanuatu,' Law & Anthropology [Internationales Jahrbuch for 
Rechtsanthropologie] vol. 3 (1988), pp. 103-134. 
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number of crucial issues having to do with the relationship between law and 
custom are centrally featured.'2 
For obvious reasons, concepts of law and custom in 'traditional' and changing 
Melanesian societies are intrinsically interesting to Western scholars. To 
anthropologists, the jural qualities and functions of 'native custom' in Papua New 
Guinea have always been matters of especial theoretical importance.<3 With the 
encroachments of expanding white settlement and increased inter-racial contact 
during the late-nineteenth and throughout much of the twentieth centuries, those 
ethnographic interests have been expanded concomitantly to include questions 
germane to the relationship between indigenous jural custom and the exogenously 
introduced orders of Western social organisation, regulation and control. 
Historians, too, have long regarded the relationship between law and custom in 
Papua New Guinea as a crucial element in their analyses of inter-cultural 
relations44 and, for their part, political scientists, sociologists and political 
economists have likewise devoted a substantial proportion of their own descriptive 
and analytical energies to the peculiarly legal aspects of relations between 
indigenous Melanesian groups and the various emanations of the colonial and 
42 See D. Weisbrot, A. Paliwala and A. Sawyerr, eds., Law and Social Change in Papua New 
Guinea (Sydney: Butterworths, 1982). 
43 It is no accident that Bronislaw Malinowski's seminal research in Melanesian ethnography 
should have been an explicitly legal-anthropological undertaking. See B. Malinowski, Crime and 
Custom in Savage Society (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1926). See also H.!. Hogbin, ed., 
Law and Order in Polynesia: A Study of Primitive Legal Institutions (1934; rpt., New York: 
Cooper Square Publishers, 1972). 
44 See, e.g., S. Firth, New Guinea Under the Germans (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 
1983); P.O. Sack, Land Between Two Laws: Early European Land Acquisitions in New Guinea 
(Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1973); C.D. Rowley, The Australians in German 
New Guinea, 1914-1921 (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1958); J. Griffm, H. Nelson 
and S. Firth, Papua New Guinea: A Political History (Richmond: Heineman Educational 
Australian, !979); K.S. Inglis, ed., The History of Melanesia, Papers Delivered at the Second 
Waigani Seminar (Port Moresby and Canberra: University of Papua and New Guinea and the 
Australian National University, 1969). 
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post-colonial state.45 Although academic lawyers in Papua New Guinea have been 
involved with many of the administrative and policy-making activities of colonial 
and post-colonial governments for quite some time, and whilst these involvements 
have necessarily included close considerations of the relationship between law and 
custom, legal scholars, as such, have come to develop a formal jurisprudential 
interest in these matters only rather late in the game. 
For many of these scholars, the intellectual allure in studies of the relationship 
between law and custom in Papua New Guinea has always derived from 
something other than (or at any rate, in addition to) the inherent capacity of the 
subject matter to provide an exotic and richly interesting topic for theoretical 
analysis and discussion. Recognising the palpable salience of questions revolving 
around the historical juxtaposition of Western law and Melanesian custom, and 
sensing from their unique perspectives the urgency of the problems which those 
questions throw into sharp relief, academic lawyers and legal ethnographers have 
displayed a particularly acute (and arguably natural) interest in the practical 
implications of these issues.46 
Today, the debate about the relationship between law and custom in Papua 
New Guinea is at the core of a decidedly politicised discourse, the practical 
45 See, e.g., S. W. Reed, The Making of Modern New Guinea (Philadelphia: The American 
Philosophical Society, 1943); A. Amarshi, K. Good and R. Mortimer, Development and 
Dependency: The Political Economy of Papua New Guinea (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 
1979); R. Goodman, C. Lepani and D. Morawetz, The Economy of Papua New Guinea: An 
Independent Review (Canberra: Development Studies Centre, Australian National University, 
1985); R. Wiesinger, Towards a New Society: Economic and Social Aspects of Development in 
Papua New Guinea (Bombay: Shakuntala Publishing House, 1981); J.A. Ballard, ed., Policy-
Making in a New State: Papua New Guinea, 1972-1977 (St Lucia: University of Queensland 
Press, 1981 ). 
46 See, e.g., 'Annual Report of the Neu Guinea Compagnie for 1886-87', in German New 
Guinea: The Annual Reports, ed. and trans. P. Sack and D. Clark (Canberra: Australian National 
University Press, 1979), pp. I 0, II. See also W. C. Groves, 'Anthropology and Native 
Administration in New Guinea,' Oceania, vol. 6, no. I (September 1935), pp. 94-104. 
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urgency of which is spelt out graphically in the terms of the Constitution, in the 
actions of the Parliament and the courts, and in the jural affairs of day to day 
existence which increasingly press themselves upon the lives of ordinary people.<7 
Thus, even at a time when Papua New Guinea's political, economic and legal 
problems appear to mimic the fungible crises of any other Third World country; 
even in a year described by scholars, policy-makers and journalists alike as 
involving some of the most serious difficulties and gravest dangers yet to be faced 
by Papua New Guineans in their fifteen years as citizens of an independent state,48 
thoughtful and contentious debates about the relationship between law and custom 
are at least as timely, topical and important as they have ever been. Probably 
more so. And whilst some may express surprise at the persistence of these 
debates,49 others cogently argue that their resolution vel non may well prove to be 
determinative of Papua New Guinea's continued viability as a nation. 5° 
47 The problem of 'law and order' is an indicative example, if only because it is amongst the 
more persistent and prominently publicised. See S. Dinnen, 'Crime, Law and Order in Papua New 
Guinea,' Melanesian Law Journal, vaL 17 (1989), pp. 10-25; B.M. Harris, The Rise of Rascalism: 
Action and Reaction in the Evolution of Rascal Gangs, lASER Discussion Paper No. 54 (Boroko: 
Institute of Applied Social and Economic Research, 1988); L. Morauta, ed., Law and Order in a 
Changing Society, Political and Social Change Monograph No. 6 (Canberra: Department of 
Political and Social Change, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 
1986); R.J. Gordon and M.J. Meggitt, Law and Order in the New Guinea Highlands: Encounters 
with Enga (Hanover, VT: University Press of New England, 1985); W. Clifford, L. Morauta and 
B. Stuart, Law and Order in Papua New Guinea (Port Moresby: Institute of National Affairs, 
1984); R. Gordon and A. Kipalan, 'Law and Order,' in Enga: Foundations for Development, ed. B. 
Carad, D.A.M. Lea and K.K. Talyaga (Arrnidale: University of New England, 1982), pp. 310-336; 
48 T. Wesley-Smith, 'Melanesia in Review: Issues and Events, 1989-Papua New Guinea,' The 
Contemporary Pacific, vaL 2, no. 2 (Fall 1990), p. 365; U.S. House of Representatives, 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, 10 I st Con g., 2d Sess., Problems in Paradise: United States 
Interests in the South Pacific, Report of a Congressional Delegation to the South Pacific, 5-16 
August 1989 (Comm. Print 1990), p. 64; D. Robie, 'Bougainville: One Year Later,' Pacific Islands 
Monthly, val. 59, no. 22 (November 1989), p. 10. 
49 See S. Dinnen, 'Sentencing, Custom and the Rule of Law in Papua New Guinea,' Journal of 
Legal Pluralism, no. 27 (1988), p. 2!. 
50 P. Sack, 'Law, Custom and Good Government: The Derham Report in its Historical 
Context,' unpublished paper (1984). 
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Over a period of decades, the debate about the relationship between law and 
custom in Papua New Guinea has involved issues to which an extraordinary 
measure of ethnographic and otherwise anthropologically informed attention has 
been devoted.51 Many of the resultant analyses offer their own theoretical 
explanations of the nature and dynamics of that relationship. Some go on to 
prescribe, in more or less explicit terms, the practical bases upon which particular 
policy-orientated actions might be-{)r, perhaps, ought to have been-taken, in 
order that the course of the development of that relationship should be altered in 
one way or another.52 Few relevant aspects of legislative and judicial policy 
respecting the relationship between concepts and practices of 'modem' law and 
'traditional' custom in Papua New Guinea have escaped some kind of critical, 
scholarly scrutiny.53 And in the years since the achievement of independence, the 
government itself has directed a good deal of its time and resources to research 
51 References to such considerations are legion. See, e.g., the numerous entries contained in 
two comprehensive bibliographies published by the Australian National University (Department of 
Law, Research School of Social Sciences), C. O'Sullivan, Tradition and Law in Papua New 
Guinea (Canberra 1986); M. Potter, Traditional Law in Papua New Guinea (Canberra 1973). See 
also the relevant listings in Pacific Law Bibliography, comp. J.D. Elliott (London: Legal Division, 
Commonwealth Legal Secretariat and Commonwealth Legal Education Association, 1988). 
52 See, e.g., D. Weisbrot, A. Paliwala and A. Sawyerr, eds., Law and Social Change in Papua 
New Guinea (Sydney: Butterworths, 1982); B.J. Brown, ed., Fashion of Law in New Guinea 
(Sydney: Butterworths, 1969). Criticising some of the failures in the attempt effect a practical 
reconciliation of law and custom in Papua New Guinea, David Weisbrot enumerates several areas 
in which that attempt has been made (prior to and since independence), and with respect to which 
there has, in fact, been some measure of success. D. Weisbrot, 'The Post-Independence 
Development of Papua New Guinea's Legal Institutions,' Melanesian Law Journal, vol. 15 (1987), 
pp. 9, 43-48. 
53 See, e.g, W. Iamo, 'Customary Law in Keaka1o Society: Implications for Legal 
Development,' Journal of Anthropology, vol. 6, no. 1 (1987), pp. 95-125; B.L. Ottley and J.G. 
Zorn, 'Criminal Law in Papua New Guinea: Custom and the Courts in Conflict,' American Journal 
of Comparative Law, vol. 31, (1983), pp. 251-300; A. Paliwala, 'Law and Order in the Village: 
The Village Courts,' in Law and Social Change in Papua New Guinea, ed. D. Weisbrot, A. 
Paliwala and A. Sawyerr (Sydney: Butterworths, 1982), pp. 191-217; D. Chalmers, 'The Village 
Courts of Papua New Guinea: Their introduction, History and Operation until 1976,' Melanesian 
Law Journal, vol. 6 ( 1978), pp. 56-78; P. Bayne, 'Legal Development in Papua New Guinea: The 
Place of the Common Law,' Melanesian Law Journal, vol. 3 (1975), pp. 9-39. 
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expressly concerned with the ways and means by which that relationship might be 
reconciled more efficiently and with greater fidelity to Melanesian perceptions of 
jural propriety.54 
Clearly, the relationship between law and custom in Papua New Guinea has 
never been a matter of either scholarly or administrative indifference. Yet in both 
a theoretical and practical sense, the debates engendered by a recognition of the 
importance of that relationship, and the urgency of the problems to which it has 
given rise, remain largely 'academic' and effectively unresolved. Moreover, and 
with very few exceptions/5 the conventional anthropological and socio-legal 
wisdom informing those debates continues to hold, as it has all along, that the 
basic underlying issues themselves are intrinsically irresolvable. 
The preliminary question addressed in this chapter has to do with some of the 
reasons why the 'problem' of the relationship between law and custom in Papua 
New Guinea remains so fundamentally intractable; and the preliminary answer to 
that question would seem to be, simply, that the fundamental premise supporting 
virtually every major proposition concerning the nature of that relationship 
implicitly assumes that the jural concepts and cognate regimes broadly 
instantiated in the notions of law and custom, respectively, are theoretically 
antagonistic and functionally incompatible. However, it is not as if the evidence 
54 Law Reform Commission of Papua New Guinea, Customary Law in Papua New Guinea: A 
Melanesian View, ed. R. Scaglion, Monograph No.2 (1983); idem, The Role of Customary Law in 
the Legal System, Report No. 7 (November 1977). And see also, e.g., 'Custody Jurisdiction in 
Papua New Guinea,' Working Paper No. 22 (August 1987); Homicide Compensation in Papua 
New Guinea: Problems and Prospects,' ed. R. Scaglion, Monograph No. I (1981); 'Criminal 
Responsibility: Taking Customs, Perceptions and Beliefs into Account,' Working Paper No. 6 
(February 1977). 
55 See J. Zorn, 'Customary Lijw in the Papua New Guinea Village Courts,' The Contemporary 
Pacific, val. 2, no. 2 (Fall 1990), pp. 279-311; idem, 'Making Law in Papua New Guinea,' Pacific 
Studies, val. 14, no. 3 (July 1991), pp. 1-23. 
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and arguments upon which this premise is based have been presented witb 
anything approaching theoretical univocality. Indeed, the assumptions supporting 
the view tbat law and custom in Papua New Guinea are irreconcilably polarised 
have been variously described-by social anthropologists, legal historians, 
colonial administrators, political policy-makers, dependency and modernisation 
theorists, imperial apologists, Marxists, neo-Marxists, anti-Marxists and many 
others. Approaching a general contemplation of the relationship between law and 
custom from so wide a range of frequently conflicting perspectives, it would be 
most unlikely that many of those representing such disparate intellectual and 
ideological camps would be inclined to agree upon much of anything-anything, 
apparently, otber than this one fundamental conviction which they all seem to 
share in common. 
Considering tbe extraordinary variety of thematic contexts in which 
discussions of the relationship between law and custom in Papua New Guinea 
have been framed, and given the sometimes radical differences between the 
purposes for which those discussions have been entered into, this level of 
unanimity on so significant a point is quite remarkable indeed. Still, regardless of 
the ways in which the terms 'law' and 'custom' may be defined, and irrespective of 
the personal beliefs, intellectual predilections, political predispositions or 
ideological orientations which may colour their variable characterisation, virtually 
every participant in the debates about the relationship between law and custom in 
Papua New Guinea assumes, right from the start, that the relationship itself 
encapsulates fundamentally antinomic concepts, inimical phenomena and wholly 
incongruous processes and institutions. 
'Right from the start,' however, the debates about the relationship between law 
and custom in Papua New Guinea were, and still are, 'dominated by preconceived 
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notions about law, history and the state and the inner logic of theories (and 
institutions) based on those notions.'56 In the light of newly refined pluralist 
understandings which today broadly elucidate the interactive, integral relationship 
of all manner of socio-legal forms, these, perhaps, are the very notions which most 
require a thoroughgoing re-examination, reappraisal and reformulation. And it is 
the principal argument of this chapter that the fundamental assumptions 
underlying the virtually uncontested proposition that the relationship between law 
and custom is properly conceptualised only as a categorical contraposition, are 
fundamentally misconceived. 
In what follows, I shall attempt, firstly, to outline the analytical bases in which 
the conventional debates about law and custom in Papua New Guinea continue to 
be anchored; secondly, to identify those areas in which much of that discourse 
appears to be wide of the mark; and finally, to suggest an alternative perspective 
from which the present and prospective circumstances of the relationship between 
law and custom might be reconceptualised in a way that captures the theoretical 
dynamics of interactive, syncretic legal change more adequately, and in a way 
which may also permit a more constructive approach to some of the enduring, 
practical problems involved in the integration of law and custom in Papua New 
Guinea. 
There is one point, however, about which I should like to be quite clear at the 
outset. My concern about the analytical validity of the dominant paradigmatic 
formulations of the relationship between law and custom reflects my doubts about 
the underlying validity of some of the assumptions upon which those formulations 
tend to be based. The assumptions which I find particularly suspect, however, 
56 P. Sack, 'Law, Custom and Good Government,' p. 3. 
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involve certain conceptions of 'modem Western law' rather than the associated 
conceptions of 'traditional Melanesian custom' with which the law is seen to 
interact. Thus, my criticisms here are directed not so much towards the processes 
or products of the ethnography of Melanesian custom, as towards the seemingly 
unexamined assumptions about the nature and dynamics of Western law which 
inform prevalent anthropological formulations of the relationship between Jaw and 
custom in Papua New Guinea today. 
3. 'MODERN LAW' AND 'TRADITIONAL CUSTOM': 
INDETERMINACY IN SOCIO-LEGAL RELATIONS 
It is a commonplace in socio-legal and anthropological literature that the 
circumstances of jural relations in Papua New Guinea should be characterised as 
fairly beset by the historically troublesome co-existence of a multiplicity of 
diverse legal orders. In many ways, the situation does represent a veritable 
archetype of the legally plural field. Even the primal base of indigenous 
Melanesian socio-political organisation consisted in countless autonomous 
regimes, each of which provided its own essentially discrete and localised system 
of customary normative order and social control. Into these disparate 
arrangements, and over the course of little more than a century, a succession of 
European interlopers have imported a patchwork of alien forms of 
reglementation-initially through a shallow dispersion of 'theocratic' systems 
administered under the more or less charismatic aegis of Protestant and Catholic 
missionaries;57 followed by the introduction of a discrepant sequence of unevenly 
57 On the nature of Pacific Island mission 'theocracies' generally, see A.A. Koskinen, 
Missionary Influence as a Political Factor in the Pacific Islands (Helsinki: University of Helsinki, 
1953). See also R.W. Abel, Charles W. Abel of Kwato: Forty Years in Dark Papua (London:. 
Fleming H. Revell Co., 1934); E.S. Armstrong, The History of the Melanesian Mission (London: 
Isbister & Company Ltd, 1900); J.A. Boutilier, D.T. Hughes and S.W. Tiffany, eds., Mission, 
Church and Sect in Oceania, ASAO Monograph No. 6 (Lanham, MD: University Press of 
America, 1978); P.J. Hempenstall, 'The Reception of European Missions in the German Pacific 
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penetrative secular arrangements designed to service the entrepreneurial interests 
of proto-colonial settlers;" and finally, through the more classically colonial 
imposition of Anglo-Australian statutory and common law.59 All of this has 
tended to be seen as conducing to the inexorable subsumption of 'traditional' 
forms of popular jural custom in the 'tidal wave' of colonisation.60 With 
independence, in 1975, came an 'official' (i.e., constitutional) adoption of much of 
the introduced law along with a concomitant, albeit ambiguous, adoption of 
indigenous custom/' and to this there has since been added the nominally 
autochthonous products of Papua New Guinea's own national and provincial 
Empire: The New Guinea Experience,' Journal of Pacific History, vol. !0, pts. I & 2 (!975), pp. 
46-64; D. Langmore, Tamale-A King: James Chalmers in New Guinea, 1877-1901 (Carlton: 
Melbourne University Press, 1974); idem, 'Missionaries in Melanesia Before the First World War,' 
in Melanesia: Beyond Diversity, ed. R.J. May and H. Nelson (Canberra: Research School of 
Pacific Studies, !982), l/!07-122; P. Lawrence, 'Lutheran Mission Influence on Madang 
Societies,' Oceania, vol. 27, no. 2 (December 1956), pp. 73-89; E.S. Miller, 'The Christian 
Missionary, Agent ofSecularisation,' Anthropological Quarterly, vol. 43, no. I (1970), pp. 14-22; 
N.D. Oram, 'The London Missionary Society and the Emergence of an Educated Elite in Papua,' 
Journal of Pacific History, vol. 6 (!971), pp. !15-132; B. Stanley, 'Commerce and Christianity: 
Providence Theory, the Missionary Movement and the Imperialism of Free Trade,' Historical 
Journal, vol. 26, no. I (March 1983), pp. 71-94; D. Wetherell, Reluctant Mission: The Anglican 
Church in Papua New Guinea, 1891-1942 (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1977); C.P. 
Williams, mNot Quite Gentlemen": An Examination of "Middling Class" Protestant Missionaries 
from Britain, 1850-1900,' Journal of Ecclesiastical History, vol. 31, no. 3 (July !980), pp. 30 l-
3!5; F. E. Williams, 'Mission Influence Amongst the Keveri of South-East Papua,' Oceania, vol. 
!5, no. 2 (December 1944), pp. 89-!41. 
58 See, Reed, The Making of Modern New Guinea. 
59 See R.S. O'Regan, The Common Law in Papua New Guinea (Sydney: The Law Book 
Company, 197! ); idem, 'Common Law and English Statutes in Papua and New Guinea,' 
Australian Law Journal, vol. 45, no. 6 (June 1971), pp. 297-305; idem, 'The Reception of the 
Common Law and the Authority of Common Law Precedents in the Territory of Papua and New 
Guinea,' International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 19, pt. 2 (April 1970), pp. 217-228; 
idem, 'Codes and Common Law in Papua and New Guinea,' Melanesian Law Journal, vol. I, no. I 
(!970), pp. 5-10; P. Bayne, 'Legal Development in Papua New Guinea: The Place of the Common 
Law,' Melanesian Law Journal, vol. 3, no. I (April 1975), pp. 9-39; D.R.C. Chalmers and A.H. 
Paliwala, An Introduction to the Law in Papua New Guinea (2d ed. Sydney: The Law Book 
Company, 1984). 
60 Report of the Constitutional Planning Committee (Port Moresby: Constitutional Planning 
Committee, 1974), vol. 2, p. 13. 
61 Constitution of Papua The Independent State of Papua New Guinea [hereinafter PNG 
Canst.] sees. 9, 20, sch. 2 (!975). 
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legislatures and courts.62 From the beginning, this inherently volatile admixture of 
socio-legal forms has been further complicated by the recurrent generation of the 
plural field's own syncretic, jural by-product: that eclectic, enigmatically protean 
and emotive conglomeration of jural attitudes, beliefs and practices variously 
labelled 'native custom', 'customary law' or 'traditional law', nowadays frequently 
included within the broader rubric of 'custom' simpliciter. 
Amongst the mostly European and North American scholars who, along with 
a number of Melanesian politicians, have been primarily responsible for the 
contemporary proliferation of these last mentioned expressions, there is little in 
the way of agreement upon the precise meaning or encompassment of the terms. 
In a way, however, it would be surprising if there were. The empirical 
manifestations of even the most general notions of jural 'custom' in Papua New 
Guinea have yet to be fully or definitively articulated (arguably, it is unlikely that 
they ever could be) and their conceptual dimensions are certainly far from being 
clearly, to say nothing of fully, understood. In these indeterminate circumstances, 
as one legal ethnographer quite properly insists, it is only through the circumspect 
employment of historically informed, syncretistically attuned interactional 
approaches to the study of changing jural relations in Papua New Guinea that the 
'dynamic qualities of legally plural situations' may ever be apprehended 
adequately; or, indeed, that even a preliminary understanding of the complex 
relationship between law and custom might be achieved.63 
62 See generally, D.R.C. Chalmers and A.H. Paliwala, An Introduction to the Law in Papua 
New Guinea (2d ed. Sydney: The Law Book Company, 1984); P. Fitzpatrick, Law and State in 
Papua New Guinea (New York: Academic Press, 1980). 
63 G.D. Westermark, 'Court is an Arrow: Legal Pluralism in Papua New Guinea,' Ethnology, 
val. 25, no. 2 (Aprill986), p. 131. 
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Corroborating this view, another field-seasoned legal anthropologist observes 
that the examination of even the most localised instances of 'conflict management' 
in Papua New Guinea can no longer be regarded as a valid anthropological 
undertaking in the absence of clear and explicit 'reference to the broader social 
milieu of which it is part' :64 
In situations of legal pluralism, the relationship between the 
local community and the state is of more central importance, 
and must be examined in the colonial and postcolonial context 
in which it developed. 65 
Manifestly, then, what social anthropologists and other socio-legal theorists 
are coming to recognise and accept about emergent forms of contemporary jural 
understandings and experience in Melanesian societies, and what their research 
repeatedly and often dramatically demonstrates, is that in Papua New Guinea, as 
elsewhere: 
• law is formulated in a socio-political context; 
• it serves some interests rather than others; 
• different social structures or forms of societal organisation display different 
forms of law and legal systems, and 
• a combination of coercive and ideological processes are at work to ensure 
the continuation of existing systems of law and through these the 
perpetuation of existing social structures. 66 
64 R. Scaglion, 'Legal Adaptation in a New Guinea Village Court,' Ethnology, vol. 29, no. 1 
(January 1990), p. 17. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Henry, Private Justice. pp. 1-2. 
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Underpinning these propositions 1s a growmg body of ethnographic and 
related empirical evidence indicating that 'the existence of one structural influence 
does not necessarily mean the exclusion of all others' .67 And with respect to the 
integral relationship between the introduced (cum adopted) law of the state and 
one or another of the various notions of 'traditional' Melanesian custom, it is 
becoming increasingly clear that 'the dominance of particular structural 
forms ... does not deny the influence of existing or "subordinate" forms, even 
though it may appear to do so.'68 Gradually, the appearance of the dominance of 
'modem' state law (colonial and post-colonial) over pre-existing forms of 
'traditional' custom is beginning to give way to a more sophisticated 
understanding of the complex processes of syncretic interaction, and it is towards 
those processes that social anthropologists and legal scholars are beginning to 
direct more of their critical attention. 
The recognition of this highly problematic indeterminacy in contemporary 
Melanesian socio-legal relations casts doubt upon any conclusive propositions 
concerning the relationship between law and custom in Papua New Guinea today. 
67 Ibid., p. 9 (emphasis supplied). 
68 Ibid. Coupling 'ethnographic' data of this sort with newly elucidated understandings of the 
underlying mechanisms involved in much broader processes of syncretic socio-cultural change 
provides the basis upon which current re-evaluations of the nature of changing legal relations in 
Western, as well as Melanesian, societies may rest. See M. Jolly, 'Custom and the Way of the 
Land: The Politics of Tradition in Vanuatu and Fiji,' paper presented at the Association for Social 
Anthropology in Oceania Conference, Kauai (21-24 March 1990); R.M. Keesing, 'Creating the 
Past: Custom and Identity in the Contemporary Pacific,' The Contemporary Pacific, val. I, no. I 
(Spring-Fall 1989), pp. 19-42. See generally H.T. Wilson, Tradition and Innovation: The Idea of 
Civilization as Culture and Its Significance (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984); E. 
Hobsbawm, 'Introduction: Inventing Traditions,' in The Invention of Tradition, ed. E. Hobsbawm 
and T. Ranger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 1-14; E. Shils, Tradition 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981); S.N. Eisenstadt, Tradition, Change and Modernity 
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 19730; J.R. Gusfield, 'Tradition and Modernity: Misplaced 
Polarities in the Study of Social Change,' American Journal of Sociology, val. 72, no. 4 (June 
1967), pp. 351-362; R. Bendix, 'Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered,' Comparative Studies in 
Society and History, val. 9 (April 1967), pp. 292-346). 
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But in the absence of much else about which one may be certain in the face of this 
changeable and interdigitated state jural affairs, one thing seems clear: efforts to 
analyse the central features of those affairs, and attempts to portray the general 
nature of the relationship between law and custom in particular, can no longer 
admit of explanatory or even descriptive models formulated along simplistic, 
bipolar lines. Heuristic constructs intended to differentiate 'modem' legal ideas 
from 'traditional' ones on sharply decisive bases, or to distinguish in similar terms 
between nominally 'endogenous' and 'exogenous' factors in the organisation of 
complex belief systems informing conceptualisations of law and custom, must be 
abandoned as inadequate and inappropriate to the complexity of the situation. 
And yet, in perhaps the most fundamental sense, socio-legal scholars and legal 
anthropologists still tend to characterise the relationship between law and custom 
in Papua New Guinea in just such dualistic formulations. Implicitly-and often as 
not, quite explicitly-the relationship between law and custom in Papua New 
Guinea is represented today in much the same way as it has been right from the 
start, and almost always in some variant of the classic, dichotomous model of the 
state versus stateless societies.69 Essentially, the concepts and phenomena of law 
and custom in Papua New Guinea continue to be constructed as 'two radically 
divergent-indeed, diametrically opposed-systems ... ; each with its own highly 
idiosyncratic processes of social control geared to operate within it and meet its 
peculiar needs.'70 It is this model of dualistic opposition that is replicated, time and 
again and in a variety of sophisticated permutations, seemingly whenever the 
relationship between law and custom is ethnographically described in situ, or its 
69 P. Lawrence, 'The State Versus Stateless Societies in Papua and New Guinea,' in Fashion of 
Law in New Guinea, ed. B.J. Brown (Sydney: Butterworths, 1969), pp. 15-37. 
70 Ibid., pp. 15, 16. 
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elements are analysed comparatively from either an ethnographic or an 
ethnographically informed socio-legal perspective. In so many of what are 
otherwise keenly insightful considerations of contemporary jural relations in 
Papua New Guinea, it is this kind of dichotomy that is almost invariably advanced 
as a theoretically axiomatic premise; and it is this constructive polarity that is 
introduced or insinuated into all manner of discussions in which the concepts and 
phenomena of law and custom are assumed, ipso facto, to be intrinsically and 
irreconcilably antagonistic. 
4. IDIOMS OF DIFFERENCE: 
THE DICHOTOMISATION OF LAW AND CUSTOM 
Various renderings of the conceptual dichotomy between law and custom in 
Papua New Guinea extend well beyond the realm of conventional ethnographic 
and anthropological exposition. Their influence today is as readily apparent in 
some of the most self-consciously 'critical' discourses on law, history and political 
economy in Papua New Guinea as it is in the less (or less overtly) politicised 
literatures of the social sciences. Irrespective of the discursive context in which it 
may occur, however, the representation of law and custom as theoretical and 
functional opposites is, I submit, a fundamentally flawed construct. 
There are a number of grounds upon which the uncritical employment of 
dichotomous models of law and custom can be questioned. Some of these reflect 
broader considerations of the relationship between the concepts of tradition and 
modernity per se, and have already formed the bases of thoughtful challenges to 
the analytical validity of the general dichotomy between 'modern' and 'traditional' 
law?' Others, like those with which I am specifically concerned here, are more 
71 See, e.g., Chiba, Legal Pluralism; Kulcsar, Modernization and Law. 
directly related to applications of that kind of conceptual polarisation to the 
distinctive socio-legal circumstances prevailing in contemporary Melanesian 
contexts.72 Thus, for example, it has been argued that contraposing Western and 
Melanesian jural systems as culturally incompatible approaches to common 
problems of social control implicitly involves the projection of certain 
assumptions about the centrality of 'social control' in the jural organisation and 
operations of Melanesian societies.73 Such assumptions may not, in every case, be 
wholly unjustifiable. However, within certain Melanesian cultures and societies 
whose members 'do not define "society" as the regulation of "individual 
behaviour", assumptions about social order and control may underestimate the 
direction of indigenous interests. '74 
In a more generally theoretical sense, it has also been argued that, with respect 
to any given society, the characterisation of jural arrangements as a 'system' or 
'systems' of law (or custom, as the case may be) similarly assumes too much in its 
universalist postulations regarding the essential nature of socio-legal organisation. 
Indeed, there may be far less evidence than we have been given to believe exists in 
72 See, e.g., P.G. Sack, '11 Law" and "Custom" in Papua New Guinea,' in Transactions of the 
Jean Bodin Society, vol. 51, pt. 1 (1990), pp. 249-274. 
73 M. Strathern, 'Discovering "Social Control",' Journal of Law and Society, vol. 12, no. 2 
(Summer 1985), pp. 111-134. 
74 Strathern, 'Discovering "Social Control",' pp. 113-114. This, in turn, Strathern points out, 
'may also lead to misunderstandings about the impact of introduced judicial procedures and the 
nature of local dispute settlement alike' [p. 114]. See also idem, 'Self-Regulation: An 
Interpretation of Peter Lawrence's Writings on Social Control in Papua New Guinea,' Oceania, 
vol. 59, no. 1 (September 1988), pp. 3-6; 'The Persuasive Fictions of Anthropology,' Current 
Anthropology, vol. 28, no. 3 (June 1987), pp. 251-281; Official and Unofficial Courts: Legal 
Assumptions and Expectations in a Highlands Community, New Guinea Research Bulletin No. 47 
(Port Moresby and Canberra: New Guinea Research Unit, The Australian National University, 
1972); 'Legality or Legitimacy: Hageners' Perception of the Judicial System,' Melanesian Law 
Journal, vol. l, no. 2 (1971), pp. 5-27. 
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support of the view that demonstrably 'systematic' qualities are inherent in the 
operative patterns of non-Western and Western legal orders alike75 
In the light of the dramatic changes which have so radically altered the 
composition of a whole range of 'traditional' Melanesian beliefs and values Gural 
and otherwise), and in view of the pace at which such changes continue to occur, 
it might further be argued that dichotomous models constructed to represent the 
complex interactions of law and custom in Papua New Guinea today are simply 
obsolete; that they have, in effect, outlived whatever descriptive or explanatory 
utility they may once have provided in relation to earlier, less complicated times. 
No doubt, compelling and persuasive arguments could be made along these lines 
as well. 
My particular quarrel with the dichotomous model of the relationship between 
law and custom in Papua New Guinea, however, proceeds on a rather more 
fundamental basis, in that it is directed squarely at the underlying validity of such 
dichotomous formulations and at the enduring force of the bi-polar analytical 
paradigm upon which those formulations invariably rely. It is my contention, 
therefore, that by organising the constructs of law and custom in the way that it 
does, the dichotomous model of law and custom in Papua New Guinea-like that 
of the 'state versus stateless societies'-is not only descriptively passe but, as a 
theoretical premise, it may never have been apposite. 
75 See P. Sack, 'Norms, Facts and the "Structure" of Social Reality: Some Melanesian 
Comparisons,' Rechtstheorie, vol. 20, no. 3 (1989), pp. 303-321; Gordon and Meggitt, Law and 
Order in the New Guinea Highlands, pp. 199-200; and see generally C.J.G. Sampford, 'Legal 
Systems and their Place in Legal Theory,' in Essays in Legal Theory: A Collaborative Work, ed. 
D.J. Galligan (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1984), pp. 165-186; G. MacCormack, "'Law" 
and "Legal System",' Modern Law Review, vol. 42 (1979), pp. 285-290. 
5. 'FALSE DICHOTOMIES' AND 'DOUBLE STANDARDS': 
CONVENTIONAL REPRESENTATIONS OF THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN LAW AND CUSTOM 
426 
Whilst it is a frank rejection of the fundamental premises upon which 
conventionally accepted formulations of the relationship between law and custom 
in Papua New Guinea have long been based that I am urging here, there are two 
important respects in which the argument I intend to present requires qualification. 
First of all, let me say that it is not my intention to supplant the orthodoxy of 
dichotomous paradigms with an alternative model or theory, as such. Rather, my 
objective is only to suggest an alternative perspective from which the relationship 
between law and custom might be critically re-appraised. The terms upon which I 
would conduct that reappraisal, however, are necessarily quite different to those in 
accordance with which conventional formulations are almost invariably 
constructed. 
Secondly, I do not at all mean to suggest or imply that there were not, and are 
not now, real and significant differences between Melanesian and Western 
cultures and societies, or that these palpable differences are not reflected in the 
legal cultures and legal systems of the respective societies. To whatever degree 
historical and ongoing processes of syncretic interaction may have altered or 
attenuated their original dimensions, it is clear that such differences most certainly 
continue to exist, mutatis mutandis, in a variety of areas; and with respect to the 
ways in which jural realities are understood and experienced by Papua New 
Guineans today, I dare say many of these differences remain determinatively 
significant. Moreover, I do not doubt for a moment that many of the conflicts and 
contradictions inherent in contemporary Melanesian belief systems and reflected 
in the day to day experience of contemporary Melanesian life are inextricably 
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bound up in fundamental and enduring discrepancies between Western and 
Melanesian cultures. 
What I am suggesting is simply that, in certain cases, the bases upon which 
some of these seemingly determinative differences are said to exist may be 
substantially overdrawn. And in other cases, I believe that the identification of 
such differences as the sources or causes of jural conflicts, tensions and 
contradictions may, in fact, have a good deal more to do with the predisposing 
attitudes and values of those who insist upon their existence in such exaggerated 
forms than with real (and possibly imagined) features of inherent, irremediable 
difference between the respective cultures, per se. In comparing the nuances and 
subtleties of law and custom in the contemporary Melanesian context, the 
likelihood that differences of idiom may be taken to be differences of substance is 
at least as great as, and probably greater than, the possibility that apparent 
resemblances might be similarly misconstrued.76 
A. Legal Cultures and Legal Systems Distinguished 
The concept of 'culture' has been reified as a text, externalised as a symbol and 
deployed as an instrumentality of political strategy.77 In many contexts today, the 
mere utterance of the term is polemical and liable, therefore, to provoke heated 
ideological debate. Yet in its more familiar anthropological sense, the term may 
still provide a useful reference to discernibly integrated patterns of human 
76 See R. Horton, 'African Traditional Thought and Western Science,' Africa, vol. 37, no. 1 
(January 1967), p. 50. 
77 See R.M. Keesing, 'Theories of Culture Revisited,' paper presented at the annual meeting of 
the American Anthropological Association, Washington, D.C. (November 1989); idem, 
'Anthropology as Interpretive Quest,' Current Anthropology, vol. 28, no. 2 (April 1987), pp. 161-
176; J. Linnekin, 'The Politics of Culture in the Pacific,' in Cultural Identity and Ethnicity in the 
Pacific,' ed. J. Linnekin and L. Poyer (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990), pp. 149-173. 
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knowledge, belief and behaviour shared generally amongst the members of a 
society, and dependent upon their capacity to learn and transmit that knowledge to 
succeeding generations. 78 
As an epiphenomenal concept, 'legal culture' is equally problematic and here, 
too, definitional propositions bear the attendant risks of controversy.79 For present 
purposes, however, it will be sufficient to adopt a more familiar definition of that 
term as referring broadly to 'the network of values and attitudes relating to law ... 
which determine[ s] the place of the legal system in the culture of the society as a 
whole.'80 In a slightly more elaborate formulation, then, by 'legal culture' I mean 
here: 
a set of deeply rooted, historical conditioned attitudes about 
the nature of law, about the role of law in the society and 
polity, about the proper organisation and operation of a legal 
system .... 81 
There are, of course, other definitions which might have been adopted. 
Except for 'minor differences in literal expression,' however, most of these tend to 
describe the concept in much the same way, referring comprehensively to the 
78 See R.M. Keesing, Cultural Anthropology: A Contemporary Perspective (2d ed. New York: 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981), p. 509. 
79 See M. Chiba, 'The Identity Postulate of a Legal Culture,' in Philosophy of Law in the 
History of Human Thought, ed. S. Panou, G. Bozonis, D. Georgas and P. Trappe (Stuttgart: Franz 
Steiner Verlag GmbH, 1988), pp. 85-91; H.W. Ehrmann, Comparative Legal Cultures 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1976). 
80 L.M. Friedman, 'Legal Culture and Social Development,' Law & Society Review, vol. 4, no. 
l (August 1969), p. 34. 
81 J.H. Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition (2d ed. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985), 
p. 2. 
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'culturally characteristic values and attitudes related to law.'82 It is that sense of 
comprehensiveness that I am especially concerned to capture here. 
A more important point to be stressed in relation to the definition of 'legal 
culture' adopted for use here, however, is the crucial distinction it implicitly draws 
between the concept of a 'legal culture' and that of a 'legal system'. For whilst the 
idea of a 'legal culture' clearly implies the existence of a relationship of some kind 
between it and its associated legal system(s)-a relationship that could normally 
be expected to exist at both the conceptual and phenomenological levels-the 
concepts and phenomena denoted by the two expressions are not meant to be 
regarded either as synonymous or interchangeable. In any analysis of the 
relationship between law and custom in Papua New Guinea, therefore, it is 
essential that the conceptual and phenomenological distinction between legal 
systems and legal cultures remain clear; and by employing the expression legal 
system here, I mean neither more nor less than the full panoply of operative 
mechanisms, processes and institutions by and through which any society may 
give expression and effect to the jural values shared amongst its members. From 
this proposition, however, it should not be inferred that there is anything 
necessarily or intrinsically systematic in the organisation, arrangement or 
operation of those mechanisms, processes and institutions. 
Now presumably, a certain familiarity with the structure and functions of a 
particular legal system will reveal something about the legal culture of the society 
within which that system is seen to operate. But it does not necessarily follow 
that even a close empirical understanding of the operations of that legal system 
will provide anything like a complete or perfectly accurate representation of the 
82 Chiba, 'The Identity Postulate of a Legal Culture,' p. 86. 
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complex, interactive elements constituting the legal culture within which the 
system is embraced;83 not, at any rate, in the sense that one may safely draw clear, 
definitive conclusions about the fundamental nature of a legal culture solely on 
the basis of limited observations of the institutional or processual activities of its 
constituent legal system(s). Indeed, as legal ethnographers know only too well, 
whilst the study of legal systems may provide a window which opens on the 
values, attitudes and beliefs constituting their underlying legal cultures, the glass 
in such a window is bound to be translucent rather than transparent. It is far more 
likely on that account to refract the images one perceives through it than to allow 
for an undistorted reception of what lies behind. All too often, it may do no more 
than reflect the images projected on to it by an observer. 
In Papua New Guinea, where contemporary jural relations are necessarily 
observed and assessed in an amorphous social context of extraordinarily 
indeterminate fluidity, the difficulties and dangers associated with the task of 
describing and explaining the nature of the relationship between legal systems and 
legal cultures are compounded. Faithful description and circumspect analysis 
require that innumerable elusive nuances of inter-relational dynamics be 
meticulously teased out, as it were, from an immense diversity of indigenous 
customary orders, overlain with the historical imbrications of exogenously 
introduced forms of law and the resultant interfusion of ideas and phenomena born 
of the ongoing processes of syncretic interaction. Confronted with such a 
daunting indeterminacy in the conventional correlates of socio-legal analysis, it is 
logically incumbent upon empirical and theoretical scholars to introduce some 
heuristic means by which at least a semblance of analytical order might be 
83 See A. Watson, Society and Legal Change (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1977), p. 
130: '(T]here does not exist a close, inherent, necessary relationship between existing rules of law 
and the society in which they operate.' 
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achieved. Recognising this, it would be foolish to deny that it is 'probably 
preferable' to analyse the complexly plural fields of Melanesian jural reality 'by 
way of some simple dichotomies.'84 In doing so, however, there are certain risks. 
One of the more serious risks inherent in the erection of simple, heuristic 
dichotomies to facilitate an understanding of the distinction between legal systems 
and legal cultures in Papua New Guinea lies in their tendency to be mistaken for 
the real thing-or rather, in the propensity of those who employ such dichotomous 
formulations to reity these models, and thus to confuse an explanatory device for 
the objects it has been contrived to explain. On this score, Peter Sack offers an 
instructive caveat: 
If an analytical line is drawn between primitive and Western 
law, it is drawn because they are regarded as two different 
phenomena. But, having drawn this line, it can easily happen 
that primitive law is at the same time regarded as ... not 'law' but 
only 'custom' .... [G]enerally speaking, reality and the world of 
analytical concepts are two separate spheres, the latter 
reflecting and explaining the former. The world of analytical 
concepts cannot and will not be a perfect image of reality: it 
must follow its own rules. In order to understand reality it is 
necessary to use analytical concepts which have no 
counterparts in reality or which even contradict real 
phenomena. 85 
In the comparative analysis of the relationship between law and custom in the 
contemporary Melanesian context, however, it is not enough simply to be aware 
of the fact that the analytical lines one may be obliged to draw are artificial. For 
to the extent that the critical distinction between legal systems and legal cultures 
is a significant consideration in the process of differentiating law and custom in 
Papua New Guinea, there are at least two further and related analytical hazards 
84 P.G. Sack, Land Between Two Laws: Early European Land Acquisitions in New Guinea 
(Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1973), p. 9. 
85 Ibid., p. 8. 
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against which many legal anthropologists and academic lawyers alike have failed 
to guard. These are discussed below. 
B. The 'False Dichotomisation' of Legal Systems and Legal Cultures 
Simple dichotomies may well assist m the analysis of complex social 
realities. 86 But even simple, carefully constructed analytical dichotomies can be 
false, and even the most cautiously conservative reliance on such false 
dichotomies will be misleading. Thus, in dealing with the relationship between 
law and custom in Papua New Guinea, where the apparent tensions and 
contradictions of jural plurality fairly invite a kind of dialectical analysis, the 
uncritical employment of dichotomous models of radical, diametric opposition 
imports the very real danger that ostensibly operative jural theses and antitheses 
will be wrongly identified and, as a result, falsely contraposed. The consequential 
risk in this is that one may proceed quite innocently upon the basis of analytical 
premises that are not just inadequate but fundamentally inaccurate. 
In portraying the relationship between law and custom generally, many 
scholars have shown a particular proclivity for dichotomous constructs in which 
the purportedly dialectical relationship between law and custom is represented in 
models that contrapose the legal culture(s) of one type of society occupying the 
plural field, and the legal system(s) of another type of society with which that field 
is shared. 87 With specific respect to analyses of the relationship between law and 
custom in Papua New Guinea, the delineation of sharply contrastive differences 
86 Ibid., p. 9. 
87 See J. van Velsen, 'Procedurallnformality, Reconciliation, and False Comparisons,' in Ideas 
and Processes in African Customary Law, ed. M. Gluckman (London: Oxford University Press, 
1969), pp. 137-150. Note, however, that van Velsen focuses here upon false comparisons 
occurring exclusively at the inter-systemic level. 
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between these conceptualisations frequently appears to be based on just such 
dichotomies, falsely polarising Melanesian legal culture(s), on the one hand, and 
Western (or, more specifically, Anglo-Australian) system(s) of law, on the other.88 
When comparative analyses are pursued on the basis of a category error of this 
magnitude, it is difficult to see how they can yield much in the way of apposite 
insights into the relationship between law and custom. 
Now, the concept of a legal culture, of course, is an abstract representation. 
No legal culture really 'exists'; and to the extent that it may be said to 'exist' at all, 
it does so only as an intangible bundle of ideas, values, beliefs and attitudes 
characterising a particular orientation to jural realities, which itself is assumed to 
be shared amongst an identifiable group of people.89 A legal system, on the other 
hand, is far more amenable to empirical observation, involving, as it does, more 
clearly and readily identifiable mechanisms, processes and institutions. At an 
exclusively systemic level of analysis, therefore, inter-cultural (or inter-societal) 
comparisons of legal systems may be undertaken with greater confidence; for as 
an empirical exercise focusing upon real phenomena and events, such 
comparisons promise a measurable degree of certainty and competence, without 
necessarily involving the fallacious dichotomisations implicit in the process of 
comparing one society's legal culture with another society's legal system. 
However, whilst the inter-societal comparison of legal systems may be 
intrinsically interesting, to the extent that such comparisons represent purely 
88 In the Papua New Guinea context, Gordon and Meggitt similarly take issue with the false 
comparative dichotomisation of Western and Melanesian legal systems. Law and Order in the New 
Guinea Highlands, pp. 197-198. 
89 See S. Macaulay, 'Popular Legal Culture: An Introduction,' Yale Law Journal, vol. 98, no. 8 
(June 1989), p. 1547; C. Geertz, 'Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective,' in 
Local Knowledge: Further Essays on Interpretive Anthropology (New York: Basic Books, 1983), 
pp. 167-234. 
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descriptive exercises they are unlikely to be particularly significant. The obvious 
differentiae in the structure and operation of various jural institutions and 
processes may be observed (more or less directly) and recorded in meticulous 
detail. In the absence of deeper analysis, however, such data reveal little if 
anything about the nature of the features that have been selected for comparative 
analysis (presumably on account of their ostensibly distinguishing characteristics); 
nor are they likely to shed much light on the reasons why those features (and not 
others) should be characterised as sufficiently distinctive to warrant comparative 
analysis in the first place. 
These considerations have not been lost on social anthropologists; and in the 
general ethnographic analysis of different Melanesian societies and cultures, there 
is a demonstrable adherence to the discipline of a deeper comparatist ethos. 90 This 
kind of commitment, however, creates problems of its own. And in the field of 
legal anthropology, comparative endeavours raise a number of controversial 
questions having to do both with methodology and the selection of appropriate 
comparative criteria:91 
90 See generally L. Mair, An Introduction to Social Anthropology (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1965), pp. 21, 42-45; F. Eggan, 'Some Reflections on Comparative Method in 
Anthropology,' in Context and Meaning in Cultural Anthropology, ed. M.E. Spiro (New York: 
The Free Press, 1965). In more specific connection with the Melanesian ethnography, Marty 
Zelenietz observes: 
The ultimate goal of social anthropology is the formation of 
general statements regarding the human condition. We strive 
to understand human beliefs and behaviour not only in one 
society or situation, but in many.... An exercise which is 
purely ethnographic is unsatisfactory because, at some point or 
another, comparisons must be made ['Sorcery and Social 
Change: An Introduction,' Social Analysis, no. 8 (November 
1981), p. 5]. 
91 Eggan suggests that 'the comparative method is not a "method" in the broad sense, but a 
technique for establishing similarities and differences.' He goes on to conclude, however, that 
'despite the considerable variation in the conceptions held by different anthropologists as to its 
nature ... , the comparative method is till a useful procedure in cultural anthropology ... .' ['Some 
Reflections on Comparative Method in Anthropology,' p. 366]. 
In investigating legal phenomena, on what basis is the 
anthropologist to decide what he is looking for and what to 
look at? Is he comparing legal concepts or behavior? Are these 
different from each other, or are they facets of the same entity? 
Is he comparing whole legal systems? Cases? Rules? Systems 
of rules dealing with particular substantive matters ... ? 
Procedures? Is he interested in dispute settlement exclusively 
or in systems of social control in general? There is no end to 
the possible topics. Each person in the field defines somewhat 
differently what he is looking for. There is serious question 
whether there should be, or even whether there can be, 
consensus in the discipline about such matters." 
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Although these questions often tend to be addressed in connexion with intra-
societal comparisons (e.g., comparisons of 'Melanesian' societies), their 
broader, inter-cultural implications are nonetheless apparent. 
Even in the absence of an anthropological consensus on the protocols of an 
appropriate comparative methodology-and acknowledging that the desirability 
of such a consensus is itself open to question-the fact remains that it is still 
primarily through the comparative ethnographic study of various Melanesian legal 
systems that access of any kind to the inner-workings of the legal cultures with 
which those systems are associated has been achieved. Although most social 
anthropologists would readily admit that the insights they may obtain through 
such an indirect approach to comparative ethnological explanation will inevitably 
reflect the imprecision and inadequacies of a necessarily 'mediated' ethnographic 
inquiry, it must ultimately be conceded that these imperfect, ethnographically 
derived representations provide essentially the only (and consequently the best 
available) avenue leading to a deeper understanding of the nature and dynamics of 
Melanesian legal cultures. And given the limitations within which such inquiries 
must necessarily be pursued, an impressive collection of richly descriptive data 
92 Moore, Law as Process, p. 138. 
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and cogent analysis elucidating the organisation and operations of Papua New 
Guinean legal systems and legal cultures alike has been generated. 
On the strength of the available Melanesian ethnographic data and 
comparative ethnological analyses, one might cautiously proceed to a comparative 
consideration of the two types of legal cultures co-existing in Papua New 
Guinea-Western and Melanesian. In attempting such a comparison, however, 
what must be borne in mind is the inherent imprecision involved in the processes 
by which access to understandings about Melanesian legal cultures has been 
achieved in the first instance, since this imprecision must have serious 
implications for the qualitative accuracy of the larger, comparative exercise. 
Indeed, at this 'higher level' of inter-cultural analysis, the conclusions one may 
reach will unavoidably reflect a kind of 'generation loss' in precision of far greater 
proportions than that which one could reasonably expect to encounter in 
comparisons made exclusively at the 'lower level' of legal systems. The 
development of cultural explanations for the empirical qualities of systemic legal 
phenomena must be recognised as an inherently interpretative process, and one 
which, at best, can only be inexact; for in the pursuit of that kind of inquiry, one is 
apt to read as much into the data as one may properly read out of them. To 
undertake such an inquiry unconscientiously means that one runs the constant risk 
of reading the data wrongly. 
In the comparative analysis of Western and Melanesian legal cultures, 
therefore, perhaps the greatest threat to cogency is the common misapprehension 
that it is two legal cultures which are, in fact, being compared. Conventionally 
dichotomous formulations of the relationship between law and custom may 
portray custom in reasonably well constructed, ethnographically sound 
representations of Melanesian legal culture(s). But the law, against which those 
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representations are set, is invariably portrayed in the guise of a crude stereotype of 
nominally Western legal system(s). The 'false comparison' underlying the 
dichotomy between law and custom in Papua New Guinea, therefore, may have 
less to do with the erroneous comparison of two different types of legal system(s), 
than with the false dichotomisation of Western legal system(s) and Melanesian 
legal culture(s). 
C. 'Double Standards' in the Analytical Construction of 
Western and Melanesian Legal Cultures 
One possible explanation for the persistent recurrence of the 'false dichotomy' 
between Western (or Westernised) legal systems and Melanesian legal cultures 
may be linked to the employment of a 'double standard' in the analytical 
construction of the conceptual models conventionally used in dichotomous 
formulations of law and custom. For it seems to me that in most representations 
of the relationship between law and custom in Papua New Guinea, the prevalent 
tendency amongst anthropologists and other socio-legal scholars involves the 
application of one standard of description and analysis in respect of indigenous 
Melanesian custom, and quite another in respect of the introduced or imposed 
Western law. It is this discrepancy in analytical standards which may result in the 
erroneous comparison of Melanesian legal cultures and Western legal systems 
whereby the appearance of radical difference is given substance, and which serves, 
in tum, to reify the dichotomous representation of the relationship between law 
and custom that I challenge here. 
For the most part, legal anthropologists move with caution and restraint from 
their accumulated data on individual Papua New Guinea legal systems (the 
dynamic, empirical manifestations of jural custom in action) to guarded 
hypothetical propositions about the underlying Melanesian legal culture. 
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Ethnographic observations, normally undertaken over extended periods of time in 
the field, almost invariably focus exclusively upon small, individual groups or 
communities.93 Broad, sweeping generalisations about jural processes and 
institutions tend to be avoided. Exceptional or unique circumstances are duly 
noted, and ethnographically derived anthropological conclusions are usually 
framed with appropriate qualifications. By and large, grand theories are eschewed 
in favour of further research; and always there is the looming caveat that more 
data must be collected and assessed before anything other than the most tentative 
explanations concerning the essential nature of Melanesian jural values might be 
offered. Insofar as the legal-ethnographic study of contemporary Papua New 
Guinea societies increasingly require that anthropologists include within the ambit 
of their research the novel extensions of Western law into the conventional 
Melanesian ethnographic field, these too have been approached with balance, 
restraint and a prudent absence of bold speculation. 
In the largely ethnographic and anthropological consideration of Melanesian 
legal culture(s), therefore, it may be said that the analytical standards employed 
have been uniformly high. The problem of the 'double standard', as I see it, rather 
involves the manner in which Western legal culture has been dealt with by socio-
legal scholars concerned with the historical, contemporary and emerging 
relationship between law and custom in Papua New Guinea. In this limited, albeit 
crucial, respect, there would seem to be either an egregious violation of the 
standards of analysis so rigorously applied in the process of moving from 
empirical considerations of Melanesian legal systems to conceptual considerations 
of Melanesian legal culture, or a distinct confusion of Western legal culture with 
the relatively few, relatively recent and demonstrably distorted indicia of that 
93 See R.M. Keesing, Cultural Anthropology, pp. 5-8. 
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legal culture, as these have been expressed through the institutions, processes, 
mechanisms and personalities associated with the legal systems of the colonial and 
post-colonial state in Papua New Guinea. 
To be sure, the application of this double standard has not gone wholly 
unnoticed. Yet when it has been recognised as such, that recognition seems to 
take the form of observations made only en passant. For example, in the 
introduction to the volume in which Peter Lawrence first offered his exposition on 
'the state versus stateless societies' in Papua New Guinea to a decidedly legal 
audience,94 whilst Geoffrey Sawer saw fit to question Professor Lawrence's 
stereotypical characterisation of Western legal culture, he did so in what 
amounted to an almost casual aside: 
Professor Lawrence's picture of the west is more an 'ideal type' 
of the western tendency-whether hoped for, feared or merely 
predicted. Western society actually contrives to combine the 
abstract legal forms dear to a Hans Kelsen or a Herbert Hart 
with social realities which are much earthier, and include a 
great deal of status, caste, family and kin groups, and you-do-
me-a-favour-so-l'll-eventually-do-the-same.95 
More recently, two legal ethnographers, Robert Gordon and Mervyn Meggitt, 
similarly called into question the commonly accepted assumption that Melanesian 
custom entertains a flexibility that simply does not exist in Western law: 
[A]s in all societies, Western law undergoes frequent change; 
even when it retains its form, its content may change. 
Flexibility derives not so much from the form of law as from 
the interpretation of laws at various times and their 
discretionary enforcement. Thus, . . . assertion[s] that the 
uniqueness of Melanesian law resides in the continuum of 
simply acceptable, less acceptable, and unacceptable ways of 
doing things could be applied just as well to industrialized 
Western states, where popular knowledge of the vast body of 
94 B.J. Brown, ed., Fashion of Law in New Guinea (Sydney: Butterworths, 1969). 
95 G. Sawer, 'Introduction,1 in B.J. Brown, ed., Fashion of Law in New Guinea, p. 5. 
legal and other rules is severely limited. In their everyday life 
people lump together whole realms of behaviour into just such 
taken-for-granted categories." 
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At this same level of comparison, Gordon and Meggitt raise further questions 
about the actual extent to which the procedural peculiarities of Western law and 
Melanesian custom really do differ to one another, and some of the reasons why 
those differences might so frequently be exaggerated: 
It has been suggested that for ideological reasons the 
differences between Melanesian and Western dispute 
management have been exaggerated . . . . Most accounts of 
indigenous law refer to litigation in village situations, which 
are then compared with processes in superior courts in 
Western societies while ignoring comparable grass-roots 
phenomena in those societies . . . . A more acceptable 
comparison between the societies would concern the 
dispensing of justice at the truly local level, and it is clear that 
if this were done many of the alleged radical differences 
would disappear'' 
Much to their credit, Gordon and Meggitt do consider the problem of 'false 
comparisons' between Melanesian and Western jural systems more seriously than 
most of their contemporary colleagues seem prepared or particularly interested to 
do.98 Their discussion, however, is effectively restricted to matters of inter-
systemic process and procedure; and the oversights in analysis of which they are 
particularly critical in this regard refer only to the 'obvious' fact that: 
in industrial states many disputes, perhaps most, are in fact 
settled out of court and are handled by customary procedures, 
in which plea bargaining, negotiation, and mediation are 
crucial elements.99 
96 Gordon and Meggitt, Law and Order in the New Guinea Highlands, p. 196. 
97 Ibid., p. 197. 
98 See Gordon and Meggitt, Law and Order in the New Guinea Highlands, pp. 197-198. 
99 Ibid., p. 198. With respect to the problem of the double standard in such inter-systemic, 
comparative analyses, see J. Van Velsen, 'Procedural Informality, Reconciliation, and False 
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In the main, and to the extent that their descriptions and explanations are 
based upon relevant and accurate historical and empirical evidence, 
anthropologists and other scholars have been circumspect in their analytical 
treatment of the ways in which particular Western legal systems have operated in 
Papua New Guinea. The fact that they have been 'critical' of those operations in 
many cases in no way necessarily detracts from the quality and precision of their 
research-indeed, as said, responsible scholarship quite properly involves a 
critical edge; most especially so, perhaps, when matters of socio-legal policy are 
under direct or indirect scrutiny.100 It is, however, when the level of analysis shifts 
from specific observations having to do with the actual operations of Western 
legal systems to the ostensibly governing values and principles of Western legal 
culture that the standards of comparative analysis so often appear to decay rapidly 
and abjectly .101 
The standard anthropological representations of Western legal culture-the 
law side of the dichotomy between law and custom in Papua New Guinea-are 
typically rife with gross and frequently erroneous generalisations about its 
essential nature. Situationally or circumstantially specific events and phenomena 
are regularly invoked as exemplary of timeless, cross-cultural features of the 
Anglo-Australian common law (or, more frequently, 'Western law' simpliciter). 
From these generalised misrenderings, facile and stereotyped representations of a 
monolithic legal tradition are adopted, adapted, inverted and manipulated with 
Comparisons,' in Ideas and Procedures in African Customary Law, ed., M. Gluckman (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 137-150. 
100 Daniel Hughes spoke eloquently to this point in 'The Responsibility of Anthropologists to 
Pacific Islanders,' Pacific Studies, vol. 3, no. 2 (Spring 1980), pp. 43-5 I. 
101 In her excellent critique of Gordon and Meggitt's work, Jean Zorn recently called attention 
to this general failing in legal anthropological analysis. See J.G. Zorn, 'Lawyers, Anthropologists, 
and the Study of Law: Encounters in the New Guinea Highlands,' Law & Social Inquiry, vol. 15, 
no. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 271-304. 
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little regard for the actualities of variation, diversity and nuance. As a 
consequence, all manner of conclusive (and invariably disparaging) assertions 
about the fundamental and unalterable nature of law, and Western legal culture in 
toto, abound. Based upon exceptional events, cynical presupposition or wholly 
hypothetical caricatures, these simplistic and misconceived perceptions are 
routinely trundled out and paraded through the literature like so many medieval 
witches on their way to foreordained ecclesiastical judgment. 
6. 'POLITICAL' AND 'ORGANIC' FORMULATIONS OF THE 
DICHOTOMY BETWEEN LAW AND CUSTOM IN PAPUA NEW 
GUINEA 
Canvassing the range of the literature in which these deceptive caricatures of 
Anglo-Australian law and legal culture occur, it is possible to group the various 
discursive contexts in which they appear within two broadly overlapping 
categories. Signifying the central characteristics of the analytical perspectives 
they embrace, I denominate these categories political (or politicised) and organic 
(or ethnological) formulations, respectively. 
Both of these approaches have given rise to substantial bodies of literature 
illuminating important aspects of the issues with which they are especially 
concerned, and together they may offer compelling, complementary explanations 
for historical and contemporary problems of jural relations in Papua New Guinea. 
The principal differences between political and organic formulations lie in the 
areas of analytical focus and methodology, reflecting, amongst other things, the 
fact that the former are more often the handiwork of political economists, social 
historians and legal scholars, whilst the latter are almost exclusively the products 
of anthropological and legal-ethnographic research. What is far more important 
than those features which may be seen to distinguish political from organic 
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formulations, however, is the singular feature that unites them; for both 
approaches proceed on the shared assumption that law and custom are accurately 
understood as involving discrete ideas and phenomena, properly conceptualised in 
a dynamic arrangement of diametric opposition. 102 
Before examining important aspects of the mutually reinforcing inter-
dependency of political and organic formulations and how they both conduce to 
the false dichotomisation of law and custom in Papua New Guinea, let me briefly 
describe the contours and content of each approach individually. 
A. Political Formulations 
Perhaps the most distinctive characteristic of political formulations is their 
tendency to identify 'law' possessively with the state, whilst 'custom' and its 
cognates are linked in similarly possessive terms to 'traditional' forms of stateless 
socio-political organisation. Typically, political formulations of the relationship 
between law and custom in Papua New Guinea represent that relationship as the 
embodiment of perpetual hegemonic conflict. Thus, from the earliest European 
attempts to 'pacify' Melanesian peoples to the most recent programmes of 
'development', the imposition of Western cultural values (legal and otherwise) is 
seen as having been effected principally (if not always directly or 'officially') 
through the instrumentalities of the colonial and post-colonial state. 103 In this way, 
the essentially exogenous forces and ideas of the modem Western (or 
Westemised) state have been historically pitted against the endogenous forces and 
102 Cf. Moore, Law as Process, p. 13. 
103 See, M. Rodman and M. Cooper, eds., The Pacification of Melanesia, ASAO Monograph 
No. 7 (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1983); B. Narokobi, 'History and Movement in 
Law Reform in Papua New Guinea,' in Law and Social Change in Papua New Guinea, ed. D. 
Weisbrot, A. Pa1iwala and A. Sawyerr (Sydney: Butterworths, 1982), pp. 13-24. 
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ideas of traditionally stateless Melanesian societies m the former's relentless 
efforts to subdue, suborn, subsume and, ultimately, to extinguish the popular 
custom of the latter. '04 
Conceding that the major colonial powers involved in Papua New Guinea, 
namely Britain and Germany, initially 'adopted the view that the indigenous 
population should remain . . . governed by its own "custom",' political 
formulations are quick to point out that this accommodation was intended to last 
only until Melanesian society 'had "advanced" far enough to be fully absorbed into 
the introduced "legal system".' From the outset, Western law was regarded as the 
'dominant' legal order;105 
'custom' was to be tolerated temporarily by the 'legal system' 
rather than being integrated or abolished. The aim was the 
gradual replacement of 'custom' by 'law', not a synthesis of the 
two, let alone a development of 'custom' to a point where it 
became a viable alternative to 'law' ... 106 
The relationship between law and custom in Papua New Guinea thus comes to 
be seen as having been forged in a crucible of essentially inter-cultural 
confrontation. Indicatively and inevitably, the contemporary ramifications of that 
continuing confrontation are reflected in the jural arena, just as they are in 
virtually every other sphere of social affairs. At bottom, then, the antagonism 
implicit in the relationship between law and custom tends to be regarded merely 
as an epiphenomenal expression of the antagonism inherent in the larger, 
104 See, M. Cooper, 'On the Beginnings of Colonialism in Melanesia,' in Rodman and Cooper, 
The Pacification of Melanesia, pp. 25-41; Fitzpatrick, Law and State in Papua New Guinea; idem, 
'The Political Economy of Law in the Post-Colonial Period,' in Weisbrot, Paliwala and Sawyerr, 
Law and Social Change in Papua New Guinea, pp. 25-55. 
105 P.G. Sack, '"Law" and "Custom" in Papua and New Guinea,' Transactions of the Jean 
Bodin Society, val. 51, pt. I (1990), p. 256. 
106 Ibid. 
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hegemonic relationship between the political forms of the state and stateless 
societies. 107 
From a politicised perspective, law and custom are conceptualised 
dichotomously because tbey are ideologically incompatible: 'Law is seen as a type 
of state action, distinctive in certain operational ways, but sharing its functions 
with other types of state action.' 108 Custom, or 'traditional law', on tbe other hand, 
is 'embedded in and supportive of traditional forms of stateless socio-political 
organisation. 109 As a manifestation of the conflicting political ideologies 
represented by tbe dichotomy between state and stateless societies, tbe dynamics 
of the dichotomy between law and custom logically instantiate expressions of the 
state's hegemonic assertion and the inexorable exertion of the state's political will. 
Ultimately, it is the state which will not permit tbe development of a symbiotic 
relationship between law and custom, since to do so would undermine the 
competitively advantageous position enjoyed by the state and those whose 
interests it is said to serve. 
Familiar critiques of capitalism, imperialism and colonial law are frequently 
anchored in political explanations of this general type; 110 although the same 
107 See Merry, 'Legal Pluralism,' pp. 872-879; D. Lloyd, The Idea of Law (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin Books Ltd, 1981), p. 235; Moore, Law as Process, pp. 17, 21; Lawrence, 'The State 
Versus Stateless Societies'. 
108 Fitzpatrick, Law and State in Papua New Guinea, p. 28. 
109 Ibid., p. 68. 
110 See, e.g., M. Chanock, Law. Custom and Social Order: The Colonial Experience in 
Malawi and Zambia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); F.G. Snyder, Capitalism 
and Legal Change: An African Transformation (New York: Academic Press, 1981 ); idem, 'Law 
and Development in the Light of Dependency Theory,' Law & Society Review, vol. 14, no. 3 
(Spring 1980), pp. 723-804; idem, 'Anthropology, Dispute Processes and Law: A Critical 
Introduction,' British Journal of Law and Society. vol. 8, no. 2 (Winter 1981 ), pp. 141-190; idem, 
'Rethinking African Law,' Modern Law Review, vol. 51 (March 1988), pp. 252-258; P. Fitzpatrick, 
'Is It Simple to Be a Marxist in Legal Anthropology?' Modern Law Review, vol. 48 (July !985), 
pp. 472-485; idem, 'Law and Societies,' Osgoode Hall Law Journal, val. 22, no. I (!984), pp. 115-
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analytical assumptions can be found to underlie a much broader range of 
politically based formulations in which the role of the state is viewed as 
determinative in the fashioning of the relationship between law and custom. 
Indeed, notwithstanding the ideological predilections of their proponents, and 
irrespective of the form in which the state is represented (colonial, post-colonial or 
neo-colonial), it is the hallmark of political formulations that the relationship 
between law and custom should be characterised as one of inter-cultural and 
eminently political conflict. 
Sir Hubert Murray, Lieutenant-Governor and Chief Judicial Officer in the 
Territory of Papua from 1908 to 1940, was a man with few illusions about the 
motives of the colonial state he served and who unequivocally supported the 
palpably political purposes behind its administrative efforts to establish and secure 
the supremacy of an Anglo-Australian legal order. 111 In his memoirs, Murray 
candidly observed: 
The material fact is that ... [ w ]e came here for our own 
purposes ... and we have remained on for our own purposes; it 
is merely self-deception to say that we are any of us ... in the 
Territory for the good of the natives. 112 
And in his active pursuit of these imperialist objectives, it is clear that Murray 
entertained little doubt about the capacity of the colonial state to provide 
138; idem, 'Traditionalism and Traditional Law,' Journal of African Law, vol. 28, nos. I & 2 
(1984), pp. 20-27. 
111 See Francis West. Hubert Murray: The Australian Pro-Consul. Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press, 1968. 
112 H. Murray, Papua of To-Day or an Australian Colony in the Making (London: P.S. King 
and Son Ltd, 1925), p. 285. 
'something better' than indigenous Melanesian custom as a supplanting legal 
order for Papua New Guineans: 113 
Some native ideas are excellent, but others are bad; in a 
country like Papua, apparently, they must all, or nearly all, go, 
sooner or later, but it is desirable that the good should remain 
until their place is taken by something which is equally good 
or better, and which will be more lasting.'" 
In Murray's day, to the extent that a case for the value and propriety of 
retaining traditional Melanesian forms of socio-legal order was put at all, that case 
was advanced largely on the basis of anthropological arguments, cautiously and 
often quite unofficially presented. " 5 On both practical and ideological grounds, 
however, Murray frankly rejected these preservationist sentiments; especially 
where they concerned the conservation of 'native custom' in its jural aspects. In 
doing so, Murray revealed his deep ambivalence, if not hostility, towards the 
contributions of anthropology to what he understood to be the primary tasks of 
colonial administration, in which connexion he reflected: 'I think . . . an 
anthropologist would probably make rather a mess of things-he would ride his 
hobby-horse too fast and too far.'" 6 
Throughout the period of British, and subsequently Australian, rule in Papua 
New Guinea, the tone, timbre and content of colonial rhetoric varied in accordance 
113 Murray, Papua of To-Day, p. 225. 
114 Ibid .. 
115 For example, in an address before the 1939 meeting of the Australian and New Zealand 
Association for the Advancement of Science, F. E. Williams, who served for a time as goverrunent 
anthropologist during the period of Murray's tenure in Papua, was obliged to quality as 'unofficial' 
his remarks about the value of preserving native custom, since his views were, '[i]n some 
particulars,' at variance with those of the government that employed him. See F.E. Williams, 
'Creed of a Government Anthropologist,' in The Vailala Madness and Other Essays, ed. Erik 
Schwimmer (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1977), p. 396. 
"
6 Murray, Papua of To-Day, p. 227. 
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with the parameters of the particular discursive context and the changing political 
tenor of the times. Nevertheless, the same general type of dichotomous, 
confrontational model employed to portray the relationship between law and 
custom during the early years of colonial administration has been consistently 
invoked, mutatis mutandis, to characterise and explain the nature and dynamics of 
that relationship.lt7 Moreover, political formulations of jural relations in the 
independent state of Papua New Guinea continue to organise discussion and 
debate about the relationship between law and custom in very much the same 
terms-which is to say, in terms of fundamental conceptual and practical 
opposition and irremediable ideological irreconcilability."8 Today, the underlying 
construct invoked and employed to explain the contradictory relationship between 
law and custom in Papua New Guinea remains effectively anchored in the pre-
eminently political premise: 
that a customary legal system, created to serve the needs of 
small, homogeneous, stateless societies, constitutes a threat to 
the state and to the system of codes and common law cases, 
117 See Hon. Mr Justice Smithers, 'Law and the Territory of Papua and New Guinea,' 
Melbourne University Law Review, vol. 4 (November 1963), pp. 212-237; D.P. Derham, 'Law and 
Custom in the Australian Territory of Papua and New Guinea,' University of Chicago Law Review, 
vol. 30, no. 2 (Winter 1963), pp. 495-506; J. Goldring, 'Just Law for Primitive Society?' Sydney 
Law Review, vol. 6, no. 3 (August 1971), pp. 371-381; P. Hasluck, A Time for Building: 
Australian Administration in Papua and New Guinea. 1951-1963 (Carlton: Melbourne University 
Press, 1976); L.W. Johnson, Colonial Sunset: Australia and Papua New Guinea, 1970-74 (St 
Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1983). 
118 See J. Goldring, 'Legalism Rampant: The Heritage of Imposed Law and the Constitution of 
Papua New Guinea,' Warwick Law Working Papers, vol. 2, no. 3 (June 1978); D. Weisbrot, 
'Integration of Laws in Papua New Guinea: Custom and the Criminal Law in Conflict,' in Law and 
Social Change in Papua New Guinea, ed. D. Weisbrot, A. Paliwala and A. Sawyerr (Sydney: 
Butterworths, 1982), pp. 59-103; idem, 'The Post-Independence Development of Papua New 
Guinea's Legal Institutions,' Melanesian Law Journal, vol. 15 (1987), pp. 9-48; 'Papua New 
Guinea's Indigenous Jurisprudence and the Legacy of Colonialism,' University of Hawaii Law 
Review, vol. 10, no. 1 (1988), pp. l-45; W.J. Stewart, 'Stone Age and Twentieth Century Law in 
the Independent State of Papua New Guinea; Boston College Third World Law Journal, vol. 4, 
no. l (Winter 1983), pp. 48-71. 
created by the agencies of government in order to reinforce the 
authority and legitimacy of the state.'" 
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This is not to confuse the individual political persuasions of those involved on 
either side of the debate about law and custom in Papua New Guinea with the 
wider, embracing political perspective from which everyone participating in that 
debate views the total situation. Disparate expressions of preference and dissent 
regarding the propriety of particular motives and the desirability of particular 
outcomes in the hegemonic conflict between the state and stateless societies have 
always played a part in considerations of the relationship between law and 
custom-Murray had his contemporary critics, as have his successors. 120 The 
consistent feature of political formulations, however, is that regardless of whether 
sympathy, support or allegiance is displayed towards the jural integrity of the state 
or stateless societies (that is to say, towards law or custom), participants in the 
debate invariably present their arguments arrayed in a scheme of competitive 
opposition. Thus, when the paradigmatic framework of the political formulation 
is viewed as a geme, the differences of opinion about the nature of the relationship 
between law and custom in Papua New Guinea embraced within that geme may 
be seen as amounting rather more to differences of idiom and nuance than of 
determinative substantive. General representations of that relationship are derived 
from commonly held and essentially uncontroverted assumptions about the 
inevitability of bilateral political conflict; assumptions shared in common amongst 
the members of otherwise disparate political camps. 
119 Ottley and Zorn, 'Criminal Law in Papua New Guinea,' p. 254. 
120 See, e.g., Williams, 'Creed of a Government Anthropologist'; Kaputin, 'Law: A Colonial 
Fraud?'; D.M. Fenbury, "'Kot Bilong Mipela" Better than "Kot Bilong Gavment"?' New Guinea, 
vol. I, no. 4 (1965/66), pp. 61-66. 
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In this fundamental sense, then, there is no significant disagreement between 
those who hold to the view that no greater benefit than the common law has ever 
been conferred upon Papua New Guineans, 121 and those who insist that the law is 
nothing other than 'an instrument of domination and oppression by the ruling 
classes.'122 To recognise that conflict is inevitable, and even to accept the 
inevitability of certain outcomes as a result of such conflict, of course, by no 
means necessarily implies an endorsement of the conflict per se or approval of its 
presumably foreordained consequences. 
To sum up, political formulations of the relationship between law and custom 
in Papua New Guinea predicate on the assumption that custom is ideologically 
incompatible with law, because 
it [custom] is seen as incompatible with the existence of the 
state and the processes of replacing the traditional social order 
of stateless societies with that of the modem social order. In 
the latter context it is the state which is supposed to exercise 
authority on behalf of the aggregate of individual citizens. 
The localised, communal and subjective qualities of custom as 
a means of social control are seen as incompatible with, and, 
on occasion, subversive of, the existence and extension of 
state authority. 123 
B. Organic Formulations 
Consistent with their ethnographic ongms and the anthropological 
orientations of their proponents, organic formulations of the relationship between 
law and custom in Papua New Guinea generally identify determinative 
discrepancies between traditional Melanesian custom and the introduced (or 
'
21 See Paliwala, Zorn and Bayne, 'Economic Development and the Changing Legal System of 
Papua New Guinea,' p. 12 (criticising that view); Hasluck, A Time for Building, pp. 177, 189. 
122 Kaputin, 'The Law: A Colonial Fraud?' p. 4. 
123 Dinnen, 'Sentencing, Custom and the Rule of Law in Papua New Guinea,' p. 21. 
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imposed) cum adopted Anglo-Australian law with the respective cultural systems 
in which the fundamental jural concepts of each type of society are embedded. 
Thus, the distinctive features which serve to differentiate Western law from 
Melanesian custom tend to be seen, not so much as the unmediated consequences 
of hegemonic conflict between the state and stateless societies (qua political 
forms), but rather as indicia of a much more deeply anchored complex of inter-
cultural disparities. Unlike political formulations, therefore, organic formulations 
neither require, nor even necessarily involve, so direct an appeal to hegemonic 
paradigms of political tension in order to validate the dichotomous conceptual 
premises upon which they, too, are based. 
Organic formulations regard the incompatibility of law and custom as merely 
emblematic of the underlying epistemological differences which separate, 
distinguish and contrapose Melanesian and Western cultures more generally. 
From this perspective, the irreconcilability of law and custom in Papua New 
Guinea is seen as having less to do with conflicts or failures of political will, than 
with the intrinsic polarities of the jural forms (qua cultural forms) peculiar to 
Melanesian and Western societies, respectively. As in political formulations, the 
opposition of law and custom in organic formulations is also seen to be coeval and 
largely co-extensive with the oppositional relationship between the state and 
stateless societies. The organic approach, however, emphasises the deeper, 
cultural basis of both jural and political dichotomies. Anthropology, after all, is 
said to be 'the study of the significance of cultural difference'; 124 and from the 
124 C.J. Greenhouse, 'Just in Time: Temporality and the Cultural Legitimation of Law,' Yale 
Law Journal, vol. 98, no. 8 (June 1989), p. 1631. 
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organic perspective, 'culture' 1s properly regarded as constitutive of jural and 
political forms alike. 125 
Within the framework of organ1c formulations, the legal cultures of 
Melanesian and Western society are understood and represented as significantly 
different to one another upon independent and autonomous bases. Indeed, the 
differences between Western and Melanesian legal culture are considered to be so 
fundamental, that the peculiar jural forms and systems to which each type of 
society has given rise are deemed to be entirely incompatible, structurally and 
functionally, in both a conceptual and practical sense. It is this underlying 
incompatibility that is reflected in conflicts between the state and stateless 
societies, rather than it being a product of those political and ideological conflicts. 
Because organic formulations of the troubled relationship between law and 
custom in Papua New Guinea regard the bases of the incompatibility of the state 
and stateless societies as culturally rather than politically constituted, questions of 
political (or judicial) will become only marginally relevant. The inter-systemic 
contradictions manifested in political conflict are viewed as the effects, not the 
causes, of inter-culture incongruities. 
The complementary theoretical enterprises of legal anthropology and the 
sociology of law have been largely devoted to the identification of the salient 
differentiae of law and custom, and to the explanation of those differences on 
demonstrably socio-cultural bases. 126 These common objectives notwithstanding, 
125 Thus, although Lawrence underscores the point that the discrete compartmentalisation of 
jural and political, amongst other, forms of social organisation and interaction, is itself a 
distinctively Western construct, an overarching cultural emphasis is implicit in the dichotomous 
scheme he advances, and which he supports on the strength of essentially ethnological arguments. 
'The State Versus Stateless Societies,' pp. 17, 20. 
126 See generally M. Weber, On Law in Economy and Society, ed. M. Rheinstein, trans. E. 
Shils and M. Rheinstein (1925; rpt. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954); Malinowski, Crime 
and Custom in Savage Society (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1926); H.l. Hogbin, ed. Law 
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attempts to specify and isolate adequate criteria upon which such determinative 
distinctions might be drawn, and to formulate appropriately expressive grammars 
through which these might be accurately conveyed, have generated far more 
contention than consensus amongst social scientists engaged in that collective 
pursuit. Legal scholars, too, have consistently tried to define and clarify the 
relationship, which is to say, the differences, between law and custom, although 
the debates these parallel undertakings have engendered tend to proceed upon 
rather different terms of reference. None of these efforts, however, has come 
close to achieving anything like a universally acceptable theory or analytical basis 
upon which broad intra- or inter-disciplinary understandings might be secured. 
With specific reference to the relationship between law and custom in Papua 
New Guinea, efforts to develop tenable, organic explanations for the nature and 
dynamics of that relationship have been significantly influenced by the 
vicissitudes of ongoing theoretical and methodological considerations in the social 
and Order in Polynesia: A Study of Primitive Legal Institutions (1934; rpt. New York: Cooper 
Square Publishers, Inc., 1972); N.S. Timasheff, An Introduction to the Sociology of Law (1939; 
rpt. Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1974); E.A. Hoebel, The Law of Primitive Man: A Study in 
Comparative Legal Dynamics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954); L. Nader, "The 
Anthropological Study of Law,' American Anthropologist, vol. 67, no. 6, pt. 2 (December 1965), 
pp. 3-32; P. Bohannan, ed., Law and Warfare: Studies in the Anthropology of Conflict (Garden 
City, NY: The Natural History Press, 1967); L. Pospisil, Anthropology of Law: A Comparative 
Theory (New York: Harper and Row, 1971); S. Diamond, 'The Rule of Law versus the Order of 
Custom,' in The Rule of Law, ed. R.P. Wolf (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971), pp. 115-144; 
A.L. Epstein, ed., Contention and Dispute: Aspects of Law and Social Control in Melanesia 
(Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1974); A. Podgorecki, Law and Society (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974); I. Hamnett, ed., Social Anthropology and Law, ASA 
Monograph No. 14 (London: Academic Press, 1977); S.F. Moore, Law as Process: An 
Anthropological Approach (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978); S. Roberts, Order and 
Dispute: An Introduction to Legal Anthropology (New York: StMartin's Press, 1979); S. Vago, 
Law and Society (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1981); W.J. Chamblis and R.B. 
Seidman, Law, Order and Power (2d ed. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1982); 
R. Cotterell, The Sociology of Law: An Introduction (London: Butterworths, 1984); N Luhmann, A 
Sociological Theory of Law, trans. E. King and M. Albrow (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1985). 
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sciences and the humanities. 127 As with their political counterparts, however, there 
is a remarkable degree of consistency in the thematic structure of the disparate 
arguments marshalled in support of all of the organic formulations in which that 
relationship is represented. Thus, legal ethnographers discern and abstract those 
features of Melanesian custom which, in their view, best serve to distinguish it 
from Western law. From these analyses, they have been able to develop a 
plethora of richly detailed descriptions of the techniques of 'traditional' dispute 
management and the relationship of those techniques to the larger social matrices 
within which they have evolved. 
But to set about such tasks with the intention of devising sharply 
differentiating descriptions and meticulous distinctions in the first instance, 
necessarily presupposes the existence of fundamental differences between both the 
. concepts and the phenomena denoted by the expressions 'law' and 'custom'. 
Inevitably, therefore, the conclusions towards which such inquiries are drawn are 
effectively predetermined. For the most part, organic formulations of the 
relationship between law and custom in Papua New Guinea have produced, and 
continue to generate, what is by now a familiar litany of intrinsic, irreconcilable 
differences between the respective jural forms--differences which invariably 
manifest themselves in terms of the institutional structures, substantive content, 
processes and procedures, scope and objectives of law and custom. 
127 See Gordon and Meggitt, Law and Order in the New Guinea Highlands, pp. 194-197; M. 
Strathem, 'Discovering "Social Control'"; Epstein, Contention and Dispute, pp. l-39; Sack, Land 
Between Two Laws, pp. l-18. 
C. The Inter-Dependency of Political and Organic Formulations 
of Law and Custom 
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For the purposes of the kind of analysis with which I am concerned in this 
chapter, political and organic formulations of the relationship between law and 
custom in Papua New Guinea may be seen to differ significantly only in terms of 
the aspects of incongruity in that relationship which each approach emphasises. 
The formulations themselves are neither contradictory nor incompatible; and when 
drawn together, they can and do provide persuasive, complementary explanations 
to account for the tensions and conflicts which both approaches tend to regard as 
central features in the dichotomy between law and custom. In some cases, the 
state-centred (political) conviction that it would be impolitic to allow for a greater 
congruency between law and custom may be stressed (and as said, arguments of 
this kind may either support or criticise the policies and practices of the state 
which give rise to that conviction); whilst in other cases, underlying (organic) 
factors may be focused upon, underscoring the contention that a better integrated 
relationship between law and custom is impossible to achieve in any event. 
Beyond this, however, the distinctive characteristics of political and organic 
formulations of the relationship between law and custom are not especially 
important. 
Nowadays, as ethnographic analyses are employed with increasing frequency 
to reinforce political formulations of the relationship between law and custom in 
Papua New Guinea, and as ethnographers begin to take a greater, more 
sophisticated cognisance of the historical and political-economic determinants of 
socio-legal change, it is ever more common to find combinatorial variants of the 
political and organic arguments interfused and advanced in mutually supportive 
concert. Like the distinctive formulations of which they are comprised, however, 
these amalgamated analyses uniformly predicate upon the shared assumption that 
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law and custom are properly conceived of only as discrete ideas and processual 
phenomena, contraposed in dichotomous constructs of radical opposition.128 And 
it is this common predicatory point to which I take particular exception. 
Since it is rather the synthesised fusion of the political and organic 
perspectives which provides the theoretical foundation upon which the 
contemporary dichotomy between law and custom in Papua New Guinea is 
consistently based, it is sensible that the concepts of law and custom represented 
by that inter-dependent formulation should be the objects of critical scrutiny here. 
(1) Melanesian Custom from the Dichotomous Perspective 
Allowing for the myriad variations that must attend any typification of 'at least 
I 000 different customary legal systems' in a country 'well known for its social 
diversity and richness of cultures,' 129 custom, or customary law, in Papua New 
Guinea is still generally described as the distinctively Melanesian approach to the 
maintenance of normative social order and control in stateless, non-hierarchically 
organised societies. It is flexible, unsystematic and fluidly applicable to different 
persons in different ways, varying further in its application from time to time and 
from place to place (even within the same group and locality) depending upon the 
status and relationships of the persons involved. 
Custom is not comprised of specific rules of conduct, as such. Thus, although 
broader principles of conduct are sometimes recognised, acknowledged as 
128 Although the relationship between law and custom is sometimes said to be manipulated for 
ideological purposes, in order to produce the illusion of partial complementarity. See Fitzpatrick, 
Law and State in Papua New Guinea. 
129 R. Scaglion, 'The Role of Custom in Law Reform,' in Essays on the Constitution of Papua 
New Guinea, ed. R. De Vere, D. Colquhoun-Kerr and J. Kaburise (Port Moresby: Tenth 
independence Anniversary Advisory Committee, 1985), p. 32. 
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relevant to instant circumstances and normatively invoked, custom is said rather to 
consist in relatively loose, open-ended and freely flowing processes whereby 
disputes and grievances of all kinds may be considered, discussed, managed, 
directed (or re-directed) and occasionally resolved. Whilst the operations of such 
processual mechanisms may involve particular techniques, styles, routines and 
rituals, the dynamics of custom are essentially informal. 
The institution of traditional Melanesian custom is eminently malleable and 
politicised, in that the identities, reputations and relationships of the persons 
involved in its operation may influence (sometimes determinatively) the manner 
in which it is performed, as well as its outcomes. Invariably, the processes of jural 
custom are interpersonal affairs. Two, and frequently many more persons may 
negotiate towards the settlement of a grievance, although third parties may assist 
or participate mediatorily and, occasionally, even adjudicatively (and grievances 
themselves are apt to involve a complex of ongoing, sometimes seemingly 
unrelated issues). 
The customary management of a dispute may lead to a definitive resolution of 
the matter or matters to hand, although it is equally, perhaps more, likely that what 
will be achieved will involve only a partial or temporary settlement. But this is 
not quite so problematic as it may seem, since the successful conduct of 
'traditional' Papua New Guinean disputing processes does not necessarily depend 
upon their being carried out to a final conclusion. Rather, their underlying 
purpose is to permit the ventilation of festering grievances and to permit aggrieved 
parties to work out some sort of mutually acceptable modus vivendi. In Papua 
New Guinea, as Professor Lawrence so aptly put it: 
there is no concept of fiat justitia, ruat coelum but a clear 
recognition that the sky must be kept up. In settling a dispute, 
the aim is to restore the social order, or to patch up 
relationships that have been broken or damaged. Somehow, 
for the good of all, plaintiff and defendant must be made to 
resolve their quarrel. 130 
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Custom may operate, however, to oblige, compel or otherwise to permit 
aggrieved individuals to seek unilateral self-redress against assumed offenders on 
either an individual or a collective basis. The remedies they seek may be 
compensatory, retributive or both. In the end, however, the object is to restore a 
sense of balance (if not harmony) to a relationship or a set of relationships which 
have been disturbed as a consequence of some act or omission, and regardless of 
whether the precipitating conduct is real or imagined, actual or constructive, 
proven or alleged. 
In the absence of a state there can be no notion of 'crime,' as such, within the 
jural order of traditional Melanesian social organisation. There are, however, 
various kinds and gradations of interpersonal delicts and offences which may be 
committed against certain quasi-religious norms (the latter of which can, on 
occasion, invite retributive sanctions from decidedly human agencies). 
Responsibility for wrongdoing (which can extend well beyond what, in 'modern' 
Western experience, amounts to demonstrable culpability) is commonly shared 
amongst several members of a group or community. Liability for certain forms of 
conduct causing harm or injury, and the prerogative to enforce sanctions against 
the perpetrators, are likewise often matters of collective or communal concern. 
Questions of causation, which give rise to the attachment of customary 
responsibility and/or liability, may not, in every case, require proof or even 
evidence of a tangible link (direct or proximate) between an alleged act and its 
consequences. Indeed, the eduction of such evidence as may be necessary (or 
desirable) to establish a causal connection between an actionable delict and the 
130 Lawrence, 'The State Versus Stateless Societies,' p. 34. 
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accused wrongdoer may involve all manner of metaphysical or supernatural 
processes. 
Finally, a central feature of the organic model of 'traditional' Melanesian 
custom is that custom, or customary law is, by its very nature, inherently 
unamenable to fixed formulation or recordation in any permanent form. Custom 
is unwritten-not simply because its practice is prevalent amongst 'traditionally' 
non-literate peoples, but because any attempt to codifY or otherwise memorialise it 
in writing would rob custom of its dynamic and indeterminate plasticity. Once 
written down, custom would simply cease to be custom. 
(2) Western Law from the Dichotomous Perspective 
For the purposes of contrasting law and custom in Papua New Guinea, 
Western law (that is to say, the introduced and adopted Anglo-Australian common 
law) is typically understood and represented in dichotomous formulations as the 
complete inversion of virtually all of the features by which Melanesian custom is 
generally characterised. Thus, it is portrayed as the specialised and uniform 
means by which the centralised, hierarchically configured authorities of the 
modem state provide for the normative regulation of society. 
Law is rigidly systematic and universally applicable to all persons within its 
clearly defined jurisdictional spheres of operation upon demonstrably impersonal, 
impartial and apolitical bases. Substantively, it is understood to consist 
exclusively in the fixed formulations of rules and principles, which are either 
positively enacted by designated legislative bodies, or else they are embodied in 
the closely framed pronouncements of judicial decisions. In either form, however, 
the law delineates clear and specific rights and duties, from none of which may a 
person's conduct lawfully depart in the absence of an equally clear and specific 
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provision of the law allowing for such deviation. Rules and principles further 
define and constrain the institutional and processual aspects of the law's 
operations, and these, too, tend to be tightly structured, closely bounded affairs, 
formalistically routinised at every stage. In this way, the law provides both the 
basis upon which the broadest range of human affairs are ordered and directed in 
organised society, and the means by which disputes and grievances arising out of 
the breach of that order are expected, and in many cases required, to be addressed. 
And in both respects, it is a strict, unwavering compliance with these requirements 
that the law demands of all who participate, willingly or otherwise, in the social 
life of the state. 
The law seeks to maintain and restore its own sense of balance in social 
relationships, which may or may not reflect the relevant values of the larger 
community (or even necessarily the values of those in whose relationships it 
intervenes). Moreover, this distinctively legal balance is achieved through an 
adversarial process by which an aggrieved party must challenge and, if he or she is 
to succeed, prevail in the prosecution of his or her claim over the defences or 
counterclaims of an alleged wrongdoer. But before they may be addressed in this 
way, issues of legal contention are narrowed to their barest essentials. 
Circurnscriptive rules of evidence delimit the quality and quantity of information 
which the law will regard as admissible in its disposition of the matters to hand, 
and the mere passage of time (measured in pre-determined and arbitrary 
increments) may render claims stale, and thus inactionable, despite their otherwise 
legitimate bases. 
Upon these exclusive terms, one party will be adjudged to have acted (or to 
have failed to act) in such a way as to be legally wrong, whilst another will be 
found to have acted rightly (at least to the extent that the latter's conduct is 
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deemed to have been in compliance with, or not in violation of, the law). One 
wins because the other has lost in a process commonly characterised as an 
intricately structured, competitive engagement. Whilst not necessarily 'illegal', 
negotiated compromises or mediated settlements entered into by parties to a legal 
dispute with a view to the achievement of a an arrangement mutually acceptable to 
themselves, are nonetheless extra-legal. And if such extra-legal arrangements are 
to be regarded as within the law, they must receive the formal approbation of the 
state in one form or another. At all events, finality and certainty are amongst the 
law's principal objectives and temporary, ad hoc dispositions are disfavoured. 
The law draws clear and definitive distinctions between interpersonal conduct 
of a wrongful nature, and wrongful conduct directed against the state. In the 
former instance, remedies tend to be compensatory rather than restorative 
(although on occasion, the law may direct remedial actions whereby certain kinds 
of conduct may be compelled or restrained). In the latter case, however, where 
one's unlawful action involves a direct affront to state, the consequences are 
punitive and often quite severe. 
Regardless of whether a particular instance of wrongdoing is directed against 
the state or another person, responsibility (and/or culpability) for wrongdoing 
under the law always attaches, at least preliminarily, to the acts or omissions of a 
an individual person. As a general rule, there is no presumption of 'corporate' 
responsibility, unless the corporate entity itself entertains a legally cognisable 
personality (in which case the law may or may not provide for some allocation of 
responsibility amongst the members of the legally recognised group). Even in 
clear cases of a legally legitimate grievance, however, unilateral self-help is 
condemned and may itself constitute illegal conduct. The state maintains a 
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covetous monopoly over the acceptable use of force and coercion in the effort to 
achieve the remedial ends of the law. 
Except in the rarest of circumstances, liability for wrongdoing must be 
premised upon fault; and fault, amongst other things, must be proven on clear and 
convincing evidence demonstrating tangible relations of cause and effect. Thus, 
actionable wrongdoing of any kind must be linked directly and proximately to the 
conduct of the alleged wrongdoer. Having evinced the required causal linkages, 
however, a claimant may still be required to show that the harmful or injurious 
consequences of the conduct in question were reasonably foreseeable before legal 
liability will attach. 
Finally, law is, and, in a sense, must be, recorded in writing and preserved, so 
that it may continue to provide a clear and specific exposition of norms of conduct 
to those who must abide by it, and in order also that it may serve as a certain, 
fixed and consistent reference for those who have been delegated to construe, 
interpret and apply it. Memorialising the law in this way not only ensures its 
ready availability, but operates further to secure the signification of its authority 
and legitimacy. Indeed, the premium placed upon the written enunciation of law 
in Western society is so significant that, lacking that form of presentation, its very 
validity may well be denied. 
*** 
These radically divergent characterisations constitute the substantive elements 
from which the persistent dichotomy between Western law and Melanesian 
custom in Papua New Guinea has historically been, and continues to be, 
formulated. Despite mounting evidence to the effect that the foundations of this 
dichotomy are grounded in stereotypical and what are increasingly coming to be 
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regarded as untenably simplistic notions of law and custom alike, this bi-polar 
contraposition remains as pervasive, and seemingly as persuasive, today as it has 
always been. As Peter Sack observes, however, the dichotomous formulation of 
law and custom 'is not only in itself unsatisfactory but also seriously misleading 
because it tends to merge the "law"/"custom" dichotomy with a distinction 
between the indigenous and the imposed colonial law.' Although this 
identification 'is in line with official colonial usage,' Sack continues, 131 
and while there was, at the time of independence, a 
widespread belief that the end of colonial rule would 
miraculously alter the status of 'custom' as well as the 
character of 'law' in the country, it is likely to prevent a better 
appreciation of legal reality in Papua New Guinea instead of 
facilitating it132 
But if the dichotomous representation of law and custom in Papua New 
Guinea is so fundamentally misconceived, how is one to account for its prevalent 
and enduring influence in the discrete (and complementary) political and organic 
formulations of that relationship? If such constructions are the products of 
inadvertence, what are the factors that have permitted these kinds of egregiously 
misdirected conceptualisations to emerge and to remain effectively unchallenged 
in the context of what is otherwise generally competent and responsible 
scholarship? And if they are deliberately erected, to what end? 
131 Sack, 111Law" and "Custom" in Papua New Guinea,' p. 250. 
132 Sack, "'Law" and "Custom" in Papua New Guinea,' p. 250. 
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7. THE OVER-VALUATION OF DIFFERENCE 
IN THE DICHOTOMISA TION OF LAW AND CUSTOM 
Of all the antinomic features by which Western representations of the 
relationship between tradition and modernity tend to be characterised, the 
dichotomy between law and custom stands out as one of the more enduringly 
problematic and persistently vexing. 133 Indeed, its conceptual origins can be traced 
back to the dualistic propensities that shaped the ontological and epistemological 
orientations of Graeco-Roman philosophical thought, and which have influenced 
the controversial evolution of the entire Western Weltanschauung ever since. 134 
This, of course, is not the place to explore, au fond, the historical development 
of these issues, which even today charge debates about the relationship between 
law and custom in Papua New Guinea-and in the contemplation of which the 
questions raised above are certainly implicated. For present purposes, however, in 
considering of some possible answers to these questions, a useful and instructive 
light may be shed upon some of their more immediately relevant aspects. 
133 See M. Chiba, Legal Pluralism: Toward a General Theory Through Japanese Legal 
Culture (Tokyo: Tokai University Press, 1989), pp. 13-26; K. Kulcsar, Modernization and Law: 
Theses and Thoughts (Budapest: Institute of Sociology, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 1987), 
pp. 7-58; D. Lloyd, The Idea of Law (Rev. ed. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1981), pp. 226-
255; W. Friedmann, Legal Theory (4th ed. London: Stevens & Sons Ltd, 1960), pp. 28-39; Sack, 
'Paradigm Lost: Modem versus Traditional Legal Systems,' paper presented at the 9th World 
Congress of Sociology, Research Committee on the Sociology of Law. 
134 Marilyn Strathem links related anthropological misconceptions about law and custom to 
what she describes as the 'naturalist interpretation' of law, which she associates directly with the 
more recent philosophical influences of the European Enlightenment and the eighteenth-century 
market-place utilitarianism of Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham. See M. Strathem, 'Discovering 
"Social Control",' Journal of Law and Society, vol. 12, no. 2 (Summer 1985), pp. 111-134. And 
see generally R.A. Nisbet, Social Change and History (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1969); H.T. Wilson, Tradition and Innovation: The Idea of Civilization as Culture and its 
Significance (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984); S.N. Eisenstadt, Tradition, Change and 
Modernity (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973); R.H. Chilcote, Theories of Comparative 
Politics: The Search for a Paradigm (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981), pp. 271-346; S.L. 
Seaton and H.J.M. Claessen, eds., Political Anthropology: The State of the Art (The Hague: 
Mouton Publishers, 1979), pp. 1-28; H.J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the 
Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983). 
465 
A. The Ideological Deployment of'Law' and 'Custom' 
One of the minor ironies of modem intellectual history, suggests the eminent 
symbolic anthropologist, Clifford Geertz, is the extent to which the term 'ideology' 
has itself become 'thoroughly ideologized': 135 
A concept that once meant but a collection of political 
proposals, perhaps somewhat intellectualistic and impractical 
but at any rate idealistic . . . has now become . . . 'the 
integrated assertions, theories, and aims constituting a politico· 
social program, often with an implication of factitious 
propogandizing ... '. 136 
Nowhere, perhaps, is the poignant accuracy of this observation more readily 
demonstrable than in the discursive contexts in which the concepts and 
phenomena of law and custom are considered in connexion with the relationship 
between Western (or Westemised) and Melanesian legal cultures; and although I 
am not especially concerned here to develop a general discussion of the 'ideology 
of law' (either as a theoretical polemic in contemporary socio-legal scholarship, or 
even in the narrower context of inter-cultural comparison137), it is quite apparent 
that the relationship between law and custom in Papua New Guinea has come to 
be regarded as something of a barometer, if not the touchstone, of ideological 
contradiction and conflict in colonial and post-colonial jural relations. 
For example, and as we have seen, the ideological rhetoric of the political and 
politicised organic formulations of the relationship between colonial law and 
135 C. Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays, (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 
1973), p. 193. 
136 Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, p. 193. 
137 See C.J. Greenhouse, 'Courting Difference: Issues of Interpretation and Comparison in the 
Study of Legal Ideologies,' Law & Society Review, vol. 22, no. 4 (1988), pp. 687-707; A. Hunt, 
'The Ideology of Law: Advances and Problems in Recent Applications of the Concept of Ideology 
to the Analysis of Law,' Law & Society Review, vol. 19, no. I (1985), pp. 11-37; D. Sugarman, 
ed., Legality, Ideology and the State (London: Academic Press, 1983). 
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indigenous custom in Papua New Guinea has been effectively wielded as both a 
sword and a shield (although, perhaps, 'two-edged sword' provides the better 
simile). Essentially the same kind of arguments have been employed to exalt the 
introduction of the Anglo-Australian rule of law as the greatest 'gift' ever 
bestowed upon a benighted native population, 138 and to condemn the imposition of 
law as an abject 'colonial fraud' and the 'ultimate indignity' visited upon subject 
Melanesian peoples by their erstwhile European overlords. 139 In both cases, the 
law is set hegemonically against custom; and custom is devalued accordingly: 
Ultimately, custom remains peripheral because it is seen as 
incompatible with the existence of the nation-state and the 
processes of replacing the traditional social order of stateless 
societies with that of the modern social order. 140 
As the peculiarly jural expression of the hegemonically expansionist culture it 
represented, the Anglo-Australian rule of law in Papua New Guinea epitomised 
the great 'civilising mission' of Western imperialism, the undisguised objectives of 
138 P. Has luck, A Time for Building: Australian Administration in Papua and New Guinea, 
1951-1963 (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1976), p. 189, echoing, mutatis mutandis, Sir 
Kenneth Roberts-Wray's observation that: 
British administration in overseas countries has conferred no 
greater benefit than English law and justice. That may be a 
trite observation, but I offer no apology. It has been said so 
often by so many people-as many laymen as lawyers and 
perhaps more Africans than Englishmen-that it must be 
assumed to be true. ['The Adaptation of Imported Law in 
Africa,' Journal of African Law, vol. 4, no. 2 (1960), p. 66). 
139 J. Kaputin, 'The Law: A Colonial Fraud?' New Guinea, vol. 10, no. I (1975), pp. 4-15. See 
also, Fitzpatrick, Law and State in Papua New Guinea; A. Paliwala, J. Zorn and P. Bayne, 
'Economic Development and the Changing Legal System of Papua New Guinea,' African Law 
Studies, no. 16 (1978), pp. 3-79. 
140 Dinnen, 'Sentencing, Custom and the Rule of Law in Papua New Guinea,' pp. 20-21. See 
also, B.L. Ottley and J.G. Zorn, 'Criminal Law in Papua New Guinea: Code, Custom and the 
Courts in Conflict,' American Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 31, no. 2 (Spring 1983), pp. 251-
300. 
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which were to supplant 'savage anarchy' with 'order and rationality.' 141 Thus Mr 
Justice Gore, a former Chief Judicial Officer in colonial Papua, could unabashedly 
declare: 'All they [Papua New Guineans] know, which is worthwhile, has been 
taught them by Europeans.' 142 
But the transparent ideology of Anglo-Australian colonialism is said to have 
contained a 'convenient duality', enabling it to be deployed in order to justifY 'the 
adaptation and exploitation of resident social formations' and, at the same time, as 
a corollary 'ideology of protection' invoked to justifY 'conserving the traditional 
mode.' 143 As Peter Fitzpatrick explains: 
Traditional law could hardly be ignored or suppressed, as it 
was the law of the vast bulk of the people. It was embedded in 
and supportive of the traditional mode of production which the 
colonist sought to conserve. Yet traditional law was also seen 
as uncivilized, arbitrary and partial and, in short, contrary to 
bourgeois legality .... 144 
This particular apparent conflict between law and custom was effectively 
resolved ideologically by Papua New Guinea's colonial administrators 'by 
extracting something called "native custom" [or customary law] from the 
operative dynamic of traditional dispute settlement':145 
The perceived vices of traditional law could then be attached 
to dispute settlement. Provision was usually made for the 
recognition of 'native custom' in colonial courts, subject to 
broad exceptions including one that the custom concerned 
must not be inconsistent with colonial law. Even where there 
141 Paliwala, Zorn and Bayne, 'Economic Development and the Changing Legal System of 
Papua New Guinea,' pp. 11-12. 
142 R.T. Gore, Justice versus Sorcery (Brisbane: Jacaranda Press, 1965), p. 218. 
143 Fitzpatrick, Law and State in Papua New Guinea, p. 68. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Ibid. 
was no such formal recognition ... custom was allowed 'in 
every case where it can be reasonable fitted in with our idea of 
good government.' 146 
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Carried forward into the post-colonial milieu of the independent state, this 
dualistic ideology is said to have found its counterpart in the ideology of 
'development and modemisation': 147 
Such doctrines have it that the introduction of modem or 
western values and institutions will transform third world 
social formations into a metropolitan likeness and in this way 
they will eradicate the backwardness that causes 
underdevelopment . . . . As well as obviously serving the 
interests of metropolitan capital, the ideology of 
modernization . . . serve to legitimate the position of the 
national bourgeoisie, the 'new elites', the resident agents and 
the indigenous vanguard of modernization. This ideology also 
helps legitimate the arrogation of tremendous state power for 
the Herculean task of development and helps legitimate the 
broad discretionary form of law. Such legitimations underlie 
the emphasis in academic theorizing about law and 
modernization on the efficacy or ever omnipotence of law as 
an instrument of development . . . . As with the general 
ideology of modernization, this theorizing sometimes 
explicitly sets a better, modem, western world towards which 
transforming the law is to aim. 148 
In the post-colonial context, however, the devaluating transmogrification of 
Melanesian custom is more subtle and more insidious. 
The independent state has made bold claims which, on the surface, reflect a 
genuine interest in the preservation (or resurrection) of indigenous jural custom. 
Indicatively, and in anticipation of independence, Papua New Guinea's first Prime 
Minister (then Chief Minister) proclaimed in 1973: 
146 Ibid. (quoting Sir Hubert Murray). 
147 Ibid., p. 47. 
148 Ibid. 
[W]e are facing, at this very moment, the need to devise a 
system of laws appropriate to a self-governing, independent 
nation. The legal system that we are in the process of creating 
... must respond to our own needs and values. We do not 
want to create an imitation of the Australian, English or 
American legal systems. We want to build a framework of 
laws and procedures that the people of Papua New Guinea can 
recognise as their own-not something imposed on them by 
outsiders. 149 
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And subsequently, Papua New Guinea's Law Reform Commission reasserted 
this objective in terms of the now constitutionally mandated task of fostering the 
development of a genuine Melanesian jurisprudence-
a common law of Papua New Guinea that would reflect the 
values, customs, traditions, beliefs, perceptions, and cultures 
of the people, and would secure the kind of justice that the 
people would understand and appreciate. 150 
Ideologically, however, law remains an inseparable part of the state, colonial 
or post-coloniaL As such, it tends to be regarded merely as 'a type of state action, 
distinctive in certain operational ways, but sharing its functions with other types 
of state action.' Hence, even when the state appears to be engaged in the active 
advancement of traditional jural values and practices, it is actually, albeit 
clandestinely, striving only to conserve the 'traditional mode'. 151 Under this 
pretext, the independent state, no less so than its colonial predecessor, 
manipulates, co-opts and suborns custom for ideologically self-serving purposes. 
Contemporary proponents of the development of a genuinely 'home-grown' 
Melanesian jurisprudence (as the expression of authentic customary legal values) 
149 Han. M. T. Somare, 'Law and the Needs of Papua New Guinea's People,' in Lo Bilong 01 
Manmeri: Crime, Compensation and Village Courts, ed. J. Zorn and P. Bayne (Waigani: 
University of Papua New Guinea, 1975), p. 14. 
150 Law Reform Commission of Papua New Guinea, Annual Report, 1979, p. 19. 
151 Fitzpatrick, Law and State in Papua New Guinea, pp. 28, 247. 
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are thus cynically identified as 'Papua New Guinea lawyers, expatriate academics, 
and legal consultants with extensive experience in the Third World,' 152 promoting 
'home-grown' jural adaptations intended to serve the state's ideological need 'to 
give fuller recognition to elements of traditional social formations so as to 
incorporate and contain them more integrally within the same system.' 153 
From this perspective, any effort designed to promote the fuller integration of 
law and custom in Papua New Guinea can only be understood as disingenuous or 
deluded; and nowadays, the term customary law is usually employed only in a 
pejorative sense, connoting the products of those machinations by which 
'traditional' jural values are said to be distorted, invented and massaged this way 
and that, before they are ultimately pressed into ideological service on behalf of 
the state. 154 Because 'customary law' is really rather more like law than custom, the 
'rule of law' and the 'order of custom' remain dialectically antithetical, 155 and the 
theoretical integrity of the dichotomy between law and custom remains intact. 
Thus, whilst the newly politicised anthropology of law in Papua New Guinea 
predicates on the assumption that 'Western law may well be a colonial fraud,' its 
modem ideological critique is directed even more pointedly at 'the possibility of 
152 Gordon and Meggitt, Law and Order in the New Guinea Highlands, p. 190. 
153 Fitzpatrick, Law and State in Papua New Guinea, p. 238. 
154 Gordon and Meggitt offer these observations in respect ofthe term 'customary law': 
[I]n view of the ideological importance that Papua New 
Guinea nationals attach to making a fresh start on the basis of 
recognized customary law, it is rather surprising that the 
definition of custom they have accepted is essentially alien, a 
confection of ethnocentric Australian administrators . . . . The 
product of legal draughtsmen, lawyers, and academics, it 
reflects their cultural biases and disciplinary inclinations [Law 
and Order in the New Guinea Highlands, p. 195]. 
155 See S. Diamond,' The Rule of Law Versus the Order of Custom,' in The Rule of Law (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1971 ), pp. 115-143. 
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customary law being transformed into a neocolonial fraud ... .' 156 And as every 
lawyer knows, fraud is, by definition, intentional deceit. 
B. Epistemological Bases of the 
Dichotomy Between Law and Custom 
Ideologically, the dichotomy between law and custom in Papua New Guinea 
usefully serviced the political requirements of the colonial state, and it continues, 
mutatis mutandis, to provide quite similar services in relation to the needs of the 
independent state. 157 At the same time, various conceptualisations of law and 
custom (and the dichotomous nature of their inter-relations) have been 
ideologically deployed by individuals and groups in Melanesia who, whilst not 
necessarily acting as agents of the state, per se, nevertheless have come to 
recognise and appreciate the potent political utility of adopting and adapting 
dichotomous formulations of the relationship between law and custom (amongst 
other significations of the differences between modem and traditional culture), for 
decidedly political purposes. 158 
More subtle and more sophisticated than these patently political applications, 
however (although not, I think, unrelated to them), the perpetuation of the 
dichotomy between law and custom may also involve processes that are largely 
156 Gordon and Meggitt, Law and Order in the New Guinea Highlands, p. 204. 
157 See U. Sundhaussen, 'Ideology and Nation-Building in Papua New Guinea,' Australian 
Outlook, vol. 31, no. 2 (August 1977), pp. 308-319. 
158 See, e.g., M. Jolly, 'Custom and the Way of the Land" The Politics of Tradition in Vanuatu 
and Fiji,' paper presented at the annual conference of the Association for Social Anthropology in 
Oceania, Kauai, Hawaii (March 1990); L. Lindstrom, 'Pasin Tumbuna: Cultural Traditions and 
National Identity in Papua New Guinea,' paper presented at the annual conference of the 
Association for Social Anthropology in Oceania, Kauai, Hawaii (March 1990); J. Linnekin, 'The 
Politics of Culture in the Pacific,' in Cultural Identity and Ethnicity in the Pacific, ed. J. Linnekin 
and L. Poyer (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990). 
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inadvertent or, at any rate, less deliberative. Such processes may well entertain 
distinctively ideological characteristics and objectives; but they are anchored, it 
would seem, more deeply in the epistemological substructures of Western thought. 
With particular reference to anthropological and historical renderings of 
Pacific Island societies, Roger Keesing elucidated the processes whereby aspects 
of 'Western' conceptualisations of 'culture' may pass through our scholarly 
discourses and into the 'cultural nationalist rhetoric' of 'Third World elites'. 159 
However much Melanesian appeals to custom (kastom) may be distinctively 
Melanesian, the exogenous influences of Western ideology and epistemology are 
palpable. 160 
In both contexts, Keesing observed, essentialistically reified, 'thinglike' 
concepts of 'culture' provide 'an ideal rhetorical instrument for claims to identity, 
phrased in opposition to Modernity, Westernization, or neocolonialism.' 161 And in 
this sense, anthropologists, amongst other Western scholars, may be directly 
implicated in the initial misrepresentation of 'traditional' Oceanic cultures, as well 
as the transmitted reproduction of those misrepresentations: 
Some of the classic accounts and generalisations about the 
culmres of Polynesia and Melanesia by expatriate scholars-to 
which Islanders have been exposed through books and other 
media-are misleading. Western scholars' own misrenderings 
and stereotypes have fed back into contemporary 
(mis)representations of the Pacific past162 
159 Keesing, 'Theories ofCulmre,' p. 5. 
160 R.M. Keesing, 'Kastom in Melanesia: An Overview,' Mankind, vol. 13, no. 4 (August 
1982), p. 297. 
"' Keesing, 'Theories of Culmre,' p. 5. 
162 Keesing, 'Creating the Past,' p. 24. 
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In his description of the many ways in which such derivative and misrendered 
images are perpetuated through 'discourses of cultural identity', Keesing 
underscored the importance of the pervasive incorporation of 'the structures, 
categories, and premises' underlying the hegemonic ideology of colonial 
domination into contemporary counterhegemonic discourses. 163 Dialectically, he 
argues, 'elements of indigenous culture are selected and valorized (at the levels of 
both ideology and practice) as counters to or commentaries on the intrusive and 
dominant colonial culture.' And in constituting these idealised images, he notes, 
the conceptual contributions of Western anthropology 'particularly ideas about 
"culture" ... as the[se] have entered Western popular thought,' are prominently 
featured. 164 
To the extent that the machinations Keesing described in relation to the larger, 
embracing concept of 'culture' regularly occur in the generation and transmission 
of Western scholarly discourses, it must follow that the embedded concept of 
'legal culture' (and its integrands of law and custom) should be a salient 
component in this process of 'political mythmaking' .165 It is certainly apparent that 
the ideological utility provided by formulary invocations of law and custom 
derives principally from the deployment of those expressions as conceptual, as 
well as practical, antagonists. 
163 Keesing. 'Creating the Past,' p. 23. 
164 Ibid. Keesing accounted for this process as follows: 
In part this is because those who are dominated intemalise the 
premises and categories of the dominant; in part, because the 
discourse of domination creates the objective, institutional 
realities within which struggles must be fought; and in part, 
because it defines the semiology through which claims to 
power must be expressed ['Creating the Past', p. 20]. 
165 Keesing, 'Creating the Past,' p. 20. 
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Twenty years ago, theoretical anthropology was said to have ratified a shift in 
conceptual emphasis from notions of law and culture to the idea of law in 
culture. 166 Today, 'new directions' in the anthropology of law are said to point 
unerringly towards a reformulated concept of law as culture. 167 Responsively, 
analytical approaches have been recast to concentrate greater attention 'on the 
ways in which legal ideas permeate daily life and how common-sense 
understandings of the person, time, and causality inform legal processes.'168 
Manifestly, it is no longer only anthropologists, 'but also the people they study, 
[who] assume that legal systems are cultural systems.' 169 
Perhaps, as Keesing's arguments suggest, the dichotomisation of law and 
custom is but a further expression of enduring Western cravings for 'radical 
alterity.' 170 At all events, it is a persistent and recurring feature in contemporary 
representations of the distinctively 'legal' in the comparative consideration of 
Western and Melanesian societies, pervading the interpretative theories of 
anthropology, law, philosophy, history, sociology, economics and politics alike. 
It is, as we have seen, a hallmark of the conceptual orientations which set the 
conventional constructs (political, organic and politico-organic) of modern and 
traditional jural arrangements against one another in formulations of radical 
opposition, and it forms the basis of a dichotomous model that reifies and 
9. 
166 L. Nader, Law in Culture and Society (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969), pp. 8-
167 Starr and Collier, 'Dialogues in Legal Anthropology,' pp. 11-13. 
168 Ibid., p. 11. 
169 Ibid. 
17° Keesing, 'Theories of Culture,' p. l. 
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perpetuates an irreconcilable contraposition of 'the state versus stateless societies' 
in Papua New Guinea. 
If Melanesian custom must be valorized in order to sustain the vigour of a 
counterhegemonic discourse, then as a corollary of that proposition, Western law 
must be devalued commensurately. Implicitly, then, the dichotomisation of law 
and custom magnifies instances of difference; and in that continuing 
overstatement of difference, situations of conflict and contradiction are necessarily 
accentuated. In tum, these preoccupations may be seen as tending not only 
supplant equally important considerations of resemblance and continuity, but as 
operating further to diminish the likelihood that existing and potential bases for 
complementarity and integrative concord may be recognised as such. 
Indeed, approaching the relationship between law and custom as one of 
dichotomous opposition, at the epistemological and ideological, levels may well 
invite and exacerbate the very problems of conflict and contradiction at the 
practical level which the dichotomous model is supposedly intended only to 
explain. Thus, if the conception of 'culture' itself represents a reification-or, as 
Keesing so persuasively argued, '[a] complex system of ideas and customs, 
attributed a false concreteness ... , turned into a causal agent'; and if ' [ c ]ultures are 
viewed as doing things, causing them to happen (or not happen),'17I then to the 
extent that misrendered notions of law and custom are taken to represent 
instantiated expressions of Western and Melanesian legal culture, similar, and 
commensurately misrendered conclusions will logically be drawn in respect of 
those concepts. If "'opposing the values of kastom to those of the West ... 
[represents] a Western criticism of Westernization ... [which] borrows from the 
171 Keesing, 'Creating the Past,' p. 33. 
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West a number of its patterns",' 172 then contraposing the values of Western and 
Melanesian legal cultures is liable to involve the same processes of reification, 
distortion and misrepresentation. 
Insofar as the conventionally dichotomised relationship between law and 
custom in Papua New Guinea is concerned, this appears to be the case. And 
whilst it is heartening to see that anthropologists are now beginning to take the 
first tentative steps towards a necessary reappraisal of their understandings 
concerning the nature and dynamics of Melanesian custom, these important strides 
will only be complete when the nature and dynamics of the common law are 
similarly reassessed. 
8. AN ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LAW AND CUSTOM 
Referring illustratively to a standard introductory volume on Western 
jurisprudence, 173 the American legal anthropologist and lawyer, Sally Falk Moore, 
has drawn critical anthropological attention to what she described as a failure on 
the part of the text's author to extract 'any general sociological significance from 
the study of societies quite different from our own.' 174 In a subsequent essay, 
Moore extended her criticism to the whole of jurisprudential scholarship in 
relation to its treatment of law and custom. Expressly challenging the patently 
172 A. Babadzan, 'Kastom and National Building in the South Pacific,' in R. Guideri, F. Pellizzi 
and S. Tambiah, eds., Ethnicities and Nations: Processes of Interethnic Relations in Latin 
America, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific (Houston: University of Texas Press, 1988), quoted in 
Keesing, Creating the Past,' p. 33. 
173 Dennis (now Lord) Lloyd, Introduction to Jurisprudence (London: Stevens and Sons Ltd, 
1965). 
174 Moore, Law as Process, p. 220 (originally published as an essay, 'Law and Anthropology,' 
in Biennial Review of Anthropology, I 969, ed. B.J. Siegel (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1970). 
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evolutionary orientations characteristically reflected m the conceptual 
categorisations 'which used to be dear to the hearts of scholars of historical 
jurisprudence' (and amongst which the dichotomy between law and custom was 
once prominent), Moore condemned the influence of those categorisations, which 
she regarded as operative still (circa 1978) in modem jurisprudential 
scholarship. 175 
Reminding us that 'the origins of law and the course of legal development 
were the subject of much evolutionary speculation' in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, and that in such analyses custom was invariably treated as the 
'precursor of law, its evolutionary source,' 176 Moore decried the fact that, even 
today, when virtually all works on jurisprudence might be credited for including at 
least 'some introductory remarks on primitive law,'177 most of these more recent 
works (of which she cites only two examples) still tend to: 
treat the law of technologically simple societies as the 
historical or typological precursor of modem law-as an early 
stage subsequently replaced by that of the supposed apogee of 
excellence, the Western European tradition, or perhaps still 
better, the Anglo-American tradition. The law of pre-
industrial society is ... treated as a phenomenon that has been 
superseded, rendered obsolete by later improvements.m 
To render Moore's general comments about the jurisprudential treatment of 
the relationship between law and custom specifically applicable to the 
consideration of that relationship in respect of Papua New Guinea, it is only 
necessary to replace 'Anglo-American' with 'Anglo-Australian'; and as Peter Sack 
175 Moore, Law as Process, p. 13. 
176 Ibid. 
177 Ibid., p. 219. 
178 Ibid., pp. 219-220. 
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has noted, custom (or customary law) in that context has typically been 
characterised as 'obsolete', 'ineffective' and 'irrational', in contradistinction to the 
'modem law' of the developed Western state179 (although, as we have seen, this is a 
dichotomous formulation which is quite capable of cutting in precisely the 
opposite direction at the ideologicallevel).'80 
In certain respects, of course, it must be owned that Moore's critical 
observations regarding the place of 'primitive law' in conventional jurisprudential 
analyses are not entirely inapposite. What she fails to acknowledge, however, is 
that most contemporary legal scholars have fairly well rejected analytical schemes 
of universal legal evolution, and also that legal theorists had certainly begun to 
expand and refine their treatments of 'primitive law' long before Moore offered her 
critique. 181 Even ten years ago, then, Moore's misgivings about the extent to which 
ethnocentric, evolutionist preconceptions (and the dichotomous models of law and 
custom they embrace) had been responsively purged from the consciousness of 
modem jurisprudence were probably overstated. Unfortunately, a great many 
legal anthropologists today still seem to share Moore's suspicion of legal scholars, 
along with her doubts about the capacity of legal theory to come to terms with the 
complexities of 'primitive law' other than from a blinkered, ethnocentric and 
evolutionist perspective. 182 
179 Sack, 111Law" and 11 Custom" in Papua New Guinea,1 p. 250. 
180 See also P.G. Sack, "'Law" and "Custom" in Papua New Guinea: Separation, Unification or 
Co-operation?' Verfassung und Recht in Obersee, vol. 20, no. 3 (1987), p. 334. 
181 Indeed, as Peter Stein has shown, the movement away from evolutionary paradigms in 
jurisprudence was itself influenced largely by the contributions of anthropological and 
ethnographic research. See P. Stein, Legal Evolution: The Story of an Idea (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. I 04. 
182 See Zorn, 'Lawyers, Anthropologists and the Study of Law.' 
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But assuming, if only for the sake of argument, that the anthropological 
criticisms of the way in which jurisprudential scholars deal with the concept and 
phenomena of 'primitive law' are well founded, if anthropologists mean to include 
a broader, comparative consideration of the general nature and operations of 
custom within the ambit of what they would regard as a proper contemplation of 
'primitive law' (and as social scientists, they are fairly obliged to do so), then they 
still paint with far to broad and cynical a brush, in their glib dismissal of the 
treatment accorded that subject by legal scholars. For the literatures of historical 
and theoretical jurisprudence have consistently offered thoughtful and quite 
detailed discussions of the relationship between law and custom, 183 with scholars 
of comparative law in particular demonstrating a lively and growing interest that 
area of inquiry .184 Perhaps, if anthropologists were less encumbered by their own 
preconceptions and biases about the nature and development of legal thought, they 
183 See, e.g., E.K. Braybrooke, 'Custom as a Source of English Law,' Michigan Law Review, 
vol. 50 (1951), pp. 71-94; W.J. Brown, 'Customary Law in Modem England,' Columbia Law 
Review, vol. 5, no. 8 (December 1905), pp. 561-583; F.A. Greer, 'Custom in the Common Law,' 
Law Quarterly Review, vol. 9, no. 34 (Aprill893), pp. 153-170; H. Hartog, 'Pigs and Positivism,' 
Wisconsin Law Review, vol. 1985 (1985), pp. 899-935; A. Kiralfy, 'Custom in Mediaeval English 
Law,' Journal of Legal History, vol. 9, no. I (May 1988), pp. 26-39; N. Neilson, 'Custom and the 
Common Law in Kent,' Harvard Law Review, vol. 38, no. 4 (February 1925), pp. 482-498; G.W. 
Paton, A Textbook of Jurisprudence, ed. G. W. Paton and D.P. Derham (4th ed. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1972), pp. 1-44; P. Shuchman, Readings in Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1979), pp. 1-133, 755-834; T.F.T. Plucknett, A Concise History of 
the Common Law (5th ed. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1956), pp. 307-314. 
184 See, e.g., J.H. Barton, J.L. Gibbs, V.H. Li and J.H. Merryman, Law in Radically Different 
Cultures (St Paul: West Publishing Company, 1983); R. David, 'Custom,' in International 
Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984), vol. 2, pp. 97-110; R. 
David and J.E.C. Brierly, Major Legal Systems in the World Today: An Introduction to the 
Comparative Study of Law (3d ed. London: Stevens and Sons Ltd, 1985); M.A. Glendon, M. W. 
Gordon and C. Osakwe, Comparative Legal Traditions (St Paul: West Publishing Company, 
1985); J. Hall, Comparative Law and Social Theory (Louisiana State University Press, 1963); J. 
Hill, 'Comparative Law, Law Reform and Legal Theory,' Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 9, 
no. I (Spring 1989), pp. 101-113; H.-H. Jeschek, 'The Significance of Comparative Law for 
Criminal Law Reform,' Hastings International and Comparative Law Review, vol. 5 (Fall 1981 ), 
pp. 1-25; A. Watson, 'Comparative Law and Legal Change,' Cambridge Law Journal, vol. 37, no. 
2 (November 1978), pp. 313-336; K. Zweigert and H. Kotz, An Introduction to Comparative Law: 
The Framework [vol. 1], trans. T. Weir (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1977). 
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might be surprised to discover that custom has long been regarded as a dynamic 
ingredient in both the theoretical and practical expressions of Western law. '85 
As it happens, the conventional anthropological assumption that custom IS 
jurisprudentially cognisable only as a precursory source of law has never been 
universally accepted amongst legal scholars and theorists. Thus, for example, in a 
critique of Eugen Ehrlich's otherwise cogent efforts to minimise the differences 
between 'law' and other 'norms of social compulsion,' Wolfgang Friedmann 
astutely pointed out that even in 'modem state society,' custom is properly 
regarded as both a 'source' and a 'type' of law. 186 Though critical himself of 
Friedmann's disposition of the matter, Peter Sack underscores both the importance 
of recognising the analytical faux pas involved in the delimiting classification of 
custom 'as a mere source of law' and the confusion to which this assumption has 
given rise in connexion with conventionally dichotomous characterisations of the 
relationship between law and custom in Papua New Guinea. 187 
Acknowledging the relevance of discernible differences between Melanesian 
custom and Western law, Sack endorses 'the step from "source oflaw" to "type of 
'
85 Interestingly, it was a legal scholar who, in 1905, called attention to the ideological uses to 
which politicised notions of 'customary law' can be put in academic discourse, well in advance of 
the same 'discovery' by post-modern social science. Thus, W.J. Brown mused on what he called 
the 'despotism of ulterior purpose' in contemporary debates about the relationship between law and 
custom: 
Accounts of customary law have been written, less often to 
represent actualities, than to promote an ulterior purpose-to 
justify a political or constitutional policy ... to justify or deny 
the validity of judicial legislation, or to support some a priori 
theory of the nature of law in general. As a result, that which 
may have purported to be scientific has been in reality 
polemic. ['Customary Law in Modern England,' p. 562]. 
186 Friedmann, Legal Theory, p. 203. 
187 Sack, 111 Law" and "Custom" in Papua New Guinea,' p. 251. 
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law"' as 'a major improvement' in the conceptualisation of custom. 188 I agree; and 
in proposing an alternative perspective from which the relationship between law 
and custom in Papua New Guinea might be apprehended more clearly, I would go 
even further to suggest that, in Papua New Guinea, not only might custom more 
properly be understood as a type of law, but that law itself might more properly 
(and more constructively) be regarded as a species of custom. 
A. Law as Custom 
As an alternative framework within which the legal cultures, as opposed to 
distinctive iterations of the various legal systems, of Anglo-Australian and 
Melanesian society may usefully be conceptualised, the characterisation of law as 
custom is not nearly so radical as it might at first seem. As Sir Carleton Kemp 
Allen noted, it is hardly novel in a jurisprudential sense: 
Blackstone's 'general customs' and 'customs of the realm' are 
those fundamental principles in legal relationships which for 
the most part are not to be found in any express formulations, 
but are assumed to be inherent in our social arrangements. 
They are, in short, the Common Law itself. 189 
Like their Realist forebears, critically oriented legal scholars regularly 
demonstrate the truly variegated influences upon and sources of modem law. 
Anthropologically, too, as we have seen, emergent analytical formulations are 
stressing the significance of continuities between legal orders and wider cultural 
systems, thereby diminishing the theoretical importance of differentiating between 
state law and indigenous custom in so-called pre-industrial or tribal societies. 
This forthright equation of law and culture would seem logically to imply a 
188 Ibid. 
189 C.K. Allen, Law in the Making (7th ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), p. 70. 
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commensurate equation of law and custom; 190 and with particular respect to the 
contemporary legal-ethnographic critique of the relationship between law and 
custom in Papua New Guinea, anthropologists are, in fact, tending to regard the 
state itself as 'problematic and ambiguous.' At the same time, the relations of the 
indigenous constituents of traditional, stateless Melanesian society to the state 
tend to be described as effectively 'open' and negotiable. 191 
In rejecting the dichotomous premises of both the political and organic 
formulations of the relationship between law and custom in Papua New Guinea, 
however, I am not so much inclined to eliminate the state from the conceptual 
equation, as to reduce its ostensibly determinative significance to that of a single, 
albeit important, element amongst many influential factors operative within the 
processes of social organisation and normative order. More importantly, by 
focusing upon legal cultures rather than indeterminate legal systems, by stepping 
back theoretically in an effort to apprehend two jural forests and not simply a 
profusion of trees, as it were, the alternative perspective I propose reveals with a 
refreshing clarity the unifying features of Melanesian custom and Anglo-
Australian common law, enabling one to formulate a meaningful understanding of 
their inter-relations in a decidedly non-dichotomous configuration; that is to say, 
as different jural iterations within the same kind of tradition. 
As a point of departure in the analysis of the relationship between law and 
custom in Papua New Guinea today, there are distinct advantages to the adoption 
of this non-dichotomous perspective in a theoretical as well as practical sense. 
Theoretically, to regard law and custom as species of the same kind of tradition 
190 Starr and Collier, History and Power in the Study of Law, p. ll. 
191 Gordon and Meggitt, Law and Order in the New Guinea Highlands, pp. ll-12. 
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redresses the distorting imbalances implicit in the essentialistic characterisation of 
both variants of which Keesing is justly critical, and which are conceptually 
inherent in any analytical approach that assumes, a priori, that comparison must 
lead to the specification of super-ordinate differences. Thus, as Robin Horton 
argued in justifying his approach to the comparative consideration of African 
thought and Western Science: 
[A]n exhaustive exploration of features common to Western 
and traditional African thought should come before the 
enumeration of differences. By taking things in this order, we 
shall be less likely to mistake differences of idiom for 
differences of substance, and more likely to end up identifying 
those features which really do distinguish one kind of thought 
from the other.'" 
As a practical matter, insofar as the real problems generated by the inter-
relations of law and custom in Papua New Guinea are approached on the basis of 
the conviction that law and custom represent two distinct, diametrically opposed 
and mutually exclusive sets of culturally based orientations to jural organisation 
and order in society, the likelihood of reconciling those troubled relations (and 
thereby, perhaps, mitigating some of the tensions present within that historically 
troubled relationship) is effectively precluded. On the other hand, if law and 
custom are approached as variations upon a demonstrably consistent theme, 
equally demonstrable similarities and continuities are bound to become more 
apparent; although this view neither denies the existence of patent differences nor 
necessarily hinders the recognition more subtle contradictions. As a result, new 
and relatively unexplored grounds upon which appropriate institutional 
compromise, adjustment and accommodation may be based will inevitably present 
themselves, broadening the scope for genuinely structural law reform. 
192 R. Horton, African Traditional Thought and Western Science,' Africa, vol. 37, no. 
(January 1967), p. 50. 
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Scholars of comparative law are generally cautious in their recognition of the 
differences between a legal system and a legal culture. In calling attention to 
those important and determinative differences, some prefer to draw an analytical 
distinction between a legal system and a legal tradition, employing the latter term 
as a synonym for legal culture. Thus, for example, John Merryman commences 
his discussion of the civil law tradition of Western Europe and Latin America with 
the following remarks: 
The reader will observe that the term used is 'legal tradition,' 
not 'legal system.' The purpose is to distinguish between two 
quite different ideas. A legal system ... is an operating set of 
legal institutions, procedures, and rules . . . . In a world 
organized into sovereign states and organizations of states, 
there are as many legal systems as there are such states and 
organizations ... , [and] there is great diversity among them 
[legal systems], not only in their substantive rules of law, but 
also in their institutions and processes .... 
A legal tradition, as the term implies, is not a set of rules of law, although 
such rules will always be in some sense a reflection of that tradition. Rather it is: 
a set of deeply rooted, historically conditioned attitudes about 
the nature of law, about the role of law in the society and the 
polity, about the proper organization and operation of a legal 
system, and about the way law is or should be made, applied, 
studied, perfected, and taught. The legal tradition relates the 
legal system to the culture of which it is a partial expression. 
It puts the legal system into cultural perspective. 193 
Others, however, may expand the concept of a legal tradition to include 
several cultures; all of which may be related by common historical experience, but 
each of which retains its own distinctive qualities and characteristics as to 
language, race, religion and so forth. In this way, what Merryman describes as the 
'civil law tradition' might be considered only a sub-category within a larger, 
193 J.H. Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition, pp. 1-2. 
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embracing 'Western' legal tradition. 194 So, too, one may speak broadly of African, 
Asian, Melanesian and other legal 'traditions'. 
But the shared sense of traditionality by which I characterise the relationship 
between law and custom in Papua New Guinea today is not quite the same as 
either of those which inform the notions of legal tradition described above. In 
certain respects, to be sure, any configuration of legal traditions in Papua New 
Guinea must reflect the interdigitated realities of a shared experiential history of 
inter-cultural co-existence (however brief and contentious that history may have 
been), and I recognise that there is and must be a close conceptual relationship 
between what comparative legal scholars might refer to either as the (or a) 
'modem Melanesian legal tradition' or 'modem Melanesian legal culture' which 
necessarily reflects that syncretically interactive experience. The notion of legal 
tradition that I have in mind, however, is rather different to that of legal culture, 
and I would not use the terms synonymously. 
Because it is a construct that gives precedence to the threads of continuity 
which run through law and custom alike, the concept of jural tradition that I am 
advancing here is one within which the legal cultures of Western and Melanesian 
society are both embraced. The alternative perspective from which I am urging 
that the relationship between law and custom in Papua New Guinea ought to be 
reconsidered is formulated along the lines of a general theory of tradition, albeit 
with particular jural applications, rather than a parochial theory of law or custom 
as such. 
194 See, e.g., Bennan, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition, pp. 
l-10; Glendon, Gordon and Osakwe, Comparative Legal Tradllions, pp. 14-31. 
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Law, says Martin Krygier, 'is a profoundly traditional social practice, and it 
must be': 195 
That is to say, not only do particular legal systems embody 
traditions, which of course no one would deny; tradition is 
central to the operation of every legal system. To understand 
much that is most characteristic of the nature and behaviour of 
law, it is not enough to analyse it in terms of one or even 
several of the 'time-free' staples of modem jurisprudence. One 
needs to explore and understand the nature and behaviour of 
traditions in sociallife. 196 
But the very same observations can be, and frequently are, made in respect of 
custom as well; hence the interchangeability of the terms 'custom' or (polemics 
notwithstanding) 'customary law' and 'traditional law'. This is the gravamen of the 
argument I present here in support of an alternative perspective on the nature and 
relationship of law and custom in Papua New Guinea. 
According to Krygier's formulation, the concept of tradition itself involves 
three essential characteristics, each of which can be shown to apply appositely, not 
just to the common law (as Krygier has done with impressive cogency), but to the 
jural custom (or, again, the 'customary law') of Papua New Guinea. Firstly, then, 
there is what Krygier describes as the pastness of tradition: the notion that the 
content of a tradition has, or is believed to have, originated some time in the past. 
Thus, he argues, 'the legal past is central to the legal present' in all legal 
cultures:197 
Like all complex traditions, law records and preserves a 
composite of (frequently inconsistent) beliefs, opinions, 
values, decisions, myths, rituals, deposited over generations. 
The stuff of legal doctrine ... has been proclaimed, applied, 
195 Krygier, 'Law as Tradition,' p. 180. 
196 Ibid. 
197 Ibid., p. 181. 
recorded, and passed down, by officials specifically entrusted 
with these functions. 198 
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In Western (and W esternised) society, it is the state that authorises and 
delegates the specific and specialised tasks of recording, reproducing and 
disseminating the 'stuff of the law; and as we have seen, it is the tangibly 
memorialised nature of Western law that supposedly sets it apart so distinctively 
from custom. But anthropologists themselves are quick to observe that, amongst 
traditional Melanesian societies, a given customary practice is inevitably with 
imbued with this same sense of pastness. Moreover, it is not at all unusual for 
particular individuals within a group or a community to be recognised, by 
common consensus, as especially knowledgeable in the 'old ways', they ways in 
which this or that 'has always been done' (even if the idea or institution is a 
relatively recent innovation), and it is frequently to these individuals that other 
members of the community turn for a gloss on the relevant custom. At this level, 
therefore, the outstanding differences between Western and Melanesian 
evocations of the pastness of law and custom (between a written and an oral 
tradition, between state as opposed to a popular designation of recognised 
authority) become really rather more differences of idiom than of substance.199 
Much in this portrayal of the traditional pastness of the law pointedly refutes 
the stereotypical model of law upon which conventionally dichotomous 
formulations of the relationship between law and custom necessarily rely, and 
Krygier's more accurate characterisation of the eminently traditional nature of law 
resonates exceptionally well with the ostensibly distinctive traditionality of 
198 Ibid. 
199 
'Even if legal systems did not institutionalise the recording, preservation and transmission 
of so much of the legal past,' Krygier notes, 'residues of this past would still mould what can be 
done, indeed thought, in the present' ['Law as Tradition,' p. 181]. Again, the application of these 
observations about Western Law to Melanesian custom is readily apparent. 
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custom. Many of the fundamental qualities ascribed to the pastness of law (and 
essential to the tenability of a dichotomous representation of its relationship with 
custom) are revealed as illusory. Consistency, coherence, univocality, even the 
fixed centrality of rules are all likely to be invoked in what Krygier correctly 
points out to be a largely symbolic and often exaggerated elevation of 'the power 
of the past over the present.'200 
Within the operation of jural tradition, however-Western or Melanesian-
the significance of symbolic invocations of pastness should not be underestimated. 
In judging cases at common law or in managing village disputes, reference to the 
past, in fact or hypothetically, plays an important part. Thus, in law: 
a judicial decision is one which is justified publicly by 
reference to authorised institutional tradition. In those hard 
cases that lawyers and legal theorists so enjoy to contemplate, 
the need publicly to justify one's decision in terms of the legal 
past remains important, long after the rules have run out.201 
And so, too, with Melanesian custom. 202 
Secondly, legal traditions entertain what Krygier calls authoritative or 
normative presence. 203 Thus, although derived from a real or imagined past, a 
traditional practice, belief or more complex set of attitudes and general 
orientations have not, as it were, remained in the past; for traditionality consists in 
its present authority and significance for the lives, thoughts and activities of 
participants in the tradition. Of course, not every jural idea or event that is past 
200 Ibid. 
201 Ibid., p. 182. 
202 See P.G. Sack, 'Coming to Grips with Melanesian Law: Tolai Ethnography from a Legal 
Perspective' (unpublished paper. 1990) 
203 Krygier, 'Law as Tradition,' p. 182. 
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enters into tradition. Indeed, much of it 'simply disappears without a trace, or 
leaves traces which survive without present consequences for anyone.' By the 
same token, 'not everything from the past which has consequences in the present . 
. . enters a tradition linking the past with the present.'204 
Moreover, the authoritative presence of the past in jural traditions may pass 
effectively unnoticed even by those participating in the tradition. As Krygier 
suggests, 
the past is often most powerfully and persuasively present 
when it is not known either to be past or present. It is simply 
'obvious' or 'natural', an unremarked piece of the furniture of 
the world."" 
In this sense, an understanding of one's own legal culture may be held quite 
unconsciously, and Krygier employs the analogy of language to illustrate the 
point. Likening the intuitive way in which a person 'knows' his or her own legal 
culture to that of one's knowledge of the granunar of his or her native language, he 
reminds us that, 
law is a language and it is not only lawyers who speak it. We 
all do, and even the least legally expert of us arrange and 
transact some of the most and least significant of our everyday 
affairs in terms of our understanding of it.206 
Interestingly, Peter Sack uses the same analogy to language in connexion with 
his discussion of the unselfconscious way in which the Tolai of East New Britain 
speak of their law as 'the way we do things.' Intuitively (although this intuition, of 
course, is a product of acculturating and historical experience), Tolai know when a 
204 Ibid. 
205 Ibid., p. 183. 
206 Ibid. 
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grammatical utterance is correct because it 'sounds' or 'feels' right; and so it is, too, 
with a sense of a legal culture.207 
Thirdly, a tradition is not merely the past made present. It must have been-
or be thought to have been-passed down over time, deliberately or otherwise. 
'Traditions,' Krygier writes, depend on real or alleged continuities between past 
and present'; and whilst these continuities may be formalised, as they are in 
Western (or Westernised) societies, it is not necessary that they be so.208 
Whatever the mode of transmission used in a particular tradition will affect 
directly and profoundly what passes from generation to generation, what is added, 
what subtracted, and how the transmitted past enters and is received into the 
present?09 
Naturally, in both Western and Melanesian societies, the content of a jural 
tradition can, and invariably will, be altered in the process of transmission. But 
change in law and custom alike is an aspect of their shared traditionality, and is in 
no way inimical to either. In fact, as Krygier observes, 'the very traditionality of 
law ensures that it must change':210 
For although interpreters might police the present to see that it 
does not stray too far from their interpretation of the past, it is 
impossible for traditions to survive unchanged . . . . The 
changes thus made are then incorporated into the tradition and 
come to be interpreted in traditional ways.'" 
207 Sack, 'Coming to Grips with Melanesian Law,' p. 12. With respect to the traditional law of 
the Tolai, Sack stresses the decidedly 'non-normative' context in which such expressions tend to be 
offered. But the authoritative presence of a legal tradition need not be normative in every case. 
20& Krygier, 'Law as Tradition/ p. 185. 
209 Ibid. 
210 Ibid. 
211 Ibid., pp. 185-186. 
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Viewed in this way, law and custom can be seen as essentially the same kind 
of traditional jural form. The distinctive features of both legal orders, whence 
derive the dichotomous opposition of the respective jural systems and the false 
dichotomisation of the two legal cultures, proportionately dissolve, whilst the 
patent resemblances and continuities that link law and custom together effectively 
eclipse what, from this perspective, begin to look more and more like mere 
superficialities at the processual, institutional and substantive levels. 
At this point, I should probably do well to reiterate that in adapting Krygier's 
formulation of 'law as tradition' to the gravamen of this chapter I am not 
advocating a simple (and arguably simplistic) theory of law and custom, 
collapsing two demonstrably different concepts and groups of phenomena into a 
single analytical category. Rather, what I am proposing is only an alternative 
perspective, from which the conceded differences between law and custom are not 
assumed, a priori, to subsume and negate those equally significant features which, 
in a very fundamental sense, form the bases upon which they may be seen to share 
a great deal more in common with one another; far more in common, at all events, 
than conventionally dichotomous models of the relationship between law and 
custom suggest or allow for. This perspective, I believe, provides a new and 
demonstrably more appropriate point of departure from which the debate about 
law and custom in Papua New Guinea today might proceed more productively and 
more constructively. 
B. Custom as Law 
In urging the reconceptualisation of law as custom--or rather, in suggesting 
that law and custom, as different iterations within the same traditional framework 
of jural experience and understanding, might properly be regarded as more similar 
than dissimilar to one another-[ have been advancing an essentially theoretical 
.f92 
argument. The cogency of that argument, however, is enhanced by a supportively 
practical complement, demonstrating that, in Papua New Guinea, custom is (or 
again, can properly be regarded as) law. In denying this proposition, political and 
organic formulations of the dichotomous relationship between law and custom 
have shown much confusion. In the case of political and politicised formulations, 
I think this confusion may simply reflect the tendentious nature of any polemical 
consideration; in the case of organic or ethnological formulations, I suspect it is 
the result of misunderstanding. 
If, however, the organic formulation of the relationship between law and 
custom in Papua New Guinea can be shown to be analytically wanting-and I 
would hope to have gone some way in showing that it is-then countering the 
political formulation of that relationship becomes a more comprehensible, if by no 
means simple, task. For there is a great difference between what cannot be 
effected because it is intrinsically impossible to do so, and what has not been 
achieved because of an absence or failure of political will. And whilst a 
reformulated theoretical perspective may facilitate the process whereby law might 
be made into custom, in Papua New Guinea today, it is the Parliament and the 
courts which must make custom into law. Moreover, although I oversimplifY a 
complex and convoluted political situation in saying so, the fact remains that the 
mandate and the means for that latter transformation do exist. 
This is not the place to engage in an extended consideration of the provisions 
of Papua New Guinea's constitution which deal quite explicitly with the adoption 
and integration of law and custom.zu Nevertheless, it is accurate to say that, under 
212 For such discussion, see Editorial, 'Customary Law and Statute in the Pacific: A Policy 
Framework,' Melanesian Law Journal, vol. I 0 (December 1982), pp. 6-13; M. Kapi, 'The 
Underlying Law in Papua New Guinea,' Conference Papers-Proceedings of the 9th 
Commonwealth Law Conference (Auckland: Commerce Clearing House Ltd, 1990), pp. 129-134; 
C.J. Lynch, 'The Adoption of an Underlying Law by the Constitution of Papua New Guinea,' 
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the Constitution, the law is defined to include within its intended purview the 
practices of Melanesian custom.213 Constitutionally, custom is law (albeit not the 
only law) in Papua New Guinea today. Custom, too, is defined in the 
Constitution, somewhat tautologically perhaps, but broadly enough to entertain a 
fairly wide range of formulations. 214 
This, of course, is only the beginning of a complex and controversial inquiry 
which, apart from the relevant judicial interpretations and dispositions, has been, 
and will doubtless continue to be, at the core of debate and discussion framed in 
both a political and an organic idiom. Thus far, much of the scholarly discussion 
concerning the constitutional status of law and custom in Papua New Guinea, and 
the bases upon which their reconciliation might be achieved, has moved from an 
early, somewhat idealistic optimism to a bitter cynicism (this with particular 
respect to the state's failure to undertake the expressly mandated task of 
attempting actively to integrate law and custom and to develop an appropriate, 
traditionally based underlying jurisprudence). In terms of Papua New Guinea's 
relatively short constitutional history to date, the facts of the matter speak for 
themselves, and there are good grounds for disappointment. Abject cynicism, 
however, is premature at best. Hearteningly, there have been some recent 
indications of a shift back in the direction of a more constructive optimism insofar 
Melanesian Law Journal, val. 4, no. l (1976), pp. 37-66; Narokobi, Lo Bilong Yumi Yet: Law and 
Custom in Melanesia; D. Weisbrot, 'Papua New Guinea's Indigenous Jurisprudence and the 
Legacy of Colonialism,' University of Hawaii Law Review, val. 10, no. I (1988), pp. 1-45. 
"'PNG Canst., sec. 9. 
214 PNG Canst., sch. 1.2 provides: 
'Custom' means the customs and usages of indigenous 
inhabitants of the country existing in relation to the matter in 
question at the time when and the place in relation to which 
the matter arises, regardless of whether or not the custom or 
usage has existed from time immemorial. 
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as informed commentary is concerned. 215 The constitutional basis for a purposeful 
integration of law and custom certainly remains intact.Z16 
* * * 
So long as the issues germane to the debate about the relationship between 
law and custom in Papua New Guinea are perceived as governed ultimately by the 
parameters of dichotomous formulations of radical, irreconcilable opposition, any 
approach to a resolution of that debate is bound to result in frustration and failure. 
And to the extent that conventional theoretical orientations towards law and 
custom continue to dictate the terms upon which that debate is pursued, the 
practical problems its resolution would purport to address will remain intractable. 
Thus, political (and politicised) analyses throw up organic arguments in their 
tenacious critique of the state's inability to do that which, from the political 
perspective, the state must be unwilling to do in any case; whilst organic (or 
ethnologically based) formulations persistently castigate the state for its failure (or 
refusal) to do that which, from an organic perspective, cannot be done. 
215 See Zorn, 'Making Law in Papua New Guinea'. 
216 Sir Mari Kapi, Deputy Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Papua New Guinea recently 
reiterated this, underscoring the Parliament's responsibilities under PNG Canst., sec. 21. See 'The 
Underlying Law in Papua New Guinea,' Conference Papers of the 9th Commonwealth Law 
Conference (Auckland: Commerce Clearing House, Ltd, 1990), pp. 129-134. Peter Bayne makes a 
complementary argument urging the further development of an autochthonous Melanesian 
jurisprudence, and laying emphasis upon the constitutional role of the National Judiciary in that 
process. See 'The Constitution in the Courts, 1975-1980,' in Law and Social Change in Papua New 
Guinea, ed. D. Weisbrot, A. Paliwala and A. Sawyerr (Sydney: Butterworths, 1982), pp. 219-239; 
idem, 'Judical Method and the Interpretation of Papua New Guinea's Constitution,' Federal Law 
Review, val. II (1980), pp. 121-166. 
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Without impugning its past or even its present empirical validity and 
descriptive accuracy, the conventional model of the relationship between law and 
custom in Papua New Guinea, formulated along political or organic lines and built 
upon false dichotomies derived from double standards of analysis, has become a 
self-fulfilling and damning theoretical prophecy for the future. In this, it is not so 
much wrong as wrong-headed. As a practical matter, the continued adherence to 
the protocols of this model foreordain the persistence of the pattern described in 
the preceding paragraph and, I fear, the undoing of the nation. 
The alternative perspective on law and custom suggested here, and the 
reappraisal of the relationship between law and custom implicit therein, promises 
no more-but nothing less-than an opportunity to break a decidedly counter-
productive cycle in the contemplation of jural relations in Papua New Guinea 
today. Theoretically reformulated, a unified concept of law and custom lends 
itself to the further development of a salutary jurisprudential methodology, which 
recognises the full panoply of differences and similarities in the nature and 
dynamics of law and custom. This, in turn, may provide the practical basis upon 
which the courts, Parliament, academic lawyers and the organised bar in Papua 
New Guinea might actively and purposefully take up their collective 
responsibilities to foster the development of a viable, socio-culturally appropriate 
and genuinely autochthonous Melanesian jurisprudence, and thereby begin to lay 
the necessary foundations for a uniquely Papua New Guinean contribution to the 
rich and diverse tradition of the common law. 
If we disregard the institutionalisation of certain views about 
law, the translation of certain legal theories into legal 
technologies, and their inter-dependence with human thought 
and action in other fields, the acceptance of a fundamental and 
lasting plurality of law does itself no more than rule out any 
single, coherent theory of law. General legal theory can no 
longer be concerned with discovering what law is, but must 
investigate what it can be. It can no longer confront law as a 
single phenomenon (however complex), but must see it as a 
range of possibilities. It cannot even assume that this range 
has any theoretical limits: everything is henceforth possible 
and nothing is certain.217 
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